Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Derrida Vs Aristotle | II 327 Habermas I 221 DerridaVsAristotle: no longer priority of logic over rhetoric, but vice versa. However, he does not put his projects in the history of philosophy: otherwise, he would have had to relativize the significance of his own project based on the tradition from Dante to Vico, via Hamann, Humboldt, Dilthey to Gadamer. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Derrida, J. | Habermas Vs Derrida, J. | Derrida I 95 Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle). I 196 HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity. I 211 Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script. I 213 HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below. I 214 Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority. I 233 DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding I 240 Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function. I 241 HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty) I 243 HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. Rorty II 27 HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants. II 30 Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken. II 32 Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. II 33 RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens! Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power. II 35 RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous." Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years. II 36 Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here. Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside. RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism". Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"." HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Putnam Vs Derrida, J. | III 96 ff However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!" PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction? III 97 The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty. PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance. DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether. III 163 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed. III 164 Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate". III 165 Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case. III 168 Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism. By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of the rational justification. Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything." Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified". III 171 PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists. I (a) 22 PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous. I (k) 266 Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case. I (k) 273 PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Derrida, J. | Rorty Vs Derrida, J. | III 222 Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all. Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words. Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers. IV 9 Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification. IV 118 Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause IV 119 arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy IV 120 and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses". IV 121 SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases! RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy. IV 122 RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object! IV 123 RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle. Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically. DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.). IV 126 Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language. IV 127 This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog". IV 129 RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal. IV 130 But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again. IV 129 sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra. IV 49 World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.). IV 131 Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced. IV 135 Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time. IV 136/137 RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being. IV 138 Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it? IV 139 "Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept. IV 140 Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time. RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics. IV 142 RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate. VI 475 Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.) VI 476 Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space. RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen! Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents". VI 477 RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played. Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot. VI 480 Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)! VI 500 Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Fodor, J. | Putnam Vs Fodor, J. | Pauen I 228 Meaning/VsFodor: it is not sure if Fodor has made here a sufficient condition for the emergence of meaning. Example, one could consider, according to Fodor, artificial chicken eggs as asymmetrically dependent on the production of real chicken eggs. Yet, one will not regard such eggs as a representation of chickens, although the latter represent the asymmetrical effective "causes" for the emergence of chicken eggs. --- I 229 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor/Pauen: it is also unclear whether the asymmetric dependence of references of a mental representation is necessary. E.g. Super-Billionaire: here, the meaning does not depend on the meeting with real specimens. E.g. Unicorn: can be no "original cause" of our thoughts. The relation is much more complex than it is assumed in Fodor with a quasi one to one opposition. It's about the whole language practice of our ancestors. Another problem: it has to be excluded that the original causations are from e.g. Lions children's books or television tubes. --- Putnam III 56ff Dependency/reference/Possible World/PutnamVsFodor: does the relationship really exist and is it asymmetrical? In the terminology of semantics of possible worlds this thought says that the "closest possible worlds" in which the cats do not trigger such remarks, are possible worlds, in which the word "cat" refers to something completely different (possible worlds not real worlds, but hypothetical situations). --- III 57 This would show that the dependency relationship does exist, and the law according to which the expressions of images are triggered is dependent on the law that cats trigger the expressions. But it is not enough to show that they are asymmetrical. For this, the evidence would have to be provided: if not images, then also not cats as a trigger. Fodor thinks this is obvious, but is it really? VsFodor: Would it not be reasonable to assume that the closest possible worlds, in which it is not a "law" that images are triggers, are possible worlds in which most people have no idea how cats look like at all!? If these are the closest possible worlds in which images do not trigger any, then it would be the case when images would not trigger any remarks, cats would also not trigger any, and then the dependency relationship would be symmetrical. FodorVsVs: possible answer: simply "intuitive" understanding. It could be about worlds in which people are blind. --- III 58 VsFodor: but this does not seem reasonable. He could better say that the signs would sometimes be triggered. Then it could be objected that the thesis is too weak. One would probably say that the sentence could be true, but it is not "law-like". "Law-like"/Fodor: is an undefined basic concept in Fodors metaphysics. Not a property of sentences, but a relationship between universals. In this way, he fends off the objection by the use of this term, an already intentional concept is introduced. (Putnam: is probably intentional). --- III 59 Fodor: even if the ordinary people there would have no idea, how cats look like, there would certainly be biologists and other specialists who would still know how cats look like. PutnamVs: at least for natural kinds it does not necessarily follow that it is possible for the theory to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of reference. The theory even fails completely when it comes to extensions by an analytical definition of necessary and sufficient conditions. --- III 60 E.g. "Super-billionaire" persons whose property is at least 100 billion Mark. It could be that there is not a single example of the triggering of such statements. Fodor could say, the characters would be triggered when the people would know about all the relevant facts. But what actually a relevant fact is, depends on the meaning of each considered word. The word is already interpreted. Omniscience is not only a non-real fact, but an impossible. FodorVsVs: could say that his theory does not apply to words that have analytical definitions. --- III 61 But especially Fodor's theory is anti-hermeneutic, he disputes the view that the reference of a word cannot be determined in isolation. Hermeneutics/PutnamVsFodor: according to the hermeneutic view, there can be no such thing as necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x. The best we can hope for are the adequacy criteria of translation schemes. (FodorVs). FodorVsVs: in his view, this leads to the "meaning-holism" which, in turn, results in the "meaning-nihilism" and thus the denial of the possibility of a "special science" of linguistics. --- III 62 FodorVsVs: might reply, actually the theory should not apply to natural languages, but to his hypothetical innate thinking language "mentalese". PutnamVsFodor: definitely, Fodor's theory fails for other words: E.g. witch. Perhaps it is analytic that real witches possess magical powers and are women. But no necessary and sufficient conditions for witch. There are also good witches. --- III 63 A witch-law (see above) would be wrong. Indeed, there are no witches that can trigger remarks. --- III 67 ff Cause/causality/PutnamVsFodor: uses the concept of causation very informal. --- III 68 Putnam: the normal linguistic concept of cause is context-bound and interest-dependent. The concept of causality used by Fodor is not the relatively more context-independent concept of a contributing cause, but the context-sensitive and interest-relative concept of everyday language. According to Fodor the presence of a cat is then a contributing cause for remarks. --- III 69 PutnamVsFodor: now, then past behavior of past generations is (not to mention representatives of strong dialects) also a contributing factor. --- III 70 FodorVsPutnam: that is certainly not Fodor's causality. All his examples just want to take the colloquial term as an undefined basic concept as a basis. PutnamVsFodor: the strange thing is that this is interest-relative. How do we use it, depends on what alternatives we consider for all relevants. (Intentionality). --- III 71 Counterfactual conditionals/KoKo/Fodor: assumes, they had established truth values. PutnamVsFodor: counterfactual conditionals have no fixed truth values. --- III 73 Possible Worlds/Putnam: we can then call "closer" worlds the ones which we believe are more relevant when it comes to determining the truth value of the conditional clause. --- III 74 FodorVs: might reply that this physics would be given a special position compared to the specialized sciences. PutnamVsFodor: one might then reply, the laws of the special sciences are just as unproblematic as those of physics. FodorVsVs: but that does not really work: E.g. "coffee, sugar cubes": it could mean that this piece of sugar is somehow "not normal." --- III 78 Reductionism/PutnamVsFodor: Fodor fails in the scaling-down, because he fails to define the reference using these terms (law, counterfactual conditionals and causality). --- III 79/80 PutnamVsFodor: from the fact that a statement does not specifically deal with something mental, it does not follow that no requirement of this statement refers to our cognitive interests. Causality/Putnam: the concept of causality has a cognitive dimension, even if it is used on inanimate objects. --- Putnam I (k) 269 Meaning/PutnamVsFodor: actually makes the same mistake as Saussure and Derrida: that equality of meaning is, strictly speaking, only reasonable in the impossible case in which two languages or texts are isomorphic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Habermas, J. | Derrida Vs Habermas, J. | I 32 VsHabermas: he fails to recognize that Derrida no longer interprets the language in the light of the theory of signs. He does not understand writing as signs. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Heidegger, M. | Derrida Vs Heidegger, M. | I 29 DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time. I 43 DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless. I 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming". Rorty III 202 Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name". III 203 Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power) III 207 DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games". III 208 Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors. Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being". III 213 Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story! Rorty IV 124 DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being". IV 125 Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. IV 137 Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Husserl, E. | Derrida Vs Husserl, E. | I 31 Spoken word (parole)/Derrida/Metaphysics: the spoken word is to be assigned to metaphysical thinking. DerridaVsHusserl: against ideal meaning. Husserl: he wanted to replace the psychological and coincidental moment of the "announcement" with the ideal meaning to be grasped by thinking. DerridaVsHusserl: sees a unity of idealization and voice. The ideal object is detached from any space. The voice is in time. I 32 Voice/Derrida: presence of the object as both meant and self-presence of the meaningful transcendental consciousness. This cannot be achieved through something inner-worldly, empirical. Only the voice is entitled to it. Its saying hears itself, and it leaves no trace (this is also Husserl's description of the phenomenon of the voice, which again differs from ordinary speaking!). Habermas I 205 Logocentrism/DerridaVsHusserl: Logocentrism: to assume that any subjective expression could be replaced by an objective one, unboundedness of objective reason. Phenomenology/Derrida: the metaphysical core of phenomenology is the thought of the identity of an experience certified by presence. But the model of the intention of meaning makes the temporal difference and otherness disappear, which are both constitutive for the identity of the meaning of a linguistic expression. That structure of repetition is lost, and nothing but the same can be represented. DerridaVsHusserl: he was blinded by the metaphysics that the ideality of the meaning identical with itself is only guaranteed by the living presence of the sudden, intuitively accessible actual experience in the inwardness of the purified subjectivity. Perception/Husserl: each perception is based on a structure of repetition investigated by Husserl himself, including protention and retention. DerridaVsHusserl: he has not recognized that this structure is only made possible by the symbolizing force or the representative function of the sign. Habermas I 207 Representation/Derrida: only expression and meaning taken together can represent something. And Derrida understands this as a process of temporization, as that postponement, that active absence and withholding. Habermas I 210 DerridaVsHusserl: reverses its fundamentalism: the transcendental force of origin passes from the generating subjectivity to the anonymous, historiographical productivity of writing. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Kant | Rorty Vs Kant | I 166 Synthesis/Synthesis/Kant/Rorty: an object, something that is true for multiple predicates, is always the result of synthesis. RortyVsKant: Kant's conception of cognition did not have perception as a model. Unfortunately, he still remained in a Cartesian frame of reference: he still formulated it in response to the question of how we can move from inner to the outer space. His paradoxical answer was that the outer space will constructed from the material of ideas. >Cartesianism, >dualism. I 169 Naturalism/Rorty: musing of psychologists about stimuli and responses. (This is not philosophical, because it does not look for causes.) (RortyVsKant: confuses cause and reason here). I 171 Kant/Rorty: accepted that you must not equate the individual judgment with "the individuality of a sensibly given". RortyVsKant: he would have had to proceed to conceive knowledge as a relation between persons and >propositions. Then he not would have needed the concept of synthesis. He could have considered the person as a black box. I 173 Concept/Rorty: we want to know if concepts are connectors. VsKant: the information that they cannot be if it were not for a number of synthesis waiting views, does not help us. RortyVsKant: either machinery (synthesis) and raw material (views) are noumenal or they are phenomenal. a) if the two are phenomenal, we can be aware of them (contrary to the conditions of deduction). If they are b) noumenal, we cannot know anything about them, not even the statements of deduction! I 174 Copernican Revolution/RortyVsKant: it is no longer attractive for us. Because the statement that knowledge of necessary truths is more understandable for manufactured than for found objects depends on the Cartesian assumption that we have privileged access to our activity of making. IV 117 Comprehensibility/Noumenon/Thing in Itself/Kant/RortyVsKant/Rorty: with him the concept of noumenon becomes incomprehensible in that he says, an expression is meaningful if it stands for a spiritual content which forms the synthesis of sensual perceptions through a concept. ((s) through the synthesis of the sensible to the spiritual). VI 256 Ethics/Morality/RortyVsKant: it will never be possible to justify his good suggestion for secularization of the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man with neutral criteria. VI 257 This is not because they are not reasonable enough, but because we live in a world in which it would simply be too risky, yes often insanely dangerous, to grasp the sense of the moral community to the point that it goes beyond the own family or tribe. It is useless to say by Kant "recognize the brother in the other": the people we are trying to convince will not understand. They would feel offended if we asked them to treat someone with whom they are not related like a brother or to treat an unbeliever like a believer. VI 263 Def "Supernaturalism"/Santayana: the confusion of ideals and power. RortyVsKant: that is the only reason behind Kant's thesis that it is not only more friendly but also more reasonable not to exclude strangers. RortyVsKant: Nietzsche is quite right in connecting Kant's insistence with resentment. VI 264 RortyVsNietzsche: he is absolutely wrong in regarding Christianity and democracy as a sign of degeneration. With Kant he has an idea of "purity" in common that Derrida calls "phallogocentrism". This also applies to Sartre: Sartre: the perfect synthesis of In itself and For itself can only succeed if we free ourselves from the slimy, sticky, humid, sentimental, effeminate. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Lévi-Strauss | Derrida Vs Lévi-Strauss | I 35 Levi-Strauss/Derrida: is a rousseauist thinker. I 36 DerridaVsLevi-Strauss, VsRousseau: reveals ethnocentrism in both. The humiliation of indigenous people is reversed by praising the beauty, harmony and innocence of their culture. DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: e.g. the chief learns writing: the chief understands the function of the control, which is connected with the writing ability, very fast, before he has grasped the meaning of the characters. He pretends to write and read. Thus the chief gains - temporarily - prestige and power. Later he is disempowered and left alone as one who has abandoned the common foundations of tribal culture. This story not only shows the connection between writing and dominion, but also that from the anthropologist's retrospective reflection the difference between cultures that know writing and those that do not is contradictory in itself! DerridaVsLevi-Strauss: rejects this distinction and presupposes writing for all cultures. Some voices have a word for writing: "make signs" although they do not master them. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Rorty, R. | Searle Vs Rorty, R. | Rorty VI 92 SearleVsRorty/Rorty: Searle considers relativism, which he attributes to Rorty, as a threat to the freedom and sovereignty of the American universities. Rorty VI 105 World/knowledge/language/human being/reality/SearleVsRorty: Rorty seems to deny that there were mountains before there were people or before the word "mountain" appeared in the language. RortyVsVs: that is not disputed by anyone. No one believes that there is a causal chain that ensures that mountains become an effect of thoughts or words. In fact, we believe (Kuhn, Derrida, Rorty): that it is pointless to ask whether there really are mountains, or whether it is only appropriate to talk about mountains. Rorty VI 110 SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to convince all concerned parties that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding for those that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty). Rorty VI 117 SearleVsRorty: There is a "general atmosphere of vague literary frivolity of which the Nietzschian Left is penetrated." Searle I 168 Incorrigibility: it is often said, we could not be mistaken about the contents of our mind. This is the authority of the 1st person. It has even been argued this incorrigibility was a sure sign that we are dealing with something mental (Rorty). SearleVsRorty: e.g. Sally might discover later that she was simply mistaken when she thought she loved Jimmy. I 169 By this it only follows that the standard model of error, models whose basis are the distinction between appearance and reality, do not work with the existence or characterization of mental states. We all know from personal experience, how often it occurs that we can judge somebody else better than the person can judge him- or herself, if we are for example really jealous or angry, or whether we just seem very generous. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU 1953): the bold attempt to tackle the idea of my statement, drafted in the 1st person, on intellectuals were after all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and that the question after any authority was not asked at all. When I cry out in pain, then it raises no question of my authority. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Saussure, F. de | Putnam Vs Saussure, F. de | Putnam III 162 Saussure assumed that the idea of a system of differences should be transferred as a whole by the individual elements to the language . (to semantics). But in fact it is so that different languages do not have the same semantic opposites available. A language might only have four basic colors, another 7. Such a way out leads quite quickly to the conclusion that meanings are reserved to specific individual languages. And from here it is not far to the thought that they are reserved for different "texts". According to this thesis two languages never express the same meanings. So even the concept of the meaning that can release itself from the sign, collapses. DerridaVsSaussure: is that good, he criticized Saussure only that he did not go further, and that he dropped the concept of the sign completely. --- I (k) 276 Definition signifié/Putnam: this signified is in the French semiology the meaning of the signified, the intension, not the extension. --- I (k) 266/269 PutnamVsSaussure: the alternative to his view is to maintain the concept of "meaning equality", while one recognizes that it must not be interpreted as the self-identity of objects, which are called "meaning" or "signified". There is no question of a mathematically clean equivalence or non-equivalence of contrast systems, when two uses of a word can be seen as "same" or "not the same". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Various Authors | Rorty Vs Various Authors | V 84 Englightenment/Rorty: religion, myth and tradition can be brought into contrast to an ahistorical Something that is common to all men. GadamerVsEnlightenment/HeideggerVsEnlightenment/Rorty: man himself is historical through and through. >Enlightenment. IV 143 RortyVsSearle/RortyVsCuller: (like Derrida): both consider textbook distinctions to be terribly important. We should return to the ironic skepticism of the Phenomenology of Spirit. III 180 RortyVsMann, Thomas: "Dr. Faustus" only frilly generality. VI 364 "Significance"/"Meaning"/Stag/Terminology/Rorty: differentiation by E. D. Hirsch: Def significance/Hirsch: position of a text in a different context. Def "Meaning"/Hirsch: what is in line with the intentions of the author at the time of writing the text. RortyVsHirsch But nothing depends on that. Rorty: It's always about putting a statement into a context! We can go about it as anachronistically as we want as long as we are aware of it. Truth/Interpretation/Rorty: the determination of the truth depends on that one puts this statement into the context of the allegations that we would be prepared to establish ourselves. Truth and meaning cannot be determined independently. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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