Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Evans | McDowell I 85 Belief/EvansVsMcDowell: beliefs should be understood more demanding (than McDowell thinks), namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they are always explicitly created in an active process of opinion formation. Beliefs are dispositions to the judgments and verdicts - an act of spontaneity. Cf. >Beliefs/McDowell. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Coherence Theory | McDowell | I 172 Definition "unforced coherence theory/McDowell: the thesis that the exercise of spontaneity has no external constraints - it can be controlled in a rational way by the facts if the facts manifest themselves in the experience. This is a control from outside of thought, not from outside of the thinkable. >Spontaneity, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell. DavidsonVs: spontaneity is not subject to any external rational conditions. McDowellVsDavidson: so his coherence theory is without control. I 49 McDowellVsCoherence theory: it threatens to seperate idea and reality. Cf. >Coherence. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Colour | McDowell | I 82 f Colors/McDowell: If the recognition of shades of color is conceptual, then we probably do not have the concepts before the color experience, but if we have the concept of a shade of color, then our conceptual potential is sufficient to capture our color experience in all its detail. >Recognition. I 83 Why should recognition not be conceptual? Fine graininess: here, the demonstrative expressions certainly play a special role. But why should they be less rationally integrated into spontaneity? (>pointing, >ostension). I 202 Ability to distinguish: in connection with shades of color it is a permanent ability of the subject. The experience gives this potential relevance. >Distinction. Color/Wittgenstein: there are no "stored classifications". No psychological machinery. >Color/Wittgenstein. I 203 Color/McDowell: our ability to apply the concept of shade is not based on a comparison with a stored pattern. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Concepts | McDowell | I 33f Concepts/McDowell: are used in receptivity. Concept/McDowell: something that lies beyond the reach of spontaneity of naming "a concept" and then calling the relationship "rational", is fraudulent labelling. >Spontaneity. I 59 Concept/McDowell: we must not imagine the world to be "behind the outer border of the conceptual realm". Otherwise Davidson would be right, of course, there would be nothing but purely causal effects of the world on us. But there is no such border. We can say this now without becoming idealists because of it or disregarding the independence of reality. >Myth of the given, >Reality. I 86 Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue: When someone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. >Experience/McDowell, >Judgment/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Content | McDowell | I 27 Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content - Content/Kant: Thoughts without content are empty - Concept/Kant: views without concepts are blind. I 157 ff Content/McDowell: there is a non-conceptual representational content (whether we agree with it or not). >Representation/McDowell. I 34 Content/McDowell: is not something that you put together yourself. The conceptual skills were already at work before you have a choice. >Spontaneity/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell. Content/Meaning/Quine/McDowell: therefore, "empirical meaning" is not the same as content. If you call content an attitude about how things of the empirical world are. (Quine: "conceptual sovereignty"). Content/Quine: Result of the freely acting spontaneity that is not controlled by the material of receptivity. --- Rorty VI 216 "Content"/McDowell/Rorty: the review of certain words proves that they have no empirical content: E.g. "witch", "phlogiston", "boche" (a French expression for German). These are pseudo-concepts. The more we learn about the world, the greater is the number of our real concepts. >Concept/McDowell, cf. >Conservativity. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ethics | McDowell | I 122/23 Ethics/morals/Bernard Williams: "morality system": distortion of ethics: the impression that we are really responsible only for the exercise of a wholly unconditional freedom. Therefore, Kant believed that true spontaneity must be completely unrestricted. However, within the experience we have to do with a limited freedom. >Spontaneity, >Experience/McDowell, >Freedom, >Morals. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Experience | Evans | McDowell I 73 Experience/Evans: experience is not conceptual. But it has representative content. McDowellVsEvans: experience is conceptual. Definition experience/Evans: a state of an information system is only an experience if it is the input of a thinking, conceptual and logically information system. >Information system/Evans. E.g. animals probably have a feeling for pain, but no a concept of pain. Pain/McDowell: pain is not conceptual, it is inner experience. Experience/McDowell/Evans: in both of us the experience in the Kantian sense is limited, by the connection to the spontaneity (conceptuality). Experience/Evans: although it is not conceptually in Evans (and therefore, according to Kant, it must be blind), he wants to protect it by asserting a "content". That is, an objective property of reality must be present to the subject. Namely, as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: without concepts, that does not make any sense. Evans: on the other hand, he makes the demand that perception objects must be supported by an "accompanying theory". McDowell: that is precisely the >spontaneity. --- McDowell I 80/81 ff Experience/Evans: its richness of detail cannot be grasped with terms! For example, there are much more color shades that can be experienced than concepts which are available for these color shades. ((s) The notion of difference is sufficient when samples are present.) McDowell I 91 EvansVsDavidson: (different horn of the dilemma): experience is probably outer conceptual, but still subject to rational control by the outside world. --- Frank I 524f Experience/Evans: experience is different from self-attribution: it is not clearly true/false. I 526 Judgment: although judgments are based on experience (non-conceptual), they are not about the state of information - the "inner state" deos not become the object. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Experience | McDowell | I 34f Experience/McDowell: is passive. Nevertheless, it brings abilities into the game, which actually belong to spontaneity. >Spontaneity. I 35 Spontaneity/McDowell: we must look at the expanded spontaneity as if it were subject to a control which originates outside of our thinking. This cannot be the "given". Given/experience/McDowell: how the experience of a person represents things is outside its influence, but it depends on it itself whether it is accepted or rejected by the appearance. >Reality, >Myth of the given. I 161 Experience/Quine: not subject to natural laws. Therefore, it cannot play any role within >justification. Only raw causal link to sentences. Can only lie outside the area of the reasons. >Space of reason. I 58 Experience/McDowell: includes much more than qualities. >Quality. I 81 McDowellVsEvans: E.g. Colors: Fine-grained: we should not always assume that there must be a matching pattern. There must also be recognition in the game. >Color, >Qualia, >Recognition. Thinking: there are surely thoughts that cannot be put into words so that their contents are completely determined. I 147 Definition "inner" experience: sense sensations and emotional states. (Only applies to humans). Cf. >Sensory impressions/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Justification | McDowell | I 18 Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations. A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions. This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative". I 31 Justification/Judgment/McDowell: the relations through which judgments are justified can only be understood as relations in the space of concepts (reasons). It is one thing to be free from guilt, and another to have a justification. Free from guilt: the raw influence of causality (the effect of the world on our senses) withdraws itself from the control of spontaneity. It is an excuse for someone if he was driven by a tornado to a place where he did not have anything to look for. But what we want is: that the exercise of spontaneity is subject to a control exercised by the world itself, but so that the applicability of spontaneity is not undermined (by no longer being the cause of excuse). >Spontaneity. Justification/McDowell: every concept which is now constituted by the fact that it consists in a justification relation to a merely present must be a purely private concept. I 161 Justification/Quine: cannot be done through experience. Only by events which are subject to natural laws. McDowellVsQuine: Contradiction: If experience is not within the order of justification, it cannot be exceeded by world views. This, however, requires "conceptual sovereignty." >Conceptual sovereignty. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Limits | McDowell | I 51 World/reality/thought/McDowell: the world does not depend on our thinking, but it is also not beyond the boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. >World/Thinking, >Spontaneity, >Concepts/McDowell. I 54 Ostension/McDowell: that to which we finally come across is still a conceivable content, and not something that would be fundamental, a given piece. >Content/McDowell, >Given. I 64 Ostension breaks no limits. >Ostension, >Second nature/McDowell, >Pointing/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Morality | Williams | McDowell I 122/23 Ethics/Morality/Bernard Williams: (according to McDowell): The "moral system" is a distortion of ethics: it makes it appear that one is really responsible only for exercises of wholly unconditional freedom. Therefore Kant thinks that real spontaneity must be completely unrestricted. Within experience, however, we are only dealing with a limited freedom. >Spontaneity, >Experience/McDowell, >Freedom, >Morality. |
WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Naturalism | McDowell | I 18 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: refuses to acknowledge that the relationships that constitute the logical space of the reasons are not natural. >Space of reasons. I 92 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: denies that the spontaneity of the mind is sui generis. The blunt naturalism aims to place the conceptual abilities in nature, presented as the realm of natural laws. Abolition of the distinction between the space of reasons and nature. This means that what is natural is disenchanted. (Disenchantment of nature). --- I 102 Naturalism/McDowell: a different kind of naturalism than the blunt naturalism equates nature with the field of natural laws. But it is a different concept of updating our nature: We must bring the susceptibility for the meaning back into the operations of our natural sensibilities as such. This does not mean, however, that susceptibility for the meaning can be captured naturalistically (in the sense of natural laws). >Meaning/McDowell, >Understanding/McDowell, >Nature/McDowell. This looks as if we had to stand with one foot inside and with the other outside nature. This is not naturalism at all. But we must not see ourselves as divisive, the exercise of our spontaneity belongs to our way of realizing ourselves as animals. >Spontaneity/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Perception | Davidson | I (c) 40 Perception/Quine/Davidson: no final data, therefore: observation sentences, not observation. (> Observation Sentences/Quine). - See also sense data. McDowell I 167 Receptivity/Davidson/McDowell: can come only from outside the space of reasons. Therefore, nothing can be challenged in terms of their material in a rational way. McDowell I 167 Spontaneity/Davidson/McDowell: it cannot be rationally limited by something outside itself (i.e. receptivity). This is Davidson’s coherence theory. See also other authors on coherence theory. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Perception | McDowell | I 47 "Inner experience"/McDowell: we should connect it with conceptual skills in order to understand the "inner sense" in analogy with the "external sense". >Spontaneity, >Experience/McDowell. Problem: Disanalogy to animals which can certainly feel pain, without having the conceptual skills. >Animal/McDowell. I 49 ff McDowellVs "inner experience": thesis: it makes no sense to speak of it, if the world is missing it. Cf. >Introspection. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Private Language | McDowell | I 43 Private Language/Wittgenstein: Vs view that "there are simply objects that language cannot grasp at all" - "could language capture them, they were within the conceptual sphere and could thus not exercise any control". >Private language/Wittgenstein. I 43/44 Wittgenstein: (according to McDowell): with such terms it would then be a private language. (Which is not possible according to Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein's "private abstraction" of a manifold, which could then only be achieved by "private ostension", which is, according to Wittgenstein, impossible or meaningless. McDowell: with "private terms", spontaneity does not reach as far as the term. >Concept/McDowell, >Spontaneity. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Sensory Impressions | McDowell | I 14 Sensory impressions do not belong in the area of the reasons. Sensory impressions/Empiricism: not in the same space as knowledge. Sensory impressions are not in such a space in which the one is justified by the other. (Otherwise the naturalistic fallacy threatens). >Justification/McDowell, >Space of reasons, >Naturalistic fallacy. I 33 Sensory impressions/McDowell: Thesis: from the outset there is no distance between the conceptual content and the effects of reality on the sensuality. The sensory impressions already have the most basic conceptual content. >Experience/McDowell, >Concept/McDowell, >Spontaneity. I 173f Definition sensory impression/McDowell: The impact of the world on our senses. (s) So the world's achievement, not the subject's achievement. Not the impression we have, but the impression made by the world. According to Sellars/Davidson: non-conceptual. A sensory impression: the belief that an object has certain properties is due to the fact that the corresponding fact itself exerts an impression on the subject. This is the same as the impression which the object exerts. Sensory impressions/DavidsonVsMcDowell: 1. There are no facts at all. 2. Causality: only conclusions from knowledge about causal connections - causality itself does not reveal the world. >Causality, >Fact. Sensory Impressions/McDowell: are transparent according to me, Sellars and Davidson do not see it like this. Sensory Impressions/McDowell: Thesis: a harmless concept of this could be: we can assume that spontaneity is rationally controlled by the receptivity without the receptivity blocking our access. For this we must reject only the dualism of reason and nature. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Spontaneity | McDowell | external: spontaneity/Kant/Eisler: to produce faculties, ideas and categories themselves(1) (= conceptual skills). 1. R. Eisler, Kant-Lexikon, Hildesheim 1994. --- I 32 McDowell: the spontaneity must be subject to the control of the world. >Repsonsibility towards the world/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Spontaneity | Rorty | I 287 Spontaneity/receptivity/Kant/Rorty: corresponds to the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact. >Spontaneity/McDowell, >Spontaneity/Kant, >Meaning, >Facts. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | Kant Vs Davidson, D. | McDowell I 124 Spontaneity/Davidson: characterized what effectively are the operations of the sentient nature, but they are not characterized as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still in rational relations, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant maintains that this choice is unacceptable. spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must also restructure the operations of our sensibility as such. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Davidson, D. | McDowell Vs Davidson, D. | I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.) I 41 McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)). I 168 Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so. I 172 Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control. I 86 Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs). I 124 The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable. I 216 McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons. Rorty VI 205 McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible. Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson). VI 206 McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good. VI 207 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world. Rorty VI 213 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world. Rorty VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education"). To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom. Rorty VI 217 McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact). |
J. McDowell I McDowell, Geist und Welt, Frankfurt, 2001 EMD II Evans/McDowell Truth and Meaning, Oxford 1976 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Evans, G. | McDowell Vs Evans, G. | I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: but the judgment only introduces new types of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that originates from experience! Justification/McDowell: does not exist in a derivation of one content from another. A typical perceptual judgment makes a selection from a richer content, which is provided by experience. I 75 Experience/Evans: although it is non-conceptual (and therefore must be blind, according to Kant) he wants to protect it by claiming a "content." That is, the subject is to have an objective property of reality. Namely as an apparent view of the world. McDowellVsEvans: doesn't make sense without concepts. Evans: contrasts this with the demand: objects of perception must be supported by an "accompanying theory." McDowell: just that is spontaneity. spontaneity/animal/McDowell: distinguishes us from animals that have no terms. I 80/81 Experience/Evans: their richness of detail cannot be captured by concepts! Ex many more shades of color perceptible than terms available. (S) maybe the term difference suffices if samples are available. McDowellVsEvans: Ex colors: fine grain: we should not assume that there is always a proof-sample. I 86 There must also be recognition involved. Thinking: certainly, there are thoughts that cannot necessarily put into words in a way that their content would thereby be completely determined. Concept/McDowellVsEvans: the tendency to apply a concept does not come out of the blue. If anyone makes a judgment, it is wrested from him by experience. I 87 Experience/judgment/McDowell: the connection between the two is that experiences provide grounds for judgments. That is, the tendency to use concepts does not mysteriously hover independently of the situation as in Evans. I 89 McDowellVsEvans: there is no reason for a disection into factors of similarity and difference. Instead, we can say that we possess something that animals possess too, namely the sensitivity of the perception of the characteristics of our surroundings. We are different from animals only in the sense that our sensitivity is incorporated into the realm of spontaneity. I 91 Sensuality/concepts/McDowellVsEvans: Sensuality is conceptual. Without this assumption one lapses into the myth of the given if one tries to look at the rational control of empirical thinking. |
McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kant | McDowell Vs Kant | I 69 Experience/Kant/McDowell: is for Kant, as I see it, not behind a border that surrounds the sphere of the conceptual. McDowellVsKant: (I 67-69+) the talk of transcendental conditions renders the responsibility of our actions problematic. Although empirically speaking there may be justifications, transcendentally speaking we can only claim excuses! Kant/McDowell: we should not look for psychological phenomenalism in Kant. Strawson dito. McDowellVsKant: his philosophy leads to the disregard of the independence of reality. I 69 Idealism: Kant's followers claimed that one must give up the supernatural to arrive at a consistent idealism. McDowellVsBorder of the conceptual: thesis: Hegel expresses exactly that what I want: "I'm thinking I am free because I am not in an Other. I 109/110 Second Nature/(s): internalized background of norms that have been taken from nature. Second Nature/McDowell: they cannot hover freely above the opportunities that belong to the normal human body. > Education/McDowell. I 111 Rationality/Kant: acting freely in its own sphere. ((S) This is the origin of most problems covered here). McDowell: Thesis: we must reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject and object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. I 122 Reality/Kant: attributes spirit of independence to the empirical world. I 123 McDowellVsKant: thinks that the interests of religion and morality can be protected by recognizing the supernatural. Nature/Kant: equal to the realm of natural laws. He does not know the concept of second nature, although well aware of the concept of education. But not as a background. I 126 Spontaneity/KantVsDavidson: it must structure the operations of our sensuality as such. McDowellVsKant: however, for him there remains only the resort to a transcendental realm. I 127 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). McDowellVsKant: it is not satisfactory, if the self-consciousness is only the continuity of a face. |
McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Kant | Williams, B. Vs Kant | McDowell I 122/123 Ethics / morality / Bernard Williams: "moral system": Distortion of ethics: the impression as if you are responsible only for the exercise of an entirely unconditional freedom. Therefore, Kant believes that genuine spontaneity must be completely unrestricted. Within the experience but we have to do only with a limited freedom! |
McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| McDowell, J. | Evans Vs McDowell, J. | McDowell I 85 Judgment / Evans: thinks that intuition and concept must be divided among experience and judgment. (McDowellVs). Information System / Evans: its states are independent of beliefs. Beliefs cannot explain the contents of a perceptual experience, because it could be that you have no beliefs with an appropriate content! Belief / EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood in a more demanding way, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they always explicitly arise in an active opinion-forming process. Beliefs are dispositions to judgments and judging is an act of spontaneity. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| McDowell, J. | Verschiedene Vs McDowell, J. | I 64 VsMcDowell: some accuse me of anthropocentrism: a groundless confidence that the world is completely within the reach of our thinking. I 65 McDowell: there is no guarantee for this and the ability of spontaneity brings with it the obligation to constantly reflect on the evidence that guides the active activity at all times. I 209 VsMcDowell: danger of idealism: idealistic prevailing mood of elimination of the outer border. This deprives us of a possibility that we should not renounce: the possibility of direct contact between the mental and the objects! I 210 If one accepts the world as everything that is the case, then one subordinates the world to the realm of the Fregean sense ("realm of the conceivable"). Then there are not episodes and acts of thought, but identity. Facts in this sense are thoughts, the thinkable that is the case. McDowellVs: but objects do not belong to the realm of the thinkable (Fregean Sense) but to the realm of the reference to objects. (Fregean meaning) VsMcDowell: the objection is now that Wittgenstein's "commonplace" (see above) aligns the mind with the realm of meaning, but not with the realm of object reference (meaning). VsMcDowell: then we need some kind of theory of description. Theory of Description/Russell/McDowell: indirect reference to the world. |
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| Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I (c) 41 Quine connects meaning and content with the firing of sensory nerves (compromise proposal) This makes his epistemology naturalistic. - DavidsonVsQuine: Quine should drop this (keep naturalism) but what remains of empiricism after deducting the first two dogmas. - DavidsonVsQuine: names: "Third Dogma" (> Quine, Theories and Things, Answer) dualism of scheme and content. Davidson: Scheme: Language including the ontology and world theory contained in it; I 42 - Content: the morphological firing of the neurons. Argument: something like the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make the concept relativism comprehensible. In Quine neurological replacement for sensory data as the basis for concept relativism. Davidson: Quine separation of scheme and content, however, becomes clear at one point: (Word and Object). Quine: "... by subtracting these indications from the worldview of people, we get the difference of what he contributes to this worldview. This difference highlights the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of the human, the area where he can revise his theories without changing anything in the data." (Word and Object, beginning) I 43 - Referring to QuineVsStroud: "everything could be different": we would not notice... -DavidsonVsQuine: Is that even right? According to the proximal theory, it could be assumed: one sees a rabbit, someone else sees a warthog and both say: Gavagai! (Something similar could occur with blind, deaf, bats or even with low-level astigmatism. The brains in the tank may be wrong even to the extent that Stroud feared. But everyone has a theory that preserves the structure of their sensations. I (c) 55 So it is easy to understand Cresswell when he says CreswellVsQuine: he has an empire of reified experiences or phenomena which confronts an inscrutable reality. QuineVsCresswell> Quine III) - I (c) 64 DavidsonVsQuine: he should openly advocate the distal theory and recognize the active role of the interpreter. The speaker must then refer to the causes in the world that both speak and which are obvious for both sides. I (d) 66 DavidsonVsQuine: His attempt is based on the first person, and thus Cartesian. Nor do I think we could do without some at least tacitly agreed standards. ProQuine: his courageous access to epistemology presented in the third person. I (e) 93 Quine: ontology only physical objects and classes - action not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action: event and reference object. Explicating this ontology is a matter of semantics. Which entities must we assume in order to understand a natural language? McDowell I 165 McDowell: World/Thinking/Davidson: (according to McDowell): general enemy to the question of how we come into contact with the empirical world. There is no mystery at all. No interaction of spontaneity and receptivity. (DavidsonVsQuine) Scheme/Content/Davidson: (Third Dogma): Scheme: Language in Quine - Content: "empirical meaning" in Quine. (I 165) Conceptual sovereignty/Quine: can go as far as giving rise to incommensurable worldviews. DavidsonVsQuine: experience cannot form a basis of knowledge beyond our opinions. It would otherwise have to be simultaneously inside and outside the space of reason. Fodor/Lepore IV 225 Note 13.> IV 72 Radical Inerpretation/RI/Quine: his version is a first step to show that the concept of linguistic meaning is not scientifically useful and that there is a "large range" in which the application can be varied without empirical limitation. (W + O, p. 26> conceptual sovereignty). DavidsonVsQuine: in contrast to this: RI is a basis for denying that it would make sense to claim that individuals or cultures had different conceptual schemes. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Sellars Vs Quine, W.V.O. | McDowell I 168 Sensations/Sellars: are distinguished from pieces of what is given. No direct relationship to knowledge. Active receptivity. But receptivity cannot interact in a rational way with spontaneity. (VsQuine). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Coherence | McDowell, J. | I 172 Def "unforced coherence theory" / McDowell: the thesis that the exercise of spontaneity have no external restrictions - Davidson per - McDowellVs |
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| Spontaneity | McDowell, J. | I 86 Spontaneity / McDowell: the skills that belong to it, are already effective in receptivity. These skills so do not refer to something that is independent of them, and they get delivered by the receptivity. spontaneity: corresponds to truths of reason receptivity; corresponds to truths of fact. |
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