Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Hempel. Vs Carnap, R. | II 139 Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement. Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements. E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1) (S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x) wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above). Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T. The method may be too strict. S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic). Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic. II 140 HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x)) wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1. Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates: (O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)). We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic. Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand. II 141 Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context. |
|
| Kripke, S. A. | Anscombe Vs Kripke, S. A. | Frank I 84 I/Descartes: not a kind of body. I could assume that I don’t have a body. I/Augustine: "the mind knows of itself, that it is thinking." "It knows its own substance." Kripke/Anscombe: K. tried to rehabilitate Descartes’ argument for his dualism. AnscombeVsKripke: he neglects his first person character by making it an argument for the non-identity of Descartes with his own body. I 85 According to this, Descartes would have had to doubt the existence of Descartes as a human being, and in any case the existence of this figure in the world of his time, of this Frenchman, christened René... Descartes/AnscombeVsKripke: "I am not Descartes" was for him like "I’m not a body!" Forcing the argument into the third person perspective by replacing "I" with "Descartes" means to neglect this. Descartes never thought, "Descartes is not Descartes" (which according to Anscombe is ascribed to him by Kripke). I 85/86 AnscombeVsKripke: this discussion is not about the usual reflexive pronoun, but about a strange reflexive which must be explained from the standpoint of the "I". Grammarians call it the "indirect reflexive". (In Greek it is a separate form.) E.g. "When John Smith spoke of James Robinson, he spoke of his brother, but he did not know that." So it is conceivable that someone does not know that the object of which he speaks is himself. Now, if "I" is compatible with ignorance, the reflexive pronoun cannot be used as usual. Now one may ask: was the person of which Smith intended to speak not Smith? Was the person not himself?. Answer: not in the relevant sense! Unless the reflexive pronoun is itself a sufficient proof of reference. And the usual reflexive pronoun cannot do that. I 96 I/Self/Logic/Anscombe: here, the "manner of givenness" is unimportant. Fra I 97 The logician understands that "I" in my mouth is just another name for "E.A.". His rule: if x makes assertions with "I" as the subject, then they are true iff the predicates of x are true. AnscombeVsLogic/AnscombeVsKripke: for this reason he makes the transition from "I" to "Descartes". But this is too superficial: If one is a speaker who says "I", then it is impossible to find out what it is that says "I". E.g. one does not look to see from which apparatus the noise comes. Thus, we have to compel our logician to assume a "guaranteed" reference of "I". Fra I 98 Problem: with a guaranteed reference there is no longer any difference between "I" and "A". |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Nagel, Th. | Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th. | I 167 Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.) I 168 on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior. Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way. The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it. This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! " PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here: Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN. Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions. Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type. Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of TN (Peacocke: constitutive role). Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person. Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness. I 169 E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN. Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words. Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness. PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical. Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation. So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?" For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Prior, A. | Lewis Vs Prior, A. | IV 19 Perspective/Index/Indexicality/Time/Lewis: when we take a timeless viewpoint and neglect our own localization in time, the great difference between the present and other times disappears. Cf. >Perspective. However, this is not because we then regard all times as equal, but because we IV 20 lose the possibility to use indexical time words we "currently"! Possible world/perspective: just the same, if we take an a priori standpoint and neglect our localization in the worlds, then we lose the distinction between the worlds. This is not because we consider all worlds to be the same, but because we could no longer use index words like "actual". Prior: the word "aktual" can then no longer be used to classify a world that is more real than others!° LewisVsPrior: he fell for it himself: "real" can no longer be used as an index word. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Rorty, R. | Putnam Vs Rorty, R. | McDowell I 178 Rorty: from the causal point of view we can not submit our beliefs to the standards of investigation. PutnamVsRorty: then it remains a mystery how there may be something as beliefs at all. A second point then does not help further if we do not allow into take account the causal interactions between people with beliefs and the object of their beliefs. Because then it remains a mystery how this second standpoint is to supply the standards. Putnam I (a) 21 Theory/Meaning/Putnam: there will always be different theorie but that does not matter as long as they use different terms. If they are empirically equivalent they make no difference to us. Representation/illustration/Rorty: the whole problem is misguided, a sham debate. PutnamVsRorty: this is precisely the attempt to take the position of God. Putnam I (h) 204/205 PutnamVsRorty: if there is such a thing as "a notion being worth it", then inevitably there is the question about the nature of this "correctness". Putnam: what makes speech more than a mere expression of our present subjectivity, is that it can be evaluated for the presence or absence of these features, whether one wants to call them "truth" or "correctness" or "being worth it" or whatever. Even if it is a property that is culturally relative. But that does not indemnify us of the responsibility to say which property is! Putnam I (i) 239 Metaphysics/Philosophy/Rorty/Putnam: for Rorty and the French whom he admired two notions seem to be thrilling: 1. The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of our whole culture, therefore we have to be philosophical revisionists. I (i) 240. Typical Rorty: he rejects the "realism/anti-realism debate" and the "emotion/cognition debate" by ridiculing the debate. PutnamVsRorty: when a controversy is "futile", it does not mean that the competing images are unimportant. I (i) 242 justified assertibility/PutnamVsRorty: is independent of the opinion of the majority, but that is not a fact of transcendent reality, but it's a feature of the concept of legitimacy. The majority can agree or disagree with legitimacy. By their practice relativists themselves have demonstrated that this is the case! RelativismusVs: could argue that was just a "bad feature of the ordinary concept of "legitimcy"". PutnamVsVs: what can be called "bad", if not in relation to a metaphysical notion behind? I (i) 242/243 A philosopher who refers to that (those exist), could claim that his own convictions are true, but not justified - such a philosopher would not refute her*himself. However, it is a pragmatic inconsistency of her*his position: PutnamVsRelativismus/PutnamVsRealismus: both claim they can be simultaneously inside and outside of language! Realism does not immediately refute itself since it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway. But relativism refutes itself. Norms/values/Rorty: (1985) the improvements are not better with respect to a previously known state, but only better in the sense that now they clearly appear better than their predecessors. Norms/values/PutnamVsRorty: this is not a clarification of the concept of "improvement". I (i) 243/244 As Rorty normally speaks of Western cultural community, it could be that those gain the upper hand, who think that we "cope best" with Holcaust. ((s) "Coping better" does not seem to have been used by Rorty himself.) PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is a question of how something appears to us and is not at all the notion of better and worse norms and standards. But standards and their image are logically independent! Therefore, it makes sense to say that what most consider to be an improvement, is in fact not. Discourse/Rorty: (Mirror of Nature) distinguishes between "normal" and "hermeneutic" discourse. normal: in compliance with the relevant standards and norms of a culture. hermeneutic: will attempt to bridge a gap of paradigms in case of unsolvable disagreements. I (i) 244/245 PutnamVsRorty: uses "true" and "reasonable" in an emotional way. This is rhetoric. Why? As is known, Mussolini was pro pragmatism: supports thoughtless activism. R.B. Perry, 1936). If tolerance and an open society are our goal, would it not be better to argue directly for them, than to hope they were byproducts of a change of the metaphysical image? PutnamVsRorty: probably he thinks that metaphysical realism is wrong. But he can not say it! Behind this disguise there is the attempt to say from the perspective of God that there is no perspective of God. Rorty VI 79 Human/society/good/bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users, who by our knowledge became improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep open the possibility of persuasion by Nazis? Yes, it is, but is no more dangerous than the possibility of returning to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "coping better" is not a concept, according to which there are better or worse norms, ... it is an internal property of our notion of justification, that justification be independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I can not remember having ever said justification is dependent on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in relation to "us at its best" less problematic than in relation to "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here. Except in regard to a mistaken metaphysical image? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Skepticism | Nagel Vs Skepticism | I 92 Skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: if you wanted to say: "an evil demon might mess up everything so that I say "perhaps it's just my confused brain that advises me" therefore it is impossible to concede any hierarchy of my thoughts objective validity." However, it is not possible to argue like that, because this argumentation itself belongs to those it purports to subvert. There is no place for skepticism. I 94 Logical Skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: here, we can never reach a point where there are two options, which are compatible with all "evidence". - I cannot conceive that I am in a similar knowledge situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain was confused, because I cannot imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logic-skeptic has no level of reason to offer - there is no standpoint from which to verify the logic without presupposing it - not everything can be revised - something needs to be retained to verify that the revision is justified. II 14 VsSkepticism/Nagel: very different perspective of criticism: you can say that a radical skepticism was pointless, since the notion of an external world which in principle nobody is ever capable of discovering does not make sense. Nagel: the concept of dream also includes that you can wake up from it. II 15 Or rather, the dream from which you do not wake up, is your the reality. This is also our notion of what we can observe. >Verificationism. Without the possibility of correct conception the idea, our impressions were untrue becomes irrelevant. It cannot be true that the world does not exist, unless someone can find out that it does not exist. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||