Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Dummett, M. | Peacocke Vs Dummett, M. | EMD II 165 Assertion/Dummett: in the strict sense, it can then be characterized as a quasi-assertion whose justification criterion coincides with the truth conditions for the corresponding thought. PeacockeVsDummett: that brings him into the circle! We must remember that it is an adequacy condition that each approach provides the connection between truth and assertion (better: statement): a statement is true if things are as he says in the statement. How to proceed then? Parallel to the game: Def winning/Peacocke: if you meet the goals that you have qua player. So we have to show that in the language of a community one game is played instead of another. And in the analysis we must not use any such terms as "winning" or "goals qua player". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Truth Criterion | Dummett, M. | III 17/18 Criterion of truth / truth criterion / Dummett: the thesis that there can be no tr. c. is now commonplace. Reason: we determine the sentence sense on the truth conditions so that we do not first know the meaning of the sentence and then be able to apply a criterion. Just as we do not a criterion for winning the game because that is also taught in learning the game. |
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