Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Objective Mind | Habermas | III 124 Objective mind/Habermas: I would like to overcome the term "objective mind" in favour of one concept of cultural knowledge differentiated according to several claims of validity. >Validity claims, >Culture/Habermas, >Society. III 125 However, I would like to insist on the speech of three worlds (Popper: World 1: physical objects, World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content). These three worlds are to be distinguished from the lifeworld. >K. Popper. Only one of them, namely the objective world, can be regarded as a correlate... III 126 ...to the totality of true statements. >Consciousness, >States of belief, >Objectivity, >World, >World/thinking, >Life-world, >Thinking, >Thoughts, >Content, >Laws of nature. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Objective Mind | Popper | Habermas III 116 Objective mind/Popper/Habermas: Popper deals with the basic empirical conception according to which the subject is suddenly confronted with the world, receives its impressions from it via sensory perceptions or acts on states in it. >Myth of the given. This problem context explains why Popper sees his doctrine of the objective mind as an extension of the empirical concept and introduces the objective as well as the subjective mind as "worlds", i. e. as special totalities of entities. World 1: physical objects, World World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content) The older theories of the objective mind, developed from Dilthey to Theodor Litt and Hans Freyer in the historical and new Hegelian traditions, start from the primacy of an active mind that interprets itself in the worlds it constitutes. PopperVsLitt/PopperVsDilthey/PopperVsFreyer/Habermas: Popper, on the other hand, holds on fast to the primacy of the world over the mind and understands the second and third world in analogy to the first world ontologically. In this respect, his construction of the third world is more reminiscent of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of mental being. (1) (PopperVsEmpiricism). >Empiricism. World 3/Popper/Habermas: the products of the human mind immediately turn against him as problems:"These problems are obviously independent. They are not created in any way by us; rather, we discover them and in this sense they already exist before their discovery, moreover, at least some of these problems may be unsolvable.". (2) 1.N. Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin 1932. 2.K. R. Popper, J. C. Eccles The Self and its Brain, Berlin 1977 p. 41ff. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avramides, A. | Reductionism Vs Avramides, A. | Avra I 90 Radical Interpretation/RI/Avramides: is quite obviously indeed a gradual approach? Avramides: I do not want to deny that, but that we need assumptions about beliefs and meanings simultaneously in early stages. ReductionismVsAvramides: this is the point where my opponent may step in and see an opportunity for an epistemic asymmetry: what is implausible, is not a gradual approach, but the concomitant thesis that radical interpreter needs a complete evidence basis for beliefs and intentions of the unacquainted speaker before he finds out anything about his language. AvramidesVsVs: this implausible thesis notwithstanding, the gradual approach of radical interpretation is as follows: the interpreter forms hypotheses on simple beliefs... (>see Bennett 1985) and all these hypotheses remain revisable until the end. In later stages, we then simultaneously deal with beliefs and meaning. I 158 ReductionismVsAvramides: Subjective Mind/AvramidesVsReductionism: is incompatible with the fact that the mind is only contingently connected with behavior. I 159 A subject can never be separated from its very own experience. VsAvramides: Important Argument: such a subjective concept can be constructed, without significant reference to the behavior! VsAvramides: neither is it necessary to make any significant reference to the third person perspective! I.e. reductionism (reductive Gricean) does not automatically lead to the objective mind. I.e. that a subjective concept of mind is therefore compatible with the fact that mind is only contingently connected with behavior. AvramidesVs: I admit that I cannot prove that this objection is incorrect, but is important to me that my approach allows to combine the first person and third person perspectives. I 160 Without connection to behavior there is no proper understanding of the first person perspective. And this leads to an objective Cartesian (or incomplete) picture. (55 +). |
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| Physicalism | Avramides Vs Physicalism | Avramides I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidsVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality no perspective (God viewpoint or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing his behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 135 AvramidesVsPhysicalism: by emphasizing the difficulties of an intangible empire, he loses sight of an important insight by Descartes: The subject has a unique relation to its interior. PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of first-person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. I 137 Objective mind/Asymmetry/Concept/AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsPhysicalism: thesis: if one understands the mind as objective, conceptual questions can no longer be separated from superficial epistemic questions or maintain a separation between our access to what the states of mind are in themselves and the normal evidence (behavior) that affect them. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Locke, J. | Avramides I 139 Behavior / thinking / language / Locke: behavior is linked only contingently with thoughts - AvramidesVs: Problem: what should then behavior have to do with spirit - (Vs "objective mind") - when words stand for ideas, the behavior is irrelevant. - physicalism: takes behavior to be as unimportant as idealism. |
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