Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 28 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Putnam III 122
Absolute reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with sensation of secondary qualities - even Williams seems to assume a picture of the world without colors - Williams: ideally: "theory of knowledge and of error". ---
III 132
Absolute reality/Williams: tells us, but not foreign scientists, how we understand it - PutnamVs: so only locally - absolute reality/Putnam would also require convergence - QuineVsConvergence: inscrutability of reference. >Inscrutability, >convergence. ---
III 134
Absolute reality/Williams: without normative terms - PutnamVs: precisely this leads to the problem of indeterminacy of translation - Putnam many true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies are possible.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Assertibility Putnam Rorty I 307
Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (according to Rorty): if you retreat to that, you may say that e.g. "X is gold" can be justifiably asserted at Archimedes' times, and is no longer justifiably assertible today. But he would have to dismiss the statement that X was in the extension of gold, just like the statement that "X is Gold" was true, as meaningless. (> de re / de dicto). Putnam: (according to Rorty): Follows 3 trains of thought:
1) Against the construction of 'true' as meaning the same as "justified assertibility" (or any other "soft" concept that had to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can provide a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) A certain kind of sociological facts requires an explanation: the reliability of the normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can only be explained on the basis of realism.
3) Only the realist can avoid the conclusion from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is highly probable that none of the terms that are used today refers ".
Wright: Truth/Justified Assertibility/Putnam: (Reason, Truth and History): PutnamVs equating truth and assertibility ("rational acceptability"), but for other reasons:
 1) Truth is timeless, assertibility is not.
 2) Truth is an idealization of rational acceptability.
 E.g. idealization: not to achieve friction-free surfaces, but talking about them pays off, because we come very close to them.
---
Rorty VI 30
Rorty: "justified assertibility" (pragmatism, Dewey) PutnamVs: "naturalistic fallacy": a given belief can satisfy all such conditions and still be wrong. PutnamVsRorty et al.: ignore the need to admit the existence of "real directedness" or "intentionality". Putnam: an "ideal audience" (before which a justification is sufficient) cannot exist. A better audience can always be assumed.
---
Putnam I (c) 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified sensibly - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn. if you do not believe in convergence, but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectors intuitionistically and understand truth intra-theoretically. ---
I (e) 141
Truth/Assertibility/Tarski/Putnam: from his truth-definition also follows assertibility - the probability of a sentence in the meta-language is equivalent to that in the object language. ---
I (i) 246
Truth/Justified Assertibility/Kripke's Wittgenstein: that would only be a matter of general agreement - PutnamVsKripke: that would be a wrong description of the concepts that we actually have - and a self-contradictory attempt at taking an "absolute perspective".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Chance Lewis V 65
Chance/Probability/Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.co./Possible Worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: It is legitimate to mention chances in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional - because probabilities are an objective property of the world - then you can say that there is a certain chance for C, even though this chance is unfulfilled - this is a counterexample to the alleged incompatibility - Conclusion: we should say that there would have been a tiny chance for convergence (that the possible worlds looked like the real world), even if Nixon had pressed the button.
V 91
Chance/Lewis: a) in relation to time: E.g. in a labyrinth: it depends on the location how long we still need - b) timeless: E.g. radioactive decay - "endpoint chance": time not mentioned - chance depends on possible worlds (where one stands inside the labyrinth) - Chance: function of three arguments: Proposition, time, world.
V 98
Definition chance/Jeffrey: (R. Jeffrey 1965(1)): is an objectified subjective probability.
V 99
Definition objectification: (in terms of a partition of a given world): the probability distribution obtained from a belief function by conditionalising (forming the conditional) through the element of the partition - objectified belief: the belief conditional on the truth - (only so much truth as is covered by the element) - which element is valid, is contingent and does not depend on what we think - an element: is the equivalence class of worlds in terms of equality of facts until before t and the dependency of the opportunities on the prehistory - ((s) I.e. in all possible worlds in which this prehistory is true ... will be.
V 130
Chance/Acceptable information/Lewis: problem: under the current analysis information about current opportunities is a disguised form of unacceptable information about future history.

1. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Community Blackburn Esfeld I 119
Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn: (S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community.
KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect.
I 120
EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback.
I 121
Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself?
Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined.

Blckbu I
S. Blackburn
Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Connectives Putnam I (c) 87
Interpretation/Putnam: is not a representation, but production. - E.g. classical connectives are not represented using the intuitionistic connectives, but the classical theorems are produced. - Putnam: the meaning of the connectives is still not classic, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not by truth. - Change of meaning: e.g. assuming we wanted to formulate Newton's laws in intuitionistic mathematics, then we would have to limit the real numbers (for example, on the 30th decimal).
I (c) 88
Then, in the classical theory, the connectives would refer to "provability in B1" and in the other to "provability in B2". Then the connectives would change their meaning when knowledge changes.
I (c) 95
Realism/Putnam: the realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not solely true because it follows a (any) theory.
I (c) 96
Ideal Assertibility/PutnamVsPeirce: no "ideal limit" can be specified reasonably - not to specify any conditions for science - PutnamVsKuhn: if you do not believe in convergence but in revolutions, you should interpret the connectives intuitionistically and apprehend truth intra-theoretically.
I (c) 97
Truth/Logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives is not determined by their formal logic -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the entire theory and individual statement meanings is useless.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Convergence
Convergence Gould IV 329
Evolution/Repetition/Convergence/Gould: For example, flying has developed independently of each other in insects, birds, reptiles (perterosaurs) and bats. Although the aerodynamics are the same, the constructional solution is very different. Definition Convergences/Gould: generally agreed solutions that are not detailed repetitions.
Highly adaptive forms that are easy to develop constantly evolve. Complex morphologies are rarely repeated without adaptive necessities.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Convergence Tipler Chuld IV 330
Convergence/Frank J. Tipler/G. F. Orenstein/Convergence/Gould: For example, the most famous of all convergences was refuted: the "pinhole camera eye" of vertebrates and squids. G. F. Orenstein (supported by Tipler): Thesis: There are common ancestors. (1) GouldVsOrenstein: that is not very convincing. Orenstein does not even mention the most important argument pro convergence: embryology. Squid eyes have developed from skin cells, the eyes of vertebrates are brain bulges.
Orenstein refers to Haeckel's law "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", which was refuted around 1930. The law claims that the development of the embryo repeats the stages of adult precursors. Haeckel himself recognized too many exceptions.


1. G. F. Orenstein,

Tipler
Frank J. Tipler
The Physics of Immortality New York 1995

Determinism Lewis V 37
Determinism/Lewis: it is not certain that our world is indeterministic. - More certain is asymmetry - this could also come about under deterministic conditions.
V 45
Determinism/Possible worlds/Lewis: It is wrong to say that two deterministic possible worlds would differ only slightly from each other - they can diverge just as quickly as indeterministic ones - there are many probablities for small differences which become then large.
V 58
Indeterminism/Lewis: should not be derived from the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. - This is a frivolity - to anthropocentric. - Instead: obviously also in radioactive decay processes. - But this also allows possible world/asymmetry: more simple: now we do not need anymore small wonders to justify deviations - convergence: here, the problem remains the same. - ((s) It is difficult to justify with and without determinism.) - Variant: perfect convergence: is difficult to explain with the indeterminism.
V 120
LewisVsDeterminismus: what is it then supposed to mean that a coin is fair?
V 162
Determinism/Causing/Causality/Lewis: here: not universal causation, but - here pro: in the sense that there are not two possible worlds which are exactly equal up to a point in time and then differ without violating the laws. Indeterminism/Lewis: not Vs, but problem: the >counterfactual conditional analysis will not cover all cases.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Distributive Justice Climate Policy Norgaard I 328
Distributive Justice/Emissions/Climate Policy: (…) a number of non‐philosophers made early contributions explicitly analyzing traditional theories of justice such as utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, and Kantianism and their applicability to mitigation policy (Solomon(1) and Ahuja 1991(2); Ghosh 1993(3); Paterson 1996(4)). (…) the idea of equal per capita emissions rights has consistently been a focal point for advocates of just climate policy, who have often argued that it is a necessary response to engender cooperation from developing countries (Meyer 2000(5); Athanasiou and Baer 2002(6)) as well as a fair solution in its own right.
Norgaard I 330
(…) most analysts who have studied the problem from an ethical perspective have concluded that equal per capita is a minimum standard of distributive justice, inasmuch as it ignores disproportionate historical emissions, even if one limits the period of ‘responsibility’ to (say) 1990, by which time knowledge of the risks of GHG emissions were widespread (Jamieson 2001(7); Singer 2002(8)). Yet it is also commonplace to simply state that ‘the financial transfers that would be associated with equal per capita allocations would be unacceptable to the wealthy countries’ (e.g. Ashton and Wang 2003(9); Posner and Sunstein 2008(10)), which is not an argument about justice, but rather about power.

1. Solomon, B. 1995. Global CO2 emissions trading: Early lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Program. Climatic Change 30: 75–96.
2. Ahuja, D. R. 1991. International reductions in greenhouse‐gas emissions: An equitable and efficient approach. Global Environmental Change 1: 343–50.
3. Ghosh, P. 1993. Structuring the equity issue in climate change. Pp. 267–74 in A. N. Achanta (ed.), The Climate Change Agenda: An Indian Perspective. Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi.
4. Paterson, M. 1996. International justice and global warming. Pp. 181–201 in B. Holden (ed.), The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change. New York: St Martin's Press.
5. Meyer, A. 2000. Contraction and Convergence: The Global Solution to Climate Change. Totnes: Green Books.
6. Athanasiou, T., and Baer, P. 2002. Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming. New York: Seven Stories Press.
7. Jamieson, D. 2001. Climate change and global environmental justice. Pp. 287–308 in C. A. Miller and P. N. Edwards (eds.), Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance. Cambridge,
8. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
9. Ashton, J., and Wang, X. 2003. Equity and climate: In principle and practice. Pp. 61–84 in J. E. Aldy, J. Ashton, R. Baron, et al. (eds.), Beyond Kyoto: Advancing the International Effort Against Climate Change. Washington, DC: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.
10. Posner, E. A., and Sunstein, C. R. 2008. Climate change justice. Georgetown Law Journal 96: 1565–612.


Baer, Paul: “International Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Explanation Hacking I 98ff
Good explanation/Hacking: displays context - but: the same entities can always be explained otherwise - therefore: VsReichenbach/VsSalmon: that we arrive at the same result on various ways, proves nothing. - I 98 The reality is not part of the explanation.
I 100
It follows: VsConvergence theory: is only cumulative - convergence: is not itself focussed on convergence.
I 103
HackingVsPopper: success is no confirmation of a declaration. - It shows not more than that we reasonably live in a reasonable world. (> adequacy, as Aristotle).

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Facts Quine Rorty I 217
Fact/Quine/Rorty: "Dog" is the English word for "dog", and "Robinson believes in God": that is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "factual". Quine thus offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convergence truth by virtue of correspondence instead of the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth.
Davidson.... Quinesian resolution of the distinction between questions of meaning and questions of fact.
---
Quine I 426f
Facts/Quine: not something mediating according to the image of our sentences (VsSellars, VsWittgenstein?) - better: true sentence or true proposition - facts not are required, especially not in addition to propositions. ---
II 37
Another term I want to save from the abyss of the transcendental is the term factual which proves to be relevant in the theory of radical translation. In this case, none of the facts decides which of the two manuals is right. And this term of the factual is neither transcendental nor epistemological to such an extent ((s) no fact can decide - requires facts that are just not fit to do so.) ++ ---
II 37
Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the manuals is right - Actual things are ontological, naturalistic - neither transcendental nor epistemological - physical conditions, not empirical skills - reinterpretation only with others, not with ourselves. - Factuality as gravity, inherent in our nature. ---
VI 113
Fact/Quine: we can erase that. - "It is a fact" does not contribute anything. - It is only seemingly founded in correspondence theory. - A true sentence as a whole corresponds to a fact. - "It is true that" is necessary for sentences that do not exist.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Inscrutability of reference Putnam III 122
Absolute Reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. - Even Williams seems to visualize a picture of the world without colors. - Williams: Ideal case: theory of knowledge and error. ---
III 132
Absolute Reality/Williams: explains to us, but not to foreign scientists, how we understand it. - PutnamVs: So only local. - Absolute Reality/Putnam: would also require convergence. QuineVsConvergence: inscrutability of reference.
---
III 134
Absolute reality/Williams: without normative terms. - PutnamVs: that is why we have the problem of indeterminacy of translation. - Putnam Thesis: there are many possible true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies. ---
III 133
Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability (indeterminacy) of reference: we have to abide to the individual sciences or everyday linguistic causality.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Language Production Developmental Psychology Upton I 63
Language production/Developmental psychology/Upton: Language production develops after comprehension. Early talkers may produce their first word at around nine or ten months, but many children do not produce their first word until well into their second year. As with comprehension, first words are limited in number and overextension and underextension are both commonly seen in the use of first words (Woodward and Markman, 1998)(1). >Language development/Developmental psychology. Overextension: overextension young children’s extension of a word to cover events/objects beyond that which the word is normally used for, such as calling all animals ‘doggie’.
Underextension: underextension the limiting of a word meaning to too few instances by a young child, for example when a child restricts the word ‘dog’ to situations in which the child is playing
with a toy, but then fails to refer to the animal at the park as a ‘dog’.
Word production increases gradually until around the end of the second year, when there is a vocabulary spurt (Bloom et al., 1985)(2). At around the same time, a qualitative change in language use can be seen as infants begin to use two-word phrases.



1.Woodward, AL and Markman, EM (1998) Early word learning, in Kuhn, D and Siegler. RS
(eds), Damon, W (series ed.) Handboook of Child Psychology, Vol. 2: Cognition, perception,
and languoge (5th edn) pp37 1-420). New York: Wiley.
2. Bloom L, Lifter, K and Broughton, J (1985) The convergence of early cognition and language
in the second year of life: problems in conceptualisation and measurement, in Barrett, M
(ed.) Children’s Single-word Speech. London: Wiley-Blackwell.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Method Rothbart Corr I 179
Method/developmental psychology/temperament/Rothbart: researchers have often been sceptical about using parents as informants about their children’s behaviour (e.g., Kagan and Fox 2006)(1). It has been felt that parental biases or lack of knowledge will yield measures that are invalid, with direct observation seen as a preferable method. However, considerable evidence indicates convergence between parent report and observational measures (Rothbart and Bates 2006)(2). Because temperament reflects dynamic interactions between affective and cognitive processes and there are limitations to both questionnaire and observational methods, multitrait multimethod approaches to temperament assessment have been advocated whenever feasible (see Rothbart and Sheese 2006(3), for a discussion).


1. Kagan, J. and Fox, N. A. 2006. Biology, culture, and temperamental biases, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 167–225. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
2. Rothbart, M. K., and Bates, J. E. 2006. Temperament in children’s development, in W. Damon and R. Lerner (Series eds.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional, and personality development, 6th edn, pp. 99–166. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
3. Rothbart, M. K. and Sheese, B. E. 2006. Temperament and emotion- regulation, in J. Gross (ed.), Handbook of emotion-regulation, pp. 331–50. New York: Guilford Press


Mary K. Rothbart, Brad E. Sheese and Elisabeth D. Conradt, “Childhood temperament” in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Misinformation Economic Theories Kranton I 423
Misinformation/Fake News/Economic Theories: ((s) the term “fake news” is not used by the cited authors). In one set of models, opinions spread like diseases; that is, individuals become infected (adopt an opinion) by contact with another agent with that disease (see, e.g., chapter 7 of Jackson, 2008)(1). Such diffusion processes are also studied in computer science, statistical physics, and sociology. In such models, biased agents are always better off when there are more biased agents (…). In a second set of models, opinion formation in social networks builds on DeGroot (1974)(2). Agents, with possibly different initial priors, repeatedly “exchange” their beliefs with their neighbors and adopt some statistic (the weighted average, say) of their neighbors’ opinions. Such agents fail to take into account the repetition of information that can propagate through a network, leading to a persuasion bias as referred to by DeMarzo et al. (2003)(3).
Golub and Jackson (2010)(4) find sufficient network conditions under which such a naive rule leads to convergence to the truth—there can be no prominent groups, for example, that have disproportionate influence.
Research on Bayesian learning in networks (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 1998(5); Gale and Kariv, 2003(6); Acemoglu et al., 2011(7)) characterizes convergence or not to common opinions for different network architectures.
A new literature studies individuals’ incentives to communicate private information to others. Niehaus (2011)(8) adds a cost to sharing information; an agent will weigh the benefits to her friends and neighbors against the personal cost.
Other papers study influence in networks; agents all have private information and have an incentive to share their information because, for example, agents benefit when others’ adopt the same action (Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010(9); Galeotti et al., 2013(10); Calvo´ -Armengol et al., 2015(11)).
Chatterjee and Dutta (2016)(12) [are probably the closest to the line of work by Bloch, Demange and Kranton 2018(13)]. [Their paper focuses] on the credibility of messages received by agents in a social network when the message can be false.
Kranton I 424
(…) this article features a situation in which information is not widely held, and unbiased agents strategically spread information so that a correct public decision is taken. A large economic literature also studies the transmission and communication of information through the observation of other agents’ actions. Observation helps discern the true state of the world. Knowledge or information costlessly spreads (Banerjee, 1992(14), 1993(15); Bikhchandani et al., 1992(16)), or spills over, to others, as occurs when people observe others’ use of a new technology (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995(17); Conley and Udry, 2010(18)). In these models, though individuals influence others through their actions, they derive no benefit in influencing them and, contrary to [the article by Bloch, Demange, Kranton 2018 (13)], any decision to communicate is not strategic. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Kranton.


1. JACKSON, M., Social and Economic Networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
2. DEGROOT,M. H., “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (345) (1974), 118–21.
3. DEMARZO, P. M.,D.VAYANOS, AND J. ZWEIBEL, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3) (2003), 909–68.
4. GOLUB, B., AND M. JACKSON, “Naive Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (2010), 112–49.
5. BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL, “Learning from Neighbors,” The Review of Economic Studies 65 (3) (1998), 595–621.
6. GALE, D., AND S. KARIV, “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,” Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2) (2003), 329–46.
7. ACEMOGLU, D.,M.DAHLEH, I. LOBEL, AND A.OZDAGLAR, “Bayesian Learning in Social Networks,” Review of Economic Studies 78 (2011), 1201–36.
8. NIEHAUS, P., “Filtered Social Learning,” Journal of Political Economy 119 (4) (2011), 686–720.
9. HAGENBACH, J., AND F. KOESSLER, “Strategic Communication in Networks,” Review of Economic Studies 77 (3) (2010), 1072–99.
10. GALEOTTI, A., C.GHIGLINO, AND F. SQUINTANI, “Strategic Information in Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5) (2013), 1751–69.
11. CALVO´ -ARMENGOL,A., J. DEMART´I, ANDA. PRAT, “Communication and Influence,” Theoretical Economics 10 (2015), 649–90.
12. CHATTERJEE, K., AND B.DUTTA, “Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks,” International Economic Review 57 (3) (2016), 759–86.
13. BLOCH, F., G. DEMANGE, AND R. KRANTON, "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2)(2018), pages 421-448, May.
14. BANERJEE, A., “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (3) (1992), 797–817.
15. BANERJEE, A., “The Economics of Rumours,” Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993), 309–27.
16. BIKHCHANDANI, S., D. HIRSHLEIFER, AND I. WELCH, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992), 992–1026.
17. FOSTER, A., AND M. ROSENZWEIG, “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995), 1176–209.
18. CONLEY, T., AND C.UDRY, “Learning about a New Technology: Pineapple in Ghana,” American Economic Review 100 (2010), 35–69.


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.


Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011
Personality System Neuroscience Corr I 391
Personality system/neuroscience/Saucier: contemporary neuroscience [has developed] promising theories that posit distinct brain systems or circuits, and then link individual differences in the functioning of these systems/circuits, via psychobiological endophenotypes, to overt personality characteristics. A prime example is the set of theories (e.g., Carver and White 1994(1); Torrubia, Avila, Molto and Caseras 2001(2)), emanating originally from Gray (1983)(3) that set out distinct brain systems for approach (or reward-sensitivity, or behavioural activation) and avoidance (or withdrawal, or threat- or punishment-sensitivity, or behavioural inhibition), sometimes adding a third ‘constraint’ or self-regulation system (Carver 2005(4); cf. Rothbart and Bates 1998(5)).

1. Carver, C. S. and White, T. 1994. Behavioural inhibition, behavioural activation, and affective responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS scales, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67: 319–33
2. Torrubia, R., Avila, C., Molto, J. and Caseras, X. 2001. The Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire (SPSRQ) as a measure of Gray’s anxiety and impulsivity dimensions, Personality and Individual Differences 31: 837–62
3. Gray, J. A. 1983. Where should we search for biologically based dimensions of personality?, Zeitschrift für Differentielle und Diagnostische Psychologie 42: 163–74
4. Carver, C. S. 2005. Impulse and constraint: perspectives from personality psychology, convergence with theory in other areas, and potential for integration, Personality and Social Psychology Review 9: 312–33
5. Rothbart, M. K. and Bates, J. E. 1998. Temperament, in W. Damon (Series ed.) and N. Eisenberg (Vol. ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. III, Social, emotional and personality development, 5th edn, pp. 105–76. New York: Wiley



Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Political Parties Hirschman Brocker I 524
Political Parties/Hirschman: based on his distinction between emigration and conflict (see Terminology/Hirschman), Hirschman expresses the assumption that voters move from party to party before they become involved within the party. See also Competition/Hirschman. Especially Hirschman 1974 (1). Problem: with this, the demand for a fundamental change could be directed at least for some time into useless alternatives. (2)
Brocker I 526
Hirschman complements the spatial theory of the party competition of Hotelling (3), which predicts a convergence of political positions in the middle of the political spectrum, with his approach on conflicts: "This is usually done by particularly committed members. Sometimes these party strategists who maximize the votes prevail against them. Hirschman can use this to explain that presidential candidates are clearly to the right or left of the centre.

1. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, Mass. 1970. Dt.: Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch. Reaktionen auf Leistungsabfall bei Unternehmungen, Organisationen und Staaten, Tübingen 1974, S. 22.
2. Ibid. p. 23.
3. cf. https://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/dcstevens/entry/the_hotelling-downs_model/

Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolHirschm I
Albert O. Hirschman
The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Politics Barth Brocker I 234
Politics/Barth: To the great surprise of opponents such as sympathisers, in the summer and autumn of 1938 Barth (...) replaced his previously only implicitly political theology with a decidedly explicit one. In several writings (cf. in particular Barth 1938b, 203-215; 1945a, 13-107) he now took the view that the National Socialist state had definitely proved to be thoroughly anti-Christian, (also because!) anti-Semitic and inhuman and is therefore to be fought by all means, possibly also with the determined use of military force. Barth's turn led most of the protagonists of the Confessing Church to turn away from him. (1)
Brocker I 236
Politics/Belief/Barth: With inner necessity, the believer is conscious of political responsibility. He knows that the right that every real claim a person has to the other and to others is under the special protection of the gracious God. […] He cannot escape the question of human rights. He can only want and affirm the Rule of Law. With any other political attitude, he would reject divine justification. (2)
Brocker I 237
Governance/BarthVsReformers/BarthVsLuther: Barth criticizes the talk ((s) of the reformers) of "secular authority" (3) as systematically deficient. It remained unclear "whether they also founded the right to justification, including political violence, on Christ's violence, or whether they had not secretly built here on another foundation" (4). See Secularization/Barth.
Brocker I 245
Theology/State/justification/Barth: Barth's basic idea: that theology "has no theory necessarily peculiar to the various political figures and realities" (5). "One can only judge Christian-theological from case to case, from situation to situation" (6). Political system: If (...) an ethically theologically legitimate political system should not be mentioned, there is nevertheless "a direction and line of the Christian decisions to be carried out in the political sphere that can be recognized and maintained under all circumstances". However, these should not be "obtained from a recourse to the problematic instance of the so-called natural law" (7), but with regard to the "parable ability and the need for parables of the political being", as which Barth understands the "realm of God proclaimed by the church[...]" (8).
Political system/Reasons/VsBarth: Argumentation-logically and politic-theoretically, certain structural weaknesses of Barth's theological theory of politics cannot be overlooked. Neither the figure of speech used in justification and right
Brocker I 246
by the powers of angels or the teaching of analogy of the later writing can solve the problem that this "eternal Christ right" as the origin and orientation of the legitimate rule of law cannot really be translated into the realm of the political and above all of political theory. An intrinsic connection to modern discourses of the political in the space of the secular state is simply not established. Barth refuses any reflection on a subject- and reason-theoretical interpretation of his own basic theological concepts, especially the fundamental figure of divine self-revelation (despite more or less obvious historical and systematic convergences of ideas).

1. Martin Rohkrämer, »Karl Barth in der Herbstkrise 1938«, in: Evangelische Theologie 48/6, 1988, 521-545.
2. Karl Barth 1982, S. 434f
3. Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: Theologische Studien 1, Zollikon 1938. Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht, in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998, S. 6
4. Ebenda S. 7
5. Karl Barth, »Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde« (1946), in: ders., Rechtfertigung und Recht, Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde, Evangelium und Gesetz, Zürich 1998 (b), S. 56
6. Ebenda S. 58
7. Ebenda
8. Ebenda S. 63.

Georg Pfleiderer, „Karl Barth, Rechtfertigung und Recht 1938)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Propositions Castaneda Frank I 323
Propositions/Tradition: (not represented by anyone in pure form, not even by Frege): ideal convergence of the elements of thought, speech, reality and communication - propositions that are primarily defined as carriers of timeless truth values, fundamental support of linguistic meaning as constituents of reality and as publicly accessible contents of communication - Advantage: that leaves no gap between the content of thought, and that to which it is directed - for reality arise - CastanedaVs: this does not apply to indexical sentences - individuation: of indexical sentences: in the speech act, not by meaning.
I 340ff
Proposition/Tradition: (Frege, Moore): 1) psychological units, 2) ontological, 3) ontologically objective (intersubjective), 4) metaphysical units 5) logical units, 6) semantic u. 7) linguistic units of communication - CastanedaVs : discrepancies of between 1 - 7 in the case of diachronic flow of experiences in the changing world - VsTradition: fails with indexical reference with "I", "here", "now" - Problem: E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen in my liver": understanding without knowledge of the truth value - therefore meaning unequal truth value (VsFrege) - what is meant by the formation of a sentence is not some objective feature or thing in the world that is accessible to everyone.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Realism Putnam Rorty I 305ff
Anti-Realist/Putnam/Rorty understands ancient and our modern theories not as two approximately correct description of a solid inventory, but he does not believe that our theory is better in relation to the same entities. But if our theory is merely our theory, we could instead use it just as well as the Neanderthals - PutnamVsAnti-realism: the problem is that for him truth is only useful as a theories subordinate term. But extension is inextricably linked with truth: x is then precisely part of the extension of a predicate F if "x is an F" is true. - Internal realism. (according to Rorty): position according to which we "mundane fact" that the use of language contributes to achieve our goals, to our satisfaction etc. It can be explained by the fact that "not the language but the speaker reflects the world in that they produce a symbolic representation of their environment"(Putnam): - By means of our conventions, we constitute the universe better than ever before. PutnamVsRealismus/PutnamVsRelativismus/Rorty: both assume one could simultaneously be both inside and outside the language. ---
Putnam VI 389
Realism/Putnam: explains why theories tend to convergence. - Realism means that not language but speakers depict the world.
VI 395 f
Realism/fact/Putnam: E.g. Story 1: a line can be divided into points - that is, into smaller and smaller segments - then there is the same relation "part of" between points and segments and segments and larger segments - Story 2: there are no points, but these are logical constructions. - "Hard core" -Realism: would say that there is a fact here that decides about it. - PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: "refined realism": 1 and 2 are equivalent descriptions.
VI 398
Metaphysical Realism: if you cannot say, how the WORLD theory is independent, the talk of various descriptions (e.g. point or converging segment) becomes empty - that says Quine in ontological relativity. ---
Putnam VI 404
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: is doomed to a) to consider the logic either empirically (i.e. not merely revisable, as I believe it) but in the sense that it has no conventional component at all, or - b) He has the logic for a priori i.e. not explainable by the notion of convention. ---
Putnam I (c) 78
Realism/Putnam: he must left it inexplicable that E.g. spacetime calculi predict observable phenomena correctly when there is no curved spacetime in reality. - What has prediction to do with truth then?
I (c) 95
Realism: realistic conception of connectives ensures that a statement is not true solely because it follows any theory.
I (g) 175f
PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: faces infinitely many correspondences - endless possibilities how signs and things can correspond. - Problem: to choose the right, without a metaphysical access. ((s)> Loewenheim).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Science Rorty IV 13ff
Science/tradition: it is a a special method or distinguished by a special relationship to reality. Quine: by the way, no philosophy is needed beyond the science theory. (RortyVs). Hempel: showed that this distinction is not so easy to make.
IV 35
Convergence/Science/Rorty: (also Mary Hesse): we will never get a meaning of the term "convergence", which also includes terms and beliefs. - (But Williams, Nagel and Harman would need that).
VI 10/11
Science/truth/Rorty no objective of research. - With a goal you need to know whether you are heading for it or coming away from it. - Instead: Science allows predictions.
VI 209
Science/Rorty: I think a distinction which is not found in McDowell is important: 1) Particle physics together with the part of science that refers to the microstructure. - 2) All the rest of science. Rorty: particle physics exert too strong a fascination: > uncertainty/indeterminacy: not everything can be explained with Heisenberg.
VI 374f
Def science as natural kind/Rorty: a science that is so defined will always ask the same questions. Rorty’s thesis: philosophy is not a natural kind.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Similarity Lewis IV 42
Similarity/Similarity Metric/Possible World/Lewis: problems: which aspects count, what importance do they have, how far can dissimilarity go? ---
V 46
Similarity/Possible World/Counterfactual Dependence/Lewis: the similarity relation between possible worlds should not require that miracles become necessary in differing possible worlds - SR/Similarity relation/Lewis: I do not think that they often guide our explicit judgment, but the overall similarity must be part of the desired similarity relation. - Congruence of local facts not important, but avoiding major violations of laws of nature. - E.g. small miracle: Nixon presses the button, but the signal is suppressed. - Big Miracle: In addition, all traces are blurred, Nixon’s memoirs are falsified, etc., i.e. the worlds become indistinguishable.
V 48
Small miracle: allows deviation. - Big Miracle: allows convergence. >Miracles/Lewis.
V 49
Divergence is much easier to achieve than convergence - counterfactual asymmetry: exists, because the appropriate standards of similarity in turn are symmetric and in correspondence to the asymmetry of miracles.
V 53
This is certainly about the weighting of various similarities.
V 163f
Similarity/Possible world/Similarity metric/Lewis: actually three-digit relation. - w1 is closer to w than w2. - Similarities of facts balance each other against similarity of laws. - Similarity laws are important for the character of possible worlds - Similarity: We do not make the condition that there should be only one single next possible world or merely a next set. >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >possible worlds/Lewis.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Terminology Wright I 41
"Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa.
I 60
Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence.
I 99
Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm.
I 108ff
Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable.
I 115
Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm.
ad I 115ff
Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts.
I 118ff
Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses.
I 138
Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange.
I 150
Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Terminology Gould I 190
1. Stase: Most species show little change in one direction or another during their presence on Earth. 2. Sudden appearance: In all areas of life, species do not occur due to incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed".
I 191
Evolution/Gould: essentially proceeds in two ways: a)
Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. (See Evolution/Gould).
b)
Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. Most theoreticians prefer the "allopatric" speciation (which happens in a different place). (This is the orthodox view).
With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form.
I 198
Definition preadaption: derived from the thesis that other functions would be fulfilled in the initial stages. E.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature.
I 240
Definition Eozoon: early form of an animal.
I 256
Definition protists: single cell precursors Definition Metazoen: multicellular offspring.
I 258
Definition homologous similarity in common precursors: two organisms may have the same feature because they got it from a common ancestor. Definition analogous similarity: No common precursors: If two organisms have a common feature that represents the result of a separate but similar evolutionary change in independent lines of development.
I 281
Definition parallelism, Definition convergence: a separate development of similar features in the course of evolution. This occurs very often.
II 56
Definitino Diploid: Animals with paired chromosomes in both sexes. Some animals use a different trait for sex determination: the females are diploid, but the males have instead of each female pair only one chromosome and are considered to be the first males.
Definition Haploid denotes: only one chromosome (half of the diploid number). In other words, the males develop ironically from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females.
Animals using this system are called
Definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females.
II 57
This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid.
II 186
Definition homeotic mutation: Legs or parts of legs replace a variety of structures on the head mainly antennae and parts of the mouth. Not all incorrectly placed parts are homoeoses. William Bateson (not Gregory), who later invented the word genetics, called cases only homeotically in which organs that have the same development or evolutionary origin are replaced.
II 192
Viable homoeostats that emulate the primordial forms are not really reborn ancestors. Double elements are formed, no old patterns are found.
II 193
These things make it clear how few genes are responsible for regulating the basic order in the body of a fruit fly.
II 240
Definition Zoocentric: Perspective that derives general principles from the behaviour of other animals and then completely subsumes the human being into this category, because we are undoubtedly also animals. Definition Anthropocentric: A point of view that tries to subsume nature in us by considering our peculiarities as the goal of life from the very beginning.
The zoocentric view can be extended to the caricature, which is often referred to as "nothing but error": the human is "nothing more than an animal (reductionism).
Popular science is flooding us with the excessively broad version of zoocentrism.
II 331
Definition "Genetic drift"/Gould: The process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency.
II 352
Definition Clade: a branch on an evolutionary tree. The cladism tries to establish the branching pattern for a number of related species.
II 353
Definition Sister group: upside-down Ypsilon: two tribes sharing a common ancestor from which no other tribe branches off. Gorillas and chimpanzees form a sister group. We can then consider the chimpanzee gorilla group as a unit and ask which primate forms the sister group with it.
II 354
Definition derived feature: Properties that only occur for members of a direct lineage. For example, all mammals have hair, which is not the case with any other vertebrate.
II 355
Hair is a derived feature for the class of mammals, because it has developed only once in the common ancestors of mammals and therefore identifies a true branch in the family tree of vertebrates. Common derived characteristics are common to two or more strains and can be used to identify sister groups.
II 356
GouldVsCladism: Most derived features are ambiguous: they either tend to be too easily delimitable, or they are adaptive enough to be developed by several strains through natural selection independently of each other.
II 360
Definition classification (cladism): designed for the purpose of reflecting relative dimensions of similarity. Definition Phenetism: Another theory of classification, it focuses solely on the overall similarity and tries to evade the reproach of subjectivity by referring to a large number of features, all of which are expressed numerically and processed by the computer.
II 374
Definition "Telegony": features of long extinct ancestors reappear. "Descendants from afar." Telegony refers to the idea that a producer could influence offspring that were not conceived by him.
Definition "Pangenesis" 1868, provisionally developed by Darwin: Thesis: All cells of the body produce small particles called "Gemmulae", which circulate throughout the body, accumulate in the gametes and eventually transfer the features to the offspring.
GouldVs"Pangenesis: Since the "Gemmulae" can change, acquired features can be inherited, which would be Lamarckism.
II 377
Definition orthogenesis: The assumption that a pre-drawn path is followed.
IV 103
Doctrine of uniformity: (represented by Charles Lyell and James Hutton) the uppermost layers of the earth have remained unchanged for millions of years.
IV 153
Definition Monogeny: (19th century): Thesis: common ancestry of all humans from the ancestors Adam and Eve. (Lower races were later degenerated from original perfection). Definition Polygeny: (19th century): Thesis: Adam and Eve are only the ancestors of the white peoples.
IV 159
Definition subspecies: Population inhabiting a specific geographical area.
IV 357
Definition sympatric: at the same place Definition allopatric: in separate places (assuming that species can only develop separately).
III 19
The "Full House": Gould's central argument: natural reality is an accumulation of individuals in populations. Variation is not reducible but "real" in the sense that "the world" consists of it. Error: To always describe populations (according to Plato) as "average", which is then considered "typical".
III 67
The "Full House": the need to focus not only on an abstract measure of an average or a central tendency, but on the variation within whole systems. Error: likely outcome for a single individual to be considered as a measure of a central tendency.

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989

Theories Putnam VI 389
Theory/Putnam: earlier theories are limiting cases of later theories. - This is convergence. - That explains also why theoretical terms retain their reference.
VI 392
Ideal Theory/Putnam: if we can see the fulfillment-relation as unintended, it is useless to say that even the ideal theory "in reality" could be wrong. ---
I (a) 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the meaning. - Otherwise, the term gravity would change if a 10th planet was discovered. - In addition, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse.
I (b) 63
Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference.
I (c) 97
Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Theories Rorty IV 18
Instrument realism: (coming from Dewey): Ernest Nagel, Dummett, van Fraassen: distinction "believing x" and "using the term x heuristically" is completely irrelevant! Merely verbal. >Instrumentalism.
IV 37
Theory/concepts/Rorty: When developing our theories we came up with nothing better than the phraseology of neurophysiology. Therefore, we knew from the outset that neither greenness nor divine grace nor the class struggle would play a role when it came to explaining our acquisition of the expressions "green", "grace", or "class struggle". >Language Acquisition.
IV 35
Rorty: (also Mary Hesse): we will never get a meaning of the term "convergence" which also includes terms and beliefs. (But Williams, Nagel and Harman would need that). >Convergence.
IV 36
Theory of Science/convergence/"make true": tells us that Newton one day had the splendid idea of ​​gravitation. But it remains silent about how gravity managed that Newton came up with its term. I.e. how the world guides us.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vagueness Wright I 129f
Color/vagueness/Wright: shades could be characterized as "accepted" the description as "vague". One could denote something as "red", without being obliged to it. But should one say then that this has both mandatory and permissive moves? Or should we rather conclude that it is wrong to speak of "borderline cases" that permit decisions, but do not prescribe anything? Definition Vagueness: does not mean the existence of an "inbetween realm".
Vagueness/Wright: is rather the fact that the contrast between what "red" prescribes and that what "not red" prescribes, is not clear everywhere. Also ambiguous shades contrast with unambiguous. ((s) WittgensteinVs, sorites).
Vagueness/convergence/conditions/criteria/Wright: Could there not be a completely permissive discourse? It is clear that the contrast between conditions, that allow an assertion and such for which nothing applies, cannot be completely permissive itself.
  Otherwise, there could be no information without additional information. Nothing would be excluded by the "correctness" of such an information ("per se"). There would be nothing then in which this correctness could exist.
---
II 226f
Vagueness/sorites/Wright: the existence of borderline cases does not include blurred boundaries - blurred boundaries instead blurry in logical space - Frege/Russell: lack of our language - WrightVs: vague predicates merely partial functions - consistent with a sharp distinction between cases where applicable and where not - not lack of instruction, but demand I that the borders are not drawn - continuity of the world.
II 230
Not reflex of our mental weakness.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Boyd, R. Putnam Vs Boyd, R. Williams II 492
Scientific Realism/Richard Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd's defense of scientific realism is much more complex than what we have considered so far:
Williams II 493
Is a substantial (explanatory) truth concept necessary? Boyd: more indirect approach than Putnam: the (approximate) truth of our theories explains the instrumental reliability of our methods.
Method/Boyd: is not theory neutral! On the contrary, because they are formed by our theories, it is their truth that explains the success of the methods.
Boyd/M. Williams: thus it turns a well-known argument on its head: BoydVsPositivism.
Positivism/Theory: Thesis: the observing language must be theory neutral. The methodological principles likewise.
IdealismVsPositivism: VsTheory Neutrality. E.g. Kuhn: the scientific community determines the "facts".
Boyd/M. Williams: Boyd turns the >theory ladenness of our methodological judgments very cleverly into the base of his realism. Thesis: Methods that are as theory-laden as ours would not work if the corresponding theories were not "approximately true in a relevant way".
Point: thus he cannot be blamed of making an unacceptably rigid separation between theory and observation.
Ad. 1) Vs: this invalidates the first objection
Ad. 2) Vs: Boyd: it would be a miracle if our theory-laden methods functioned even though the theories proved to be false. For scientific realism, there is nothing to explain here.
Ad. 3) Vs:
Williams II 494
M. Williams: this is not VsScientific Realism, but VsPutnam: PutnamVsBoyd: arguments like that of Boyd do not establish a causal explanatory role for the truth concept.
BoydVsPutnam: they don't do that: "true" is only a conventional expression which adds no explanatory power to the scientific realism.
Truth/Explanation/Realism/Boyd/M. Williams: explaining the success of our methods with the truth of our theories boils down to saying that the methods by which we examine particles work, because the world is composed of such particles that are more or less the way we think.
Conclusion: but it makes no difference whether we explain this success (of our methods) by the truth of the theories or by the theories themselves!
M. Williams pro Deflationism: so we do not need a substantial truth concept.

Putnam I (c) 80
Convergence/Putnam: there is something to the convergence of scientific knowledge! Science/Theory/Richard Boyd: Thesis: from the usual positivist philosophy of science merely follows that later theories imply many observation sentences of earlier ones, but not that later theories must imply the approximate truth of the earlier ones! (1976).
Science/Boyd: (1) terms of a mature science typically refer
(2) The laws of a theory that belongs to a mature science are typically approximately true. (Boyd needs more premises).
I (c) 81
Boyd/Putnam: the most important thing about these findings is that the concepts of "truth" and "reference" play a causally explanatory role in epistemology. When replacing them in Boyd with operationalist concept, for example, "is simple and leads to true predictions", the explanation is not maintained.
Truth/Theory/Putnam: I do not only want to have theories that are "approximately true", but those that have the chance to be true.
Then the later theories must contain the laws of the earlier ones as a borderline case.
PutnamVsBoyd: according to him, I only know that T2 should imply most of my observation sentences that T1 implies. It does not follow that it must imply the truth of the laws of T1!
I (c) 82
Then there is also no reason why T2 should have the property that we can assign reference objects to the terms of T1 from the position of T2. E.g. Yet it is a fact that from the standpoint of the RT we can assign a reference object to the concept "gravity" in the Newtonian theory, but not to others: for example, phlogiston or ether.
With concepts such as "is easy" or "leads to true predictions" no analogue is given to the demand of reference.
I (c) 85/86
Truth/Boyd: what about truth if none of the expressions or predicates refers? Then the concept "truth value" becomes uninteresting for sentences containing theoretical concepts. So truth will also collapse. PutnamVsBoyd: this is perhaps not quite what would happen, but for that we need a detour via the following considerations:
I (c) 86
Intuitionism/Logic/Connectives/Putnam: the meaning of the classical connectives is reinterpreted in intuitionism: statements:
p p is asserted p is asserted to be provable

"~p" it is provable that a proof of p would imply the provability of 1 = 0. "~p" states the absurdity of the provability of p (and not the typical "falsity" of p).

"p u q" there is proof for p and there is proof for q

"p > q" there is a method that applied to any proof of p produces proof of q (and proof that this method does this).
I (c) 87
Special contrast to classical logic: "p v ~p" classical: means decidability of every statement.
Intuitionistically: there is no theorem here at all.
We now want to reinterpret the classical connectives intuitionistically:
~(classical) is identical with ~(intuitionist)
u (classical) is identified with u (intuitionist)
p v q (classical) is identified with ~(~p u ~q)(intuitionist)
p > q (classical) is identified with ~(p u ~q) (intuitionist)
So this is a translation of one calculus into the other, but not in the sense that the classical meanings of the connectives were presented using the intuitionistic concepts, but in the sense that the classical theorems are generated. ((s) Not translation, but generation.)
The meanings of the connectives are still not classical, because these meanings are explained by means of provability and not of truth or falsity (according to the reinterpretation)).
E.g. Classical means p v ~p: every statement is true or false.
Intuitionistically formulated: ~(~p u ~~p) means: it is absurd that a statement and its negation are both absurd. (Nothing of true or false!).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

WilliamsB I
Bernard Williams
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011

WilliamsM I
Michael Williams
Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001

WilliamsM II
Michael Williams
"Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Boyd, R. Rorty Vs Boyd, R. I 310
Def convergence/Boyd/Putnam/Rorty: reliability of a principle such as the following: one should examine in the light of the theoretical knowledge available, under which circumstances the causal assertions of the theory can plausibly go wrong, either because other causal mechanisms seem plausible, or because kinds of causal mechanisms already known come into conflict with the theory, namely in ways that theory can not foresee. Cf. >Reliability. Rorty: no one will have anything against that as long as Boyd does not claim we could explain why this principle leads to useful results only on the basis of a "realistic understanding of the relevant adjoining theories":
I 311
Boyd: Suppose, we advise each time which theories are particularly likely to fail experimentally. And suppose further, our conjectures apply exactly where the realist would expect it. What other explanation than realism is then still possible? It certainly is not the mere effect of conventionally or arbitraryly acquired scientific traditions. If the world is not shaped by our conventions, which no empiricist would accept, then the reliability of this principle can by no means be merely a matter of convention. RortyVsBoyd: he confuses two meanings of "reliability of a method":
a) the meaning, that a process is reliable in relation to an independent test (thermometer) with
b) the meaning that a process is reliable, because one can not imagine an alternative to it. The examination of a new theory by old ones is not an optional procedure. How else could we verify it?
Theory/Rorty: but a new theory is nothing more than a relatively minor change of a comprehensive network of convictions.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Convergence Theory Hacking Vs Convergence Theory I 102
HackingVs convergence theory: maximum cumulative growth, no focus on convergence. The depth of understanding and also the range of explanations can even increase without convergence.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Convergence Theory Tipler Vs Convergence Theory Gould IV 330
TiplerVsConvergence: For example, the most famous of all convergences was refuted: the "pinhole camera eye" of vertebrates and squids. Orenstein (supported by Tipler): common ancestor! GouldVsOrenstein: not very convincing. Orenstein does not even mention the most important argument in favour of convergence: Embryology: Squid eyes have developed from skin cells, the eyes of vertebrates are brain protuberances!

Tipler
Frank J. Tipler
The Physics of Immortality New York 1995

Gould I
Stephen Jay Gould
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980
German Edition:
Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009

Gould II
Stephen Jay Gould
Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983
German Edition:
Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991

Gould III
Stephen Jay Gould
Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996
German Edition:
Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004

Gould IV
Stephen Jay Gould
The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985
German Edition:
Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Feyerabend, P. Putnam Vs Feyerabend, P. V 156
Incommensurability/PutnamVsFeyerabend: PutnamVsIncommensurability thesis: it refutes itself. It states that the term E.g. "temperature" from the 17th century cannot be equated with ours in terms of meaning or reference. This thesis should apply for the observation language as well as for the so-called "theory language." >Incommensurability, >observation language. Feyerabend/language: our normal language is nothing more than a false theory. PutnamVsFeyerabend: we could not translate other languages or earlier stages of our own language, if this hypothesis was really true.
V 156/157
According to Feyerabend (and Kuhn when he is in particularly incommensurable mood) we could conceptually grasp the members of other cultures, including the scientists of the 17th century only as living beings that respond to stimuli (and that utter sounds that are similar to English or Italian in an oddly way). So more or less animals. PutnamVsFeyerabend/VsKuhn: it is totally inconsistent, if one wants to make us believe Galileo's concepts are "incommensurable", and then goes on to describe them in detail.
Smart pro Feyerabend: it is certainly a neutral fact that we need to aim with our telescope above this treetop here to see the Mercury, and not, as predicted by the Newtonian theory, above this chimney there.
However, Feyerabend could allow that we use Euclidean geometry and a non-relativistic optics for our theory of the telescope. He would say, although this is not the real truth about our telescope, the tree and the chimney, but it is still legitimate to do so.
PutnamVsSmart/PutnamVsFeyerabend: the difficulty is that you need to understand the language of Euclidean non-relativists at least partially, to be able to say that the predictions are the same.
How can I translate the logical particle ("if then", "no", etc.) from Italian of the 17th Century if I cannot find a translation manual?
---
V 158
Translation/Quine/Davidson: (VsKuhn, VsFeyerabend): first, it has to be admitted that we can find a translation scheme, what is the point then in this context, to say that the translation does not "really" capture meaning and reference of the original? The claim that the scheme does not exactly capture the meaning or reference of the original, can be understood in the light of the admission that one could find a better translation scheme. But it is only seemingly reasonable that all possible schemes should fail to capture the "real" meaning or reference.
V 160
Convergence/Putnam: is totally rejected by Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to that we do not increase our knowledge, the science is only making instrumentally "progress". (Technology). We are getting better in "transporting people from one place to another". PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: that too is incoherent: we can only understand the idea of the instrumental (technological) progress when such terms as "transport people from one place to another" maintain a certain degree of permanent reference.
---
I (c) 83
Electron/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: E.g. Bohr's electron refers according to the two to nothing. And only that because not all of Bohr's assumptions have been confirmed. PutnamVs.
I (c) 84
Principle of leap of faith/PutnamVsKuhn/PutnamVsFeyerabend: there is nothing that corresponds exactly to Bohr's electron, but they have mass and charge, and that is pretty much so. We must give leap of faith and treat Bohr as someone who refers to these particles. ((s) in order for scientists to able to engage in dialogue and to speak of the same entity.)

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J. Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
Brendel I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing states of affairs. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
Brendel I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.

Rorty II (b) 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II (b) 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II (b) 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.

II (d) 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II (d) 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II (d) 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts. >Biopower.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"

V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Putnam, H. Wright Vs Putnam, H. I 58
"Putnam's Equivalence"/(Wright): P is true if and only if P could be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances.
Convergence Demand/Putnam: no statement that is justified under epistemic ideal circumstances can be asserted simultaneously with its negation.
Wright: this is of course to be distinguished from the requirement for completeness: not all questions can be decided (quantum mechanics).
Wright: it seems here that even ideal epistemic circumstances cannot be neutral in relation to negation. ((s) Example (s) If the location of the electron cannot be fixed, that is not a negative statement about this or any other location.)
I 59
Negation/Minimalism: requires the usual negation equivalence: "It is not the case that "P" is true if and only if it is not the case that "P" is true.
This does not work for quantum mechanics.
WrightVsPutnam: the examples from quantum mechanics or mathematics (undecidability) are deadly for Putnam's approach. (Example generalized continuum hypothesis).
It certainly does not even apply to empirical statements a priori that each of them would be decidable under ideal circumstances.
I 60
(Thus confirmable or refutable). A priori/Minimalism/Wright: the minimum platitudes probably apply a priori.
WrightVsPutnam: so if Putnam's informal explanation would be a priori correct it has to be like this to be correct at all - then it would have to apply a priori that also the negation of a statement that cannot be justified under ideal circumstances (electron) would be justified.
Wright: exactly this cannot be the case a priori.
WrightVsPutnam: erroneously a priori claim. But it gets even worse: the extension of the argumentation destroys any attempt to determine truth as essentially independent of evidence (>quantum mechanics/Putnam).
Anti-Realism, Semantic/Evidence: in contrast to Putnam, may now be satisfied with a "one-way street": (EC, epistemic restriction):
EC If P is true, then there is evidence that it is.
Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: Truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of logic.
I 64
WrightVsPutnam: he must make intuitive revisions.
I 66
Def Truth/Peirce: that which is justified at an ideal limit of recognition when all empirical information has been obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one simply cannot know when one has all the information! Wright ditto
I 68/69
Def Superassertibility: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrary verification of its ancestry and arbitrary extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear".

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Realism Nietzsche Vs Realism Rorty V 30
NietzscheVsRealism/Rorty: the human character passes its test if it is able to live with the notion that there is no convergence.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Realism Putnam Vs Realism I (c) 96/97
Realism/Putnam: argues ultimately that science should be taken "at face value", given the failure of all serious programs by philosophical reinterpretation of sciences without philosophical reinterpretation and that science, "taken at face value" implies realism. Realism is sort of "scientific theory of science".
VsRealism: could be cited (in the absence of convergence) at the most that the realism would be refuted diachronically.
---
I (i) 243
PutnamVsRelativism/PutnamVsRealism: both claim at the same time to be able to exist inside and outside the language. The Realism thus does not refute itself because it adopts a "perspective of God" anyway.
But Relativism refutes itself with that.
I (i) 249
PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism: both see the world as a product Realism: the world is a product ex nihilo.
Relativism: product of our culture.
Putnam: but the world is not a "product", it is only the world.

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Sellars, W. Putnam Vs Sellars, W. III 131
Map/Sellars: unlike truth and reference: our normal linguistic schemata map the world more or less adequate. Some schemes are more adequate than others, although they are in no objective semantic relationship to the world. This has led to a split in the students of Sellars: Sellarean Left: Rorty waives the notion of mapping.
PutnamVsSellars: does not explain how the picture would be possible for the frame of the ideal scientific scheme.
III 132
To make a "perspective", characters and sounds have to map something. To give an objective description, they have to describe something. Absolute View/Williams: it will tell us, but not necessarily foreign researchers, how we understand this view.
Putnam: So the "theory of error" is not provided by the absolute view, but from the "local perspective". Be it a perspective that is characterized by the absolute view. Does Williams claim that the existence of the absolute view is a member of our local perspective? Rorty could even agree on this.
---
I (c) 96
Realism/theory/science/Peirce/Sellars: both try to maintain the idea that the theory B1 - (B) A statement may be wrong, even if it follows from our theory (or our theory plus the set of true observation sentences)
  - Could be wrong (yes, sooner or later turn out to be incorrect) without using a realistic concept of truth by not having identified them with present justified assertibility but with ideally justified assertibility.
That is what both consider the meaning of the assertion, the Venus could also have no carbon dioxide.
Realism/truth/PutnamVsPeirce/PutnamVsSellars: However, this presupposes that we sensibly fill the concept of "ideal limit" without a frame of spacetime localizations, objects, etc. and can specify the conditions for science. And that does not work. Besides, it also requires convergence.
If there is no convergence, (so just more frequent cases of failure of convergence than of success) as Kuhn and Feyerabend believe, then the "ideal limit" is treated as badly as the realism.

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Smart, J. C. Peacocke Vs Smart, J. C. I 103
Instrument/Smart: (Between Science and Philosophy, 1969) Thesis: extension of the senses. We du use theory, but it corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects at a distance. PeacockeVsSmart: nevertheless, the cases are different from the perspective of the subject: for seeing a number of objects in the distance we do not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc. Even if you have these concepts, they are not analogous to the epistemic possibility I 104 which are needed like active current for theoretical concepts. "Extension of the senses" should not be merely metaphorical. But this would require the existence of a way of thinking, that there is a physical property x [a current flows through x], and that it is not epistemically possible that under normal circumstances..., etc. and yet there is no current. I am not saying that such concepts are impossible, but this is about different concepts. Those concepts would take other places in the net of epistemic possibility. Better instruments never give us new concepts by themselves. ((s) We would also need to know that they are better or that e.g. that a higher resolution of a microscope simply shows similar structures in a better way, and not entirely new structures. >Presupposition.)

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Tradition Castaneda Vs Tradition Frank I 342
Proposition/Tradition/Castaneda: its strength: that all of these entities which this theory equates must somehow converge. If language is to be an efficient means of thinking, then meaning and thought content must coincide.
I 343
Belief/Intention/Tradition: their contents should coincide. Frege: what can be believed can also be demanded, commanded, required, requested, etc.
CastanedaVs: that seems to be synchronically successful, but it lacks dynamism.
The discrepancies between the different entities involved in proposition ((i) - (vii) emerge when we consider the diachronic river, where one undergoes changing experiences about a constantly changing world.
In particular, we must have direct contact with the world in order to locate ourselves in it.
This is precisely the role of the indexical reference.
Propositions/CastanedaVsTradition: classical propositionality theory fails with indexical reference when it encounters experiences with "here", "now", "I", "he", etc.
I 345
Thinking/Language/Proposition/CastanedaVsTradition: we seem to have assumed that thinking is embodied by symbolic activity. While thinking one somehow produces an illustrative token; since it happens both when thinking aloud and in silence, there has to be some brain pattern.
I 346
The distinction between episodes of production of sentences and episodes of thinking is already made in the theory itself: therefore it postulates the convergence of sentence meaning and thought content. The propositionality theory does not have to identify a thinking episode ,that p, with an event in the brain or in the entire body. It is not about the body-soul problem.
Vs: the required application of this distinction breaks the elegant arrangement of the coincident units:
the distinction between a symbolic system and its application! This is Saussure’s distinction between langue/parole. This accomodates the dynamics of language and is itself not dangerous for the propositionality theory.
But: Problem: the distinction between knowing the meaning and correct use exists! This is not a problem in most cases, but:
I 347
E.g. "I have 30 grams of nitrogen compounds in my liver": we may understand the sentence, but we do not know whether someone expresses a truth or falsity with it.

Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Wiggins, D. Wright Vs Wiggins, D. I 231
Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition:
If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X.
Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum.
I 233
WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme:
For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P.
I 234
Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12.
(ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of.
Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure!
I 235
Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them.
The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence.
WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do:
Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"!
Then it just says:
I 235/236
"for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers.
Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules.
((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.).
I 237
WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner.
Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed.
I 238
Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive.
According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable):
(i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable.
(ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P.
Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition.
However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Wright, Cr. Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. VI 40
WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other.
Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive.
RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations.
1) to justify actions, and
2) another obligation to do the right thing.
It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another.
Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed.
Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation."
VI 41
"Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration.
RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given?
E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard.
VI 42
I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart.
VI 42/43
Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property".
Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences.
VI 45
Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input."
VI 46
Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse!
VI 46/47
Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines!
Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner.
What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content).
VI 48
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale.
VI 48/49
Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it.
Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term.
VI 50
WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell.
McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists:
VI 51
struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral).
Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general".
Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell).
We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion.
Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction.
Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint".
World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution.
VI 52
True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson).
VI 56
PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Miracle Lewis, D. V 49
Divergence / convergence / asymmetry / Lewis: what makes convergence a miracle (unlikely) is the asymmetry of overdetermination:
V 50
Whatever happens, is leaving many and highly distributed traces in the world of the future. They are hardly ever afterwards brought together again, but that does not matter, as long as they exist.
Ethics Mackie, J.L. Put V 276
Ethics/Mackie thesis: The good is ontologically "strange": you cannot know that something is good without having a "pro attitude" towards that something. This amounts to assuming emotivism in order to prove it. It also presupposes that there is A TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is incorrect, there are also cases of deliberate contravention.
Philippa Foot: You can even aim to be a bad person.
V 277
The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad function of vocabulary! The fact that "good" is used to recommend does not mean that it is not a property!
Stegm IV 266
Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Thesis: Primacy of rights over duties and goals.
IV 286
Moral/Ethics/Mackie: Problem: Exceptions for animals, sick, disabled, old.
IV 287
Thesis: Here we have to develop a humane attitude that makes us wish that people and animals are well. (Disposition).
IV 287
Moral/Ethics/Mackie: neither teleological nor deontological: rather methodological! Without reference to mythical entities such as "objective values", obligations and "transcendental necessities".
IV 288
Self-love is a positive value for Mackie.
IV 288/289
He hopes that "utilitarianism", "law" and "egoism" will result in one and the same thing. ">Convergence optimism.

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Convergence Putnam, H. Horwich I 389
Convergence / theory / Putnam: Thesis: earlier theories are special cases (borderline cases, limiting cases?) of later theories. This makes it possible to understand theoretical terms (TT) as retaining their reference beyond the theory change.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Instrument Smart, J.C. Peacocke I 103
Instrument / Smart: (Between Science and Philosophiy, 1969) Thesis: the i. is an extension of the senses. We probably use a theory, but this corresponds to the theory that we use when we perceive objects in the distance.   PeacockeVsSmart: yet the cases from the point of view of the subject are different: for seeing a number of objects in the distance one does not need the concept of convergence, corresponding retinal points, etc.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Convergence Willams, B. Rorty IV 32
Convergence / Bernard Williams thesis in scientific investigations, there should be in the ideal case, a converging approximation to an answer.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Convergence Nagel, E Hacking I 119
Ernest Nagel: These Erkenntnis hat die Tendenz zur Akkumulation - eine neue Theorie subsumiert ältere Theorien. KuhnVs.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996