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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Income | Sraffa | Kurz I 151 Income/Sraffa/James Mill/Kurz: Sraffa saw that, several differences notwithstanding, the contributions of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and many other authors exhibited a similar orientation and analytical structure and sought to explain all shares of income other than wages in terms of the surplus product within a circular flow framework of the analysis. In Sraffa's interpretation, physical real cost held the key to the classical approach to the problem of value. He saw this view corroborated in the writings of numerous authors. A particularly clear expression of it had been given by James Mill ([1821] 1826(1), 165), Who had insisted that, in the last instance, "the agents of production are the commodities themselves They are the food of the labourer, the tools and the machinery with which he works, and the raw materials which he works upon." Or, as Sraffa stressed toward the end of 1927, "the sort of 'costs' which determines values is the collection of material things used up in production" (D3/12/7: 106)(2). And, "the fundamental force is physical real cost," which, however, is "seen only in general equilibrium" (D3/12/42: 46)(2). The reference to "general equilibrium" was close at hand, because with the "Production of Commodities by Commodities," as Sraffa for a considerable time intended to title the book he was in the process of composing, echoing Mill's dictum above, the determination of values involved solving a set of simultaneous equations. 1. James Mill. 1821. The History of British India in 6 vols. (3rd edition) (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826). 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Sraffa I Piero Sraffa Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge 1960 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Income | Van Parijs | Gaus I 128 Income/wages/salaries/labour/jobs/Van Parijs/Gaus/Mack: Steiner, and most left-libertarians, (...) uphold some form of substantial income redistribution on the grounds of a claim by each to an equal share in natural resources. >Income/Hillel Steiner. Unique to Van Parij's left libertarianism is a 'massive extension' of the scope of resources to be redistributed (taxed) by including job assets as an external resource (Van Parijs, 2003(1): 206). More specifically, Van Parijs seeks to identify and capture the employment 'rents' associated with jobs. (On the idea of rents, see Mack, 1992)(2) >Jobs/Van Parijs. 1. Van Parijs, Philippe (2003) 'Hybrid justice, patriotism and democracy'. In Real Liberterianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, ed. Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave: 201—214. 2. Mack, Eric (1992) 'Gauthier on rights and economic rents'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 9: 171-200. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Income | Steiner | Gaus I 128 Income/wages/salaries/labour/Hillel Steiner/Gaus/Mack: Steiner, and most left-libertarians, (...) uphold some form of substantial income redistribution on the grounds of a claim by each to an equal share in natural resources. Cf. >Justice/Steiner, >Property/Steiner. Unique to Van Parij's left libertarianism is a 'massive extension' of the scope of resources to be redistributed (taxed) by including job assets as an external resource (Van Parijs, 2003(1): 206). 1. Van Parijs, Philippe (2003) 'Hybrid justice, patriotism and democracy'. In Real Liberterianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, ed. Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams. Houndsmill, Basingstoke: Palgrave: 201—214. Mack, Eric and Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Income | Okin | Gaus I 234 Income/family/politics/feminism/Okin/Lamont: the feminist field has been unprecedented in its diversity, yet remarkably a common theme has emerged, usually expressed under the motto 'the personal is political'. These feminists argue that liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference. There are many versions of this criticism, but perhaps the best developed is Susan Moller Okin's (1989(1): 128—30), which documents the effects of the institution of the nuclear family. She argues that the consequence of this institution is a position of systematic material and political inequality for women. Okin demonstrates, for example, that women have substantial disadvantages competing in the market because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equally shared with men. As a consequence, any Gaus I 235 theory relying on market mechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems which result in women systematically having less income and wealth than men. FiminismVsLiberalism: the theoretical trouble for liberalism is that in its respect for individual liberty, and in its insistence on government neutrality, it cannot even recognize the inequalities in the economic or political positions of women as unjust, since these inequalities result from the combined effect of many individual choices (Hampton, 1997(2): 200—8; MacKinnon, 1987(3): 36). 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1989) Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Harper Collins. 2. Hampton, Jean (1997) Political Philosophy. Oxford: Westview. 3. MacKinnon, Catherine A. (1987) Feminism Unmodified: Discourses of Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lamont, Julian 2004. „Distributive Justice“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Income | Rothbard | Rothbard III 208 Income/trade/exchange/Rothbard: (…) the consumer must have money in his cash balance in order to spend it on consumers’ goods, and, likewise, the producer must have the original money to invest in factors. Where does the consumer get the money? (…) in the last analysis he must have obtained it from the sale of some productive service. (…) laborers and landowners use the money thus obtained to buy the final products of the production system. The capitalist-producers also receive income at each stage of the production process. (…) the net incomes accruing to the owners of capital goods are not simply the result of the contribution to production by the capital goods, since these capital goods are in turn the products of other factors. Producers: Where, then, do the producers acquire their money for investment? Clearly, from the same sources only. From the income acquired in production, individuals can, in addition to buying consumers’ goods, purchase factors of production and engage in the productive process as producers of a good that is not simply their own labour service. Rothbard III 209 Investments: In order to obtain the money for investment, then, an individual must save money by restricting his possible consumption expenditures. >Loans/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Investments, >Factors of production/Rothbard, >Consumption. Rothbard III 300 Income/Rothbard: Everyone attempts to maximize the [psychic income], which includes on its value scale a vast range of all consumers’ goods, both exchangeable and nonexchangeable. Exchangeable goods: exchangeable goods are generally in the monetary nexus, and therefore can be purchased for money, whereas nonexchangeable goods are not. We have indicated some of the consequences of the fact that it is psychic and not monetary income that is being maximized, and how this introduces qualifications into the expenditure of effort or labor and in the investment in producers’ goods. >Action/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard, >Exchange/Rothbard. Subjectivity: It is also true that psychic income, being purely subjective, cannot be measured. Utility/praxeology: Further, from the standpoint of praxeology, we cannot even ordinally compare the psychic income or utility of one person with that of another. We cannot say that A’s income or “utility” is greater than B’s. We can - at least, theoretically - measure monetary incomes by adding the amount of money income each person obtains, but this is by no means a measure of psychic income. Furthermore, it does not, as we perhaps might think, give any exact indication of the amount of services that each individual obtains purely from exchangeable consumers’ goods. An income of 50 ounces of gold in one year may not, and most likely will not, mean the same to him in terms of services from exchangeable goods as an income of 50 ounces in some other year. The purchasing power of money in terms of all other commodities is continually changing, and there is no way to measure such changes. Rothbard III 301 Purchasing power: Even if we confine ourselves to the same period, monetary incomes are not an infallible guide. There are, for example, many consumers’ goods that are obtainable both through monetary exchange and outside the money nexus. Psychic income: Neither can we measure psychic incomes if we confine ourselves to goods in the monetary nexus. Utility/marginal utility: It follows that the law of the diminishing marginal utility of money applies only to the valuations of each individual person. There can be no comparison of such utility between persons. Thus, we cannot, as some writers have done, assert that an extra dollar is enjoyed less by a Rockefeller than by a poor man. If Rockefeller were suddenly to become poor, each dollar would be worth more to him than it is now; similarly, if the poor man were to become rich, his value scales remaining the same, each dollar would be worth less than it is now. >Marginal utility of money/Rothbard, >Marginal utility/Rothbard. Rothbard III 533 Income/business/profit/Rothbard: Are “capital gains” - increases in capital value - income? If we fully realize that profits and capital gains, and losses and capital losses, are identical, the solution becomes clear. No one would exclude business profits from money income. The same should be true of capital gains. >Business/Rothbard, >Economy/Rothbard, >Production/Rothbard, >Production structure/Rothbard, >Profit/Rothbard, >Rate of profit/Rothbard, >Gain and Loss/Rothbard. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Income | Mill | Kurz I 151 Income/Sraffa/James Mill/Kurz: Sraffa saw that, several differences notwithstanding, the contributions of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and many other authors exhibited a similar orientation and analytical structure and sought to explain all shares of income other than wages in terms of the surplus product within a circular flow framework of the analysis. In Sraffa's interpretation, physical real cost held the key to the classical approach to the problem of value. He saw this view corroborated in the writings of numerous authors. A particularly clear expression of it had been given by James Mill ([1821] 1826(1), 165), Who had insisted that, in the last instance, "the agents of production are the commodities themselves They are the food of the labourer, the tools and the machinery with which he works, and the raw materials which he works upon." Or, as Sraffa stressed toward the end of 1927, "the sort of 'costs' which determines values is the collection of material things used up in production" (D3/12/7: 106)(2). And, "the fundamental force is physical real cost," which, however, is "seen only in general equilibrium" (D3/12/42: 46)(2). The reference to "general equilibrium" was close at hand, because with the "Production of Commodities by Commodities," as Sraffa for a considerable time intended to title the book he was in the process of composing, echoing Mill's dictum above, the determination of values involved solving a set of simultaneous equations. 1. James Mill. 1821. The History of British India in 6 vols. (3rd edition) (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1826). 2. Taken from the work Sraffa carried out in the period 1927–1931 (unpublished papers). Kurz, Heinz D. „Keynes, Sraffa, and the latter’s “secret skepticism“. In: Kurz, Heinz; Salvadori, Neri 2015. Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). London, UK: Routledge. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Mill Ja I James Mill Commerce Defended: An Answer to the Arguments by which Mr. Spence, Mr. Cobbett, and Others, Have Attempted to Prove that Commerce is Not a Source of National Wealth 1808 Kurz I Heinz D. Kurz Neri Salvadori Revisiting Classical Economics: Studies in Long-Period Analysis (Routledge Studies in the History of Economics). Routledge. London 2015 |
| Income | Robinson | Harcourt I 210 Income/Robinson/Harcourt: In any given situation, with given productive capacity in existence, a higher rate of investment brings about a higher level of total gross income (through a higher level of employment of labour and utilization of plant) and a higher share of gross profit in gross income (by pushing up prices relatively to money-wage rates). Thus, within reason, investment generates the saving that it requires. (Robinson [1965b(1)], p. 177.) >Investment, >Saving. 1. Robinson, Joan [1965b] Collected Economic Papers, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). |
EconRobin I James A. Robinson James A. Acemoglu Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012 Robinson I Jan Robinson An Essay on Marxian Economics London 1947 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quine, W.V.O. | Verschiedene Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Davidson I 55 CreswellVsQuine: he had a realm of reified experiences or phenomena facing an unexplored reality. Davidson pro - - QuineVsCresswell >Quine III) Kanitscheider II 23 Ontology/language/human/Kanitschneider: the linguistic products of the organism are in no way separated from its producer by an ontological gap. Ideas are certain neuronal patterns in the organism. KanitscheiderVsQuine: Weak point: his empiricism. One must therefore view his epistemology more as a research programme. Quine VI 36 VsQuine: I've been told that the question "What is there?" is always a question of fact and not just a linguistic problem. That is correct. QuineVsVs: but saying or assuming what there is remains a linguistic matter and here the bound variables are in place. VI 51 Meaning/Quine: the search for it should start with the whole sentences. VsQuine: the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation leads directly to behaviorism. Others: it leads to a reductio ad absurdum of Quine's own behaviorism. VI 52 Translation Indeterminacy/Quine: it actually leads to behaviorism, which there is no way around. Behaviorism/Quine: in psychology one still has the choice whether one wants to be a behaviorist, in linguistics one is forced to be one. One acquires language through the behavior of others, which is evaluated in the light of a common situation. It literally does not matter what other kind psychological life is! Semantics/Quine: therefore no more will be able to enter into the semantic meaning than what can also be inferred from perceptible behaviour in observable situations Quine XI 146 Deputy function/Quine/Lauener: does not have to be unambiguous at all. E.g. characterisation of persons on the basis of their income: here different values are assigned to an argument. For this we need a background theory: We map the universe U in V so that both the objects of U and their substitutes are included in V. If V forms a subset of U, U itself can be represented as background theory within which their own ontological reduction is described. XI 147 VsQuine: this is no reduction at all, because then the objects must exist. QuineVsVs: this is comparable to a reductio ad absurdum: if we want to show that a part of U is superfluous, we can assume U for the duration of the argument. (>Ontology/Reduction). Lauener: this brings us to ontological relativity. Löwenheim/Ontology/Reduction/Quine/Lauener: if a theory of its own requires an overcountable range, we can no longer present a proxy function that would allow a reduction to a countable range. For this one needed a much stronger frame theory, which then could no longer be discussed away as reductio ad absurdum according to Quine's proposal. Quine X 83 Logical Truth/Validity/Quine: our insertion definitions (sentences instead of sets) use a concept of truth and fulfillment that goes beyond the framework of object language. This dependence on the concept of ((s) simple) truth, by the way, would also concern the model definition of validity and logical truth. Therefore we have reason to look at a 3rd possibility of the definition of validity and logical truth: it gets by without the concepts of truth and fulfillment: we need the completeness theorem ((s) >provability). Solution: we can simply define the steps that form a complete method of proof and then: Def Valid Schema/Quine: is one that can be proven with such steps. Def Logically True/Quine: as before: a sentence resulting from a valid schema by inserting it instead of its simple sentences. Proof Procedure/Evidence Method/Quine: some complete ones do not necessarily refer to schemata, but can also be applied directly to the propositions, X 84 namely those that emerge from the scheme by insertion. Such methods generate true sentences directly from other true sentences. Then we can leave aside schemata and validity and define logical truth as the sentence generated by these proofs. 1st VsQuine: this tends to trigger protest: the property "to be provable by a certain method of evidence" is uninteresting in itself. It is interesting only because of the completeness theorem, which allows to equate provability with logical truth! 2. VsQuine: if one defines logical truth indirectly by referring to a suitable method of proof, one deprives the completeness theorem of its ground. It becomes empty of content. QuineVsVs: the danger does not exist at all: The sentence of completeness in the formulation (B) does not depend on how we define logical truth, because it is not mentioned at all! Part of its meaning, however, is that it shows that we can define logical truth by merely describing the method of proof, without losing anything of what makes logical truth interesting in the first place. Equivalence/Quine: important are theorems, which state an equivalence between quite different formulations of a concept - here the logical truth. Which formulation is then called the official definition is less important. But even mere terms can be better or worse. Validity/logical truth/definition/Quine: the elementary definition has the advantage that it is relevant for more neighboring problems. 3. VsQuine: with the great arbitrariness of the choice of the evidence procedure it cannot be excluded that the essence of the logical truth is not grasped. QuineVsVs: how arbitrary is the choice actually? It describes the procedure and talks about strings of characters. In this respect it corresponds to the sentence. Insertion definition: it moves effectively at the level of the elementary number theory. And it stays at the level, while the other definition uses the concept of truth. That is a big difference. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Various Authors | Fraassen Vs Various Authors | Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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