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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electoral Systems | Persson | Mause I 286 Majority Election/Proportional Representation/voting system/fiscal policy/Persson/Tabellini: in a simplified probabilistic model of Persson and Tabellini (Persson & Tabellini 1999)(1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2), the main difference between the electoral systems was in the election programmes of the parties. Idealization adopted only one constituency for the proportional representation system. Proportional Representation: Here, the fiscal policy programmes are designed to address at least 50% of the voters necessary to win the election. Here the model predicts higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution. Majority voting: only 50% of the votes are required in a relative majority of constituencies. Therefore, a party can theoretically win a majority of seats in parliament by as little as 25% of all votes. Therefore, the election campaign here focuses on a few constituencies. As a result, public expenditure on public goods, which actually benefits a majority of voters, will be reduced. The predictions of the model of Persson and Tabellini were empirically confirmed in the following period.(3)(4) >Political elections, >Electoral rules, >Democracy, >Parliamentary system. 1. Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699–735. 2. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. 3. Torsten Persson, Torsten, und Guido Tabellini, The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge 2003. 4. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, und Carsten Wolf. 2009. The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating – And extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139: 197– 225. |
EconPerss I Torsten Persson Guido Tabellini The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Electoral Systems | Tabellini | Mause I 286 Majority Election/Proportional Representation/voting system/fiscal policy/Persson/Tabellini: in a simplified probabilistic model of Persson and Tabellini (Persson & Tabellini 1999) (1) (Persson & Tabellini 2000) (2), the main difference between the electoral systems was in the election programmes of the parties. Idealization adopted only one constituency for the proportional representation system. Proportional Representation: Here, the fiscal policy programmes are designed to address at least 50% of the voters necessary to win the election. Here the model predicts higher expenditure on public goods and redistribution. Majority voting: only 50% of the votes are required in a relative majority of constituencies. Therefore, a party can theoretically win a majority of seats in parliament by as little as 25% of all votes. Therefore, the election campaign here focuses on a few constituencies. As a result, public expenditure on public goods, which actually benefits a majority of voters, will be reduced. The predictions of the model of Persson and Tabellini were empirically confirmed in the following period.(3)(4) >Financial policy. 1.Torsten Persson &Guido Tabellini. 1999. The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians. European Economic Review 43( 4– 6): 699– 735. 2.Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political economics. Explaining economic policy. Cambridge 2000. 3.Torsten Persson, Torsten, und Guido Tabellini, The economic effects of constitutions. Cambridge 2003. 4. Lorenz Blume, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, und Carsten Wolf. 2009. The economic effects of constitutions: Replicating – And extending – Persson and Tabellini. Public Choice 139: 197– 225. |
EconTabell I Guido Tabellini Torsten Persson The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians 1999 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Electoral Systems | Policy of the United States | Levitsky I 48 Electoral Systems/Policy of the United States/Levitsky/Ziblatt: The American presidents (...) are not members of parliament, and they are not elected by Congress. Levitsky I 49 Dilemma: On the one hand, [the authors of the American Constitution] did not want to install a monarch at the head of the state, but an elected president, one who fulfilled their idea of a republican people's government and reflected the will of the people. On the other hand, they did not fully trust the people's ability to decide whether a candidate was suitable for office. >Political Elections/Hamilton. Levitsky I 50 Political Parties: The rise of political parties in the early 19th century changed the way our electoral system functions. The electors became party representatives, which means that the electoral college handed over its guardian function to the parties, which have kept it ever since. Parties thus became the guardians of American democracy. Levitsky I 51 19th century: Delegates were not elected by the people, but were sent by local and state party committees, and they were not tied to any particular candidate. However, they usually followed the instructions of the party leaders, who sent them to the convents(1). Levitsky I 52 Solution: In the Progressive Era (the 1890s to 1920s), primary elections were introduced, first in Wisconsin in 1901; in 1916, primary elections were held in two dozen states. Problem: (...) [these primaries] changed little, partly because this tool was not used in many states, but mainly because delegates were not required to support the successful candidate in the primary. Levitsky I 60 20th century: The so-called Battle of Michigan Avenue encroached upon the Congress Hall itself. In his nomination speech for anti-war candidate George McGovern, Senator Abraham Ribicoff from Connecticut condemned the "gestapo methods" of the Chicago police, looking directly at Mayor Daley - live on television. NBC presenter Chet Huntley, who watched in horror, exclaimed: "This is certainly the first time that police officers have ever entered a convention hall. His co-host David Brinkley added: "In the United States."(2) The events in Chicago triggered a profound reform. Since the political system was at stake, the party felt compelled to fundamentally revise the nomination process for presidential candidates (3) (...). The result was a system of binding pre-elections. Since 1972, the vast majority of Democratic and Republican convention delegates have been elected in state primaries and caucuses (party conferences). A preliminary selection of delegates is made by the candidates for the presidential candidacy themselves in order to be sure of their loyalty. >Political Parties/Levitsky/Ziblatt, >Political Elections/Alexander Hamilton. 1. James W. Ceaser, Reforming the Reforms. A Critical Analysis of the Presidential Selection Process, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982, p. 19-21. 2. »A Look Back at the 1968 Democratic Convention«, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aUKzSsVmnpY, last retrieved on 11/05 2017. 3. Ceaser, Presidential Selection, p. 273. |
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