Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Irrationality | Weber | Habermas III 259 Irrationality/Weber/Habermas: Weber is interested in the origin of that irrational element which lies in giving oneself to professional work in a way that is incomprehensible from the standpoint of self-interest and which is characteristic of capitalist culture.(1) >Interest, >Culture, >Capitalism, >Explanation. Habermas III 260 Inner world asceticism/Weber/Habermas: of the individual in dealing with his/her own subjective nature as with the interaction partners corresponds to the blindness of obedience to God's per se irrational decision. >Interaction, >Subjectivity, >Obedience. Habermas: when the life form has irrational features, and not just a cultural peculiarity III 261 then they are actually on the same level as rationality. This contradiction can only be resolved if one can prove the merely partial, i.e. incomplete character of this historical form of ethical rationalization. >Rationality, >Rationalization. 1.M.Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I Tübingen, 1963, p. 259. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirationalism | Black Vs Antirationalism | III 33 Cause/Reason/Rationality/Black: Reasons must also be applied correctly! They must be "good reasons". Irrationality/Anti-Rationality/Black: the punishment for it can be damage, injury or extinction. III 34 VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: Just because our Skepticus is still alive we can now assume that he applies at least proto-rationality. Canonical form: (of this argument): "You should respect fundamental reasons, because otherwise you expose yourself to frustration, pain or death." Skepticus/Black: has the choice to "imitate" an animal with its reflexes. Namely, by trusting his own reflexes. VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: consequently, he would have to be completely weak-willed, and distrust all social ties. He would be without friends! Circularity/Black: so far, there is nothing circular about our argument. Reasoning/Black: for us here the first step (the assumption of proto-rationality) is of extreme importance. We can then infer on wider rationality. ((s)VsBlack: Why actually, animals also stop after quasi-rationality? His argument therefore leads to the difficulty of distinguishing humans and animals or finding a reason why intelligent life has developed.) BlackVsVs: for expansion we assume social skills. III 35 That means that something is involved in his dealings with others. III 36 Rationality/Black: As a child you had no choice of wanting to be rational or not, but as an adult you do. VsAnti-Rationality/Black: the price for this is high, but: one would have to become the pet of someone else. Cleansing oneself of reason would lead to a catatonic (apathetic) state. You would only live in the immediate present. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Ayer, A. J. | Black Vs Ayer, A. J. | III 25 Rationality/Circularity/Self-justification/Reasoning/RationalityVsVs/Black: what we need is proof that what we regard as rational practice (procedure), is truly rational. That our idea of good evidence is correct. Problem: purely formal evidence would not be applicable for it, and everything else would not answer the question. That does not mean that the inductive method is irrational within science. It just might be irrational if there were a standard of rationality which would not be achieved. In fact, rationalitysets the standard itself according to which arguments are valued as rational or irrational. (Baltimore, 1956, S 75). Ayer/Black: does not speak explicitl about of our problem with rationality, but his argument can be transferred to it. He could then say: Rationality/Ayer/Black: he might say: no proof is possible, because nothing is allowed at this stage as evidence. Ayer: if it is clear that there can be no logical superior law, then it should not be worrying that something can be decisive in its own right. III 26 Science/Rationality/Justification/Self-affirmation/Ayer/Black: Ayer’s view then leads to the following: scientific method is what scientists accept as what justifies the conclusions accepted by them. Belief/Justification/Standard/Black: Our standard for the justification of our beliefs (in science) is an appeal to good reasons. ((s)> "good scientific practice"). Standard/Evidence/Justification/Ayer: but there is no proof for the quality of the standard itself. Important argument: the result is that even if experience shows that relying on reasons is not sufficient in some areas, that our ongoing reliance on reasons was not even discredited by that in the same area. BlackVsAyer: unlike himself, I find that indeed very troubling! Because I believe that it supports the irrationalist. Irrationalism/VsRationalism/Black: From this position, one can say that if there are no reasons for rationality, there is no reason against irrationality. Then there is also no possibility for relativism (cultural relativism), to defend itself against a serious revolt against the standards (i.e. also against culture-specific standards). |
Max Black I Black Bedeutung und Intention aus "Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Georg Meggle (Hrsg) Frankf/M 1979 II Black Sprache München 1973 III Black The Prevalence of Humbug ornell University Press Ithaka/London 1983 |
| Popper, K. | Black Vs Popper, K. | III 26 Rationality/Popper/Black: (Popper, "Utopia and Violence" in Conjectures and Refutations, London, 1963, p. 356 57). Def Rationalism/Popper: Thesis: a rationalist is someone who seeks to obtain decisions through arguments and perhaps also through compromise rather than by force. Rationality/Self-affirmation/Ultimate justification/Popper: my rationalism is not completed (is not based on itself, is not justified by itself), but it is based on an irrational belief in the attitude of reasonableness. I do not see how you can go beyond that. III 27 Popper/Black: refers to "irrational" here in attenuated the sense of "not rational". Rationality/Rationalism/Popper: I cannot prove my rationalism rationally, I chose it because I hate violence. And I do not fool myself to bleieve that I could justify this hatred rationally. PoppervsAnti-Rationalism/RationalismVsVs/Black: Popper’s response to the anti-rationalists might go like this: "Why you should be rational? There is no "should". There are not even reasons here. You have the choice between being rational and exercising violence, if you, like me, hate violence, you will choose reason, if not, you won’t. That’s all. BlackVsPopper: it is worth noting here that Popper gives no reasons against violence either! A terrorist could respond, "Bravo! Just like you, I believe that there are no ultimate reasons for my irrationality. The difference between us is the same as the difference III 28 between Protestants and Catholics. My faith is your heresy and vice versa. Rationality/BlackVsPopper: it may well be defended rationally (see below). |
Max Black I Black Bedeutung und Intention aus "Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Georg Meggle (Hrsg) Frankf/M 1979 II Black Sprache München 1973 III Black The Prevalence of Humbug ornell University Press Ithaka/London 1983 |
| Skepticism | McGinn Vs Skepticism | I174 Skepticism: a) first person perspective: limits to my knowledge coincide with the limits of my phenomenal experience. b) third person perspective: biological limit. How can we as a few pounds of meat permeated by nerve get an image of the outside world? I 176 McGinnVsSkepticism: uses the idea that there is a metaphysical gap between the subject and the object of knowledge. a) for the first-person stance: between the states of consciousness and the conditions in the outside world. b) for the third person: the gap is to be perceived as if a part of the objective world opposed another part of the world, while both parts each have their own characteristics. We need to prove that despite these gaps knowledge is possible, and that the gaps are not as detrimental to knowledge as it seems. I 191 McGinnVsSkepticism: its brittle core consists of two problematic ideas: 1. The idea of a possible content of attentive consciousness. 2. concept of the rationality of our inferences. I 193 If the premises are not enough logically, we are worried about the underdetermination through evidence. Often we intuitively deem a certain conclusion correct. This intuitive accuracy is an example of a classical philosophical riddle: there is an inexplicable transition from one kind of things to another type without clear principles being available to justify this stretch. Then we talk about innovation and creativity. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: the skeptic misinterprets our principle inability at the level of meta-theory as a case of irrationality on the basic level. I 196 McGinnVsSkepticism: a 3rd point is the viability of our cognitive practices. Does the way how we arrive at our beliefs entail a clue that this were deeply irrational? If it were, the problem would be far more drastic than the mere absence of justifications. I 199 transcendental naturalismVsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can only be seen from outside our system of concepts. It has to be explained psychologically, only that this explanation is beyond our capabilities. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Spinoza, B. | Leibniz Vs Spinoza, B. | I 12 Metaphysics/Holz: Spinoza is an example of the highest level of traditional metaphysics LeibnizVsSpinoza. I 38 Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The world is the infinite diversity of simple substances; for the latter therefore, there can be an infinite number of statements. I 58 Identity/Multiplicity/Diversity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: The origin of identity's evidence does not touch upon the multiplicity of the given. Spinoza, however, reduces everything on the unity of a single substance. The principle of identity is purely logical formal. But: epistemic/ontological/Leibniz: The ontological quality of identity's principle is not to be found in itself but in the sensory perception. The senses let see that "A is A" is a sentence, and that the opposite of it, "A is not A", is a formal contradiction. The senses show that the predicate lives in the subject, and that is a contradiction to deny this. Holz: However, this is not irrational empiricism: the system of vérités de raison [Vernunftwahrheiten], which necessarily pertain in this possible world, must be possible in the facticity of this world. But the logical in the facticity is only perpetually given by reason in the course of deduction. I 59 We do not have a direct access to it. It must be deduced at first. In order to not have pre-predicative evidence transform into irrationality, deduction needs to be firstly grounded in an ontological construction. This is done by identity which shows itself to be the necessary structure of a diverse and changing world. (Reflection). I 63 VsSpinoza: For Spinoza, the problem cannot be solved if one accepts the existence of the individual. He solves the problem or rather it does not appear in his field of vision because for him the human is formed from particular modifications of God's attributes. As such, the Cartesian doubt is not considered. The ego cogitans becomes a mere appearance, it is an annex to the self-assured unity of God. Thus, Spinoza turns back to the realism of the Middle Ages. Thus, facticity's rationality cannot be established. I 73 LeibnizVsSpinoza: World's unity is its structure, not a substance, which defines everything. I 75 Unity/Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: However, it is necessary that the ultima ratio is a reason and not a plurality, because the reason is the structure of the whole. Therefore, Leibniz does not need to sacrifice the plurality of things in order to come to a single and only world [die eine und einzige Welt]. Instead of Spinoza's substance, there is the "harmonie universelle". I 90 Substance/LeibnizVsSpinoza: the first and necessary ens [Seiende] only seems to correspond to Spinoza's substance. In reality, it is only the term for the totality of the inner-worldly [innerweltlich] facts. (Holz: " All that is the case" ["Alles, was der Fall ist"]; Wittgenstein). Der Begriff des als seiend Erfahrenen schließt den Begriff der wirklichen Totalität ein. I 91 Therefore, if something is, then the one is the being of all, and not of nothing.[Wenn daher etwas ist, dann ist auch das eine Sein aller Seienden und nicht nichts.] |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
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