Lexicon of Arguments

 

II 49
Grammar/Logic: subject/predicate are always a thought without a truth value, there is no extension. >Subject, >Predicate, >Extension.
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Tugendhat II 54
Hegel: logic is composed of concepts. FregeVsHegel: logic is not composed of concepts, but of sentences. Important: not objects can be negated, but only sentences.
>Concept, >Object, >Sentence, >Negation.
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Thiel I 335
Logic/Frege/Thiel: Frege's concept of logic, on which he wanted to trace back the entire non-geometric mathematics, was a more broadly formulated one than that of today.
For Frege, the formation of sets is a logical process, so that the transition from the statement that exactly the same objects fall under two terms A and B to the statement of equality of the conceptual scopes of A and B is a law of logic for Frege.
I 335/336
Today's view: conceptual scopes are nothing more than sets, therefore the law does not belong to logic, but to set theory. >Term scope.
In traditional logic, the doctrine of conceptual extents was part of logic. Today it is part of set theory, while the doctrine of "conceptual content" remains in logic. That is rather weird.