Frank I 17
Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true.
>
Possible world/Lewis.
Def property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property.
>
Properties/Lewis.
Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies. It makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes.
But there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed as an attitude toward a proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time.
E.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) Because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds. - Therefore no knowledge).
Frank I 329
Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional).
Advantage: non-perspectivic access. - ((s) Not everyone has their own possible worlds.)
Frank I 355
Propositions: have nothing intersubjective per se. - Problematic therefore is the subjectivity of reference of the first person.
>
First Person, >
Subjectivity, >
Centered world.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55
James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
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Lewis IV 137
Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times.
IV 142
E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both.
E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference >
proposition / >
statement).
IV 145
Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions.
IV 146
Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties.
- - -
V 160
Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - >
inclusion,
overlapping.
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ad Stechow 42
Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds).
