Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Ontology I 416
Existence/Quine: doubtful: "There are terms that...", "some of these propositions...", "there is something that he doubts..." - meaningless: talking about two different meanings of "there is" for abstract and concrete objects - but of one single meaning of object.
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I 416
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: each behavior is more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore acceptable - but not approved in ontology - unlike geometrical object: Position of mass points had no meaning - therefore not individuable, no identity! > §52
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I 465f
Ontology: in the end only words at all (names of objects) - but accpetance of ideal objects is no linguistic convention.
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II 25
Ontology that consisted only of materials and bodies would be very vague - but precision is just a question of classification.
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II 28
Numbers/ontology: Numbers merely "facon de parler" - higher classes needed to replace numbers - otherwise only physical object.
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VII 15~
Ontology/Quine: the phrase "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" does not decide between competing O - we do not consider the variables to find out what there is! - The variable shows what a statement asserts - Problem: I cannot admit that there are things that the other one accepts and I do not - deviations in the O involve those in the conceptual scheme - the upper links of the object language can be shared by counterparties and make discussion of language possible -> semantic ascent.
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VII 107
Ontology/Translation/Quine: we cannot find ontological definitions for totally foreign languages.
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VII 132
Ontology/Quine: a theory may even include entities that are indefinable in the same theory.
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XII 38
Economical ontology/Quine: predicates instead of properties - sentences instead of propositions.
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XII 75ff
Pythagorean ontology/Pythagorism/Quine: a pythagorean ontology consists only of objects of one type, for example numbers or quantities or bodies - one could get these with Loewenheim - Quine: that should be avoided -" problem: after reduction an infinite range might still remain - some numbers lose their number property -" but we do not know which -" Solution: Ontological Relativity: it is useless to speak of the ontology of a theory in absolute terms - including that "all are numbers" - Solution:. relativistic theory - just as there is no absolute location or absolute speed - problem: we need to specify a proxy function for a reduction and that is not possible with the axiom of choice (the strong form of Loewenheim) - "a proxy function from above-countable to countable range is impossible because of the lack reversibility.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Ontology



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29