Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
 
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Representation Rorty VI 63
PutnamVsRepresentation/Rorty: Parts of what we call "language" or "mind", penetrate so deeply into the so-called "reality" that "pictures" of something "language independent" must fail.
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Putnam III 38
Representation/PutnamVsDavidson: that the word "cat" refers to cats is not simply due to the causal relationship - the word stands in many causal relationships - just: I would not use the word, if there were no cats. - Instead of representation one might assume fundamentally: evolutionary role.
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V 17/18
Representation/reference/Putnam: mental images arise as little as normal pictures in a necessary connection with the represented - (otherwise no mistake would be possible). - E.g. Martians (who know no trees) are faced with a tree image - the internal mental images are then no representations. - One who recites unfamiliar words, for him they refer to nothing. - Thoughts have no intrinsic connection to something outside - but probably possible.
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I 209ff
Representation/Putnam: is not a magic connection between phenomenological character and denoted objects - no intrinsic connection. - Problem: Brains in a vat: without intrinsic connection, one could say that the word "vat" with inhabitants of vats that come up with the idea, "We are in the vat!" refers to phenomenological manifestations of vats and not to real vats - (and also in the case of "brain" and "in"). - Problem: if a real vat were to collapse, the people could not use their "vat" word anymore. - But that would be a connection between a vat and every word they use and no distinctive connection between real vats and the use of the word vat. - Putnam: the truth conditions of the inhabitants of vats would be something like that they are in the vat in the image. - And that is what is wrong if they think it - (although they are in the vat). - ((s) because they have not learned the use in their environment.)

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Representation



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28