Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Strength of theories, philosophy: theories and systems can be compared in terms of their strength. With increasing expressiveness of a system, e.g. the possibility that statements refer to themselves, however, grows the risk of paradoxes. Strength and expressiveness do not always go hand in hand. Thus, e.g. the modal logical system S5, which is stronger than the system S4, is unable to establish a unique temporal order. Aspects of strength and weakness are inter alia the set of derivable sentences, or the size of the subject area of a theory or system. See also theories, systems, modal logic, axioms, axiom systems, expansion, mitigation, areas._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Nozick on Stronger/weaker - Dictionary of Arguments
II 207 stronger/weaker/Nozick: the negation of the consequent is much stronger than the negation of the antecedent. >Stronger/weaker. II 270 Stronger/weaker: the weaker the hypothesis, the stronger the negation. >Hypotheses, >Negation. II 271 Strongest form of an assertion: at the same time the most neneral. ((s) i.e. that it covers most cases, but not that it ascribes the most predicates.) >Predication, >Ascription, >Identification, >Generality, >Generalization._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Nozick
> Counter arguments in relation to Strength of Theories
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26