Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Corruption: Corruption is the abuse of power for personal gain. It can happen in any sector, but it is most common in politics and business._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Public Choice Theory on Corruption - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 191 Corruption/Public choice theory/Farber: (…) legislators have an incentive to support local pork barrel projects in order to woo local voters. Only a small share of the tax dollars financing the project come from the district, whereas the Parisi I 192 benefits of the projects flow there, so these projects are likely to be inefficient, with national costs exceeding their local benefits. (Note, however, that given limited funds to use for pork barrel projects, legislators will pick the most efficient local projects since they will produce the biggest local benefits given available resources.) Since their own pork projects are in the interest of every individual legislator, the legislators have an incentive to establish a norm of universalism under which each gets a share of the pork. Equilibrium: This norm is an equilibrium: no individual legislator has an incentive to opt out, since doing so would simply allow the funds to be reallocated to other districts. The legislators as a group might be better off with a norm prohibiting pork barrel projects, which would allow them collectively to bestow greater benefits to the electorate in other forms. Problem: But such a norm would be vulnerable to defection by individual legislators who would have an incentive to seek pork for their own districts. Vs: This story depends heavily on a kind of voter myopia whereby the voters credit their representatives with the economic benefits of government projects but fail to realize that these projects have the hidden cost of support for pork barrel projects elsewhere (Mueller, 2003(1) , p. 215). If the voters "wise up," legislators can benefit from adoption of a norm of self-restraint and curtailing the availability of pork barrel projects (as in the recent ban on earmarks). Presumably, as the level of pork rises, public visibility also rises, providing a check on the overall amount of pork because of the threat of voter sanctions. >Legislature/Public choice theory. 1. Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Farber, Daniel A. “Public Choice Theory and Legal Institutions”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Public Choice Theory Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
||
> Counter arguments against Public Choice Theory
> Counter arguments in relation to Corruption
