Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Interpretation: A) Making statements about other statements, whereby new vocabulary may be introduced. If no new vocabulary is introduced, new information can be obtained by changing the syntactic grouping. B) In logic, interpretation is the insertion of values (objects) instead of the constants or free variables. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Donald Davidson on Interpretation - Dictionary of Arguments
Glüer II 28 Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle). Therefore: DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning. Glüer II 29/30 Def interpretative/Glüer: a theory is interpretative if all theory equivalences are to be obtained from the schema T are true. Because truth conditions are given in the recursion to the structure of the sentences. Meaning holism: a sentence only has meaning in the context of the language. >Meaning holism. Thus the problem is "Snow is white iff grass is green is excluded, because such a theory could not imply at the same time a true T-equivalence for the sentences "This is white" or "That is snow". >Meaning Holism. Glüer II 117/8 Interpretation/action/explanation/Davidson/Glüer: an action is only interpretable if it can be described as part of a rational structure - this also applies to speech action - therefore, actions are linked to propositional attitudes - each action is an interpreted action. N.B.: therefore it is no empirical question whether an acting person is rational. - ((s) Because it is presupposed). An event that cannot be described in the language of the propositional attitudes is not an action - (because it is not interpretable). - - - Frank I 645 Mental states/proposition/self-attribution/external-ascription/Davidson: we have to start from sentences or utterances instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types of sources are suggested. Instead: relationships between actors and utterances. There is no different knowledge and no different criteria. Solution : If someone knows that I think of a sentence as correct, he knows what I believe - it would be circular to explain the basic asymmetry by an asymmetry of certainty. >Interpretation. I 648 Interpretation/mental states/external-ascription/Davidson: also the speaker can problematize his sentences. - He can also be wrong about the meaning of his words. - He also needs the Tarski-theory. Asymmetry: the listener/interpreter cannot be sure that the Tarski-theory is the best method for external attribution. The best thing the speaker can do is to be interpretable. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Graeser I 167 Interpretation/Davidson: utterances are verifiable, without the individual propositional attitudes of the speakers being known. Radical interpretation: equality of meaning cannot be assumed, otherwise there is circularity. >Truth conditions/Davidson. - - - Davidson V 139 Truth/Interpretation/Davidson: the contrast between truth and falsity can only occur in the context of interpretation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |