Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maxwell, G. | Quine Vs Maxwell, G. | II 212ff Maxwell thesis: that our knowledge of the outside world exists in a commonality of structure. Quine: important truth. Definition structure is what we retain when we enCode information. --- II 213 The speech about material objects has no qualitative similarities between the objects and the inner state of the speaker, but only one type of coding and of course, causal relations. Maxwell has a theory of relative accessibility of the foreign-psychological with which I agree in a strange way. Quine: difference: I assume that between the knowledge of two individuals with regard to the same things exists a more substantial similarity, than between knowledge and things. But to that, to which our most secure knowledge relates to, is not the knowledge of other people, but publicly perceptible bodies. --- II 213 Knowledge/Quine: between knowledge of two people more substantive similarity than between person and thing (language, observation term has consensus inclination). --- II 213 Properties/Quine: can be emergent: (water) table smooth, brown, but not atoms, similar to "swarm" and "waging war": only for masses because of that not unreal or subjective. Observation Termini have consensus inclination, because they are learned through ostension. --- II 214 Therefore, I share not Maxwell's theoretical belief that "The outside world is not observable." Quine: On the contrary, as an observation scene, the outside world has had little competition. Maxwell denies the colors of the bodies, since they would be accumulations of submicroscopic particles. QuineVsMaxwell: water remains liter for liter of water, even if sub-microscopic particles are rather oxygen and hydrogen. And that has nothing paradoxical. As little paradoxical as that a table remains smooth and brown square inch for square inch, although its submicroscopic particles are discrete, swinging and colorless,. (> Emergence). Qualities: Quine: the qualities of wateriness, of the smoothness and the "being brown" are similar to the properties of swarming and of waging war. They correspond exclusively to masses as properties. Thus they are not getting unreal or subjective. It is not necessary that a predicate is true for each part of the things to which it applies. Finally, not even a figure predicate would stand the test. That specifically wateriness, smoothness and "being brown" are similar in this regard to "being square" (one corner alone is not square) and to the swarming. This is a modern knowledge, it is not a contradiction. QuineVsMaxwell: he reified without questioning the sense data, Humean sensations, floating spots of color. If one attaches the color to a subjective "curtain", there is nothing else than to leave the bodies colorless. Quine pro Maxwell: We agree that bodies and our knowledge of them are not linked by common properties with each other, but only structurally and causally. --- II 214 Knowledge: structurally and causally related to the object, not by similarity. The curtain comes from the time when the philosophy wanted to be closer to the objects than the natural science, and when it claimed, to just pull those curtains aside. --- II 215 Quine: this and not behaviorism is the exaggerated empiricism which must be expelled. Neurath: Philosophy and Science are in the same boat. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Soames, S. | Schiffer Vs Soames, S. | I 217 Compositional Semantics/Comp.sem./Understanding/Explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: comp.sem. is not needed for explaining the language understanding, nevertheless natural languages have a comp.sem .: Language understanding/Soames: you should not look at the semantics to explain semantic competence. Instead one needs comp.sem you. for the explanation of the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is needed to represent the world. Propositions enCode systematic information that characterize the world so and so. We need comp.sem. for the analysis of the principles of this enCoding. SchifferVsSoames: Instead, I have introduced the expression potential. One might assume that a finally formulated theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of expression potential to each proposition of the language. But would that then not be a compositional theory?. I 218 E.g. Harvey: here we did not need comp.sem. to assume that for each proposition of M (internal language) there is a realization of belief, that means (µ)(∑P)(If μ is a proposition of M and in the box, then Harvey believes that P). (s) Although here no connection between μ and P is specified). Schiffer: Now we could find a picture of formulas of M into German, which is a translation. But that provides no finite theory which would provide a theorem for every formula μ of M as If μ is in the box, then Harvey thinks that snow is sometimes purple. Propositional attitude/Meaning theory/Schiffer: Problem: it is not possible to find a finite theory which ascribes verbs for belief characteristics of this type. Pointe: yet the terms in M have meaning! E.g. "Nemrac seveileb taht emos wons si elprup" would realize the corresponding belief in Harvey and thus also mean trivially. SchifferVsCompositionality: when the word-meaning contributs to the proposition-meaning, then it is this. Then expressions in M have meaning. But these are not characteristics that can be attributed to a finite theory. We could find only the property to attribute to each proposition of M a particular belief, but that cannot happen in a finite theory. mental representation/Mentalese/Schiffer: the formulas in M are mental representations. They represent external conditions. Propositions of E, Harvey's spoken speech, received their representational character via the connection with mental representations. Therefore Mentalese needs no comp.sem. SchifferVsSoames: So he is wrong and we need the comp.sem. not even for an illustration of how our propositions represent the world. I 219 We had already achieved this result via the expresion potentials. Because: representational character: is indistinguishable from the expression potential. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Compositionality | Soames, Sc. | Schiffer I 217 Compositional Semantics/understanding/explanation/Scott Soames/Schiffer: (Soames 1987) Thesis: compositional semantics is not used to explain speech understanding, yet natural languages have a compositional semantics: Language Mastery/Soames: one should not look at semantics to explain semantic competence. Instead, compositional semantics is needed to explain the representational character of the language. The central semantic fact about language is that it is used to represent the world. Sentences systematically enCode information that characterizes the world so and so. We need compositional semantics for the analysis of the principles of this Coding. SchifferVsSoames: instead I introduced the expression potential. One could assume that a finitely formable theory should be able to formulate theorems for the attribution of AP to each sentence of the language. But wouldn't that be a compositional theory? |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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