Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Russell, B. | Kripke Vs Russell, B. | I 36 FregeVsMill/RussellVsMill: Error: In reality, a proper name which is used correctly is only a shortened or disguised description. I 87 Description: Kneale and partly Russell as well say that it is not an insignificant message that Socrates was the greatest philosopher in Ancient Greece. It is, however, an insignificant message that we called Socrates "Socrates". KripkeVs: it is not an inSignificant message: If it is some sort of fact, it can be wrong! sie ist keineswegs eine unbedeutende: wenn das irgendeine Art von Tatsache ist, kann es falsch sein! A wrong message is indeed that Jesajah was called "Jesaja". The prophet would never have recognized this name! And naturally the Greeks have not given their country the name "Greece" nor a similar one. It is, however, inSignificant that we call Socrates that way. I do not believe that it is analytic or necessary. Sentences as "Socrates is called ’Socrates’" are very interesting indeed, and their analysis can be discussed for hours. I 145 Mill: "singular names": connotative: description. non-connotative: proper names. I 145 But Mill: all names are connotative for general types, e.g. "human being". It is defined as a conjunction of specific characteristics which are sufficient and necessary to be human: rationality, animality and specific physical characteristics. RussellVsMill: Wrong by common names, right by singular names. KripkeVsRussell: Mill: Right by singular names, wrong for general names. Maybe some general names ("foolish" ,"fat", "yellow ") express properties. General names like "cow"and "tiger"do not, unless being a cow banally counts as a property. (> Properties/Kripke). Kripke’s general names such as "cat" do not express any property. Wolf II 209 KripkeVsRussell: Artificial descriptions are not always elliptic. II 216 Domain/KripkeVsRussell: It does not work: No two-tier distinction can take on this task because it requires a tripartite. Ex: (2) The number of planets could necessarily have been a straight number. (The number could have been eight, for example, and that would have been a straight number.) II 217 Kripke: If(2) is interpreted as true, it is neither de re nor de dicto, i.e. the description has neither the smallest nor the biggest domain (according to Russell). (M= möglich= possible, N= notwendig= necessary) (2a) MN(Ex)(There are exactly x planets and x is a straight number). (Smallest domain, de dicto) (2b) (Ex)(There are exactly x planets and MN(x is a straight number)).(Biggest domain, de re) (2c) M(Ex)(there are exactly x planets and N (x is a straight number)). (Middle domain,). Middle domains are possible if operators are repeated. (2c) renders (2) true. (2a) states, probably erroneously, that it might have been necessary that there is a straight number of planets. (2b) erroneously states that the real number could necessarily have been a straight one. e.g. The newspapers wrote: "FBI Chef Hoover leveled an accusation that the Barrigan were planning to kidnap an American senior civil servant". (It was Kissinger) a) there is a senior civil servant, so that Hoover believes...(biggest domain, de re) b) Hoover believes that the Barrigan were planning...(smallest domain, de dicto) c) Hoover believes that there was a senior civil servant. (middle domain) The more intentional constructions (or others)are repeated, the more possible domains exist. II 218 Kartunnen showed that no n-partite differentiation suffices for each specific n. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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