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Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Deflationism | Wright Vs Deflationism | I 26
Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric?
Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "Minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient.Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common! Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture). Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes. WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards. I 35
Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example
"It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T. This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability). It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible. Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.) I 47
VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all. I 48
InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain)
DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P)I 53
Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism). I 97
WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness.
With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible.The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" InTruth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |

Redundancy Theory | Brandom Vs Redundancy Theory | I 434
E.g. Vsredundancy theory "Goldbach s conjecture is true". I 438
This sentence is not interchangeable with "Goldbach s conjecture".VsRamsey.
E.g. »everything the oracle says is true," is not open to simpler approaches of redundancy and disquotation. I 468
Brandom: "true" expresses a pro-sentence-forming operator. Its syntax and grammar is very different from that of a predicate. Just as "no" is not the necessary grammatical form to pick out a person . |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |

Superassertibility | Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility | Wright I 68/69
Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information.
Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear".Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed. The thought that neither the principle the proposition that P is justified if and only if P, nor the principle It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd) applies a priori. Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es) (Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P. I 72
Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies:
(DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P.From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence: It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible. Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation. Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...) VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact. For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible. For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong. Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori. Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate). I 73
VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples):
(F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P(F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible. Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case. Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently. It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle: Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker) I 74
and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity.
((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"!If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏". (G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro). G: Truth without limitation by evidence. F: Superassertibility. So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa. Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive. Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture). (Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction. This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.) But this does not justify a global conclusion. I 75
Oversimplification:
(Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is.Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails: (Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P. So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility! I 76
Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future).
For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not! Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B. But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B. This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them. I 77
Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible.
Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?)Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence". |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |