Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boghossian, Paul | Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul | I 270 Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results: (5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after disquotation: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. "Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object... I 271 WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all? ((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis). 2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism. I 273 WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it: (iv) It is not the case that S is true and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S (v) It is not the case that (i) is true. From this follows the "disquotation properties": (vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question! If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness. A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct. Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma: a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent, I 274 b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out. 2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not. Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him. Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial. I 275 WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS): (I) A > "A" is true. Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly! Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all. I 293 Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: Truth is not a property). WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Deflationism | Wright Vs Deflationism | I 26 Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric? Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient. Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common! Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture). Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes. WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards. I 35 Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example "It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T. This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability). It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible. Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.) I 47 VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all. I 48 InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain) DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P) I 53 Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism). I 97 WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness. With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible. The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally. |
Cr. Wright I Wright Wahrheit und Objektivität , Frankfurt, 2001 |
| Dummett, M. | Wright Vs Dummett, M. | Rorty VI 45 WrightVsDummett/Rorty: it is necessary to say more about the pragmatic use of the terms "realism", "representation" and "agreement" than Dummett. For example, judgments may coincidentally converge for historical reasons. Representation (and thus realism) must be explained by means of a concept that is neither merely logical nor merely sociological. (Rorty pro). Wright I 225/226 Abstract/"pure abstract objects"/Dummett: (Frege: "logical objects"): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects, whose meaning, however, cannot be represented as consisting in our ability to identify objects as their carriers. Wright: could be read as Nominalism. (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). But this is not Dummett's view. Dummett does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but in fact have reference. I 227 They even play a semantic role! Example the "largest prime number": is an empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach after the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. (> Numbers). Abstract/Moral/Ethics/Wright: this fits well with our attitude to the discourse of morality: the matter of moral realism is not really exhausted in the question of whether the moral discourse is truthful or not. If the truth ability is affirmed, there are still a number of questions relevant to realism. I 228 Identification/WrightVsDummett: it is simply unclear what the "identification" of an object should mean, if the recognition of the truth of an identity statement, which contains a term for the object, is not sufficient! It is also not controversial that we use abstract singular terms in a reasonable way. Wright: there is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. (> Abstractness). Abstract objects can only affect us in this way! Frege (Platonist) quite rightly claims that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any reasonable sense. (Wright: this is minimalism regarding reference). Realism/Wright: but then there still remain the considerations that force us to assign concrete things an independent role in an independent world. I 229 Def Minimalism/Wright: is a better name for Dummett's >"Anti-Realism" or >"Nominalism". |
Cr. Wright I Wright Wahrheit und Objektivität , Frankfurt, 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Putnam, H. | Wright Vs Putnam, H. | I 58 "Putnam's Equivalence"/(Wright): P is true if and only if P could be justified under ideal epistemic circumstances. Convergence Demand/Putnam: no statement that is justified under epistemic ideal circumstances can be asserted simultaneously with its negation. Wright: this is of course to be distinguished from the requirement for completeness: not all questions can be decided (quantum mechanics). Wright: it seems here that even ideal epistemic circumstances cannot be neutral in relation to negation. ((s) Example (s) If the location of the electron cannot be fixed, that is not a negative statement about this or any other location.) I 59 Negation/Minimalism: requires the usual negation equivalence: "It is not the case that "P" is true if and only if it is not the case that "P" is true. This does not work for quantum mechanics. WrightVsPutnam: the examples from quantum mechanics or mathematics (undecidability) are deadly for Putnam's approach. (Example generalized continuum hypothesis). It certainly does not even apply to empirical statements a priori that each of them would be decidable under ideal circumstances. I 60 (Thus confirmable or refutable). A priori/minimalism/Wright: the minimum platitudes probably apply a priori. WrightVsPutnam: so if Putnam's informal explanation would be a priori correct it has to be like this to be correct at all - then it would have to apply a priori that also the negation of a statement that cannot be justified under ideal circumstances (electron) would be justified. Wright: exactly this cannot be the case a priori. WrightVsPutnam: erroneously a priori claim. But it gets even worse: the extension of the argumentation destroys any attempt to determine truth as essentially independent of evidence (>quantum mechanics/Putnam). Anti-Realism, Semantic/Evidence: in contrast to Putnam, may now be satisfied with a "one-way street": (EC, epistemic restriction): EC If P is true, then there is evidence that it is. Evidence/WrightVsPutnam: Truth is limited by evidence. This leads to a revision of logic. I 64 WrightVsPutnam: he must make intuitive revisions. I 66 Def Truth/Peirce: that which is justified at an ideal limit of recognition when all empirical information has been obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one simply cannot know when one has all the information! Wright ditto I 68/69 Def Superassertibility: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrary verification of its ancestry and arbitrary extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Superassertibility | Verschiedene Vs Superassertibility | Wright I 68/69 Def Superassertibility/Wright: a statement is superassertible if it is justified, or can be justified, and if its justification would survive both the arbitrarily accurate verification of its ancestry and arbitrarily extensive additions and improvements to the information. Wright: For our purposes it is sufficient that the term is "relatively clear". Superassertibility/Content: the opponents of the superassertibility would have to refute the simple notion that the content of the claim that P does not include the claim that P is justified, nor that P is believed. The thought that neither the principle the proposition that P is justified if and only if P, nor the principle It is believed that P, if and only if P ((s)) is absurd) applies a priori. Superassertibility: their representatives must justify the validity of (Es) (Es) It is superassertible that P, if and only if P. I 72 Negation: this problem will be solved if it applies: (DSS) "P" is superassertible if and only if P. From this follows, as we have seen, the negation equivalence: It is not the case that "P" is superassertible if and only if it is not the case that "P" is superassertible. Here we can distinguish between propositions and sentence when it comes to negation. Then the validity of DSS depends on Es. ("It is superassertible that P...) VsEs/VsSuperassertibility: one could object that Es cannot be valid since it mixes the validity of certain high-level evidence for P with the validity of fact. For example, the Goldbach conjecture may be undetectably true and therefore not be superassertible. For example a superassertible proposition (brains in a vat) can be undetectably wrong. Since Es can be victim of counterexamples at any time, it cannot be true a priori. Therefore, superassertibility does not claim to be a truth predicate (T-predicate). I 73 VsSuperassertibility: the critics claim that the following equivalence cannot be established: (because of counterexamples): (F) It is true that it is ∏ that P if and only if it is true that P (F) However, contains two occurrences of a truth predicate that must be understood as distinct from the superassertibility. ((s) "∏" should be replaceable by "superassertible", but then allegedly does not guarantee equivalence). "∏" is more neutral than "true", which can mean true or assertible. Example: It is possible that the Goldbach conjecture is true without it being true that it is superassertible (provable), but it is certainly not evident that the conjecture could be superassertible without it being superassertible that this is the case. Pluralism: if, as minimalism thinks, there can be a pluralism of predicates of truth, then it is to be expected that the illusion of failure can be created if each occurrence of "true" is interpreted differently. It is as if someone wanted to prove that physical necessity cannot qualify as a real concept of necessity because the concept does not satisfy the following principle: Necessary (AB) |= Necessary(A) Necessary (B) ((s) right side weaker) I 74 and would then try to support his thesis by interpreting the last occurrence of "necessary" in the sense of logical necessity. ((s) There is no "logical necessity" of any object "B"! If we want to know if there are counterexamples to (Es), the right question is not whether F is fulfilled, but whether it is, which arises when the two tendentious occurrences of "true" are replaced by those of "∏". (G) It is ∏ that it is ∏ that is P, if and only if it is ∏ that is P. (Wright pro). G: Truth without limitation by evidence. F: Superassertibility. So whether it is in fact always when it is superassertible that P is also superassertible that this is the case and vice versa. Problem: if any true predicate of truth can fulfill the equivalence scheme a priori, its two possible forms (true and assertible, claimable) must be a priori coextensive. Thus, no predicate F can obviously function like a T-predicate if it has to function alongside another predicate G, which is already assumed to both fulfil the equivalence scheme and potentially diverge extensionally from F. (e.g. Goldbach's conjecture). (Since it cannot apply a priori that (P is if and only if of P F) if a priori that P applies then and only if P is G, but not a priori that (P is G if and only if P is F). (s) So coextension needs equivalence (concordance in both directions), and not only concordance in one direction. This weakens the original objection. It applies only to the following extent: if it is shown that a discourse is dominated by a truth concept - G - not restricted by evidence, then it is shown that superassertibility - F - is not a predicate of truth for this discourse. (For, trivially, if P is superassertible, evidence for P must be available.) But this does not justify a global conclusion. I 75 Oversimplification: (Gs) It is superassertible that it is superassertible that P is, if and only if it is superassertible that P is. Correct: given the equivalence scheme (see above), only the cases are counterexamples for (Es) in which (Fs) also fails: (Fs) It is true that it is superassertible that P is if and only if it is true that P. So if (Gs) applies, we know that there are no counterexamples to (Es) and consequently (Es) applies. But only provided that there are no competing predicates of truth besides superassertibility! I 76 Question: So is (Gs) unrestrictedly valid? It should be shown that the existence of an entitlement for P means that there is also an entitlement for the assertion that P is superassertible (showable in the future). For example, suppose the possession of an authorization for A also means possessing an authorization for B, and vice versa, but that for a reductio A is superassertible, B on the other hand is not! Then a total state of information I entitles to A and also all its improvements I' and hypothetically also to B. But: since B is not superassertible, there must be some improvement of I supporting A, but not B. This shows that (i) the coincidence of the assertibility conditions is sufficient for (ii) both statements of a pair to be superassertible if this is true for either of them. I 77 Superassertibility: it is less clear that the possession of an authority for the assertion also means the possession of the authority to view the statement as superassertible. Question: Can the authority to claim P coexist with the lack of authority to view P as a superassertible? ((s) Can something be assertible without being superassertible?) Assertiveness/Strawson: the assertibility-conditional view offers "no explanation for what a speaker actually does when he/she uttered the sentence". |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Minimalism | Wright, Cr. | Read Logik III 49 Minimalist Theory of Truth/Minimalism: Wright, et al. Wright Thesis: the assertion that truth is not a substantial property cannot explain essential features of the concept of truth, especially that it differs from justified assertiveness. Wright: Thesis: truth goes beyond assertiveness in that it is stable (once true, always true) and absolute (without degrees of justification). III 243 Def Minimalism: if it is possible in any form, it shows that this thought is confused. He attributes objective truth values without assuming an additional range of objects. (Minimalism is the thesis that there is nothing more to say about truth than what is contained in the truth scheme.) (>Wright) Rorty/Truth/Wright: Thesis: truth is an independent norm. (sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro variant of minimalism with truth as an independent norm alongside a mere property of sentences. |
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