Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armstrong, D. | Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. | V 353 "New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis. LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind. --- Schwarz I 71 Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157). Problem: modality is required. VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209). Schwarz I 118 Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals. Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory. SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6). Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature? Schwarz I 119 What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it. Schwarz I 124 Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability. Schwarz I 139 Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum. Schwarz I 140 Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability. Schwarz I 141 Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event. Schwarz I 231 Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f). Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination. SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance. To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact. LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds. ((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant). Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219). Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25). Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4). Schwarz I 232 N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified. 1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594. 3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. 4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316. 5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97. 7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44. 8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”. 9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615. 11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30. 13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490. 14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Fine, Kit | Lewis Vs Fine, Kit | V 41 Analysis 2: a counterfactual conditional "If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C" is true then and only when a (accessible) world where A and C are true is everywhere more similar to our actual world than a world where A is true and C is false. V 43 Kit FineVsLewis/VsAnalysis 2: e.g. the counterfactual conditional "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust" is true or can be imagined as being true. According to Lewis' analysis the co.co. is then probably wrong because by imagining just a slight change in reality, the effects will not exist. >Counterfactual conditional. LewisVsFine: Surely the event or not of an atomic holocaust will strongly contribute to a basing relation or not. But the similarity relation (s.r.) which rules over the counterfactual conditionals is not one of those! Still, s.r. can be a relation for similarity everywhere, but not because it determines explicit judgments, rather because it is a result of many single similarity relations according to particular priorities of evaluation. V 44 w0: e.g. Nixon pushed the button at the time t. w0. This can but does not need to be in our actual world. This world could have deterministic laws, and the world is sufficient for our darkest visions of buttons that are pushed. A nuclear holocaust happens because all connections of the button do work. There are now all possible worlds where Nixon pushes the button, but those worlds are different from our actual world. Which world resembles our the most? Some are simply squib loads or the missile is simply filled with confetti. e.g. w1: w1 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. In the last moment both worlds diverge: In w1 the deterministic laws of w0 are violated. Lewis: Supposing a minuscule little miracle happens: Maybe some extra neurons in Nixon's brain. As a result, Nixon pushes these extra neurons. The holocaust happens. As such, both worlds are quite different from each other, at least regarding the surface of the planet. ((s) It was only counterfactual in w0 : If he pushes, the holocaust would happen.) Lewis: so w1 is sufficient for analysis 1 (asymetry by postulate.) (We assume that we are in w0.) It should appear that worlds, like w1 in the basing relation, have more resemblance than all the other worlds in which Nixon would have pushed the button. miracle/Lewis: I simply mean the violation of laws of nature. But the violated laws are not in the same world! This would be impossible! V 45 Miracle: Relation between possible worlds because the laws of a single world are not violated! w2: A second class of candidates of worlds that resemble w0 the most: without any miracle, the deterministic laws of w0 are followed exactly. Difference to w0: Nixon pushes the button. Determinism: After this, both worlds are either always or never the same. This is why both are never exactly the same for any period of time. They are even different in the past of a long time ago. Problem: It cannot be stated what can be done in order to make the difference in recent past disappear. It is difficult to imagine how two deterministic worlds an actually be only slightly different over a long period of time. There is too much probability for small differences, which become a big sum. Naturally, worlds like w2 are not the most similar world for a world w0 in which Nixon pushes the button. This would lead to infinite backwards arguments. Bennett: counterfactual conditionals would also be rendered senseless. We do not know enough to know which of them would be true. To conclude: what we learn by comparing w1 to w2: in the basing relations, a small miracle is needed in order to have a perfect concordance of single facts. w3: begins like w1: w3 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. Then a small miracle happens, Nixon pushes the button, but there is no war! This is because a second small miracle happens immediately after the push. It can as localized as the first one. The fatal signal is erased. Still, Nixon's action has left its marks: his fingerprints on the button, an empty bottle of gin, etc. V 46 There are numerous differences between w3 and w0, but no one is particularly important. w3: There is more than only small differences, e.g. Nixon's memoirs have no influence on later generations, etc. But even if it is unclear whether the differences will have strong repercussions it is not important. Schwarz I 51 Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./FineVsLewis: His analysis clearly gives wrong results even with our vague intuitive similarity standards, e.g. "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear war". Problem: A possible world, in which Nixon pushed the button and an atomic war was started, must then resemble our actual world more than a world, in which he pushed the button, the mechanism failed and nothing happened. But an undestroyed world should surely have more similarities with our world? LewisVsFine: Here wrong resemblance criteria were used. The important categories are those in which his analysis is proven correct. We need to find out what we now about truth and wrongness of the co.co. in order to ascertain whether we can find a sort of basing relation.[ (1979b(1),43, 1986f(2),211). Lewis/Schwarz: this is why his theory of counterfactual conditionals is more a frame for such theories. Analysis tells us which sort of facts make co.co. true, but it does not tell us for which specific conditionals in specific contexts they are. 1. D. Lewis [1979b]: “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. Nous, 13: 455–476. 2. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Lewis Vs Leibniz, G.W. | V 293 Weak determinism/weak thesis/Lewis: I am able to do something so that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken. Strong thesis: I am able to break the laws of nature. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a window would be broken. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act would create an event of breaking the window. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a promise would be broken. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act generated an event of breaking the promise. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did, a law would be broken. For example, to throw a stone faster than light. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did it, my act would create an event of breaking the law of nature. For beginners: I am able to do something so that if I did it, a law would be broken. For example, to move my hand faster than light, no matter what the action does. But there is more to say: I am able to do something so that if I did, my act itself would be an event of breaking the law of nature. N.B.: if no act of mine was a window-breaking promise or law of nature or generated one, then it might not be true that I broke a window, a promise or a law of nature. So I am only able to break a window, a promise or a law of nature if I could do something so that if I did it, my act V 294 would have been or would have generated either an event breaking a window, a promise or a law of nature. Keith's teacher: represents a weak thesis (similar to mine, but, LewisVsTeacher: I cannot accept his reason): his reason: Teacher: it is wrong that if the actor had preferred that there should have been a difference in natural laws or history, there would have been such a difference. LewisVsTeacher: 1. this conditional cannot be wrong at all, assuming the actor is predetermined to wish that there should be no such difference, if he had then wished something else, there would have been a difference. 2. if this conditional is not wrong, it is not enough to make the stronger thesis come true. There must be another reason why it's wrong. For example, I am able to raise my hand, although it is intended ((s) according to the soft determinism assumed here) that I will not. I will even concede that a law-breaking event is taking place. (Neutral present, I don't imply anything about a time when something like this should happen). Question: But is it the case that my raising my hand causes a law-breaking event? If not, there is no special ability on my part. If I had raised my hand, a law would have been broken in advance. Then the course of events would have deviated from the actual course. For a while before I had raised my hand. And this divergence point would be the law-breaking event. N.B.: this divergence point (before) would not be caused by my hand raising! If at all, the cause should be reversed. Terminology: we have called the divergence point "miracle" above. My act itself would not have been the miracle! It wasn't here when the miracle happened. There is no other act of mine before. There's also no reason why my act should cause any more lawbreaking events. That would be unfounded. V 295 Lewis: Thesis: I was able to raise my hand (instead of actual lowering). I acknowledge that a law of nature had to be broken for this, but I deny that it would enable me to break natural laws. For soft determinism you don't need supernatural powers. Compatibilism/Lewis: to maintain it, one does not even have to assume that supernatural powers would be possible at all. |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Miracle | Lewis, D. | V 49 Divergence / convergence / asymmetry / Lewis: what makes convergence a miracle (unlikely) is the asymmetry of overdetermination: V 50 Whatever happens, is leaving many and highly distributed traces in the world of the future. They are hardly ever afterwards brought together again, but that does not matter, as long as they exist. |
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