Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Affectional Bond Psychological Theories Slater I 17
Affectional Bond/psychological theories: (cf. >Affectional bond/Bowlby, >Behavior/Harlow, >Experiments/Harlow). Studies of early experience in rodents further qualified the nature of separations that can have enduring negative effects. Daily separations are a normal part of the developing attachment bond in humans and the young child’s ability to re-establish contact with the caregiver following separation is critical for the maintenance of the bond. This point was illustrated by Seymour Levine’s work with rodents. He developed an “early handling” paradigm in which it was discovered that rat pups who experienced brief 15-minute separations from their mothers performed better as adults in an avoidance learning paradigm than pups who had not been separated from their mothers (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(1). This finding illustrated how exposure to normally occurring or “intermittent stressors” early in development results in the development of effective coping strategies later in life. Levine’s early handling paradigm and the effects of intermittent stressors has consistently been replicated in both rodent and monkey models (Lyons et al., 2010)(2).
1. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press
2. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624.


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Affectional Bond Ainsworth Slater I 15
Affectional Bond/Ainsworth: Ainsworth (1989)(1) emphasized that affectional bonds differed on the basis of the behavioral system that motivated bond formation. Whereas children’s bonds with caregivers were motivated by the attachment system, the adult’s bond to the child was motivated by the caregiving system. Bonds to a peer may be motivated by either affiliation in the case of friends or sexual and reproductive systems in the case of adult pair bonds.
Slater I 18
A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)(2). Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) at 12 and 18 months.
Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)(3). The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)(4).


1. Ainsworth, M. S. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. American Psychologist, 44, 709–716.
2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
3. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press
4. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387.


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Agreeableness Neuroimaging Corr I 315
Agreeableness/Neuroimaging/Canli: Agreeableness can be viewed as a trait associated with affective processing (readers interested in Impulsivity are referred to Congdon and Canli (2005)(1)). For example, Agreeableness is associated with greater effort to regulate negative affect (Tobin, Graziano, Vanman et al. 2000)(2). This tendency to minimize negative affect is even on display in implicit processing paradigms, suggesting that the regulation of negative affect can be automatic (Meier, Robinson and Wilkowski 2006)(3). One key region appears to be the right lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) in the conscious regulation of negative affect (Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow et al. 2004(4)). However, it was unknown whether this region also activates during implicit emotion regulation, and whether it does so as a function of Agreeableness. We tested this hypothesis using the standard gender discrimination emotional face processing task (Haas, Omura et al. 2007b)(5).


1. Congdon, E. and Canli, T. 2005. The endophenotype of impulsivity: reaching consilience through behavioural, genetic, and neuroimaging approaches. Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Review 4: 262–81
2. Tobin, R. M., Graziano, G., Vanman, E. J. et al. 2000. Personality, emotional experience, and efforts to control emotions, Journal of Personal and Social Psychology 79: 656–69
3, Meier, B. P., Robinson, M. D. and Wilkowski, B. M. 2006. Turning the other cheek: Agreeableness and the regulation of aggression-related primes, Psychological science 17: 136–42
4. Ochsner, K. N., Knierim, K., Ludlow, D. H. et al. 2004. Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 16: 1746–72
5. Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic Haas, B. W., K. Omura, et al. 2007b. Is automatic emotion regulation associated with agreeableness? A perspective using a social neuroscience approach, Psychological science 18: 130–2


Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Arousal Neurobiology Corr I 416
Arousal/Neurobiology: The traditional paradigm for biological explanations of personality effects on performance is Eysenck’s (1967) arousal theory. According to the Yerkes-Dodson Law, cortical arousal is linked to processing efficiency and performance by an inverted-U function. Moderate levels of arousal are optimal for performance; extremes of both low arousal (e.g., fatigue) and high arousal (e.g., anxiety) are damaging. The theory specifies that a cortico-reticular circuit controlling alertness and arousal is more easily activated in introverts than in extraverts. Hence, introverts are prone to performance deficits due to over-arousal, whereas extraverts are vulnerable to under-arousal. The prediction has been confirmed in a number of studies e.g., Revell, Amaral and Turriff 1976)(2).
VsArousal Theory/VsEysenck: the Yerkes-Dodson Law fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for Extraversion-Introversion effects. Psychophysiological findings suggest that Extraversion is only weakly linked to indices of arousal (Matthews and Amelang 1993; Matthews and Gilliland 1999). >Psychological Stress/Neurobiology (VsYerkes-Dodson).
VsArousal Theory: Other biologically-based theories may do a better job of explanation. For example, Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Philip J. Corr 2004(5), >Reinforcement sensitivity/Corr) links the impulsivity and anxiety traits to the sensitivity of brain systems for reward and punishment.



1. Eysenck, H. J. 1967. The biological basis of personality. Springfield, IL: Thomas
2. Revelle, W., Amaral, P. and Turriff, S. 1976. Introversion/Extraversion, time stress, and caffeine: effect on verbal performance, science 192: 149–50
3. Matthews, G. and Amelang, M. 1993. Extraversion, arousal theory and performance: a study of individual differences in the EEG, Personality and Individual Differences 14: 347–64
4. Matthews, G. and Gilliland, K. 1999. The personality theories of H. J. Eysenck and J. A. Gray: a comparative review, Personality and Individual Differences 26: 583–626
5. Corr, P. J. 2004. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28: 317–32


Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
BBC Prison Study Haslam Haslam I 141
BBC Prison Study/BPS/social psychology/Reicher/Haslam: The BBC Prison Study (BPS) (Reicher and Haslam, 2006(1); see also Haslam and Reicher, 2005(2), 2009(3)) (…) revisited issues raised by Zimbardo’s >Stanford prison experiment (SPE) using the same basic paradigm as Zimbardo’s study – seeking to examine the behaviour of 15 men who had been randomly assigned to roles as guards or prisoners within a specially constructed prison-like environment over a period of up to two weeks. ReicherVsZimbardo/HaslamVsZimbardo: BPS differed form the SPE in two key respects: 1. No rule within the prison was assumed so that
Haslam I 141
[one] could study groups dynamics without directly managing them. 2. The study involved a number of manipulations that had been devised on the basis of social identity theory (SIT). It suggests that people do not automatically take on roles associated with group membership, but do so only when they have come to identify with the group in question (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)(4).
BPS/Reicher/Haslam: its outcome suggests a very different analysis of tyranny from that promoted by Zimbardo.
1) this is because when participants in the BPS became committed to tyranny they were not acting in terms of roles assigned by the experimenters, but instead had rejected those roles and adopted new ones.
Haslam I 142
2) There was variation in participants’ enthusiasm for this tyrannical solution, and that those who were most enthusiastic were the participants who had been most authoritarian at the study’s outset. (…) this meant that authoritarian participants were only in a position to express and advance their authoritarian ambitions once they had been galvanized by a sense of shared identity that had both steeled them and drawn more moderate individuals to their cause.


1. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (2006) ‘Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 1–40.
2. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2005) ‘The psychology of tyranny’, Scientific American Mind, 16(3): 44–51.
3. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2009) The BBC Prison Study website. Available at: www.bbcprisonstudy.org.
4. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48.


S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications

Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017

Behavior Harlow Slater I 16
Behavior/Harlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). Working with small numbers of monkeys, Harlow observed few differences between mother-raised and peer-raised monkeys on play, defensive, or sexual behavior with peers during the juvenile period of development. This finding led Harlow to conclude that play with agemates was “more necessary than mothering to the development of effective social relations” (Harlow & Harlow, 1962(1), p. 495). However, Harlow remained tentative about his conclusions noting that they were limited to outcomes only up to two years of age.
Follow-up studies of peer-reared monkeys by Harlow’s former graduate student, Steve Suomi, suggested a less sanguine view of peer-raised monkeys even during the juvenile period of development (Suomi, 2008)(2).
When (…) peer-raised monkeys were grouped with mother-raised monkeys, they dropped to the bottom of the peer dominance hierarchies (Bastian, Sponberg, Sponberg, Suomi, & Higley, 2002)(3).
Slater I 17
VsHarlow: Research has advanced from the social deprivation paradigms in several respects. 1) Researchers have examined more subtle variations in early caregiving environments by considering the effects of temporary separations from caregivers as well as variations in the quality of maternal care provided to offspring (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(4).
2) Researchers have begun to examine individual differences in offsprings’ susceptibility to environmental influences (Lyons, Parker, & Schatzberg, 2010)(5).
3) The trends toward examining a continuum of caregiving environments and individual differences in children’s susceptibility to caregiving environments have been advanced by efforts to identify the genetic, neural, and physiological mechanisms through which early experience affects later outcomes (Weaver et al., 2004)(6). Cf. >Affectional bonds/psychological theories.




1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146.
2. Suomi, S. J. (2008). Attachment in rhesus monkeys. In J. Cassidy & P. Shaver (Eds), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research and clinical applications (pp. 173–191). New York: Guilford Press.
3. Bastian, M. L., Sponberg, A. C., Suomi, S. J., & Higley, J. D. (2002). Long-term effects of infant rearing condition on the acquisition of dominance rank in juvenile and adult rhesus macaques
(Macaca mulatta). Developmental Psychobiology, 42, 44–51.
4. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press.
5. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624.
6. Weaver, I. C. G., Cervoni, N., Champagne, F. A., D’Alessio, A. C., Sharma, S., Seckl, J. R., Dymov, S., et al. (2004). Epigenetic programming by maternal behavior. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 847–854.


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Behavioral System Bowlby Corr I 232
Behavioral System/attachment theory/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: According to Bowlby (1973)(1), the ability of a behavioural system to achieve its set-goal depends on a person’s transactions with the external world. Although behavioural systems are innate intrapsychic mechanisms, which presumably operate mainly at a subcortical level and in an automatic, reflexive manner, they are manifested in actual behaviour, guide people’s transactions with the social world, and can be affected or shaped by others’ responses. Over time, social encounters mould the parameters of a person’s behavioural systems in ways that produce fairly stable individual differences in strategies and behaviours; that is, a person’s neural and behavioural capacities become ‘programmed’ to fit with major close relationship partners, or attachment figures. Representation/Bowlby: Bowlby (1973)(1) assumed that the residues of such social encounters are stored as mental representations of person-environment transactions, which he called working models of self and other, and that these representations shape the functioning of a person’s behavioural system and the way he or she behaves in particular social situations.


1. Bowlby, J. 1973. Attachment and loss, vol. II, Separation: anxiety and anger. New York: Basic Books

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press



Slater I 15
Behavioral System/Bowlby: Bowlby (1969(1)) formalized Harlow’s work into a theory of control systems that were activated and terminated by environmental conditions. Bowlby’s theory emphasized contextual factors that both activated and terminated behavioral systems. In infancy, he viewed the attachment, fear, and exploratory systems as each having set goals that needed to be maintained based on ongoing monitoring of and feedback from the environment.
Control systems theory in turn guided systematic observations of human infants in the village and home environment (Ainsworth, 1967)(2). It also led to the development of a laboratory paradigm that tested infants’ abilities to use their caregiver as a source of safety and base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wall, & Waters, 1978)(3). The development of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) – in which infants’ responses to separation from, and subsequent reunion with, their mother, and their reactions to an unfamiliar woman were recorded – in turn became a paradigm for assessing individual differences in the security of infants’ relationships with their primary caregiver.


1. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York, NY: Basic Books.
2. Ainsworth, M. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
3. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018

Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Behavioral System Ainsworth Slater I 15
Behavioral System/Ainsworth: Control systems theory in turn guided systematic observations of human infants in the village and home environment (Ainsworth, 1967)(1). It also led to the development of a laboratory paradigm that tested infants’ abilities to use their caregiver as a source of safety and base for exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Wall, & Waters, 1978)(2). The development of Ainsworth’s Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) – in which infants’ responses to separation from, and subsequent reunion with, their mother, and their reactions to an unfamiliar woman were recorded – in turn became a paradigm for assessing individual differences in the security of infants’ relationships with their primary caregiver.

1. Ainsworth, M. S. (1967). Infancy in Uganda. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
2. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.



Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Body Pelluchon Body/Environment/Resources/Pelluchon: Why (...) is the concept of food central? Material foods do not make up the totality of what I live on, since food is equally earthly and spiritual, affective and intellectual, and includes work, entertainment and relationships. Nevertheless, physical food is the paradigm of this philosophy of physicality and sensation.
A philosophy that asks for it is a political philosophy. >Existence/Pelluchon, >Ecology/Pelluchon, >Deep Ecology/Pelluchon.
Nutrition: (...) [is] an entirely social fact because, beyond its ethical and political significance, it has an affective dimension that refers back to the fact that we were originally nourished by those who have cared for us since birth and have shown us their love - or not.

Corine Pelluchon. „Wovon leben wir?“ in: Die ZEIT Nr. 38. 10.09.2020

Camps Agamben Brocker I 822
Camp/Agamben: the form (Agamben: "topology") that the political takes on through the introduction of the concept of "naked life" is that of the "camp": the camp "as a biopolitical paradigm of modernity" ("nomos of modernity" (1)) See State/Agamben, Life/Agamben.
Brocker I 828
The camp appears as a hidden paradigm of the political space of modernism. This becomes understandable when one interprets politics as biopolitics, which is about "naked" life - in contrast to a policy that regards the citizen as a subject. The camp refers to political structures of the state of emergency (see Exception/Terminology/Agamben). As examples of "camps" Agamben cites reception camps for refugees or, for example, Guantanamo in Cuba: ultimately rooms without law. VsAgamben: In this context Agamben was accused of historical inadequacy: his thesis establishes a comparability between events that are not historically and ethically comparable.
AgambenVsVs/Muhle: his thesis must be taken seriously as a structural thesis insofar as it refers to the fact that states of emergency and thus lawless spaces can also be produced within the borders of Western democracies that are consolidated under the rule of law, and thus here too naked life emerges as the original political subject.
Brocker I 829
Camp/Agamben: it is about understanding the camp not as an "anomaly" of the past, but rather "as a hidden matrix, as nómos of the political space in which we still live today". (2) It should be emphasized here that the camps do not emerge from ordinary law, nor that they are a form of prison law, but that they are "derived from the state of emergency and martial law". The camp offers a "permanent spatial institution" (3) for the otherwise temporary state of emergency.

1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, s. 175.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p. 178

Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Agamben I
Giorgio Agamben
Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Categorization Psychological Theories Haslam I 173
Categorization/group behavior/psychological theories: (Cf. >Categorization/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social Identity theory/Tajfel), after Tajfel’s minimal group studies (Tajfel et al.1971(1)) further studies have also manipulated explicit dependence on the ingroup and/or outgroup for rewards in the MGP. For example, as well as manipulating explicit categorization, Lowell Gaertner and Chet Insko (2000)(2) also manipulated whether a dependence structure was present or absent (i.e., participants were the only ones allocating rewards or others allocated them too). The prediction here was that the sole ability to allocate (i.e., where there is no dependence) should eliminate dependence on others, and thereby eliminate ingroup favouritism. This prediction held, but only for men: their responses were no more discriminatory than non-categorized men. However, women participants showed ingroup favouritism irrespective of the dependence structure –present or absent.


1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77.
2. Gaertner, L. and Insko, C.A. (2000) ‘Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation or fear?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 77–94.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Concepts Aristotle Gadamer I 436
Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: [in the] Epagoge-Analysis(1) (...) Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. (...) he thus [takes] into account (...) the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. In this respect, also according to Aristotle, the formation of linguistic concepts possesses a completely undogmatic freedom, in that what is seen as common in experience and thus leads to the general, has the character of a mere preliminary work, which stands at the beginning of science, but is not yet science.
Proof/Science/AristotleVsSpeusippus/AristotleVsPlato: If science sets up the compelling ideal of proof, it must go beyond such procedures. Thus Aristotle criticized Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof. See >Analogies/Speusippus; >Language/Aristotle.


1. An. Post. B 19.
---

Adorno XII 50
Concept/Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: according to Diogenes Laertiues Aristotle uses different names for the same thing: in this way, he calls ideas also form (eidos), genus (genos), pattern (paradigm) and beginning (principle, ark).


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Conformity Psychological Theories Haslam I 77
Conformity/psychological theories: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right. >Conformity/Asch.
Haslam I 80
As a further demonstration of the power of normative influence, Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard (1955)(3) created a situation in which participants could witness the (incorrect) responses of the majority but were allowed to record their own responses privately (thus eliminating fear of ridicule and, by extension, the power of normative influence). In this variant, the level of conformity plummeted (see also Abrams et al., 1990(4); Insko et al., 1983(5)). Interestingly, however, conformity was not reduced to zero. For some participants, the power of the situation was enough to convince them that the majority answer was the correct answer after all. In other words, the study provides evidence not only of normative influence (i.e., ‘going along’ with others) but also of informational influence (i.e., being convinced by others).
Haslam I 81
Age/conformity: in a study that used a slightly different paradigm to Asch, Michael Walker and Maria Andrade (Walker and Andrade 1996)(6) found that the younger participants were, the more they conformed: conformity levels were 42% among 6- to 8-year-olds, 38% for 9- to 11-year-olds, and 9% for those 12 to 14 years old, but there was no conformity at all among those aged between 15 and 17. Conformity/cultural differences: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm, Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(7) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong).
Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies.
Haslam I 82
(…) conformity of the form observed in Asch’s studies has been argued to underlie behaviours as diverse as going along with Nazi propaganda, succumbing to eating disorders such as bulimia (where people are not able to resist the majority pressure for thinness; Crandall, 1988)(8), and engaging in football hooliganism and other types of crowd violence (Le Bon, 1895)(9). >Conformity/Le Bon.
Haslam I 83
(…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool.


1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90.
2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5.
3. Deutsch, M. and Gerard, H. (1955) ‘A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 629–36.
4. Abrams, D., Wetherell, M.S., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M.A. and Turner, J.C. (1990) ‘Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity, and group polarization’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 29: 97–119.
5. Insko, C.A., Drenan, S., Solomon, M.R., Smith, R. and Wade, T.J. (1983) ‘Conformity as a function of the consistency of positive self-evaluation with being liked and being right’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 341–58.
6. Walker, M.B. and Andrade, M.G. (1996) ‘Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age’, Journal of Social Psychology, 136: 367–72.
7. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37.
8. Crandall, C.S. (1988) ‘Social contagion of binge eating’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55: 588–98.
9. Le Bon, G. (1895) La Psychologie des foules (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1982, Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company).


Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Conformity Cultural Psychology Haslam I 81
Conformity/cultural differences/cultural psychology: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm (>Conformity/Asch, Asch 1955)(1), Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(2) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong). Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies.


1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90.
2. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37.


Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Conformity Social Psychology Haslam I 77
Conformity/psychological theories: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right. >Conformity/Asch.
Haslam I 80
As a further demonstration of the power of normative influence, Morton Deutsch and Harold Gerard (1955)(3) created a situation in which participants could witness the (incorrect) responses of the majority but were allowed to record their own responses privately (thus eliminating fear of ridicule and, by extension, the power of normative influence). In this variant, the level of conformity plummeted (see also Abrams et al., 1990(4); Insko et al., 1983(5)). Interestingly, however, conformity was not reduced to zero. For some participants, the power of the situation was enough to convince them that the majority answer was the correct answer after all. In other words, the study provides evidence not only of normative influence (i.e., ‘going along’ with others) but also of informational influence (i.e., being convinced by others).
Haslam I 81
Age/conformity: in a study that used a slightly different paradigm to Asch, Michael Walker and Maria Andrade (Walker and Andrade 1996)(6) found that the younger participants were, the more they conformed: conformity levels were 42% among 6- to 8-year-olds, 38% for 9- to 11-year-olds, and 9% for those 12 to 14 years old, but there was no conformity at all among those aged between 15 and 17. Conformity/cultural differences: Looking at national differences in conformity in the Asch paradigm, Rod Bond and Peter Smith (1996)(7) conducted a statistical analysis in which they compared conformity levels across countries that promote individualism (e.g., the US) and countries that have a more collectivist orientation (e.g., Hong Kong).
Their analysis of 133 Asch line-judgment studies showed that conformity was higher in collectivist countries than in individualist countries, presumably because conformity is more valued in the former than the latter. Their study also revealed a robust effect whereby women were more likely to conform than men. Interestingly too, the researchers found that levels of conformity had dropped significantly over the decades, with conformity levels being relatively low in more recent studies.
Haslam I 82
(…) conformity of the form observed in Asch’s studies has been argued to underlie behaviours as diverse as going along with Nazi propaganda, succumbing to eating disorders such as bulimia (where people are not able to resist the majority pressure for thinness; Crandall, 1988)(8), and engaging in football hooliganism and other types of crowd violence (Le Bon, 1895)(9). >Conformity/Le Bon.
Haslam I 83
(…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool.


1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90.
2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5.
3. Deutsch, M. and Gerard, H. (1955) ‘A study of normative and informational social influences upon individual judgment’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 629–36.
4. Abrams, D., Wetherell, M.S., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M.A. and Turner, J.C. (1990) ‘Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the nature of norm formation, conformity, and group polarization’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 29: 97–119.
5. Insko, C.A., Drenan, S., Solomon, M.R., Smith, R. and Wade, T.J. (1983) ‘Conformity as a function of the consistency of positive self-evaluation with being liked and being right’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19: 341–58.
6. Walker, M.B. and Andrade, M.G. (1996) ‘Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age’, Journal of Social Psychology, 136: 367–72.
7. Bond, R. and Smith, P. (1996) ‘Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) line judgment task’, Psychological Bulletin, 119: 111–37.
8. Crandall, C.S. (1988) ‘Social contagion of binge eating’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55: 588–98.
9. Le Bon, G. (1895) La Psychologie des foules (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1982, Atlanta: Cherokee Publishing Company).


Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Conformity Asch Haslam I 77
Conformity/Asch: Solomon Asch (1951(1), 1955(2)) asked why we sometimes abandon our firmly held convictions and bring our attitudes and judgments in line with those of other people, even if we know that they are wrong and we are right.
Haslam I 78
In his experiments he created a situation in which various features of the task and the social context made it extremely difficult to resist conformity pressure despite it being very clear that conforming would mean giving an incorrect response. Experiment/Asch: in his line-judgment studies the participant finds himself within a group of others [who are no real participants but assistants to the experimenter, which the participant does not know]. Cards with lines of different lengths are shown and the group is asked to judge whether the lines are equal or different in length. After a while all of the group except the real participant judge in a obviously wrong way. >Method/Asch.
Haslam I 79
The results show that it is fairly difficult to withstand conforming in such contexts, even though it is clear that the majority is wrong. (…) the task was indeed incredibly easy. On this basis, Asch remarked that ‘whereas in ordinary circumstances, individuals matching the lines will make mistakes less than 1 percent of the time, under group pressure, the minority subjects swung to acceptance of the misleading majority’s wrong judgments in 36.8 percent of the selections’ (Asch, 1955(2): 32–3).
Haslam I 80
In one variant of the line-judgment study, Asch inverted the typical paradigm. This time there was just one confederate who was instructed to call out the wrong answer and the confederate was surrounded by several true participants. Here the (unfortunate) confederate was openly and loudly ridiculed. For other studies see >Conformity/psychological theories.
Haslam I 81
Asch also examined to what extent conformity would be affected by the extent to which the majority was unanimous. Results of these studies were even more striking. When there was one other individual who failed to conform to the incorrect majority response (either a confederate or another naïve participant), conformity dropped dramatically. Other studies examined conformity when the dissenter disagreed not only with the majority but also with the participant (i.e., still giving an obviously wrong answer, but a different one to the majority). Here conformity to the majority giving the wrong answer was relatively low (occurring on only 9% of critical trials). This led Asch to conclude that what undermined conformity was not the direction of dissent (i.e., whether the dissenter was right or wrong), but the fact that dissent had occurred at all.
Haslam I 83
(…) is it really the case that conformity is a reflection of weakness and cowardice? (…) it is particularly revealing to read what participants said when asked after the study to elaborate on what it was that dictated their responses. (…) many of those who conformed spontaneously mentioned that they went along with the group because – even though they did not think the majority was right – they did not want to appear foolish or to be the odd one out. However, there were also other reasons why people conformed. Some mentioned they did not want to ‘spoil the study results’ (Asch 1955(2): p. 33). Still others believed that the first person to call out the wrong response must have a visual impairment. When Confederates 2 and 3 also called out the wrong response, they simply concluded that these participants were conforming, possibly because they did not want to make the first person look like a fool.
Non-conformity/Asch: Asch himself also considered in detail the responses of those who resisted majority pressure, those responses are less often summarized in social psychological textbooks. So what exactly did those who resisted say? Asch reports two classes of individuals:
a )those who were confident of their own judgment and appeared to respond without much consideration of the majority, and
b) those who believed that the majority may be correct, but could not stop themselves calling out what they saw.
Haslam I 84
Conformity/Hornsey/Jetten: [in the studies] it becomes clear that people were actively trying to make sense of the situation by developing different theories as to why the majority was giving these obviously wrong responses. Participants did not sit back and simply let the majority overwhelm them. Rather, they were critically engaged and tried actively to make sense of the situation in order to develop a theory that would allow them to resolve the highly dissonant experience of contradiction between what they were seeing and how the majority was responding. Cf. >Cognitive dissonance/Festinger, >Cognitive dissonance/psychological theories. See also >Conformity/psychological theories, >Conformity/cultural psychology, >Majorities/Asch, >Resistance/Hornsey.
Haslam I 88
Social pressure/Asch: We should be skeptical, however, of the supposition that the power of social pressure necessarily implies uncritical submission to it: Independence and the capacity to rise above group passion are also open to human beings. (Asch 1955(2): 32)
Haslam I 89
Hornsey: Nevertheless, it seems that only one-half of Asch’s message has survived and that the other part has been largely forgotten. His message and purpose has thus been transformed over the years: so that rather than trying to understand the interplay between independence and conformity, consumers of his work have focused solely on people’s inclination to conform. >Resistance/Hornsey, >Majority/Hornsey.

1. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90.
2. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5.


Matthew J. Hornsey and Jolanda Jetten, “Conformity. Revisiting Asch’s line-judgment studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Conscientiousness Ethology Corr I 280
Conscientiousness/animals/ethology/Gosling: [in animal studies] some dimensions showed less cross-species generality. Chimpanzees were the only non-human species with a separate Conscientiousness factor, which was defined more narrowly than in humans but included the lack of attention and goal-directedness and erratic, unpredictable and disorganized behaviour typical of the low pole. The existence of a separate Conscientiousness factor in only humans and their closest relative suggests that the trait evolved relatively recently in the evolution of Homininae (Gosling and Graybeal 2007)(1).The finding is consistent with the fact that both humans and chimpanzees have relatively developed frontal
Corr I 281
cortices, the area of the brain associated with higher executive function like making plans and controlling impulses (Beer, Shimamura and Knight 2004)(2).


1. Gosling, S. D. and Graybeal, A. 2007. Tree thinking: a new paradigm for integrating comparative data in psychology, Journal of General Psychology 134: 259–77
2. Beer, J. S., Shimamura, A. P. and Knight, R. T. 2004. Frontal lobe contributions to executive control of cognitive and social behaviour, in M. S. Gazzaniga (ed.) The cognitive neurosciences III, pp. 1091–04. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press



Samuel D. Gosling and B. Austin Harley, „Animal models of personality and cross-species comparisons“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Consciousness Rorty Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of ​​a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. Rorty: there is no medium.
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of ​​the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424


Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality. >Mind.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. - In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. - Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. - Reason/Kant: general principles - FreudVsKant: return to the special. - Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. - Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Constitution Ackerman Gaus I 163
Constitution/Ackerman/deliberative democracy/Bohman: Civil rights, for example, may be interpreted legally so as to establish and guarantee a minimum threshold and the fair value of communicative liberties. of communicative liberties. They can be interpreted, for example, to assure that voting power is more equitably distributed, permitting greater access to representative forums, or they may open
up regulations of political speech to diminish the effects of discrepancies in campaign financing. The emergence of new norms or the reinterpretation of old ones may require a period of what Ackerman (1991(1)) calls 'constitutional politics' within an existing democracy. Ackerman thus sees the constitution as an open-ended discursive project subject to paradigm shifts at historical junctures such as Reconstruction after the Civil War and the Great Depression. These changes reflect 'discourse moments', to use Gamson's (1992(2): Part I) term, in which the people, the courts, or the executive respond to historical circumstance by reinterpreting and recreating the Constitution. >Civil rights/Discourse theories.


1. Ackerman, Bruce (1991) We the People, vol. I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Deliberative Democracy Social Choice Theory Gaus I 146
Deliberative democracy/social choice theory/Dryzek: Deliberative democracy has three prominent sets of critics, who otherwise have absolutely nothing in common: social choice theorists, ifference democrats, and sceptical egalitarians. Cf. >Democracy/Riker, >Democracy/Social choice theory.
Gaus I 147
Dryzek: [social chice theory] (...) provides a set of warnings about what democratic politics could be like if political actors behaved in Homo economicus fashion, and ifno mechanisms existed to curb these behavioural proclivities and their consequences. Deliberative democracy provides both a communicative paradigm of personhood and mechanisms to bring Homo economicus and his interactions under control (a non-deliberative alternative can be found in Shepsle's 1979(1) idea of structure-induced equilibrium).
Now, social choice theorists can still try to pour cold water over deliberation because it is easy to
demonstrate that the very conditions of free access, equality, and unrestricted communication conducive to authentic deliberation are exactly the conditions conducive to instability, arbitrariness, and so strategic manipulation (van Mill, 1996(2); see also Grofman, 1993(3): 1578; Knight and Johnson, 1994)(4).
VsVs: Deliberative democrats can reply that there are mechanisms intrinsic to deliberation that act to structure preferences in ways that solve social choice problems (Dryzek and List, 2003(5)). For
example, deliberation can disaggregate a dimension on which preferences are non-single-peaked (one major cause of cycles across three or more alternatives that are at the root of the kind of instability Riker identifies) into several dimensions on each of which single-peakedness prevails (Miller, 1992)(6).
VsDemocracy: To the extent this deliberative reply succeeds, then the social choice critique undermines only an aggregative account of democracy in which all actors behave strategically, and can actually be deployed to show why deliberation is necessary.


1. Shepsle, Kenneth (1979) 'Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models'. American Journal of Political science, 23:27—60.
2. Van Mill, David (1996) 'The possibility of rational outcomes from democratic discourse and procedures'. Journal of Politics, 58:734-52.
3. Grofman, Bernard (1993) 'Public choice, civic republicanism, and American politics: perspectives of a "reasonable choice" modeler'. Texas Law Review, 71: 1541-87.
4. Knight, Jack and James Johnson (1994) 'Aggregation and Deliberation: On the possibility of democratic legitimacy'. Political Theory, 22: 277-96.
5. Dryzek, John S. and Christian List (2003) 'Social choice theory and deliberative democracy: a reconciliation'. British Journal of Politica1 science, 33: 1-28.
6. Miller, David (1992) 'Deliberative democracy and social choice'. Political Studies, 40 (special issue): 54—67.

Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Denotation Newell, A./Simon, H. Münch III 60
Definition label/Newell/Simon: A term is used to describe an object, if the system can affect with given expression either the object itself, or its behavior is dependent on the object - so one wins through the term access to the object - Definition interpretation/Newell/Simon: the system can interpret an expression, if the expression refers to a process and if the system can run the process at given expression. ---
Münch III 64
Names/Newell/Simon: it is essential that the data are semantically inactive. At first glance there is no term of the symbol as something that signifies something - so that the machine can be operated by a description.

Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355


Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Dimensional Approach Eysenck Corr II 77
Dimensional Approach/Eysenck, H. J./Kieron/Corr: [The dimensional approach] systematizes variations and renders traits measurable as quantifiable data – after all, natural traits (e.g., height) vary along a dimension [too]. [Moreover,] the diversity contained in dimensions can always later be systematically and empirically converted into categories (e.g., personality ‘types’), but the reverse is not the case (…). There is no contradiction where quantitative extremes on the same dimension, as calculated through statistical cut-offs, may subsequently differ qualitatively (…). A dimensional approach allows portrayal of an individual as complex and multidimensional and some dimensions may be more important than others at different times and occasions (…).The dimensional approach allows us systematically to go beyond individual symptoms and signs which in themselves may not reliably appear but form rather part of a pattern (Polman, O’Connor, & Huisman, 2011)(1). Putting psychopathology on a dimension allows aberrant behaviour to be identified on one end of a continuum with normal behaviour. This allows for the understanding of patient behaviour as a progression (O’Connor, 2016) (2). It also somewhat normalizes the behaviour since extreme anxiety, for example, can be related to a normal anxiety that everyone experiences (…). Finally, a dimensional approach has a destigmatizing influence. Psychiatric patients do not come from another planet; their symptoms are cut from the same psychological cloth that the rest of us wear. >Personality/Traits.

1. Polman, A., O’Connor, K. P., & Huisman M. (2011). Dysfunctional belief-based subgroups and inferential confusion in obsessive–compulsive disorder. Personality and Individual Differences, 50, 153–158.
2. O’Connor, K. (2016). Hans Eysenck and the individual differences paradigm in the clinical setting. Personality and Individual Differences, 103, 99–104.


O’Connor, Kieron P. and Philip J. Corr : “The Dimensional Model of Personality and Psychopathology Revisiting Eysenck (1944)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 69-85.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Distinctiveness Group Psychology Haslam I 176
Distinctiveness/group psychology/VsTajfel: tests of the social identity explanation of minimal ingroup bias (>Minimal groups/psychological theories; >Minimal groups/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel) became somewhat side-tracked by the self-esteem hypothesis. One consequence of this was that researchers neglected the role of group distinctiveness that was central to Tajfel’s original explanation. In short, gaining positivity was emphasized at the expense of gaining distinctiveness. Moreover, the very question of what is distinctive about the ingroup (in contrast to the outgroup) has not been discussed. To address this, in some of our own research we have therefore distinguished ‘reactive distinctiveness’ motivated by an established outgroup that is explicitly similar to the ingroup, from a ‘creative distinctiveness’ process relevant to unknown or minimal groups (Spears et al., 2002(1), 2009(2)).
Haslam I 177
There is now evidence that one factor that contributes to responses in the minimal group paradigm is the opportunity this provides for creating coherence and meaning through the creation of positive group distinctiveness (Spears et al., 2009)(2). Participants showed more ingroup bias (on matrices and evaluative ratings) when groups were minimal rather than meaningful. This supports the idea that discrimination in the minimal group paradigm is a way of achieving group distinctiveness that gives meaning to the participants’ assigned group identity. Moreover, the studies also provided evidence that social identification increased in the minimal conditions.


1. Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Scheepers, D. (2002) ‘Distinctiveness and the definition of collective self: A tripartite model’, in A. Tesser, J.V. Wood and D.A. Stapel (eds), Self and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives. Lexington, KY: APA. pp. 147–71.
2. Spears, R., Jetten, J., Scheepers, D. and Cihangir, S. (2009) ‘Creative distinctiveness: Explaining in-group bias in minimal groups’, in S. Otten, T. Kessler and K. Sassenberg (eds), Intergroup Relations: The Role of Motivation and Emotion; A Festschrift in Honor of Amélie Mummendey. New York: Psychology Press. pp. 23–40.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Duty Jonas Brocker I 608
Duties/Generational Justice/Responsibility/Jonas: Why should the living today be responsible for the future of humanity? According to Jonas, there is no duty towards individual future generations to guarantee their existence: the sought-after and "necessary" new ethic of the future is outside the individual legal obligation field, because there can be no reciprocity with individual future generations, since they do not yet exist (1). Solution/Jonas: there is a commitment to humanity as a whole, a duty to preserve humanity. This should be thought in the form of a categorical imperative, as "an unconditional duty of humanity to exist" (2). See Ethics/Jonas.
Brocker I 615
Intuitionism/Jonas/Brocker: Jonas argues intuitively: the infant serves him as an example of the "self affirmation of being" (3). The sight of a helpless infant is sufficient to convey directly the realization of a duty to care for it. For Jonas, this is an "ontic paradigm": the coincidence of existence and value. (4) See Being/Jonas, Ethics/Jonas, Existence/Jonas.
Brocker I 616
WernerVsJonas: the example of the infant is not culturally invariant. (5) Example: In Sparta, an infant did not trigger a general sense of responsibility. Problem/BrockerVsJonas: Future generations, not yet born, just cannot appeal to our commitment in the same way as the infant in Jonas' example.
VsJonas: Ultimately, according to Jonas, even a person who remains childless violates universal duties, since he/she does not guarantee the preservation of humanity.
VsJonas: where would the limit be drawn if one wanted to determine the value of a good to be preserved? In insects? With bacteria? In cancer cells?


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 84
2. Ibid. p. 80
3. Ibid. p. 234-242.
4. Ibid. p. 235.
5. Micha H. Werner, „Dimensionen der Verantwortung. Ein Werkstattbericht zur Zukunftsethik von Hans Jonas“. In: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.) ethik für die Zukunft. Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München, 1994, p. 303-338.

Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Economy Neoclassical Economics Mause I 51f
Economy/Neo-Classicism: Political economy is being replaced by "pure" economy in the form of Neo-Classicism. This is called the "marginalist" revolution. 1) All economic issues are considered from the point of view of optimization under constraints. It is always a matter of optimizing an objective function (e.g. the utility function of a budget) under consideration of certain constraints (e.g. the amount of the household budget) (in the example case to maximize). For this purpose, a marginal value analysis is carried out, i.e. a marginal analysis. (> Rational Choice).
2) The neoclassical analysis focuses on equilibrium - a situation in which there is no reason to change behaviour. Of central importance here is the question of the existence of market equilibria and their characteristics.
3) The principle of methodological individualism applies, according to which all economic phenomena must be explained by individual actions. This implies in particular that society is merely a sum of individuals and that their preferences are independent of each other.
I 52
Main representatives: Antoine Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), who established the foundation of price theory (Cournot 1838 (1); Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), who founded consumer theory (Gossen 1854) (2); and Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783-1850), who laid the foundations of production and distribution theory (Thünen 1826) (3). In the following period, these approaches were further developed and implemented by William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) and Léon Walras (1834-1910) (Jevons 1871) (4); Walras 1874/ 1877) (5). NeoclassicismVsClassic: all three basic components of the neoclassical paradigm are foreign to classic: this is most evident in the case of the optimization and equilibrium principle; but the classics also did not represent strict methodological individualism, but recognized the social nature of human beings and
therefore considered the analytical use of supra-individual concepts to be justified (without therefore conceding this one real existence independent of individuals). The neoclassicists were always striving for a "scientificization" of economics, for the establishment of their discipline as one of the natural sciences, and here above all physics. (optimization, balance).
Classic: considers economic action, i.e. the emergence and distribution of material wealth.
Neoclassicism: this analysis is not compatible with the new formal understanding.
The neoclassical economy is microeconomic, i.e. the analysis focuses on the behaviour of individual economic entities, i.e. individual households (consumption theory) and companies (production and price theory).


1. A. Cournot, Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses. Paris, 1838.
2. H.H.Gossen, Entwickelung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs, und der daraus fließenden Regeln für menschliches Handeln. Braunschweig 1854
3. J.H. von Thünen, Der isolirte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirthschaft und Nationalökonomie. Hamburg 1826
4. W.St.Jevons, 1871. The theory of political economy. London 1871
5. L. Walras, Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure. Teile I– III (1874), Teile IV– VI (1877). Lausanne 1874/ 1877.


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Egoism Tajfel Haslam I 173
Egoism/self-interest/Tajfel: VsTajfel: Problem: ruling out the role of self-interest in the minimal group studies (>Minimal group/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social identity theory/Tajfel) has proven no easier than ruling it out in instances of altruism (a debate that continues to rage in psychology more generally). Minimal group/psychological theories: in the minimal group paradigm, participants always allocate rewards to another ingroup or outgroup member but never to themselves. Formally, then, there is no opportunity for self-interest. However, researchers have argued that there may be an expectation that ingroup members will favour their own group, and so it makes sense (and is rational) to favour other members of the ingroup. In other words, there are assumptions of interdependence or reciprocity within the ingroup that could explain ingroup favouritism. (Rabbie et al. 1989)(1).
Interaction/Rabbie: (Rabbie et al. 1989)(1) proposed a ‘Behavioural Interaction Model’ to formalize this interdependence and reciprocity argument. To test this, they devised an experiment with different conditions that made it explicit whether participants would receive reward allocations from (i.e., be dependent on) the ingroup (ID), the outgroup (OD) or both (IOD).
VsRabbie: participants still tended to favour the ingroup in the more balanced IOD condition and, in a critique of this research, Richard Bourhis and colleagues (1997)(2) point out that parity or fairness would be a more valid prediction in this case if only reciprocity was at work.
Haslam i 174
Self-interest may help explain why participants strive to maximize ingroup profit, but it struggles to explain why they sacrifice ingroup profit in order to deprive an outgroup of benefits. >Reciprocity/psychologcal theories.


1. Rabbie, J.M., Schot, J.C. and Visser, L. (1989) ‘Social identity theory: A conceptual and empirical critique from the perspective of a behavioural interaction model’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 19: 171–202.
2. Bourhis, R.Y., Turner, J.C. and Gagnon, A. (1997) ‘Interdependence, social identity and discrimination’, in R. Spears, P.J. Oakes, N. Ellemers and S.A. Haslam (eds), The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 273–95.



Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
End of History Policy of Germany Krastev I 54
End of History/policiy of Germany/Krastev: What fascinated Europeans and especially Germans about the end-of-history paradigm, [Thomas] Bagger claims, was that it liberated them from both the burdens of the past and the uncertainties of the future: ‘Toward the end of a century marked by having been on the wrong side of history twice, Germany finally found itself on the right side. What had looked impossible, even unthinkable, for decades suddenly seemed to be not just real, but indeed inevitable.’(1) The observable
Krastev I 55
transformation of Central and Eastern European countries into parliamentary democracies and market economies was taken as empirical proof of the validity of the bold claim that humanity, in its pursuit of freedom, need look no further than Western-style liberal democracy. Krastev: In a world governed by the moral imperative to imitate the insuperable model of Western-style liberal democracy, no country need be trapped by its past or compelled to take responsibility for its future. Reducing political life to the more or less successful imitation of this fully worked-out political and ideological ‘supermodel’ gave humanity in general, and Germans in particular, both past and future for the price of one.
Imitation: To this reassuring German dream we can add that the Imitation Imperative, as it was experienced or imagined in Central and Eastern Europe, tacitly implied that Germany was the real model being held up for admiring emulation. >Imitation/Krastev, >Imitation/Post-communist countries.
Krastev I 61
The old German question revolved around the idea that Germany was too small for the world and too big for Europe. The new German question is different. In the post-Cold War world, it turns out that Germany’s transition to liberal democracy was too unique and path-dependent to be imitated by countries inhospitable, given their own recent histories, to the very idea of a post-ethnic society.

1. Thomas Bagger, ‘The World According to Germany: Reassessing 1989’, Washington Quarterly (22 January 2019), p. 54.


Krastev I
Ivan Krastev
Stephen Holmes
The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
Environment Norvig Norvig I 401
Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically.
Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details
1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints.
Norvig I 404
Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated.
Norvig I 405
Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan.
Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below).
Norvig I 406
Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…).
Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN).
Norvig I 407
a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets
Norvig I 408
to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself.
Norvig I 409
Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…).
Norvig I 410
Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”.
Norvig I 411
Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further.
Norvig I 415
Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments.
Norvig I 417
Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula.
Norvig I 423
Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve.
Norvig I 425
Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have
Norvig I 426
what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies.
Norvig I 429
Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan.
Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones.
Norvig I 430
The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control.
Norvig I 431
Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources.
Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11).
Norvig I 432
Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18).
Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning.
Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28).
Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning.
Norvig I 433
Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…).
Norvig I 434
Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research).



1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267.
2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154.
3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650.
4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416.
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8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources.
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Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187.
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Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88
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Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Environment Russell Norvig I 401
Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically.
Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details
1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints.
Norvig I 404
Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated.
Norvig I 405
Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan.
Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below).
Norvig I 406
Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…).
Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN).
Norvig I 407
a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets
Norvig I 408
to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself.
Norvig I 409
Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…).
Norvig I 410
Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”.
Norvig I 411
Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further.
Norvig I 415
Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments.
Norvig I 417
Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula.
Norvig I 423
Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve.
Norvig I 425
Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have
Norvig I 426
what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies.
Norvig I 429
Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan.
Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones.
Norvig I 430
The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control.
Norvig I 431
Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources.
Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11).
Norvig I 432
Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18).
Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning.
Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28).
Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning.
Norvig I 433
Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…).
Norvig I 434
Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research).



1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267.
2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154.
3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650.
4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416.
5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann.
6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246.
7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182.
8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources.
9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI,
Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187.
10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186.
11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67.
12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158.
13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in
Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88
14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217.
15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07.
16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland.
17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag.
18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135.
20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland
21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24.
22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94,
pp. 1123–1128.
23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07.
25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08.
26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888.
27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46.
28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer science Department, Carnegie-
Mellon University.
29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69.
30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive science, 12, 393–422.
31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press.
32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244
33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117.
34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117.
35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896.
36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99,
pp. 1192–1197.
37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23.
39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272.
40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI-
87, pp. 1039–1046.
41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60.

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Environment AI Research Norvig I 401
Environment/planning/real world/representation/artificial intelligence/Norvig/Russell: algorithms for planning (…) extend both the representation language and the way the planner interacts with the environment. >Planning/Norvig, >Agents/Norvig. New: [we now have] a) actions with duration and b) plans that are organized hierarchically.
Hierarchy: Hierarchy also lends itself to efficient plan construction because the planner can solve a problem at an abstract level before delving into details
1st approach: “plan first, schedule later”: (…) we divide the overall problem into a planning phase in which actions are selected, with some ordering constraints, to meet the goals of the problem, and a later scheduling phase, in which temporal information is added to the plan to ensure that it meets resource and deadline constraints.
Norvig I 404
Critical path: Mathematically speaking, critical-path problems are easy to solve because they are defined as a conjunction of linear inequalities on the start and end times. When we introduce resource constraints, the resulting constraints on start and end times become more complicated.
Norvig I 405
Scheduling: The “cannot overlap” constraint is a disjunction of two linear inequalities, one for each possible ordering. The introduction of disjunctions turns out to make scheduling with resource constraints NP-hard. >NP-Problems. Non-overlapping: [when we assume non-overlapping] every scheduling problem can be solved by a non-overlapping sequence that avoids all resource conflicts, provided that each action is feasible by itself. If a scheduling problem is proving very difficult, however, it may not be a good idea to solve it this way - it may be better to reconsider the actions and constraints, in case that leads to a much easier scheduling problem. Thus, it makes sense to integrate planning and scheduling by taking into account durations and overlaps during the construction of a partial-order plan.
Heuristics: partial-order planners can detect resource constraint violations in much the same way they detect conflicts with causal links. Heuristics can be devised to estimate the total completion time of a plan. This is currently an active area of research (see below).
Norvig I 406
Real world planning: AI systems will probably have to do what humans appear to do: plan at higher levels of abstraction. A reasonable plan for the Hawaii vacation might be “Go to San Francisco airport (…)” ((s) which might be in a different direction). (…) planning can occur both before and during the execution of the plan (…).
Solution: hierarchical decomposition: hierarchical task networks (HTN).
Norvig I 407
a high-level plan achieves the goal from a given state if at least one of its implementations achieves the goal from that state. The “at least one” in this definition is crucial - not all implementations need to achieve the goal, because the agent gets
Norvig I 408
to decide which implementation it will execute. Thus, the set of possible implementations in HTN planning - each of which may have a different outcome - is not the same as the set of possible outcomes in nondeterministic planning. It can be shown that the right collection of HLAs can result in the time complexity of blind search dropping from exponential in the solution depth to linear in the solution depth, although devising such a collection of HLAs may be a nontrivial task in itself.
Norvig I 409
Plan library: The key to HTN planning, then, is the construction of a plan library containing known methods for implementing complex, high-level actions. One method of constructing the library is to learn the methods from problem-solving experience. (>Representation/AI research, >Learning/AI research). Learning/AI: In this way, the agent can become more and more competent over time as new methods are built on top of old methods. One important aspect of this learning process is the ability to generalize the methods that are constructed, eliminating detail that is specific to the problem instance (…).
Norvig I 410
Nondeterministic action: problem: downward refinement is much too conservative for a real world environment. See >Terminology/Norvig for “demonic nondeterminism” and “angelic nondeterminism”.
Norvig I 411
Reachable sets: The key idea is that the agent can choose which element of the reachable set it ends up in when it executes the HLA; thus, an HLA with multiple refinements is more “powerful” than the same HLA (hig level action) with fewer refinements. The notion of reachable sets yields a straightforward algorithm: search among highlevel plans, looking for one whose reachable set intersects the goal; once that happens, the algorithm can commit to that abstract plan, knowing that it works, and focus on refining the plan further.
Norvig I 415
Unknown environment/planning/nondeterministic domains: [problems here are] sensorless planning (also known as conformant planning) for environments with no observations; contingency planning for partially observable and nondeterministic environments; and online planning and replanning for unknown environments.
Norvig I 417
Sensorless planning: In classical planning, where the closed-world assumption is made, we would assume that any fluent not mentioned in a state is false, but in sensorless (and partially observable) planning we have to switch to an open-world assumption in which states contain both positive and negative fluents, and if a fluent does not appear, its value is unknown. Thus, the belief state corresponds exactly to the set of possible worlds that satisfy the formula.
Norvig I 423
Online replanning: The online agent has a choice of how carefully to monitor the environment. We distinguish three levels: a) Action monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that all the preconditions still hold, b) Plan monitoring: before executing an action, the agent verifies that the remaining plan will still succeed, c) Goal monitoring: before executing an action, the agent checks to see if there is a better set of goals it could be trying to achieve.
Norvig I 425
Multi-agent planning: A multibody problem is still a “standard” single-agent problem as long as the relevant sensor information collected by each body can be pooled - either centrally or within each body - to form a common estimate of the world state that then informs the execution of the overall plan; in this case, the multiple bodies act as a single body. When communication constraints make this impossible, we have
Norvig I 426
what is sometimes called a decentralized planning problem: (…) the subplan constructed for each body may need to include explicit communicative actions with other bodies.
Norvig I 429
Convention: A convention is any constraint on the selection of joint plans. Communication: In the absence of a convention, agents can use communication to achieve common knowledge of a feasible joint plan.
Plan recognition: works when a single action (or short sequence of actions) is enough to determine a joint plan unambiguously. Note that communication can work as well with competitive agents as with cooperative ones.
Norvig I 430
The most difficult multi-agent problems involve both cooperation with members of one’s own team and competition against members of opposing teams, all without centralized control.
Norvig I 431
Time constraints in plans: Planning with time constraints was first dealt with by DEVISER (Vere, 1983(1)). The representation of time in plans was addressed by Allen (1984(2)) and by Dean et al. (1990)(3) in the FORBIN system. NONLIN+ (Tate and Whiter, 1984)(4) and SIPE (Wilkins, 1988(5), 1990(6)) could reason about the allocation of limited resources to various plan steps. Forward state-space search: The two planners SAPA (Do and Kambhampati, 2001)(7) and T4 (Haslum and Geffner, 2001)(8) both used forward state-space search with sophisticated heuristics to handle actions with durations and resources.
Human heuristics: An alternative is to use very expressive action languages, but guide them by human-written domain-specific heuristics, as is done by ASPEN (Fukunaga et al., 1997)(9), HSTS (Jonsson et al., 2000)(10), and IxTeT (Ghallab and Laruelle, 1994)(11).
Norvig I 432
Hybrid planning-and-scheduling systems: ISIS (Fox et al., 1982(12); Fox, 1990(13)) has been used for job shop scheduling at Westinghouse, GARI (Descotte and Latombe, 1985)(14) planned the machining and construction of mechanical parts, FORBIN was used for factory control, and NONLIN+ was used for naval logistics planning. We chose to present planning and scheduling as two separate problems; (Cushing et al., 2007)(15) show that this can lead to incompleteness on certain problems. Scheduling: The literature on scheduling is presented in a classic survey article (Lawler et al., 1993)(16), a recent book (Pinedo, 2008)(17), and an edited handbook (Blazewicz et al., 2007)(18).
Abstraction hierarchy: The ABSTRIPS system (Sacerdoti, 1974)(19) introduced the idea of an abstraction hierarchy, whereby planning at higher levels was permitted to ignore lower-level preconditions of actions in order to derive the general structure of a working plan. Austin Tate’s Ph.D. thesis (1975b) and work by Earl Sacerdoti (1977)(20) developed the basic ideas of HTN planning in its modern form. Many practical planners, including O-PLAN and SIPE, are HTN planners. Yang (1990)(21) discusses properties of actions that make HTN planning efficient. Erol, Hendler, and Nau (1994(22), 1996(23)) present a complete hierarchical decomposition planner as well as a range of complexity results for pure HTN planners. Our presentation of HLAs and angelic semantics is due to Marthi et al. (2007(24), 2008(25)). Kambhampati et al. (1998)(26) have proposed an approach in which decompositions are just another form of plan refinement, similar to the refinements for non-hierarchical partial-order planning.
Explanation-based learning: The technique of explanation-based learning (…) has been applied in several systems as a means of generalizing previously computed plans, including SOAR (Laird et al., 1986)(27) and PRODIGY (Carbonell et al., 1989)(28).
Case-based planning: An alternative approach is to store previously computed plans in their original form and then reuse them to solve new, similar problems by analogy to the original problem. This is the approach taken by the field called case-based planning (Carbonell, 1983(29); Alterman, 1988(30); Hammond, 1989(31)). Kambhampati (1994)(32) argues that case-based planning should be analyzed as a form of refinement planning and provides a formal foundation for case-based partial-order planning.
Norvig I 433
Conformant planning: Goldman and Boddy (1996)(33) introduced the term conformant planning, noting that sensorless plans are often effective even if the agent has sensors. The first moderately efficient conformant planner was Smith and Weld’s (1998)(34) Conformant Graphplan or CGP. Ferraris and Giunchiglia (2000)(35) and Rintanen (1999)(36) independently developed SATPLAN-based conformant planners. Bonet and Geffner (2000)(37) describe a conformant planner based on heuristic search in the space of >belief states (…).
Norvig I 434
Reactive planning: In the mid-1980s, pessimism about the slow run times of planning systems led to the proposal of reflex agents called reactive planning systems (Brooks, 1986(38); Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39). PENGI (Agre and Chapman, 1987)(39) could play a (fully observable) video game by using Boolean circuits combined with a “visual” representation of current goals and the agent’s internal state. Policies: “Universal plans” (Schoppers, 1987(40), 1989(41)) were developed as a lookup table method for reactive planning, but turned out to be a rediscovery of the idea of policies that had long been used in Markov decision processes (…). >Open Universe/AI research).



1. Vere, S. A. (1983). Planning in time: Windows and durations for activities and goals. PAMI, 5, 246-267.
2. Allen, J. F. (1984). Towards a general theory of action and time. AIJ, 23, 123-154.
3. Dean, T., Kanazawa, K., and Shewchuk, J. (1990). Prediction, observation and estimation in planning and control. In 5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Vol. 2, pp. 645-650.
4. Tate, A. and Whiter, A. M. (1984). Planning with multiple resource constraints and an application to a naval planning problem. In Proc. First Conference on AI Applications, pp. 410-416.
5. Wilkins, D. E. (1988). Practical Planning: Extending the AI Planning paradigm. Morgan Kaufmann.
6. Wilkins, D. E. (1990). Can AI planners solve practical problems? Computational Intelligence, 6(4), 232-246.
7. Do, M. B. and Kambhampati, S. (2003). Planning as constraint satisfaction: solving the planning graph by compiling it into CSP. AIJ, 132(2), 151-182.
8. Haslum, P. and Geffner, H. (2001). Heuristic planning with time and resources. In Proc. IJCAI-01 Workshop on Planning with Resources.
9. Fukunaga, A. S., Rabideau, G., Chien, S., and Yan, D. (1997). ASPEN: A framework for automated planning and scheduling of spacecraft control and operations. In Proc. International Symposium on AI,
Robotics and Automation in Space, pp. 181-187.
10. Jonsson, A., Morris, P., Muscettola, N., Rajan, K., and Smith, B. (2000). Planning in interplanetary space: Theory and practice. In AIPS-00, pp. 177-186.
11. Ghallab, M. and Laruelle, H. (1994). Representation and control in IxTeT, a temporal planner. In AIPS-94, pp. 61-67.
12. Fox, M. S., Allen, B., and Strohm, G. (1982). Job shop scheduling: An investigation in constraint directed reasoning. In AAAI-82, pp. 155-158.
13. Fox, M. S. (1990). Constraint-guided scheduling: A short history of research at CMU. Computers in
Industry, 14(1–3), 79-88
14. Descotte, Y. and Latombe, J.-C. (1985). Making compromises among antagonist constraints in a planner. AIJ, 27, 183–217.
15. Cushing,W., Kambhampati, S.,Mausam, and Weld, D. S. (2007). When is temporal planning really temporal? In IJCAI-07.
16. Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Kan, A., and Shmoys, D. B. (1993). Sequencing and scheduling: Algorithms and complexity. In Graves, S. C., Zipkin, P. H., and Kan, A. H. G. R. (Eds.), Logistics of Production and Inventory: Handbooks in Operations Research and Management science, Volume 4, pp. 445 - 522. North-Holland.
17. Pinedo, M. (2008). Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems. Springer Verlag.
18. Blazewicz, J., Ecker, K., Pesch, E., Schmidt, G., and Weglarz, J. (2007). Handbook on Scheduling: Models and Methods for Advanced Planning (International Handbooks on Information Systems). Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
19. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1974). Planning in a hierarchy of abstraction spaces. AIJ, 5(2), 115–135.
20. Sacerdoti, E. D. (1977). A Structure for Plans and Behavior. Elsevier/North-Holland
21. Yang, Q. (1990). Formalizing planning knowledge for hierarchical planning. Computational Intelligence, 6, 12–24.
22. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1994). HTN planning: Complexity and expressivity. In AAAI-94,
pp. 1123–1128.
23. Erol, K., Hendler, J., and Nau, D. S. (1996). Complexity results for HTN planning. AIJ, 18(1), 69–93. 24. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2007). Angelic semantics for high-level actions. In ICAPS-07.
25. Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., and Wolfe, J. (2008). Angelic hierarchical planning: Optimal and online algorithms. In ICAPS-08.
26. Kambhampati, S., Mali, A. D., and Srivastava, B. (1998). Hybrid planning for partially hierarchical domains. In AAAI-98, pp. 882–888.
27. Laird, J., Rosenbloom, P. S., and Newell, A. (1986). Chunking in Soar: The anatomy of a general learning mechanism. Machine Learning, 1, 11–46.
28. Carbonell, J. G., Knoblock, C. A., and Minton, S. (1989). PRODIGY: An integrated architecture for planning and learning. Technical report CMU-CS- 89-189, Computer science Department, Carnegie-
Mellon University.
29. Carbonell, J. G. (1983). Derivational analogy and its role in problem solving. In AAAI-83, pp. 64–69.
30. Alterman, R. (1988). Adaptive planning. Cognitive science, 12, 393–422.
31. Hammond, K. (1989). Case-Based Planning: Viewing Planning as a Memory Task. Academic Press.
32. Kambhampati, S. (1994). Exploiting causal structure to control retrieval and refitting during plan reuse. Computational Intelligence, 10, 213–244
33. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117.
34. Goldman, R. and Boddy, M. (1996). Expressive planning and explicit knowledge. In AIPS-96, pp. 110–117.
35. Smith, D. E. and Weld, D. S. (1998). Conformant Graphplan. In AAAI-98, pp. 889–896.
36. Rintanen, J. (1999). Improvements to the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulae. In IJCAI-99,
pp. 1192–1197.
37. Bonet, B. and Geffner, H. (2005). An algorithm better than AO∗? In AAAI-05. 38. Brooks, R. A. (1986). A robust layered control system for a mobile robot. IEEE Journal of Robotics and Automation, 2, 14–23.
39. Agre, P. E. and Chapman, D. (1987). Pengi: an implementation of a theory of activity. In IJCAI-87, pp. 268–272.
40. Schoppers, M. J. (1987). Universal plans for reactive robots in unpredictable environments. In IJCAI-
87, pp. 1039–1046.
41. Schoppers, M. J. (1989). In defense of reaction plans as caches. AIMag, 10(4), 51–60.


Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010
Experience Kuhn I 137
Experience/Content/Kuhn: The immediate content of Galileo's experience with falling stones was not the same as in Aristotle's experiences. ---
I 138
The laboratory measurements are not "given" but "collected with difficulties" - they are not what the scientist "sees". ---
I 139
Seeing through a new paradigm is no "interpretation". >Interpretation/Kuhn.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Experiments Experiment: artificial bringing about of an event or artificial creation of a state for testing a hypothesis. Experiments can lead to the reformulation of the initial hypotheses and the reformulation of theories. See also theories, measuring, science, hypotheses, Bayesianism, confirmation, events, paradigm change, reference systems.

Experiments Harlow Slater I 11
Experiments/attachment/affectation/Harlow: In a series of studies using the surrogate preference paradigm, Harlow demonstrated that infant monkeys showed large and consistent preferences for cloth surrogates that provided contact comfort over wire surrogates that provided food. The largest sample reported in the 1962 paper(1) consisted of 56 monkeys that had been raised in conditions of “partial social isolation.” These monkeys had been housed in cages where they could see and hear other monkeys. (…+…).
Slater I 13
In another set of studies (…) monkeys were exposed to a total social isolation, a condition in which they were individually housed in a cubicle with solid walls that eliminated all visual and auditory contact with other monkeys. (…) Harlow concluded that total social isolation for the first six months of life was a critical period that created irreversible effects on subsequent social adaptation. He indicated that this six-month period in the rhesus monkey was equivalent to the first two to three years of life for the human infant. (…+…). A set of studies varied the conditions and the degree of social isolation and the resulting behavior of the monkeys was described. ((s) The severity of the social restrictions corresponded to the length and severity of the isolation as well as the time of the beginning of the isolation in the life of the monkeys.)
Slater I 14
Harlow’s paper had an immediate impact on the ongoing debate about the importance of the mother-infant bond in child psychiatry. During the 1950s, John Bowlby a British psychiatrist had published a monograph (1951)(2) on the effects of maternal deprivation on children’s development. In his visits to Harlow’s lab in the 1950s, Bowlby may have been responsible for pointing out to Harlow that his cage-raised monkey colony created conditions that were equivalent to partial social isolation (Suomi, Horst, & Veer, 2008)(3).
Slater I 15
[Harlow’s] approach was influenced by European ethologists, particularly Robert Hinde, and by Harlow’s sensitivity to the effects of different rearing environments ranging from his lab, to the local zoo, to monkeys born and raised in the wild. Harlow’s creativity in designing laboratory environments that elicit attachment, fear, exploratory, and affiliative behavior showed a unique understanding of the importance of context in assessing how early social experience could influence subsequent development. He actively designed environments that tested the interplay between attachment, fear, and exploration. >Situation/Ainsworth. VsHarlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). For criticism of Harlow, see >Behavior/Harlow.


1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146.
2. Bowlby, J. (1951). Maternal care and mental health. New York: Columbia University Press.
3. Suomi, S. J., Horst, F. C. P., & Veer, R. (2008). Rigorous experiments on monkey love: An account of Harry F. Harlow’s role in the history of attachment theory. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral science, 42, 354–369.


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Experiments Watson Slater I 24
Experiment/”Little Albert”/Watson/Rayner: the Little Albert experiment (Watson & Rayner 1920(1)) was the first demonstration (…) in humans: an unconditioned stimulus (loud noise) that produced an unconditioned response (fear) was paired with a conditioned stimulus (white rat) to produce a conditioned response (fear). In this manner, a conditioned emotional reaction was produced. >Conditioning/Watson.
Slater I 25
Watson and Rayner [posed] four questions: (1) Could they condition fear of an animal by presenting it and simultaneously striking a steel bar?
(2) If such a conditioned response could be established, would the emotional response transfer to other animals or other objects?
(3) What would the effect of time be upon such conditioned emotional responses?
(4) What methods could be used to remove the fear response?
When Albert was 11 months of age, the experiment combined the presentation of a rat that Albert showed no fear of with the loud sound of a steel bar. After some repetitions Albert began to cry when he was only shown the rat without any noise.
Slater I 26
The experiment continued and Watson and Rayner showed that the fear of the rat could be transferred to other animals and that it lasted for weeks. The experiment could not answer the fourth question, because Albert and his mother left the hospital. Watson and Rayner suggested the conditioned response could be reduced by arranging “constructive” activities with the feared object by using imitation and assisting the child in interacting with the object in a constructive manner.
Quite clearly, Watson and Rayner anticipated strategies that have subsequently been shown to be efficacious in the treatment of childhood phobias even though they did not attempt them themselves: prolonged in vivo exposure, systematic desensitization, and participant modeling (Ollendick & King, 2011)(2).
Slater I 27
{The] demonstration resulted in a paradigm shift in how fears and phobias were acquired and could potentially be treated. Problem: Harris (1979)(3) has documented that most textbook versions of Albert’s conditioning (…) suffer from various inaccuracies.
VsWatson: [the experiment] has been soundly criticized by many scholars on a number of conceptual, methodological and ethical grounds. >Conditioning/psychological theories.
Slater I 28
Stimuli/conditioning/VsWatson: it has been shown repeatedly that fears of spiders, snakes, dogs, heights, thunder, and water are much more common than fears of shoes, flowers, rabbits, and even potentially dangerous objects such as guns, knives, and electric outlets. Seligman (1971)(4) suggested that some objects or situations are more evolutionarily “prepared” to be associated with the fear response, whereas other authors like Davey (1997)(5) and Öhman and Mineka (2001)(6) speak of so-called fear-relevant stimuli and fear-irrelevant stimuli. However labeled, these recent findings challenge the notion of equipotentiality. (>Conditioning/psychological theories.)

1. Watson, J. B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14.
2. Ollendick, T. H., & King, N. J. (2011). Evidence-based treatments for children and adolescents: Issues and commentary. In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Child and adolescent therapy: Cognitive and behavioral procedures (4th edn, pp. 499–519). New York: Guilford Publications.
3. Harris, B. (1979). Whatever happened to Little Albert? American Psychologist, 34, 151–160.
4. Seligman, M. E. P. (1971). Phobias and preparedness. Behavior Therapy, 3, 307–320.
5. Davey, G. C. L. (1997). A conditioning model of phobias. In G. C. L. Davey (Ed.), Phobias: A handbook of theory, research, and treatment (pp. 301–322). Chichester: Wiley.
6. Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2001). Fears, phobias, and preparedness: Toward an evolved module of fear and fear learning. Psychological Review, 108, 383–522.


Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Explanation Ricoeur II 71
Understanding/explanation/Ricoeur: (...) it may be said, at least in an introductory fashion, that - understanding: is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of discourse and that
- explanation: is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to the objective. meaning of discourse. >Discourse/Ricoeur.
II 72
Explanation/tradition: finds its paradigmatic field of application in the natural sciences. When there are external facts to observe, hypotheses to be submitted to empirical verification, general laws for covering such facts, theories to encompass the scattered laws in a systematic whole, and subordination of empirical generalizations to hypothetic-deductive procedures, then we may say that we "explain." Understanding/tradition: Understanding, in contrast, finds its originary field of application in the human sciences (the German Geisteswissenschaften), where science has to do with the experience of
other subjects or other minds similar to our own. It relies on the meaningfulness of such forms of expression as physiognomic, gestural, vocal, or written signs, and upon documents
II 73
and monuments, which share with writing the general character of inscription. The immediate types of expression are meaningful because they refer directly to the experience of the other mind which they convey. Tradition/Ricoeur: The dichotomy between understanding and explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind.
II 75
Understanding/Ricoeur: (...) we have to guess the meaning of the text because the author's intention is beyond our reach.
II 79
Interpretation: (...) if it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is not true that all interpretations are equal. The text presents a limited field of possible constructions. The logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and scepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond our immediate reach.
II 81
Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur.
II 86
Explanation/literature/texts/Ricoeur: [The] transposition of a linguistic model to the theory of narrative perfectly corroborates my initial remark regarding the contemporary understanding of explanation. Today ((s) 1976) the concept of explanation is no longer borrowed from the natural sciences and transferred into a different field, that of written documents. It proceeds from the common sphere of language thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and myth.

Ricoeur I
Paul Ricoeur
De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud
German Edition:
Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999

Ricoeur II
Paul Ricoeur
Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976

Facts Kuhn I 66
Fact/Science/Kuhn: As long as the scientists have not learned to see nature differently, a new fact is still not a scientific fact. >Science/Kuhn, >Paradigm.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Fake News Krastev Krastev I 173
Fake News/Krastev: Behind [Trumps] constant complaints about 'fake news', we can discern a very specific and very peculiar attitude towards the truth. Here again, associating Trump with post-communist leaders such as Putin, known for publicly denying easily checkable facts, helps illuminate behaviour that would otherwise seem anomaIous. >Misinformation/Policy of Russia. Gessen: As the Russian-born American journalist Masha Gessen argues, Trump and
Putin share a similar contempt for objective truth. 'Lying is the message,' she writes. 'It's not just that both Putin and Trump lie, it is that they lie in the same way and for the same purpose: blatantly, to assert power over truth itself.(1)
Krastev: Curiously, they both tell lies that can be quickly and effortlessly exposed as false.
The purpose of their lying, given that much of their intended audience has access to alternative sources of information, cannot be to deceive. One aim, at least, is to show that leaders can prevaricate without suffering untoward consequences. Paying no price for telling easily exposable untruths is an effective way to display one's power and impunity.
Motivation: When deciding what to say, Trump always asks whether truths or untruths are more likely to help him 'win'. In his mind, obviously, there is no reason to believe that truth-tellers are more likely to get what they want than liars. But if his blatant lies betray consciousness of guilt, his sometimes surprising truths (that elected politicians are owned by their donors, for example)(2) do the same, since he is retailing such truths not because they are true but only to dramatize his de-
fiance of political correctness and to throw his enemies off balance.
Krastev I 174
Truth-tellers can inadvertently give aid and comfort to their enemies. That is why they often lose, and why liars often win.
Krastev I 175
[Trump] also believes that his enemies speak truths not because they have some sort of impartial devotion to veracity but because (and when) it serves their interest to do so. Shifting opportunistically between telling truths and telling lies, he is always 'projecting his own unruliness' onto others,(3) and that means assuming everyone else does the same. Cf. >Sincerity/Bernard Williams. Putin: When Putin denies that Moscow had anything to do with the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, he is obviously defending his country's sovereignty, which includes the right to deny the validity of 'truths' that are used by political adversaries to attack Russia. >Sincerity/Bernard Williams.
Krastev I 177
Loyalty: (...) deeply felt loyalty to a leader or a movement cannot be shaken by offcial documents or other such bureaucratic niceties. The willingness to repeat such factual untruths is a test of loyalty.

1. Masha Gessen, 'The Putin paradigm', New York Review of Books (13 December 2016).
2. 'As a businessman and a very substantial donor to very important people, when you give, they do whatever the hell you want them to do.' Peter Nicholas, 'Donald Trump Walks Back His Past Praise of Hillary Clinton', Wall Street Journal (29 July 2015).
3. Nancy Pelosi, cited in Jennifer Rubin, 'Trump's Fruitless Struggle to Stop Transparency', Washington Post (7 February 2019).

Krastev I
Ivan Krastev
Stephen Holmes
The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019

Fake News Holmes Krastev I 173
Fake News/Krastev/Holmes: Behind [Trumps] constant complaints about 'fake news', we can discern a very specific and very peculiar attitude towards the truth. Here again, associating Trump with post-communist leaders such as Putin, known for publicly denying easily checkable facts, helps illuminate behaviour that would otherwise seem anomaIous. >Misinformation/Policy of Russia. Gessen: As the Russian-born American journalist Masha Gessen argues, Trump and
Putin share a similar contempt for objective truth. 'Lying is the message,' she writes. 'It's not just that both Putin and Trump lie, it is that they lie in the same way and for the same purpose: blatantly, to assert power over truth itself.(1)
Krastev: Curiously, they both tell lies that can be quickly and effortlessly exposed as false.
The purpose of their lying, given that much of their intended audience has access to alternative sources of information, cannot be to deceive. One aim, at least, is to show that leaders can prevaricate without suffering untoward consequences. Paying no price for telling easily exposable untruths is an effective way to display one's power and impunity.
Motivation: When deciding what to say, Trump always asks whether truths or untruths are more likely to help him 'win'. In his mind, obviously, there is no reason to believe that truth-tellers are more likely to get what they want than liars. But if his blatant lies betray consciousness of guilt, his sometimes surprising truths (that elected politicians are owned by their donors, for example)(2) do the same, since he is retailing such truths not because they are true but only to dramatize his de-
fiance of political correctness and to throw his enemies off balance.
Krastev I 174
Truth-tellers can inadvertently give aid and comfort to their enemies. That is why they often lose, and why liars often win.
Krastev I 175
[Trump] also believes that his enemies speak truths not because they have some sort of impartial devotion to veracity but because (and when) it serves their interest to do so. Shifting opportunistically between telling truths and telling lies, he is always 'projecting his own unruliness' onto others,(3) and that means assuming everyone else does the same. Cf. >Sincerity/Bernard Williams. Putin: When Putin denies that Moscow had anything to do with the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, he is obviously defending his country's sovereignty, which includes the right to deny the validity of 'truths' that are used by political adversaries to attack Russia. >Sincerity/Bernard Williams.
Krastev I 177
Loyalty: (...) deeply felt loyalty to a leader or a movement cannot be shaken by offcial documents or other such bureaucratic niceties. The willingness to repeat such factual untruths is a test of loyalty.

1. Masha Gessen, 'The Putin paradigm', New York Review of Books (13 December 2016).
2. 'As a businessman and a very substantial donor to very important people, when you give, they do whatever the hell you want them to do.' Peter Nicholas, 'Donald Trump Walks Back His Past Praise of Hillary Clinton', Wall Street Journal (29 July 2015).
3. Nancy Pelosi, cited in Jennifer Rubin, 'Trump's Fruitless Struggle to Stop Transparency', Washington Post (7 February 2019).

LawHolm I
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991


Krastev I
Ivan Krastev
Stephen Holmes
The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019
False Confessions Social Psychology Parisi I 134
False Confessions/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: The physical surroundings of the interrogation are an important feature of their potential for effectively extracting an admission of guilt. Often police will interrogate a suspect in a small windowless room in the police station or other law enforcement facility, and the suspect will be isolated from his social support network of family and friends. This increases the suspect's anxiety and desire to escape (Kassin, 2008)(1). A major source of pressure on the suspect is the interrogators' confrontation with the accusation of guilt and blocking of attempts to deny guilt. Innocent people who have falsely confessed often later report that they did so simply to put an end to the stress of the seemingly never-ending confrontation. These people almost always convince themselves that the truth will come to light after they are able to escape their tormentors in the interrogation room.
Minimization/maximization: In order to convince the suspect that confessing is more advantageous than holding out, interrogators use techniques called minimization and maximization. Minimization entails convincing the suspect that the police and/or prosecutors are prepared to believe that the offense was not as serious as the accusation suggests, often because of mitigating circumstances such as self-defense, intoxication, or duress. Other face-saving justifications often suggested to suspects include the notion that their actions were peer-pressured, spontaneous, or accidental (Kassin et al., 2010)(2).
Minimization: Implicit in the minimization
Parisi I 135
theme is a promise of leniency, or even that the suspect’s actions d not constitute a crime at all. In one experiment, participants were twice as likely to confess when the minimization technique was used; innocent participants were three times as likely to confess with the minimization technique (Russano et al., 2005)(3); other experiments have demonstrated that the minimization technique increases the risk of false confessions (Klaver, Lee, and Rose, 2008)(4). Maximization: Here, the implication is that because the evidence of guilt is so strong, the suspect will be convicted regardless of whether he confesses; but cooperating with investigators is the only way to avoid the harshest punishment, for example the death penalty. Interrogators in the United States (but not in most of Europe) are lawfully permitted to manufacture false evidence to convince the suspect of the strength of the evidence against him.
Detailed confessions: Many documented false confessions consist of rich, detailed, and accurate accounts of the crime. Case studies of wrongfully convicted people show that these details were unknown to the suspect, but were disclosed to them by interrogators. >Punishment/Social Psychology.


1. Kassin, S. M. (2008). " The Psychology of Confessions." Annual Review of Law and social science 4(1): 193-217. doi:10.1146/annurev.1awsocsci.4.110707.172410.
2. Kassin, S. M., S. A. Drizin, T. Grisso, G. H. Gudjonsson, R. A. Leo, and A. D. Redlich (2010). "Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations." Law and Human Behavior 34(1): 3-38. doi:10.1007/s10979-009-9188-6.
3. Russano, M. B., C. A. Meissner, F. M. Narchet, and S. M. Kassin (2005). "Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental paradigm." Psychological science 16(6): 481-486.
4. Klaver, J. R., Z. Lee, and V. G. Rose (2008). "Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques
and Plausibility in an Experimental False Confession paradigm." Legal and Criminological Psychology doi:10.1348/135532507X193051.


Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Pres


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Falsification Kuhn I 90
Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, there is no example of falsification by comparison with nature - for those who have committed themselves to Newton's theory, his second law is simply a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. ---
I 157
Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences may not be equated with falsifying ones. I believe that the latter do not exist at all - on the one hand there is too much variation - on the other hand: if only major deviations lead to the rejection of a theory, there is no criterion. ---
I 158
Falsification is always after the event - but then it might as well be called verification of a new paradigm.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Group Behavior Psychological Theories Haslam I 154
Group behavior/boys’ camp studies/Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif/psychological theories: the studies (Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1) >Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, >Social groups/Sherif) showed that intergroup impressions, attitudes and behaviours are both (a) consequences of intergroup relations (as opposed to causes) and also (b) psychologically meaningful for group members. Specifically, in the studies, intergroup impressions (i.e., stereotypes) were shown to vary meaningfully in both content and valence so as to reflect changes in the competitive and cooperative relationships between the two groups.
Haslam I 155
Results: [the studies] provide[s] a clear path to follow in pursuing broader social change: to reduce negative stereotypes and foster positive intergroup attitudes, one needs to change the real relationships between real groups from which they arise. In this respect, seeking to promote intergroup harmony simply by bringing members of the two groups together to see that ‘they’re all just normal, decent people’ can be seen as dangerously naïve. >Social groups/psychological theories.
Haslam I 159
Ingroup antagonism: (Sherif and Sherif 1969(1): 284): „If two groups are irrevocably committed to conflicting objectives, there is little point in discussing conditions that are conducive to reducing the conflict. They will continue to cast blame for the state of things on each other. … In short, there are very real conflicts of vital interest that preclude the emergence of superordinate goals.“


1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.


Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications



Haslam I 173
Group behavior/minimal groups/dependence/VsTajfel/psychological theories: Gaertner and Insko (2000)(1) asked participants to allocate rewards but varied whether the other allocator was an ingroup member or an outgroup member, and whether participants would personally receive rewards or not. Participants favoured their ingroup over the outgroup, but only when they were dependent on an ingroup member for their own outcomes. Another study by Wolfgang Stroebe and colleagues (2005)(2) orthogonally manipulated participants’ dependence on the ingroup (yes, no) and the outgroup (yes, no) for rewards. As in Gaertner and Insko’s study, this showed that ingroup-favouring strategies were clearly strongest when there was dependence on the ingroup rather than the outgroup. See also >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Minimal groups/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel, >Egoism/Tajfel.
Haslam i 174
Reciprocity: people Btend to respond to the dependency structure and then reciprocate with favouritism toward those on whom they are dependent, but this effect is considerably stronger for dependence on the ingroup (hence ‚bounded’) (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000)(3). This idea is also supported by recurring evidence that people do indeed tend to expect the ingroup to reward fellow ingroup members more (Gaertner and Insko, 2000(1); Jetten et al., 1996(4); Stroebe et al., 2005(3)). >Reciprocity/psychological theories, >Minimal group/psychological theories.



1. Gaertner, L. and Insko, C.A. (2000) ‘Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation or fear?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 77–94.
2. Stroebe, K.E., Lodewijkx, H.F.M. and Spears, R. (2005) ‘Do unto others as they do unto you: Reciprocity and social identification as determinants of in-group favoritism’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 831–46.
3. Yamagishi, T. and Kiyonari, T. (2000) ‘The group as container of generalized reciprocity’, Social Psychology Quarterly, 62: 116–32.
4. Jetten, J., Spears, R. and Manstead, A.S.R. (1996) ‘Intergroup norms and intergroup discrimination: Distinctive self-categorization and social identity effects’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71: 1222–33.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Hegel Honneth Brocker I 791
Hegel/Honneth: Hegel's Jena program (1) must be understood as a break with the social-philosophical mainstream of his time; this had been dominated in its understanding of social relations by the paradigm of the "struggle for self-preservation. (HegelVsMachiavelli, HegelVsHobbes). Honneth: In Hegel's work, on the other hand, a more complex logic of practice comes to the fore, namely that which unfolds out of the "struggle of subjects for mutual recognition of their identity". (2) The subjects are no longer concerned exclusively with scarce resources for their own survival, but with their own identity or the creation of a positive self-relationship. See Identity/Honneth.
Brocker I 792
HonnethVsHegel: with his turn of consciousness philosophy (already raised in the Jena writings), he ultimately left the decisive suggestions of his concept of recognition theory unused. See Recognition/Honneth.

1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986.
2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p.11

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Honn I
A. Honneth
Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010

Honn II
Axel Honneth
Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Hermeneutics Giddens Habermas III 162
Hermeneutics/Giddens/Habermas: Gidden's thesis: in the social sciences, there is a specific, double hermeneutic task. „The mediation of paradigms or widely discrepant theoretical schemes in science is a hermeneutic matter like that involved in the contacts between other types of meaning-frames. But sociology, unlike natural science, deals with a pre-interpreted world where the creation and reproduction of meaning-frames is a very condition of that which it seeks to analyse, namely human social conduct: this is why there is a double hermeneutics in the social sciences…”(1)
Habermas: Giddens speaks of a double hermeneutics, because understanding problems in the social sciences already arise during the extraction and not only during the theoretical description of the data.


1.A Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, London, 1976, p. 158.


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Hobbes Hegel Brocker I
Hobbes/Hegel/HegelVsHobbes/Honneth: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' individualistic approach to a society that is based on a struggle of individuals against each other and neglects the aspect of an individual's struggle for mutual recognition. Honneth: Hegel integrates the "negative, conflictual character"(1) of social coexistence in
Brocker I 793
one's own perspective. At the same time, however, he turns into a critical argument against the paradigm of self-preservation (see >Hegel/Honneth). Honneth: So Hegel argues with Hobbes against Hobbes by adopting the motive of struggle, but combining it with a completely different theoretical tradition, especially with the recognition theory by Fichte.(2) See >Recognition/Honneth, >Hegel/Honneth, >Intersubjectivity/Hegel.



1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 27.
2. Ebenda S. 32.

Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Illusory Correlation Fiedler Haslam I 237
Illusory correlation/Fiedler: Klaus Fiedler (1991)(1) proposed a new account that did not afford any special importance to paired or doubly distinctive information. (FiedlerVsHamilton, FiedlerVsGifford). >Illusory correlation/Smith, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton, >Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton. Fiedler (like Smith) explained the illusory correlation effect as a natural consequence of asking people to process skewed distributions of information. In effect, the new models were explanations of the illusory correlation effect rather than of stereotype formation. See also Berndsen et al., (1998)(2), McConnell et al., (1994)(3), Sherman et al., 2009)(4).
Fiedler’s model focused on information loss. iI is likely that much of[the] information will be lost (…).Regardless of whether the information loss is a result of perceptual or memory processes (or both), the effect of the information loss is expected to take a particular form providing that this information loss is random.
Critically, if the information loss is random then on average the same amount of information loss will tend to do more damage to the impression of the smaller group. In the standard illusory correlation paradigm the balance of information about both groups is very positive. It follows that if perceivers had the full set of information they would form positive impressions of both groups. If a proportion of that information is lost about both groups then there may still be enough information to retain a positive impression about the large group, but the positive impression of the small group may decay. ((s) A similar approach that focuses on randomness is found in economics: the Random Walk Theory.)
Haslam I 238
VsFiedler: Problem: it is difficult to judge whether these processes are likely to yield effects that are big enough and rapid enough to explain the illusory correlation effect. It is also the case that the model should predict a rapid decay in the illusory correlation effect when the small group is large. The available evidence, however, is very limited on this point.


1. Fiedler, K. (1991) ‘The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 24–36.
2. Berndsen, M., Spears, R., McGarty, C. and van der Pligt, J. (1998) ‘Dynamics of differentiation: Similarity as the precursor and product of stereotype formation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1451–63.
3. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29.
4. Sherman, J.W., Kruschke, J.K., Sherman, S.J., Percy, E.T., Petrocelli, J.V. and Conrey, F.R. (2009) ‘Attentional processes in stereotype formation: A common model for category accentuation and illusory correlation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96: 305–23.



Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Illusory Correlation Berndsen Haslam I 240
Illusory correlation/Berndsen: (Berndsen et al. 1998(1): in a standard illusory correlation study, the statements about the two groups are reinterpreted over the course fo the experiment. I. e., rather than the desirability and undesirability of the various statements being a constant, positive behaviors performed by the larger group come to be seen more positively, and negative behaviors performed by the minority come to be seen less positively.
Haslam I 241
Critically, searching for differences between groups can transform not just the perceptions of those groups but also the very information that those perceptions are based on. Berndsen et al. (2001)(2) used a „thinking aloud“ procedure: they showed that most of the naive participants who were vievng the stimuli were engaged in a process of hypothesis-testing and a search for differentiated meaning (>Meaning/McGarty).
BerndsenVsGifford/BerndsenVsHamilton/McGarty: this again showed that the effects first observed by Hamilton and Gifford (>Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton) are based not on a passive concern to simplify information, but on an active, effortful search after meaning. >Stereotypes/Social psychology, >Simplifcation/Psychological theories.


1. Berndsen, M., Spears, R., McGarty, C. and van der Pligt, J. (1998) ‘Dynamics of differentiation: Similarity as the precursor and product of stereotype formation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1451–63.
2. Berndsen, M., McGarty, C., van der Pligt, J. and Spears, R. (2001) ‘Meaning-seeking in the illusory correlation paradigm: The active role of participants in the categorization process’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 40: 209-34



Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Imitation Animal Studies Slater I 78
Imitation/Animal studies/Slater: it is used to be thought that imitation was limited to humans, but recent research has demonstrated that newborn chimpanzees and some species of monkeys also imitate, in these instances when the modeled gestures are produced by an adult human model. Myowa-Yamakoshi, Tomonga, Tanaka, and Matsuzawa (1004)(1) reported that two chimpanzees who were reared with their mother “at less than 7 days of age…could discriminate between, and imitate, human facial gestures (tong protrusion and moth opening)” (p. 437) and with a lager sample of five neonatal chimpanzees also tongue clicking (Bard, 2007)(2).
See also Ferrari et al. 2006)(3), Paukner, Suomi, Visalberghi, & Ferrari, 2009)(4)
The evidence points towards the conclusion that the capacity for imitation is present at birth. >Mirror neurons/psychological theories.


1. Myowa-Yamakoshi, M., Tomonga, M., Tanaka,M. and Matsuzawa T.(2004). Imitation in neonatal chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Dvelopmental science, 7, 437-442
2. Bard, K. A. (2007). Neonatal uimitation in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) tested with two paradigms. Animal Cognition, 10, 233-242
3. Ferrari, P.F., Visalberghi, E., Paukner, A., Fogassi, L. Ruggiero, A. , & Suomi, S. J. (2006). Plos Biology, 4 1501-1508
4. Paukner, A., Suomi, S., Visalberghi, E., & Ferrari, P.F. (2009). Capuchin monkeys display affiliation toward humans who imitate them. science, 325, 880-883


Alan M. Slater, “Imitation in Infancy. Revisiting Meltzoff and Moore’s (1977) Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Incommensurability Feyerabend I 353
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: E.g. principle: there is a habit of considering an object as given when the list of its parts is complete (archaic thinking). This habit is abolished (but without contradicting a principle) by the assumption that even the most complete list does not fully describe an object! Therefore, incommensurability cannot be defined by recourse statements!
Reason: If the habit is overruled, then the objects of world A are also overruled. The A-objects cannot be examined with a method of conjecture that knows no end.

I 354
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: it becomes clear that the contents of A and B cannot be compared. Corresponding facts cannot be juxtaposed, not even mentally: if we imagine B-facts, then it means that principles are invalidated which were part of the construction of A-facts. We can only draw B-images of A-facts in B or make B-statements about A-facts in B. We cannot make A-statements about A-facts in B. Translation/Feyerabend: it is also impossible to translate language A into language B. That does not mean that the two views could not be discussed, but the discussion cannot be based on logical relationships between the components of A and B.
I 355
Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsCritics: incommensurability does not apply to all competing theories, and it only applies to theories if they are interpreted in a certain way, for example, without reference to an "independent observation language". This restriction was overlooked by most critics. I do not assert the incommensurability of all theories. Only general and non-instance-dependent theories can be incommensurable, and those only if they are interpreted in a certain way. (The "non-instance-dependent" condition excludes "theories" like "All ravens are black").
I 358
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: nor are there any mixed statements between classical and relativistic formulations. Certain universal principles are used while they are simultaneously extinguished. Incommensurability/Feyerabend: E.g. "Impetus" is suspended by Galileo and Newton and is therefore no longer a principle for the constitution of facts.
I 360
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: the question whether two theories are incommensurable is an incomplete question! Theories can be interpreted differently! According to one interpretation they are commensurable, according to another they are not!
I 361/362
For example, instrumentalism makes all theories related to the same observation language commensurable. Realism, on the other hand, would like to represent (and make it commensurable) the observable and the non-observable in the same way.
I 367
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: emerges only in the consideration of comprehensive cosmological theories! Limited theories rarely lead to conceptual revisions.
I 372
Incommensurability/Language/Feyerabend: we no longer say today that nature avoids the vacuum. Change of jargon, not of facts.
I 375
FeyerabendVsKuhn/Incommensurability: his ideas are more inclined towards psychology and suggest that any scientific change a) leads to a shift in sense and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the world of perception are to be determined by research, they are not self-evident.
Kuhn: An understanding between different paradigms is not possible.
FeyerabendVsKuhn: Scientists from different paradigms understand each other very well.
---
II 16
Incommensurability/Feyerabend: incommensurability shows that a methodology of the increase in content or proximity to the truth does not fit everywhere in the sciences.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Interpretation Skinner Gaus I 410
Interpretation/Quentin Skinner/Weinstein: By the 1970s, the Cambridge school of political thought, led by Quentin Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, John Dunn and Richard Tuck, began challenging
such interpretive strategies, countering that the meanings of past political philosophical texts could only be recovered with difficulty by historically contextualizing them (...).
Skinner: According to Skinner, we should first ascertain the range of possible meanings available to an author
Gaus I 411
when writing a piece of text, and next deploy 'this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer' (1969(1): 49). Pocock: For his part, Pocock (1985)(2) insists that proper interpretation depends more on discovering the discourse paradigms that inform political philosophical texts than on trying to discover their authors' intentions. >Interpretation/Pocock.


1. Skinner, Quentin (1969) 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas'. History and Theory, V Il: 3-53.
2. Pocock, J. G. A. (1985) Virtue, Commerce, and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

SkinnerBF I
B. F. Skinner
Science And Human Behavior 1965

SkinnerQ I
Qu. Skinner
The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences Cambridge 2008


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Language Deacon I 26
Language/DeaconVsTradition: traditional paradigms are e.g. 1. Explanation by association/associative images: according to that, the architecture of the language originates completely outside our organism
2. Mentalese/inner mental language: according to that it is completely within our organism
3. Innate grammatical knowledge (>Chomsky).
4. Inner images triggered by sounds (> Behaviorism).
Nature/nurture/Deacon/(s): this classical question is about what nature has given us and what we have acquired ("nurture" = food). Depending on whether the answer is closer to the end of innate properties (instinctive knowledge), learning is seen as rather superfluous.
DeaconVsChomsky: despite the amazing language learning skills of children, the origin must be sought elsewhere and other questions must be asked.
---
I 53
Language/Deacon: is a derived characteristic (derived from much longer existing animal communication) and should therefore be analysed as an exception to a rule, not vice versa. Animal communication: is usually wrongly treated as "language minus something".
---
I 54
In fact, language is a dependent stepchild of much richer communication, which also includes gestures, showing, tone of voice, interaction with objects, and so on. It is not the case that language has replaced other forms of communication. Rather, it has developed in parallel.
---
I 309
Language/Brain/Deacon: Lateralisation (lateralisation, division of tasks between the right and left hemisphere of the brain) is almost certainly an effect and not a cause within the co-evolution of language and brain. I even believe that it is an effect in the language evolution of individuals. This involves a division of tasks,... ---
I 310
...so that they can be processed more easily in parallel. ---
I 311
Children with only one cerebral hemisphere can learn all aspects of the language. (Plasticity of the brain) If we want to understand speech processing in the brain, we do not have to investigate so much the individual circumstances that change from individual to individual, but rather what drives individual development.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013

Language Stoicism Gadamer I 436
Language/Stoa/Gadamer: The struggle of philosophy and rhetoric for Greek youth education, which was decided with the victory of Attic philosophy, also has this side, that thinking about language becomes a matter of a grammar and rhetoric which have always recognized the ideal of scientific concept formation. Thus the sphere of linguistic meaning begins to detach itself from the things encountered in linguistic formation. The
Gadamer I 437
stoic logic speaks first of those incorporeal meanings by which the speaking of things takes place (to lekton). Topos: It is highly significant that these meanings are put on the same level as topos, i.e. space: see(1). Just as empty space only now, in thinking away the things that arrange themselves to each other in it, comes to the condition for thinking(2), so also the "meanings" as such are only now thought for themselves and a term is coined for them by thinking away the things mentioned by means of the meaning of the words.
The meanings are also like a space in which things are ordered to each other. Such thoughts apparently only become possible when the natural relationship, i.e. the intimate unity of speaking and thinking, is disturbed. Cf. >Language and Thought/Ancient Philosophy, >Language and Thought/Gadamer.
One may mention here, as Lohmann(3) has shown, the correspondence of stoic thinking and the grammatical-syntactic formation of the Latin language. That the incipient bilingualism of the Hellenistic Oikumene has played a promoting role in thinking about language is probably undeniable. But perhaps the origins of this development lie much earlier, and it is the emergence of science in general that triggers this process. Then the beginnings of the same will go back to the early days of Greek science.
Gadamer: The fact that this is the case speaks for the scientific concept formation in the field of music, metaphysics and physics, because a field of rational representations is measured there, the constructive creation of which brings into being corresponding relationships that can no longer actually be called words.
Signs/Word/Antiquity/Gadamer: Wherever the word takes on a mere sign function, the original connection between speaking and thinking, at which our interest is directed, is transformed into an instrumental relationship. This transformed relationship between word and sign underlies the conceptualization of science as a whole and has become so self-evident to us that it requires its own artistic remembrance that, in addition to the scientific ideal of unambiguous designation, the life of language itself continues unchanged.


1. Stoic. vet. fragm. Arnim Il, S. 87.
2. Cf. the theory of the diaphragm still rejected by Aristotle (Phys. A 4, 211 b 14ff.)
3. J. Lohmann has recently made interesting observations, according to which the discovery of the world of sounds, figures and numbers has led to a unique way of forming words and thus to a first increase in language awareness. Cf. J. Lohmann's works: Arch. f. Musikwiss. XIV, 1957, pp. 147-155, XVI, 1959, pp. 148- 173, 261-291, Lexis IV, 2 and last: Über den paradigmatischen Charakter der griechischen Kultur (Festschrift for Gadamer 1960). (In the meantime, reference should be made to the volume "Musike und Logos" Stuttgart 1970 (...)


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Language Acquisition Deacon I 39
Language acquisition/evolution/development of language/complexity/simplicity/Deacon: there are two paradigms: a) Evolution of greater intelligence
b) Evolution of a specific speech organ
Both have in common that the problem is learning a very large number of complex rules and that the complexity is simply too great for species other than humans.
DeaconVs: complexity is only one problem and not the deciding factor.
---
I 53
Language acquisition/Deacon: depends decisively on non-linguistic communication. Much of it is already innate in animals. We also use a lot of non-linguistic elements such as tone of voice, gestures, etc. in everyday speech. ---
I 125
Language Learning/Deacon: that children learn language best at a certain age seems to speak for innate structures in the brain. A better explanation seems to me to be the immaturity of children or young chimpanzees like Kanzi. We do not need to adopt an essentialist position if we concentrate on this aspect. ---
I 126
In this age of immaturity, children have little memory performance for details. Young Bonobo Kanzi was able to concentrate strongly on the proper use of symbols, while older chimpanzees had to learn what to focus on. ---
I 127
If this is true, it must be a characteristic of childhood that is independent of language. GoldVsChomsky/Deacon: Gold(1) brought a logical proof that rules of a logical system with the structural complexity of a natural grammar cannot be discovered inductively without explicit error correction, even not theoretically. It is not their complexity that is decisive, but the fact that the rules are not mapped on the surface of the sentence form. Instead, they are embodied in widely distributed word relations and are used recursively (repeatedly). This multiplies the possibilities of how a rule could actually be constructed geometrically. This makes it impossible for a child or other language learners to derive the correct rules from the nature of the language. This has led many authors to adopt innate abilities. See Induction/Deacon.
---
I 128
Language Acquisition/Newport/Deacon: Question: Why can children learn grammar more easily than other things that are much easier?(2)(3) ---
I 137
Language acquisition/Elissa Newport/Deacon: Newport was one of the first to propose that language learning for children should not be perceived as a function of a particular language learning system, but vice versa; such language structures are best passed on from generation to generation, which best correspond to the child's learning biases. ---
I 339
Language acquisition/adaptation/brain/evolution/Deacon: in addition to the constant sensomotoric conditions of language use, there are also invariances of language evolution that affect the context of language learning. There are three types of language adaptation: a) innate, b) learned, c) those that develop in the interaction between the innate and the experienced. Universality is not a sure indicator that something of the evolution has been built into our brains.

(1) Gold, E. (1967), Language identification in the limit. Information and Control 16, 447-474.
(2) Newport, E. (1991), Maturational consteraints on language learning, Cognitive science 14, 11-28.
(3) Newport, E. (1991), Contrasting conceptions oft he critical period for language. In: S. Carey and R. Gelma (Eds.) Epigenesis of Mind: Essys on Biology and Cognition, NJ.

Dea I
T. W. Deacon
The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998

Dea II
Terrence W. Deacon
Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013

Language Rules Putnam V 142
Meaning/Putnam: not determined by semantic rules or standards - but standards may determine that certain items are paradigmatic examples of gold (> Natural Kinds).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Learning Bandura Slater I 178
Learning/Bandura: The most immediate impact of [Bandura’s Bobo doll] study (Bandura et al. 1961)(1) was that it led to a paradigm shift in how developmental scientists regarded learning. >Bobo doll study/experiment/Bandura. Instead of conceptualizing learning as being limited to behaviors that were directly reinforced or punished, Bandura and his colleagues demonstrated clearly that it was possible to learn new aggressive behaviors solely through imitation, with no reinforcement or punishment attached to the behaviors for either the adult models or the child.
This breakthrough finding led to the formulation of social learning theory, with the major tenets that people learn from observing, imitating, and modeling other people (Bandura, 1977)(2). >Imitation/psychological studies, >Aggression/psychological studies.


1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582.
2. Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. New Yoric General Learning Press.


Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Lexical Studies Saucier Corr I 386
Lexical studies/psychology/Saucier: to a key premise of the lexical approach: the degree of representation of an attribute in language has some correspondence with the general importance of the attribute in real-world transactions. >Lexical hypothesis. Lexical studies in relation to personality:
A. 1. Lexicalized concepts can be found in standard sources created by disinterested parties (e.g., linguists and lexicographers), and basing variable selection on such a source reduces the likelihood of investigator bias in deciding what is or is not an important variable.
2. Because lexicalized concepts constitute a finite domain, one can sample them representatively to establish content-validity benchmarks for personality variables.
B. The lexical-study paradigm gives special importance to cross-cultural generalizability.
The lexical approach involves an indigenous research strategy. Analyses are carried out separately within each language, using a representative set of native-language descriptors, rather than merely importing selections of variables from other languages
Personality: The majority of lexical studies of personality descriptors have attempted to test the most widely influential structural model of the last two decades, the Big Five factor structure (Goldberg 1990(1); John 1990(2)).
Corr I 387
Several lexical studies have reported evidence about factor solutions containing only one factor (Boies, Lee, Ashton et al. 2001(3); Di Blas and Forzi 1999(4); Goldberg and Somer 2000(5); Saucier 1997(6), 2003b(7); Saucier, Georgiades, Tsaousis and Goldberg 2005(8); Saucier, Ole-Kotikash and Payne 2006(9); Zhou, Saucier, Gao and Liu in press), with consistent findings. The single factor contrasts a heterogeneous mix of desirable attributes at one pole with a mix of undesirable attributes at the other pole. This unrotated factor can be labelled Evaluation (following Osgood 1962)(10), or as Socially Desirable versus Undesirable Qualities.


1. Goldberg, L. R. 1990. An alternative ‘description of personality’: the Big-Five factor structure, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 1216–29
2. John, O. P. 1990. The ‘Big Five’ factor taxonomy: dimensions of personality in the natural language and in questionnaires, in L. A. Pervin (ed.), Handbook of personality: theory and research, pp. 66–100. New York: Guilford
3. Boies, K., Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Pascal, S. and Nicol, A. A. M. 2001. The structure of the French personality lexicon, European Journal of Personality 15: 277–95
4. Di Blas, L. and Forzi, M. 1999. Refining a descriptive structure of personality attributes in the Italian language: language: the abridged Big Three circumplex structure, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 451–81
5. Goldberg, L. R. and Somer, O. 2000. The hierarchical structure of common Turkish person-descriptive adjectives, European Journal of Personality 14: 497–531
6. Saucier, G. 1997. Effects of variable selection on the factor structure of person descriptors, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73: 1296–1312
7. Saucier, G. 2003b. Factor structure of English-language personality type-nouns, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85: 695–708
8. Saucier, G., Georgiades, S., Tsaousis, I. and Goldberg, L. R. 2005. The factor structure of Greek personality adjectives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 88: 856–75
9. Saucier, G., Ole-Kotikash, L. and Payne, D. L. 2006. The structure of personality and character attributes in the language of the Maasai. Unpublished report. University of Oregon
10. Osgood, C. E. 1962. Studies on the generality of affective meaning systems, American Psychologist 17: 10–28


Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Liberalism Gaus Gaus I 100
Liberalism/Gaus: The distinction between ‘comprehensive’ and ‘political’ liberalisms (...) has become central to contemporary political theory. >Liberalism/Waldron. Comprehensive liberalism: versions:

- liberalism as a secular philosophy;
- liberalism as a philosophy of the good life;
- liberalism as a political theory derived from a specific moral theory;
- liberalism as itself a distinctive theory of the right or justice.

Liberalism as a secular philosophy is a distinctly radical conception, which in some ways is the paradigmatic ‘fully comprehensive’ liberalism. On the other hand, liberalism as a theory of right is much more cautious about the extent that human reason converges; its more modest versions shade off into Rawlsian political liberalism.
GausVsRawls: Thus I shall argue that the ‘comprehensive’ liberalism of A Theory of Justice (1971)(1) was a distinctly ‘partial’ comprehensive view, which was not as comprehensive as many other varieties of liberalism.
Gaus I 101
Throughout the last century, liberalism has been beset by controversies between, on the one hand, those broadly identified as ‘individualists’ and, on the other, ‘collectivists’, ‘communitarians’ or ‘organicists’ (for scepticism about this, though, see Bird, 1999(5)).
Gaus I 102
(...) the last 20 years have witnessed a renewed interest in collectivist analyses of liberal society - though the term ‘collectivist’ is abjured in favour of ‘communitarian’. Gutmann: Writing in 1985, Amy Gutmann observed that ‘[w]e are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the 1980s fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic’ (1985(3): 308). Starting with Michael Sandel’s famous (1982)(4) criticism of Rawls, a number of critics charged that liberalism was necessarily premised on an abstract conception of individual selves as pure choosers, whose commitments, values and concerns are possessions of the self, but never constitute the self. >Rawls/Sandel.
What is important for our purposes is that these debates focus on whether liberalism entails an individualist theory of humans in society, or whether its political and moral commitments can be conjoined with various conceptions of the self and the social order; it is thus a debate about just how ‘comprehensive’ liberalism really is.
Gaus I 103
Liberalism becomes identified with the promotion of a certain sort of self-realizing individual, one who develops her nature, is rational and suspicious of custom, experiments with different ways of living and is not prone to conformism. Cf. >Mill/Gaus, >Individual/Mill, >Individualism/Rawls, >Perfectionism/Rawls.
Gaus I 104
It is a mistake to try to define liberalism; liberal theories are complex clusters of conceptual and value commitments. But surely a crucial criterion for describing a view as ‘liberal’ is whether freedom is the core conceptual commitment (Freeden, 1996(6); Gaus, 2000a(7)). >Freedom/Liberalism.
Gaus I 105
Moral theory: (...) a liberal theory of the good life and morality must be distinguished from a commitment to liberalism built on a moral theory; these two distinct conceptions of liberalism are often lumped together as ‘comprehensive’ liberalism. Liberal political principles can be derived from moral theories that themselves are not intrinsically liberal. [There are] three such theories: utilitarianism, Hobbesian contractualism and value scepticism. >Utilitarian Liberalism/Gaus.

1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2. Bird, Colin (1999) The Myth of Liberal Individualism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Gutmann, Amy (1985) ‘Communitarian critics of liberalism’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14: 308–22.
4. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Freeden, Michael (1996) Ideologies and Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon.
6. Gaus, Gerald F. (2000a) Political Theories and Political Concepts. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

Logic Piaget Upton I 93
Logic/Piaget/VsPiaget/Upton: 1. Donaldson (1978)(1) (…) criticised the procedural aspect of [Piaget’s] tasks. In the classic Piagetian conservation tasks (Cf. >Classes/Piaget, >Numbers/Piaget), the same question is usually asked twice in order to test the child’s reasoning – once before any changes are made and then again after the transformation. However, if the children are only asked the question once, after the transformation, more of the younger group get the answer right. According to Donaldson, this is because children learn to make sense of adults’ questions in teaching and testing situations. The child is not only trying to work out
Upton I 94
what the meaning of the task is, but also trying to work out the demands of the social relations in which the task is embedded. A key part of this process is trying to guess what answer the adult expects, and what response will please them most (Donaldson, 1978)(1). 2. Wheldall and Poborca (1980)(2) also agreed that the wording of the question prevents the children giving the correct answer to conservation tasks. They therefore used a non-verbal version of the beaker task and found that twice as many children could conserve using this task than in the original approach.
3. Information-processing models provide a different challenge to Piaget’s theory. Donaldson and others criticised Piaget for the tasks he used, suggesting that they did not allow younger children to demonstrate their logical reasoning. However, the assumption was still that human reasoning depends upon having mental structures for logical thinking (…).
Information-processing models consider this problem from a different angle. They suggest that children cannot do these tasks because of the demands on processes such as memory and attention, which are still developing at this age.
VsVs: In response, supporters of Piaget’s theory (neo-Piagetians) have taken some of these ideas from information processing and integrated them with Piaget’s original theory. For example, it is argued that development through the stages (and changes in logical structures) is made possible by increases in working memory capacity and processing efficiency (Demetriou et al., 2002)(3).


1. Donaldson, M. (1978) Children’s Minds. London: Croom Helm.
2. Wheldhall, K and Poborca, B. (1980) Conservation without conversation? An alternative non-verbal paradigm for assessing conservation of liquid quantity. British Journal of Psychology, 71: 117–34.
3. Demetriou, A, Christou, C, Spanoudis, G and Platsidou, M (2002) The development of mental processing: efficiency, working memory, and thinking. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 67(1): serial no. 268.

Piag I
J. Piaget
The Psychology Of The Child 2nd Edition 1969


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Logos Plato Gadamer I 416
Logos/Plato/Gadamer: [The logos is the] use of words, that is, (...) speech with [its] ability to be true and false (...) The name, the word, seems to be true or false inasmuch as it is used true or false, that is, it is attributed to being right or wrong. Such attribution, however, is no longer that of the word, but is already a logos and can find its appropriate expression in such a logos. For example, to call someone "Socrates" assumes that this person is called Socrates. The attribution that is logos is thus much more than a mere correspondence of words and things - as it would ultimately correspond to the eleatic theory of being and is presupposed in the theory of representation. Precisely because the truth inherent in logos is not that of mere perception,
(noein) and is not merely allowing being to appear, but always placing being in a respect, acknowledging and awarding it something, it is not the word (onoma), but the logos the bearer of truth (and of course of untruth). From this it follows then with necessity that this structure of relationships, into which the logos divides up things and interprets them with it, is secondary to what has been said and thus to the fact that it is bound by language.
Word/Number/Sign/Plato/Gadamer: one understands that not the word, but the number is the actual paradigm of the noetic, the number, whose naming is obviously pure convention and whose "precision" consists precisely in the fact that every number is defined by its position in the series, thus is a pure structure of intelligibility, an ens rationis, not in the weakening sense of its being, but in the sense of its perfect rationality. This is the actual result to which the "Cratylos" refers, and this result has a highly momentous consequence that in truth influences all further thinking about language.
Signs/Plato: If the area of the logos represents the area of the noetic in the multiplicity of its assignments, then the word, just like the number, becomes a mere sign of a well-defined and thus pre-conscious being. Thus, in principle, the question is reversed. Now, the question is no longer asked from the point of view of the being and mediation of the word, but from the mediation of the word towards what and how it mediates something, namely towards the person who uses it. The essence of the sign is that it has its being in its function of use, and that in such a way that its suitability
Gadamer I 417
exists alone in pointing to something. It must therefore stand out in its function from the environment in which it is to be found and taken as a sign, in order to abolish its own thing and to dissolve (disappear) in its meaning. It is the abstraction of reference itself. >Sign/Plato.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Marxism Jonas Brocker I 610
Marxism/JonasVsMarxism/Jonas: Jonas assumes that socialism is more capable of imposing a "policy of renunciation" (1) than the Western liberal democracies. This renunciation is necessary to preserve the biosphere for future generations and to preserve human life. See Ethics/Jonas. - On the other hand:
Brocker I 611
JonasVsMarxism: he has helped fuel the technological megalomania of mankind by pursuing - like capitalism - a "fundamentally technological conception of society" (2). JonasVsBloch: Jonas explicitly understands his book The Principle of Responsibility as an alternative concept and as "Critique of Marxist Utopism" (3), as paradigmatically expressed in Ernst Bloch's The Principle of Hope (1954-1959).


1. Hans Jonas, »Warum wir heute eine Ethik der Selbstbeschränkung brauchen«, in: Elisabeth Ströker (Hg.), Ethik der Wissenschaften? Philosophische Fragen, München/Paderborn u. a. 1984, p. 86
2. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 276.
3. Ibid. p. 327
Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Marxism Levine Gaus I 75
Marxism/Levine, Andrew: [a] creature of late-twentieth-century university culture [was] analytical Marxism. Analytical Marxists genuinely were Marxist. And unlike their postmodernist colleagues, they generally exhibited an intellectual seriousness and rigour equal to the best philosophy and social science of their time.
Gaus I 76
The story of analytical Marxism is a short one – beginning in the decade that spanned the years 1968 to 1978, and then continuing for roughly the next decade and a half. (...) whatever most practitioners of the genre now believe, analytical Marxism uncovered what the living core of the Marxist theoretical tradition is. Thus it would be only slightly facetious to say that this new departure in Marxist theory saved Marxism by destroying it. (...)appearances, the analytical turn in Marxist theory resulted in a very different outcome – it collapsed Marxism into liberalism. This feat was achieved with regret. Analytical Marxism was largely a creature of the Anglo-American university of the 1970s and 1980s. It emerged in consequence of the student movements that came to a head, briefly, in the spring of 1968. To a degree that is unparalleled elsewhere in the West, the English-speaking world and especially the United States never had significant political or intellectual movements identified with Marxism.
Gaus I 77
By the late 1960s, the need for an ideology consonant with prevailing political attitudes was keenly felt by many on the left. Everyone assumed that some version of Marxism must fit that description. Justice: Orthodox Marxists had always denied that justice was a trans-historical ‘critical’ concept, a standard against which socio-economic structures could be assessed. Their view was that ideas of justice were ‘superstructural’, that what is just or unjust is relative to the mode of production in place. Injustices can arise within capitalism, then, but capitalism itself cannot be unjust.
Analytical Marxism: Among the first analytical Marxist ventures were efforts to prove the orthodox view right or, failing that, to show how a suitable trans-historical concept of justice could be integrated into the larger theoretical structure Marx contrived (see Buchanan, 1982(1); Lukes, 1985(2)).
Liberalism/Rawls/Levine: Rawlsian liberalism breathed new life into egalitarian theory and therefore into a core component, arguably the core component, of socialist ideology.
Gaus I 79
Method/dialectics: The analytical Marxists came to realize that dialectical explanations either restate what can be expressed in unexceptionable ways, or else are unintelligible and therefore not explanatory at all.
Gaus I 80
For an analytical Marxist, to defend a position is to translate it into terms that bear scrutiny according to the most demanding disciplinary standards in philosophy or in an appropriate social science. Marx’s positions have turned out to be remarkably amenable to this kind of treatment (see, for example, Roemer, 1982(3)). Levine: Before analytical Marxism, Marx’s views were thought to differ qualitatively from mainstream positions, to follow from a different and perhaps incommensurable ‘paradigm’. Marxist theoretical work was also thought to imply conclusions that mainstream theorists would, in many cases, reject – not just because of ideological resistance, but on grounds that depend on their own theoretical commitments. These assumptions can no longer be sustained. In making Marx’s views acceptable in the way that analytical Marxists did, Marxism became a voice among others in ongoing debates.


1. Buchanan, Allen E. (1982) Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
2. Lukes, Steven (1985) Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1. Buchanan, Allen E. (1982) Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. Totawa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
3. Roemer, John (1982) Analytical Foundations of Marxian Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Meaning McGarty Haslam I 239
Meaning/psychology/stereotypes/terminology//McGarty: Def „differentiated meaning“: (McGarty and Turner(1992)(1) is the meaning that reflects an understanding that one thing or set of things is different from some other set of things. This is important in the context of illusory correlation: if we assume that in an illusory correlation study the perceivers are motivated to discover how Group A and Group B are different (something it is reasonable to assume since the experimenter has given them different labels), then this leads to the question of why they tend to see one group as better than the other. >Stereotype formation/McGarty, >Illusory correlation/Psychological theories.
Differentiated meaning could be derived by people in the illusory correlation paradigm from the process of interpreting the stimulus information in ways that did not rely on notions of distinctiveness. >Illusory correlation/McGarty, >Social Behavior/McGarty.



1. McGarty, C. and Turner, J.C. (1992) ‘The effects of categorization on social judgment’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 31: 253–68.



Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Method Moscovici Haslam I 95
Method/Moscovici: In their afterimage studies Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1) had the novel idea of setting out to show that, in contrast to a majority, a numerical minority could change the way people see the world (in this case colours) even though they would be unaware of this change.
Haslam I 94
(Moscovici et al. 1969(2)): In these ‘blue-green’ experiments, groups of up to six naïve participants sat in front of a screen and viewed a series of blue slides that varied in their light intensity. After each slide, each participant was asked, in turn, to name aloud the colour of that slide. When all the participants had named the colour of the slide, the next slide was presented. Under these conditions, virtually everybody called the slides ‘blue’, showing that they were perceived as being unambiguously blue. However, in some experimental conditions, a numerical minority within the group (two of the six group members) were confederates of the experimenter and gave pre-agreed responses. In this case they replied ‘green’ to the slides – a response that was clearly different from that of the naïve participants.
Through the use of a clever methodological technique, the afterimage studies were able to examine people’s perceptions of colours beyond what they publicly said but at a more latent and unconscious level.
Haslam I 96
Problem: these studies were unable to examine the impact of the minority on a more latent/private level of influence. This is because only one type of response was measured, namely the slide colour (manifest influence), and no measure of latent influence was taken. Critically, then, such studies cannot tell us whether participants’ private judgments were also affected by the minority.
Haslam I 97
Afterimage/experiment/Moscovici: (Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1)) The afterimage judgment was obtained by participants viewing a white screen, after looking at the blue slide, on which an afterimage briefly developed. Afterimage responses were recorded on a nine-point scale (1 = yellow, 2 = yellow/orange, 3 = orange, 4 = orange/red, 5 = red, 6 = red/pink, 7 = pink, 8 = pink/purple, 9 = purple). In fact, the same slide, which was unambiguously blue, was used throughout the experiment. The experiment had four phases, with each phase consisting of a number of trials or presentations of a slide. Gender/Moscovici: Moscovici argued that he preferred to use women as confederates and participants in his blue-green studies ‘because of their greater involvement in evaluating the colour of an object’ (Moscovici et al., 1969(2): 368).
Haslam I 102
VsMoscovici: no evidence has been found for influence at the manifest or public level.
Haslam I 103
Most studies (> href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=2162428&a=$a&first_name=&author=Psychological%20Theories&concept=Moscovici">Moscovici/Psychological theories) report that on only very few occasions do participants agree with the confederate that the slide is green. However, it should be noted that the paradigm was primarily designed to examine latent/private influence, and there is robust support from other research that majorities have a greater impact on the manifest/public level (Martin and Hewstone, 2008)(3).

1. Moscovici, S. and Personnaz, B. (1980) ‘Studies in social influence: V. Minority influence and conversion behavior in a perceptual task’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 270–82.
2. Moscovici, S., Lage, E. and Naffrechoux, M. (1969) ‘Influence of a consistent minority on the response of a majority in a color perception task’, Sociometry, 32: 365–80.
3. Martin, R. and Hewstone, M. (2008) ‘Majority versus minority influence, message processing and attitude change: The Source-Context-Elaboration Model’, in M. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 237–326.


Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone, “Minority Influence. Revisiting Moscovici’s blue-green afterimage studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Milgram Experiment Psychological Theories Haslam I 119
Milgram experiment/psychological theories: A. VsMilgram: For his critics (of whom there have been many; for recent discussion see Brannigan, Nicholson and Cherry, 2015)(1), Milgram had himself committed acts of inhumanity in the guise of studying inhumanity (>Experiment/Milgram). In an influential commentary that appeared in American Psychologist, Diana Baumrind (1964)(2) accused Milgram of failing to treat his participants with the respect they deserved and of undermining their self-esteem and dignity. Shortly after the research was first publicized in the New York Times of 26 October 1963, an editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch described Milgram’s work as ‘open-eyed torture’ (cited in Blass, 2004(3): 121). MilgramVsVs: Milgram (1964)(4) responded to such criticism by claiming that ‘no-one who took part in the obedience study suffered damage, and most subjects found the experience to be instructive and enriching’ (Blass, 2004(3): 124). He backed up his claims with evidence taken from post-experimental questionnaires. These showed that, of the 656 people who participated in the studies, 83.7% were ‘glad’ or ‘very glad’ to have participated, 15.1% were neutral, and 1.3% were ‘sorry’ or ‘very sorry’ to have taken part.
Reicher/Haslam: However, researchers have developed a number of strategies in order to surmount this considerable obstacle. One is to use alternative and less harmful behaviours in order to investigate obedience. Cf. >Obedience/Milgram.
These include giving negative feedback to job applicants in order to make them more nervous (Meeus and Raaijmakers, 1986(5), 1995(6)), crushing bugs (Martens et al., 2007(7)), performing an on-line analogue task which involves applying negative labels to increasingly positive groups (Haslam, Reicher and Birney, 2014(8)), or simply persisting at a long and tedious task (Navarick, 2009)(9).
Haslam I 120
B. A second strategy has been to revisit and re-analyse Milgram’s own studies for new insights. (…) Steven Gilbert (1981)(10) shows the importance of the gradual increase in shock intensity which deprives participants of a qualitative breakpoint that would allow them to justify breaking off and becoming disobedient. Dominic Packer (2008)(11), by contrast, highlights how the reactions of the learner can provide such a justification. This relates to the fact (noted above) that the point at which most people break off is 150 volts, where the learner first asks to be released from the study. Eight relevant factors: (Haslam, Loughnan and Perry, 2014)(12):
1) the experimenter’s directiveness,
2) legitimacy
3) consistency;
4) group pressure to disobey;
5) the indirectness,
6) proximity,
7) intimacy of the relation between teacher and learner
8) distance between the teacher and the experimenter.
C. Other authors have studied historical examples of obedience and disobedience form a psychological perspective: A notable example of this is François Rochat and Andre Modigliani’s (1995)(13) analysis of resistance to the official oppression of minorities by the villagers of Le Chambon in Southern France during the Second World War (see also Rochat and Modigliani, 2000)(14). >Obedience/psychological theories.


1. Brannigan, A., Nicholson, I. and Cherry, F. (2015) ‘Unplugging the Milgram machine’,
Theory and Psychology (Special Issue), 25: 551—696.
2. Baumrind, D. (1964) ‘Some thoughts on ethics of research: After reading Milgram’s “Behavioral study of obedience”’, American Psychologist, 19:421—3.
3. Blass, T. (2004) The Man who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books.
4. Milgram, S. (1964) 1lssues in the study of obedience: A reply to Baumrind’, American Psychologist, 19: 848—5 2.
5. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1986) obedience: Carrying out
orders to use psychological-administrative violence &, European Journal of Social Psychology, 16:311—24.
6. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75.
7. Martens, A., Kosloff, S., Greenberg, J., Landau, M.J. and Schmader, T. (2007) ‘Killing begets killing: Evidence from a bug-killing paradigm that initial killing fuels subsequent killing’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 1251—64.
8. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Milgram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88.
9. Navarick, D.J. (2009) ‘Reviving the Milgram obedience paradigm in the era of informed consent The Psychological Record, 59: 155—70.
10. Gilbert, S.J. (1981) ‘Another look at the Milgram obedience studies: The role of a graduated series of shocks’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 7: 690—5.
11. Packer, D.J. (2008) ‘Identifying systematic disobedience in Milgram’s obedience experiments: A meta-analytic review’, Perspectives on Psychological science, 3: 301—4.
12. Haslam, N., Loughnan, S. and Perry, G. (2014) 4Meta-Milgram: An empirical synthesis of the obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 9(4): e93927.
13. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210.
14. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (2000) ‘Captain Paul Grueninger: The Chief of Police who saved Jewish refugees by refusing to do his duty’, in T. Blass (ed.), Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram paradigm. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. pp.91—110.


Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Milgram Experiment Milgram Haslam I 109
Milgram Experiment/Milgram: the basic set-up for these studies (Milgram 1974)(1) involved a learning experiment in which the participant found himself in the role of a ‘teacher’ who had to administer ever-increasing levels of electric shock to a ‘learner’ each time the learner gave a wrong answer. In fact, the learner was a confederate who had been carefully trained to play the role, and the impressive shock machine that appeared to deliver shocks of increasing magnitude was also bogus – but the teacher (the only true participant in the study) did not know this. For him (and all participants in the early study were male) the situation was very real indeed. Before the experiment, Milgram had asked various groups (psychiatrists, college students, and middle-class adults) how far they would go in an imagined situation. No-one could have imagined going as far as "dangerous shock".
Yet when Milgram conducted pilot studies with Yale University students this was not what happened. Most of the participants in what became known as the baseline condition proved willing to obey the experimenter all the way to the bitter end.
Haslam I 110
Interpretation/Milgram: Milgram concluded that this comes about because people pay more attention to the task of carrying out instructions that to the actual consequences of that task.
Haslam I 109
Influences: Milgram was influenced by Hannah Arendt’s reports of the trial of Adolf Eichman[n] in The New Yorker, later published as Eichman[n] in Jerusalem (Arendt, 1963/1994)(2). Arendt: Eichmann and his ilk, she suggested, were moved less by great hatreds than by the petty desire to do a task well and to please their superiors. Indeed, they concentrated so much on these tasks that they forgot about their consequences. For this phenomenon Arendt coined the formulation of the “banality of evil”. (Arendt 1963/1994(2): p.287).
Haslam I 113
Experiment: The participants, recruited through an advertisement in the local paper, were 40% blue-collar workers, 40% white-collar workers and 20% professionals. The experimenter explained that the study was concerned with the effect of punishment – electric shocks – on learning. Accordingly, one of the participants would serve as a ‘teacher’ and the other as a ‘learner’. A draw was then made to decide who would take which role – but this was rigged to ensure that the volunteer was always the teacher and the confederate was always the learner. Next, the teacher and learner were taken to another room and the learner was strapped into a chair and electrodes were attached to his body. The experimenter declared that ‘although the shocks can be extremely painful, they cause no permanent tissue damage’ (Milgram, 1974(1): 19). The learning task involved word pairs. First, the teacher read out a series of such pairs (e.g., blue–box). Then, in the ‘testing phase’ he read a target word from one of the pairs (in this example, blue) along with four other words (e.g., sky, ink, box, lamp). The learner then had to say which of these four words was originally paired with the target (in this instance, box). If the learner gave a wrong answer, the teacher had to deliver an electric shock by depressing one of the switches on the shock generator, moving one level higher with every error. There were 30 switches, increasing 15 volts at a time up to a maximum of 450 volts. If participants continued all the way to the maximum level, they were instructed to continue at this level of shock for subsequent errors. In the baseline condition, as the learner was being strapped into the electric chair, he mentioned that he had a slight heart condition. Then, during the task itself, he made specific responses at different shock levels. (…) the experimenter responded using a predetermined set of prods. These were as follows: Prod 1: Please continue [or Please go on]. Prod 2: The experiment requires that you continue. Prod 3: It is absolutely essential that you continue. Prod 4: You have no other choice, you must go on.
In this baseline condition 26 out of 40 participants (65%) went all the way to the maximum level and never defied the experimenter – this was despite the screams, the demands to be released, the invocations of heart disease and, ultimately, the learner’s ominous silence. Of those 14 who did refuse to go on, the largest number (six) did so at the 150-volt level. No more than two people broke off at any other single level.
Haslam I 115
Variants: (…) the best-known set of variants addresses the physical proximity of the learner to the experimenter 1) the ‘remote’ experiment: the learner is in a separate room and his voice cannot be heard by the teacher. The only feedback comes at 300 volts when there is banging on the wall.
2) voice-feedback study: (…) almost identical to the ‘baseline’ variant except that there is no mention of a heart condition at any point.
3) (proximity): is like the second, except that it involves the teacher and learner being in the same room so there is visual as well as auditory feedback.
4) (touch proximity): the teacher has to press the learner’s hand onto a metal shock plate.
Other Variants: in one study, it is the learner who demands that the shocks are delivered. At 150 volts the experimenter calls a halt to the study but the learner indicates a willingness to continue.
In another study, the person demanding that shocks be delivered is not a scientist in a lab coat, but just an ordinary man, ostensibly a volunteer for the study, just like the participant. In this situation only 4 out of 20 people (20%) obey to the end.
Haslam I 116
In yet another study, there are two scientist experimenters who argue with each other as to whether shocks should be delivered. Here again, not one of the 20 participants (0%) is fully obedient and 18 of them stop at the 150-volt mark. Gender: Variants with women as participants: When women are used instead of men, there is no difference in obedience levels. Out of 40 participants, 26 are fully obedient (65%).
Schema: The Milgram paradigm, then, is one in which the participant is assailed on all sides by different voices demanding different things. The participants seem to be attentive to all these voices and their dilemma is which to prioritize over the others. >Explanations/Milgram.
Haslam I 118
VsMilgram: Even Milgram’s most ardent admirers are highly sceptical about the ‘agentic state’ explanation (e.g., Blass, 2004(3)). If nothing else, this is because there is no evidence that the different levels of obedience witnessed across the study variants relate to differences in the extent to which participants enter into this state (Mantell and Panzarella, 1976)(4). 1. VsMilgram: the agentic state is conceptualized mechanically as an all-or-nothing affair: one is either completely in or completely out of it.
2. VsMilgram: [the focus on] one of the several relationships in the study – that between participant and experimenter [makes him lose] sight of the fact that a key feature of the studies concerns the way in which participants are torn between different relationships and different obligations. It therefore fails to address the ways in which the balance of relationships varies between the different studies


1. Milgram, S. (1974) Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
2. Arendt, H. (1963/1994) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin.
3. Blass, T. (2004) The Man who Shocked the World: The Life and Legacy of Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books.
4. Mantell, D.M. and Panzarella, R. (1976) ‘Obedience and responsibility’, British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 15: 239–45.


Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Minimal Group Behavioral Economics Haslam I 172
Minimal groups/behavioral economics: the minimal group paradigm and its findings have been used to argue for humans’ evolutionary tendency to favour ingroups and distrust outgroups (Dunbar et al., 2005)(1). >Minimal groups/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel. This takes us well beyond Tajfel’s original grounding of the minimal ingroup studies (and evidence of bias) in an appreciation of norms, social meaning, and a quest for positive group distinctiveness.

1. Dunbar, R., Barrett, K. and Lycett, J. (2005) Evolutionary Psychology. Oxford. One World.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Minimal Group Psychological Theories Haslam I 175
Minimal group/psychological theories: Problems: VsTajfel: By definition, minimal groups are not grounded in previous experiences, nor in already existing and easily accessible stereotypes. So how can minimal groups provide their new members with meaning? >Minimal Group/Tajfel, >Social Identity Theory/Tajfel. Cadinu/Rothbart: ‘Overall, in-group favoritism in the minimal group paradigm is a well-established phenomenon, but the exact reasons for this favoritism remain unclear’ (Cadinu and Myron Rothbart: 1996(1): 661).
Explanation/Rothbart/Cadinu: two processes: a) because social categorization implies that the self and the ingroup share certain characteristics, people will be prone to project (aspects of) the typically positive representation of the individual self onto the ingroup (self-anchoring), thereby forming a positive ingroup representation.
b) people will also apply an „oppositeness heuristic“, assuming, that ingrop and outgroup do indeed differ.
Evidence: (Cadinu/Rothbart 1996(1)): manipulating the accessibility of the individual self prior to judgments about minimal groups affected ingroup but not outgroup ratings – making judgments of the ingroup more similar to those of the self.
Otten/Wentura: (2001)(2): the degree of overlap between self and ingroup ratings predicted the degree to which members of minimal groups showed evaluative intergroup bias. There was no evidence, however, that similarity or dissimilarity in the mental representations of self and outgroup was a relevant predictor of intergroup bias in a minimal group setting (see also Robbins and Krueger, 2005(3), for a similar conclusion).
Haslam I 176
Self-anchoring: findings on self-anchoring in minimal groups (cf.Cadinu/Rothbart 1969(1)) suggest that positive representations of the ingroup result from the projection of positive self characteristics onto this group, and that the positive differentiation from the outgroup is a by-product of this differentiation. In this way, an intergroup phenomenon, namely the positive differentiation of minimal ingroups from outgroups, can be traced back to an intragroup phenomenon, namely the link between self and ingroup. At the same time, the self-anchoring approach is consistent with the idea that differentiation between minimal groups is at least partly motivated by striving for meaning. Vs: Problem: the approach cannot convincingly explain why group members sacrifice maximum ingroup profit for the sake of maximum differentiation between ingroup and outgroup.



1. Cadinu, M. and Rothbart, M. (1996) ‘Self-anchoring and differentiation processes in the minimal group setting’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(4): 661–77.
2. Otten, S. and Wentura, D. (2001) ‘Self-anchoring and in-group favoritism: An individual profiles analysis’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 525–32.
3. Robbins, J.M. and Krueger, J.I. (2005) ‘Social projection to ingroups and outgroups: A review and meta-analysis’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9: 32–47.



Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Minimal Group Tajfel Haslam I 164
Minimal group/Tajfel: Extending the earlier work of Sherif (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, >Group behavior/Sherif, >Social Groups/Sherif, [Taifel’s] minimal group studies were designed to reduce the group or category to its most minimal elements and then establish at what point conflict and discrimination between groups would rear their heads. As it turned out, the intergroup discrimination arising from the highly recognizable phenomenon of gangs of boys fighting over territory and resources also arose when all obvious features that might produce such conflict (e.g., a history of antagonism, a scarcity of resources) were stripped away.
Indeed, by this means the studies provided striking evidence that boys (and later adults) would discriminate in favour of their own group in the absence of any visible signs of the groups themselves – a phenomenon typically referred to as minimal ingroup bias.
Def Minimal ingroup bias: boys (and later adults) would discriminate in favour of their own group in the absence of any visible signs of the groups themselves. >Social identity theory/Tajfel.
Predecessors: Sherifs boys’ camp studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, Sherif and Sherif (1967(1) showed that tensions arise between groups when they have to compete for scarce resources.
TajfelVsSherif: as set out in the influential 1971 (Tajfel 1971)(2) paper in which Tajfel and his colleagues presented the findings of the first minimal group studies, two related themes seemed to motivate Tajfel’s quest to go beyond Sherif’s ideas. First, he emphasized the importance of the social context in which behaviour was embedded and acquired meaning.
Haslam I 165
Prejudice/Tajfel: The articulation of an individual’s social world in terms of its categorization in groups becomes a guide for his [or her] conduct in situations to which some criterion of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied. (Meaningful need not be ‘rational’.) An undifferentiated environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action … . Whenever … some form of intergroup categorization can be used it will give order and coherence to the social situation. >Group behavior/Tajfel.
Haslam I 167
Experiment 1: (see >Method/Tajfel) when allocation involved
Haslam I 168
two ingroup or two outgroup members, participants displayed an overwhelming preference for a strategy of fairness. However, when it came to differential matrices that involved rewarding an ingroup versus an outgroup member, they were now more discriminatory in favour of the ingroup (although the modal response was still for fairness). In other words, these matrices produced evidence of significant ingroup bias. Moreover, participants’ support for this strategy did not change when the categorization procedure was given a value connotation that might justify discrimination (…). Experiment 2: Experiment 2 was designed to distinguish further between the different reward strategies participants were using. The clear result was that [the „Maximum Difference“ strategy; see >Method/Tajfel] exerted a significant pull when opposed to the other strategies. (…) the differentiation matrices provide consistent evidence of ingroup favouritism and maximum difference strategies. (>Method/Tajfel).
Interpretation of the results: Initially, Tajfel and his colleagues interpreted [the support for the maximum difference strategy (biggest positive difference between ingroup and outgroup points in favor of the ingroup)] as supporting a generic social norm to discriminate.
Haslam I 169
VsTajfel: many subsequent accounts interpreted this as an example of outgroup derogation (because it harms the outgroup at the expense of benefiting the ingroup). Problem/Spears/Otten: in the MD strategy, positive differentiation and derogation are confounded, and this problem has never adequately been addressed (and is rarely if ever discussed).
Alternative Interpretations/Tajfel: (Tajfel et al. 1971)(2): (a) demand characteristics (the idea that participants were responding to cues that conveyed the experimenter’s hypothesis), (b) expectations of reciprocity, and (c) anticipation of future interaction.
Ad (a): Lindsay St Claire and John Turner (1982)(3) found that if people were asked to role-play being members of the groups (rather than being categorized themselves) and then complete the matrices accordingly they did not show the same degree of ingroup bias (MD and MIP) but tended to predict fairness.
Ad (b): Tajfel and colleagues admitted that they had no data that spoke to this issue and hence this explanation could not easily be ruled out.
Ad (c): Tajfel proposed that the most rational strategy – given that they did not know who was in ‘their’ group – was to opt for an MJP (maximum joint points) strategy. However, (…) this strategy held little appeal.
Haslam I 170
Generic norm explanation: this explanation quickly fell from favour because of the potential circularity of a normative account: if there is a competitive norm (e.g., among participants from western countries), where does it come from and what explains that? For a solution: see >Social identity theory/Tajfel.
Haslam I 171
1. Problem: in the literature Tajfel’s minimal group studies are often used to warrant the conclusion that discrimination is pervasive and inevitable ((s) which is not explicitly claimed by Tajfel and Turner). 2. Problem: it is the question, whether the portrayal of Tajfel’s and Turner’s studies is always accurate:
A.
Social dominance theory: here evidence for ingroup favouritism is used to argue that intergroup discrimination is a generic feature of many intergroup relations (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999)(4).
B.
System justification theory: (Jost and Banaji, 1994)(5): here evidence for ingroup favouritism
Haslam I 172
is used to suggest that groups (especially those with high-status) often seek to justify their position through displays of bias towards others. >Minimal group/Psychological theories.


1. Sherif, M. (1967) Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
2. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77.
3. St Claire, L. and Turner, J.C. (1982) ‘The role of demand characteristics in the social categorization paradigm’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 12: 307–14.
4. Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. (1999) Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press.
5. Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) ‘The role of stereotyping in system-justification and the production of false consciousness’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 33: 1–27.



Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Moscovici Psychological Theories Haslam I 101
Moscovici/psychological theories: the afterimage studies by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1) was criticized for several reasons. >Experiment/Moscovici, >Social influence/Moscovici, >Minorites/Moscovici, >Conversion theory/Moscovici. 1. VsMoscovici: Machteld Doms and Eddy Van Avermaet (1980)(2) found afterimage shifts towards the complementary colour of green for both a majority and minority. These researchers also included a ‘no information’ condition in which the confederate called the slides ‘green’ but no feedback (percentage) information was given (i.e., the confederate’s responses were not linked to a majority or minority position). Interestingly, there was no shift in afterimages across the phases in the no-information condition.
Explanation/Doms/Avermaet: the shifts might be part of a general tendency to pay closer attention to stimuli when a response is unexpected or unusual.
Haslam I 102
2. VsMoscovici: Richard Sorrentino and colleagues (1980)(3) examined only minority influence. After their study they asked participants to rate how suspicious they were of the experimental procedure. Interestingly, they found afterimage shifts towards the complementary colour of green only for those participants who were highly suspicious of the experiment (see also Martin, 1998)(4). Explanation/Sorrentino: highly suspicious participants may stare more intensely at the stimulus than unsuspicious participants do, and that the shift in afterimages may be due to this greater attention to the stimulus.
3. VsMoscovici: Martin (1998(4), 1995(5)) draw attention to the fact that all the afterimage studies analyse changes in the overall afterimage response between each phase of the experiment but do not examine changes within each phase. Across five afterimage experiments, Martin (1998)(4) found a significant within-phase shift in afterimage judgments in all the phases (see also Laurens and Moscovici, 2005)(5), an effect that was more pronounced for participants who reported being suspicious of the study. This effect indicated that participants’ afterimage judgments shifted towards the complementary colour of green (i.e., red) over progressive trials within each phase of the experiment (see also Laurens and Moscovici, 2005)(5).
Explanation/Martin: it may be due to a perceptual phenomenon that arises from repeated exposure to the same stimulus in the context of afterimage methodology.
Haslam I 103
4. VsMoscivoci: Sorrentino and his colleagues (1980)(3) have criticized the afterimage judgment scale employed by Moscovici and Personnaz (1980)(1) in terms of the labels it employed (see also Laurens, 2001)(5). In their variant, they instead asked participants to select a coloured chip that best matched the colour they saw. No evidence of conversion due to minority influence was found with this method. Criteria/manifest/latent reponses: Martin and Hewstone (2001)(6) identified three important criteria that need to be satisfied in order to establish manifest and latent responses:
1) There needs to be a link between the manifest and latent response dimension, such that
Haslam I 104
change on the manifest response results in a corresponding change in the latent response (manifest–latent correspondence). 2) The relationship between the manifest and latent response should be consistent and insensitive to situational factors (manifest–latent consistency).
3) Participants should not be aware of the link between the manifest and latent responses, and ideally they should use different response codes (manifest–latent perceived independence).


1. Moscovici, S. and Personnaz, B. (1980) ‘Studies in social influence: V. Minority influence and conversion behavior in a perceptual task’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 270–82.
2. Doms, M. and Van Avermaet, E. (1980) ‘Majority influence, minority influence and conversion behavior: A replication’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 283–92.
3. Sorrentino, R.M., King, G. and Leo, G. (1980) ‘The influence of the minority on perception: A note on a possible alternative explanation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 16: 293–301.
4. Martin, R. (1998) ‘Majority and minority influence using the afterimage paradigm: A series of attempted replications’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34: 1–26.
5. Laurens, S. and Moscovici, S. (2005) ‘The confederate’s and others’ self-conversion: A neglected phenomenon’, Journal of Social Psychology, 145: 191–207.
6. Martin, R. and Hewstone, M. (2008) ‘Majority versus minority influence, message processing and attitude change: The Source-Context-Elaboration Model’, in M. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 237–326.


Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone, “Minority Influence. Revisiting Moscovici’s blue-green afterimage studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Motivation Deci Corr I 442
Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic.
Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment.
Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan.
Four types of extrinsic motivation:
external regulation
introjected regulation
identified regulation
integrated regulation
>Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan.


1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68
2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row

Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press



Corr II 140
Deci suggested that whether rewards, feedback, and other events enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation will be a function of how they affect feelings of self-determination (being an origin) and competence (experiences of effectance).
II 141
Deci began with this question: if a monetary reward is offered for performing an activity one already finds interesting, what effect will this reward have on subsequent intrinsic motivation? Operant psychology maintained (albeit using different language) that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would be additive. Counter to this, Deci (1971)(1) anticipated that the motivational impact of rewards might depend on how they are experienced. Building on de Charms (1968)(2), Deci reasoned that the application of contingent extrinsic rewards to an intrinsically motivated activity could prompt a change in the “perceived locus of causality” from internal (IPLOC) to external (EPLOC). In other words, offering rewards would shift participants’ perceived locus of causality from internal to external, undermining their experience of being an origin, and thus their intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, Deci reasoned that rewards that did not interfere with participants’ experiences of ‘self-determination and competence’ should not produce this undermining effect on subsequent intrinsic motivation. Deci’s primary measure of intrinsic motivation was what he called the free-choice behavioural paradigm, a strategy upon which most subsequent experimental work on intrinsic motivation has been based. In this approach, intrinsic motivation is operationalized as the amount of time participants spend engaged with
II 142
a target activity when they are alone, are not being observed, are free to choose what to do, have alternative activities available, and have no explicit incentives for continuing on the target task. Experiments/Deci: [In an experiment with three different groups solving a puzzle] Deci (1971)(1) [found] a potential negative effect of rewards on post-reward persistence, an outcome not previously observed in experiments with humans. Specifically, participants who had received extrinsic rewards for solving these interesting puzzles spent much less time working on the puzzles during the final free-choice period than they had in the initial one (…).
II 142
[In another experiment, conducted at a college newspaper office, Deci showed] that faster work (better performance) is indicative of higher intrinsic motivation. [Deci conducted a third experiment which was almost identical to the first “puzzle experiment.] This time, however, Deci used ‘verbal rewards’ (praise and positive feedback) rather than financial rewards as the experimental manipulation. Deci hypothesized that verbal rewards like these would typically not be experienced as controlling, but rather as ‘encouragement’. Therefore, unlike contingent financial rewards, this type of verbal reward would be unlikely to create an EPLOC or undermine intrinsic motivation.
II 144
As expected, results showed no undermining effect of these verbal rewards on intrinsic motivation.
II 145
Based on these early experiments (Deci 1971(1), 1972a(3), 1972b(4)), Deci introduced a tentative cognitive evaluation theory (CET) to account for his varied results. He argued that there are at least two aspects to any external reward: a ‘controlling’ aspect and an ‘informational’ aspect. The controlling aspect leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation by changing the perceived locus of causality from internal to external. The informational aspect leads to an increase in intrinsic motivation by increasing the person’s sense of ‘competence and self-determination’.
II 146
VsDeci: Most outstanding is that all three of the 1971 studies are statistically underpowered – or carried out with very small samples. (…) many findings do not reach an acceptable level of inferential statistical significance; several findings are trends or significant but with weak effects. [Moreover] the research was exclusively based on a relatively homogeneous group of northeastern US university students.

1. Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 105–115.
2. de Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York: Academic Press.
3. Deci, E. L. (1972a). The effects of contingent and non-contingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 217–229.
4. Deci, E. L. (1972b). Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 113–120.


Ryan, Richard M; Ryan, William S and Di Domenico, Stefano I.: “Effects of Rewards on Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation Revisiting Deci (1971)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 137-154.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Motivation Ryan Corr I 442
Motivation/Deci/Ryan: Def Intrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: refers to doing an activity because the activity itself is interesting and spontaneously satisfying (Ryan and Deci 2000)(1). Intrinsic motivation is said to be invariantly autonomous or self-determined because it is a reflection of people’s inner interests. In other words, when intrinsically motivated, people experience volition and a sense of choice as they fully endorse the activities in which they are engaged. Terminology: Csikszentmihalyi (1990)(2) referred to intrinsically motivated activities as autotelic.
Def Extrinsic motivation/Deci/Ryan: In contrast, extrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity because it is instrumental to some operationally separable consequence. The classic instance of extrinsic motivation is doing an activity because it is expected to lead to a reward or the avoidance of a punishment.
Self-Determination Theory/SDT: suggests, that extrinsic motivation can be internalized and thus can become a basis for autonomous actions. >Self-Determination/Deci/Ryan, >Internalization/Deci/Ryan.
Four types of extrinsic motivation:
external regulation
introjected regulation
identified regulation
integrated regulation
>Regulation/Deci/Ryan, >Environment/Deci/Ryan.

1. Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2000. The ‘what’ and the ‘why’ of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behaviour, Psychological Inquiry 11: 227–68
2. Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990. Flow. New York: Harper and Row

Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press



Corr II 140
Deci suggested that whether rewards, feedback, and other events enhance or diminish intrinsic motivation will be a function of how they affect feelings of self-determination (being an origin) and competence (experiences of effectance).
II 141
Deci began with this question: if a monetary reward is offered for performing an activity one already finds interesting, what effect will this reward have on subsequent intrinsic motivation? Operant psychology maintained (albeit using different language) that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation would be additive. Counter to this, Deci (1971)(1) anticipated that the motivational impact of rewards might depend on how they are experienced. Building on de Charms (1968)(2), Deci reasoned that the application of contingent extrinsic rewards to an intrinsically motivated activity could prompt a change in the “perceived locus of causality” from internal (IPLOC) to external (EPLOC). In other words, offering rewards would shift participants’ perceived locus of causality from internal to external, undermining their experience of being an origin, and thus their intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, Deci reasoned that rewards that did not interfere with participants’ experiences of ‘self-determination and competence’ should not produce this undermining effect on subsequent intrinsic motivation. Deci’s primary measure of intrinsic motivation was what he called the free-choice behavioural paradigm, a strategy upon which most subsequent experimental work on intrinsic motivation has been based. In this approach, intrinsic motivation is operationalized as the amount of time participants spend engaged with
II 142
a target activity when they are alone, are not being observed, are free to choose what to do, have alternative activities available, and have no explicit incentives for continuing on the target task. Experiments/Deci: [In an experiment with three different groups solving a puzzle] Deci (1971)(1) [found] a potential negative effect of rewards on post-reward persistence, an outcome not previously observed in experiments with humans. Specifically, participants who had received extrinsic rewards for solving these interesting puzzles spent much less time working on the puzzles during the final free-choice period than they had in the initial one (…).
II 142
[In another experiment, conducted at a college newspaper office, Deci showed] that faster work (better performance) is indicative of higher intrinsic motivation. [Deci conducted a third experiment which was almost identical to the first “puzzle experiment.] This time, however, Deci used ‘verbal rewards’ (praise and positive feedback) rather than financial rewards as the experimental manipulation. Deci hypothesized that verbal rewards like these would typically not be experienced as controlling, but rather as ‘encouragement’. Therefore, unlike contingent financial rewards, this type of verbal reward would be unlikely to create an EPLOC or undermine intrinsic motivation.
II 144
As expected, results showed no undermining effect of these verbal rewards on intrinsic motivation.
II 145
Based on these early experiments (Deci 1971(1), 1972a(3), 1972b(4)), Deci introduced a tentative cognitive evaluation theory (CET) to account for his varied results. He argued that there are at least two aspects to any external reward: a ‘controlling’ aspect and an ‘informational’ aspect. The controlling aspect leads to a decrease in intrinsic motivation by changing the perceived locus of causality from internal to external. The informational aspect leads to an increase in intrinsic motivation by increasing the person’s sense of ‘competence and self-determination’.
II 146
VsDeci: Most outstanding is that all three of the 1971 studies are statistically underpowered – or carried out with very small samples. (…) many findings do not reach an acceptable level of inferential statistical significance; several findings are trends or significant but with weak effects. [Moreover] the research was exclusively based on a relatively homogeneous group of northeastern US university students.

1. Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18, 105–115.
2. de Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York: Academic Press.
3. Deci, E. L. (1972a). The effects of contingent and non-contingent rewards and controls on intrinsic motivation. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 217–229.
4. Deci, E. L. (1972b). Intrinsic motivation, extrinsic reinforcement, and inequity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22, 113–120.


Ryan, Richard M; Ryan, William S and Di Domenico, Stefano I.: “Effects of Rewards on Self-Determination and Intrinsic Motivation Revisiting Deci (1971)”, In: Philip J. Corr (Ed.) 2018. Personality and Individual Differences. Revisiting the classical studies. Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne: Sage, pp. 137-154.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Neoliberalism Brown Mause I 74f
Neoliberalism/Brown: Brown does not use the term "neoliberalism" in the sense of economic theory. Brown thesis: the neoliberal rationality is expansive and "extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action".(1) The penetration of economic logic into all areas of life and politics is not unproblematic from the perspective of democracy theory.
Democracy/Brown: this is contrary to basic democratic values. (See Democracy/Brown).
Neoliberalism (...) represents a paradigm that has a lasting influence on our thinking and reasoning by implicitly evaluating terms and concepts - behind the speakers' backs, so to speak - and thus distinguishing specific actions and justifications normatively and making them connectable and devaluing others.


1.W.Brown, Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy. Edgework. Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Princeton 2005, S. 39-40.

PolBrown I
Wendy Brown
American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Neuroimaging Canli Corr I 310
Neuroimaging/Canli: One approach is to report the results of whole-brain analyses, in addition to analyses from a priori regions of interest.((1)-(6)) Another approach is to conduct functional connectivity analyses, to investigate how activation across spatially distinct regions is correlated. For example, in our study of state-trait associations of Extraversion and Neuroticism with ACC activation (Canli, Amin, Haas et al. 2004)(7).
Corr I 311
We have developed a third approach (Omura, Aron and Canli 2005)(8), which represents an alternative to the traditional regions of interest (ROI) approach, which we termed the ‘regions of variance’ (ROV) approach. The ROI approach focuses on regions that have been shown to be consistently activated across prior studies that employed a similar task paradigm. VsROI: brain regions that exhibit a great deal of variance from one study participant to another may never show sufficient group-level activation to pass statistical thresholds in traditional imaging studies, and therefore not ever be reported. We therefore developed an alternative methodology that identifies regions of variance (ROVs), i.e., areas that display the most variability across subjects for a given within-subject contrast. We then treat these ROVs as regions of interest to assess whether particular variables of interest can explain the variance exhibited in these regions. The conceptual difference between the ROV and ROI approaches is considerable: ROVs are empirically derived and therefore devoid of any theoretical assumptions or biases about the neural substrate and its relation to the cognitive process under study. In contrast, ROIs typically represent considerable assumptions about the cognitive functions they are believed to play a role in.
Problems/VsROV: we also discovered that the ROV approach does, on occasion, miss interesting brain-behaviour correlations.
Corr I 312
For example, the ROV approach missed the association between Extraversion and ACC response to positive stimuli in the left hemisphere. It turned out that, although the correlation between Extraversion and ACC activation was highly significant, the actual range of values that contributed to this correlation was relatively narrow, producing a low degree of between-subject variance.


1. Phan, K. L., Wager, T., Taylor, S. F. et al. 2002. Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI, Neuroimage 16: 331–48
2. Phillips, M. L., Drevets, W. C., Rauch, S. L. et al. 2003a. Neurobiology of emotion perception I: The neural basis of normal emotion perception, Biological Psychiatry 54: 504–14
3. Phillips, M. L., W. C. Drevets, et al. 2003b. Neurobiology of emotion perception II: Implications for major psychiatric disorders. Biological Psychiatry 54: 515–28
4. Wager, T. D., Phan, K. L., Liberzon, I. et al. 2003. Valence, gender, and lateralization of functional brain anatomy in emotion: a meta-analysis of findings from neuroimaging, Neuroimage 19: 513–31
5. Baas, D., Aleman, A. and Kahn, R. S. 2004. Lateralization of amygdala activation: a systematic review of functional neuroimaging studies, Brain Research Reviews 45: 96–103
6. Phan, K. L., T. D. Wager, et al. 2004. Functional neuroimaging studies of human emotions, CNS Spectrums 9: 258–66
7. Canli, T., Amin, Z., Haas, W. et al. 2004. A double dissociation between mood states and personality traits in the anterior cingulate. Behavioral Neuroscience 118: 897–904
8. Omura, K., Aron, A. and Canli, T. 2005. Variance maps as a novel tool for localizing regions of interest in imaging studies of individual differences, Cognitive Affect and Behavioural Neuroscience 5: 252–61


Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Numbers Plato Gadamer I 416
Number/Word/Sign/Plato/Gadamer: One understands that not the word, but the number is the actual paradigm of the noetic, the number, whose naming is obviously pure convention and whose "precision" consists precisely in the fact that every number is defined by its position in the series and thus is a pure construct of intelligibility, an ens rationis, not in the weakening sense of its being, but in the sense of its perfect rationality. This is the actual result to which the "Cratylos" refers, and this result has a highly momentous consequence that in truth influences all further thinking about language. >Logos/Plato, >Word/Plato.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
Obedience Psychological Theories Haslam I 120
Obedience/Milgram experiment/psychological theories: (…) three new approaches to the experimental study of obedience have been developed that allow us to address real harm-doing without harming participants in the process. (Cf. >Milgram experiment/psychological theories, >Vs Milgram).
Haslam I 121
A. The first employs virtual reality simulations of the Milgram paradigm. In these it has been shown that behaviour in these simulations corresponds closely to that which is observed in the original paradigm (Slater et al., 2006)(1). B. The second involves using a technique called Immersive Digital Realism to train actors to play the role of normal participants in the Milgram paradigm (Haslam, Reicher and Millard, 2015)(2).
C. The third is based on the observation that what people do at 150 volts is a very accurate predictor of whether they will obey up to 450 volts. So why not stop the studies at the 150-volt mark where one can see if people will obey without getting them to actually do something harmful? This was the strategy adopted by Jerry Burger (2009a)(3) in his replication of the Milgram paradigm.
Haslam I 121
1. Several authors point to the need to consider the importance of disobedience as well as obedience (Bocchario and Zimbardo, 2010(4); Dimow, 2004(5); Jetten and Mols, 2014(6); Passini and Morselli, 2009(7); Rochat and Modigliani, 1995(8)). 2. A number of analyses point to features of the various relationships in the obedience paradigm that might help explain whether people obey or disobey authority. Wim Meeus and Quinten Raaijmakers (1995)(9), for instance, argue that obedience does not result from an inability to resist scientific authority but rather from a cultural tendency to identify with the social system, combined with a tendency not to identify with our fellow citizens but to see them in terms of specific role positions – an analysis which suggests that in the Milgram studies participants relate to the learner in terms of the different roles that the two of them occupy rather than in terms of their common citizenship.
3. Rochat and Modigliani (1995)(8): note that the villagers of Chambon were descendants of the persecuted Protestant minority in France (the Huguenots) and this meant that they likened the collaborationist Vichy Government to their own persecutors, and saw commonality between themselves and those who were persecuted. Their analysis concludes that once the persecutors became ‘them’ and the persecuted became ‘us’, the choice of whom to side with – of whether to obey or defy authority – became easy. See also >Goldhagen (1996)(10).
Haslam I 123
Reicher/Haslam: Thesis: We harm others to the extent that we listen to the appeals of malicious authorities above those of its victims. At the same time, there is now converging evidence that this has something to do with the extent to which we identify with one over the other (Haslam et al., 2014(11), 2015(2); Reicher and Haslam, 2011a(12); Reicher et al., 2012(13)). There are three areas in particular that need to be addressed in the future
1) We need to investigate the way in which different situational arrangements affect group formation and identification between the participant and the different parties within the obedience paradigm (Reicher and Haslam, 2011a(12), 2011b(14)).
Haslam I 124
2) We need to understand what sort of appeals make people side with the experimenter rather than with the learner, as well as the impact that participants’ own discourse has on their ability to disengage from these parties. 3) The aspect of language: only one of the exhortations, prods and prompts used be the experimenter in the studies is a direct order. In their replication study Burger and colleagues found that every time the experimenter gave this final prod, participants refused to continue (Burger, Girgis and Manning, 2011(15)), and in controlled studies of our own we observe that prod 4 (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’). is singularly ineffective in securing compliance (Haslam et al., 2014(11), 2015(16)). This is powerful evidence against the notion that participants in Milgram’s studies are simply following orders.

1. Slater, M., Antley, A., Davison, A., Swapp, D., Guger, C., Barker, C., et al. (2006) ‘A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 1: e39.
2 Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Millard, K. (2015) Shock treatment: Using immersive digital realism to restage and re-examine Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ research. PLoS ONE, 1O(3):e109015.
3. Burger, J. (2009a) ‘In their own words: Explaining obedience through an examination of participants’ comments’. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Portland, ME, 15—17 October.
4. Bocchiaro, P. and Zimbardo, P.G. (2010) ‘Defying unjust authority: An exploratory study, Current Psychology, 29: 155—70.
5. Dimow, J. (2004) ‘Resisting authority: A personal account of the Milgram obedience experiments’, Jewish Currents, January.
6. Jetten,J. and Mols, F. (2014) 5O:5O hindsight: Appreciating anew the contributions of Mi1grams obedience experiments, Journal of Social Issues, 70: 587—602.
7. Passini, S. and Morselli, D. (2009) 1Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience &, New Ideas in Psychology, 27: 9 6—106.
8. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210.
9. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75.
10. Goidhagen, D. (1996) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. London: Little, Brown.
11. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Miigram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88.
12. Reicher, S. and Haslam, S.A. (201 la) 4After shock? Towards a social identity explanation of the Milgram “obedience” studies’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50: 163—9.
13. Reicher, S.D., Haslam, S.A. and Smith, J.R. (2012) 1Working towards the experimenter: Reconceptualizing obedience within the Milgram paradigm as identification-based followership’, Perspectives on Psychological science, 7: 315—24.
14. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (201 lb) ‘Culture of shock: Milgram’s obedience studies fifty years on’, Scientific American Mind, 2 2(6): 3 0—5.
15. Burger, J.M., Girgis, Z.M., and Manning, C.C. (2011) ðln their own words: Explaining obedience to authority through an examination of participants’ comments’, Social Psychological and Personality science, 2:460—6.
16. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. Millard, K. and McDonald, R. (2015) “Happy to have been of service”: The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Milgram’s “obedience” experiments’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 55—83.


Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Object Permanence Baillargeon Slater I 86
Object Permanence/Baillargeon: Thesis: Piaget (1954)(1) object permanence - an awareness that an object continues to exist when not available to the senses (literally „out of sight, out of mind“) - was not fully acquired until the second year of life had dominated thinking about early infant cognition. BaillargeonVsPiaget: (Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman (1985)(2) showed that infants as young as 5 months of age and later 3.5 months of age, Baillargeon 1987(3)) appeared to remember the continued existence of hidden objects and are aware that they maintained some of their physical properties.
The key was to move away from the Piagetian criteria of active retrieval (e.g., reaching) for a hidden object as a measure of knowledge.
Solution/Baillargeon: [she used] the so-called violation of expectation (VoE) paradigm: it is built on the idea that infants will orient more to novel or surprising events than familiar or expected ones (see Charlesworth, 1969(4).
Slater I 87
In particular, [Baillargeon] found that between 3.5 and 12 months of age infants became sensitive to the height (Baillargeon, 1987(3); Baillargeon & Graber 1987(5)), location (Baillargeon & Graber, 1988)(6), and solidity of hidden objects (Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, & Black, 1990)(7). Baillargeon and colleagues also gradually pieced together infants’ understanding of the physical support relations that can exist between objects placed next to or on top of one another (Baillargeon, 2004(8); Needham & Baillargeon, 1993(9), 2000(10)). Experiment/Drawbridge study/HaithVsBaillargeon: (Haith 1998)(11)the conclusion of the drawbridge study are a product of „rich interpretation“ (Haith 1998) on the part of the researchers, rather than rich conceptual abilities on the part of young infants.
Slater I 88
Haith: There was always a more parsimonious perceptual explanation for the infants’ responses. >Object permanence/Haith. Drawbridge study/VsBaillargeon: Rivera, Wakeley, and Langer (1999)(12) Thesis: young infants simply have a general preference to look at the 180-degree rotation for cognitively uninteresting reasons (e.g., longer-lasting movement). Like Haith: Baillargeon’s findings can be explained without any attribution to an ability to think about an unseen object.
VsBaillargeon: Bogartz, Shinskey, and Schilling (2000)(13): the relatively high looking times to the 180-degree impossible event in the original drawbridge studies reflected a simple familiarity preference rather than a mental representation of a hidden object.
Slater I 89
After nearly two decades of argument in the literature and two highly anticipated debates on this topic at major conferences (Haith vs. Spelke at the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD), 1997; Baillargeon vs. Smith at the International Conference for Infant Studies (ICIS), 1998), it became clear that behavioral methods alone were not going to produce a scientific consensus. Two key questions that emerged from these debates are (1) what actually constitutes evidence of object permanence (i.e., does passive surprise suffice or is active engagement required?) and
(2) where and how does this competence originate? >Object permanence/neuroscience, >Object permanence/connectionism.



1. Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic Books.
2. Baillargeon, R., Spelke, E. S., & Wasserman, S. (1985). Object permanence in five-month-old infants. Cognition, 20, 191–208.
3. Baillargeon, R. (1987). Object permanence in 3 1/2-and 4 1/2-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 23, 655–664.
4. Charlesworth, W. R. (1969). The role of surprise in cognitive development. In D. Elkind & J. Flavell (Eds), Studies in cognitive development. Essays in honor of Jean Piaget (pp. 257–314). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1987). Where’s the rabbit? 5.5-month-old infants’ representation of the height of a hidden object. Cognitive Development, 2, 375–392.

6. Baillargeon, R., & Graber, M. (1988). Evidence of location memory in 8-month-old infants in a nonsearch AB task. Developmental Psychology, 24, 502–511.
7. Baillargeon, R., Graber, M., DeVos, J., & Black, J. (1990). Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects? Cognition, 36, 255–284.
8. Baillargeon, R., (2004). Infants’ reasoning about hidden objects. Evidence for event-general and event-specific expectations. Developmental science, 7, 391-414.
9. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old infants. Cognition, 47, 121–48.
10. Needham, A., & Baillargeon, R. (2000). Infants’ use of featural and experiential information in segregating and individuating objects: A reply to Xu, Carey and Welch (2000). Cognition, 74, 255–284.
11. Haith, M. M. (1998). Who put the cog in infant cognition? Is rich interpretation too costly? Infant Behavior and Development, 21, 167–179.
12. Rivera, S. M., Wakeley, A., & Langer, J. (1999). The drawbridge phenomenon: Representational reasoning or perceptual preference? Developmental Psychology, 35, 427–435.
13. Bogartz, R. S., Shinskey, J. L., & Schilling, T. H. (2000). Object permanence in five-and-a-half-month-old infants? Infancy, 1, 403–428.


Denis Mareschal and Jordy Kaufman, „Object permanence in Infancy. Revisiting Baillargeon’s Drawbridge Experiment“ in: Alan M. Slater & Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Observation Kuhn I 49
Observation/Empiricism/Paradigm/Progress/Science/Kuhn: In hindsight, only in possession of a subsequent paradigm, we can see which properties of electrical phenomena are represented by the observations.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Parent-Child Relationship Psychological Theories Slater I 18
Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories: A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)(1). Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm (>Situation/Ainsworth) at 12 and 18 months.
Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)(2). The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)(3).
A rodent model for studying early maternal care uses naturally occurring variations in maternal behavior over the first eight days after birth (Champagne & Meaney, 2007)(4).
Direct observation of mother-pup interactions in normally-reared animals identified two forms of maternal behavior – those involving Licking/ grooming of pups (LG) and another characterized by arched-back nursing (ABN) in which a mother nurses her pups with her back conspicuously arched. Because the two types of maternal behavior tend to co-occur, mothers could be classified as either High or Low LG-ABN.
The consequences for offspring of differential mothering were established by intergenerational stability of maternal behavior, with mothers who were high on LB-ABN showing similar maternal behavior to their offspring when they subsequently became mothers, and the offsprings’ increased exploratory activity and decreased startle responses as adults (Cameron, Champagne, & Parent, 2005)(5).
Cross-fostering of high LG mothers to rat pups served to rule out genetic transmission of intergenerational effects. Offspring of low LG mothers matched to high LG foster mothers showed high LG maternal behaviors. Early exposure to high LG mothers also has produced effects on subsequent sexual and reproductive behavior of female offspring (Cameron et al., 2005(5); Curley, Champagne, & Bateson, 2008)(6). >Environment/Developmental psychology.


1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
2. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press
3. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387.
4. Champagne, F., & Meaney, M. (2007). Transgenerational effects of social environment on variations in maternal care and behavioral response to novelty. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121, 1353–1363.
5. Cameron, N., Champagne, F., & Parent, C. (2005). The programming of individual differences in defensive responses and reproductive strategies in the rat through variations in maternal care. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 29, 843–865
6. Curley, J., Champagne, F., & Bateson, P. (2008). Transgenerational effects of impaired maternal care on behaviour of offspring and grand offspring. Animal Behaviour, 75, 1551–1561


Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Personality Traits Psychological Theories Corr I 11
Personality traits/psychological theories: Gordon Allport (1937)(1) argued that traits are a central concept in personality, building on European research and theory (Matthews and Deary 1998)(2). Researchers have measured a variety of specific traits, such as field dependence, sensation-seeking and achievement motivation, predicting specific behaviours from domain-specific personality tests. The trait concept suffered a setback when Walter Mischel (1968)(3) pointed out that situations were more influential than traits in predicting behaviour. This situational challenge to the trait paradigm came with the rise of social psychology and decline of personality psychology, as sub-fields in psychology. See >Situations/Mischel, >Situations/Murray. Mischel himself later offered a conceptually more sophisticated, interactionist version of trait theory in which the effect of a person’s trait depends upon the situational context of behaviour (Mischel and Shoda 1995)(4).



1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt
2. Matthews, G. and Deary, I. J. 1998. Personality traits. Cambridge University Press
3. Mischel, W. 1968. Personality and assessment. New York: Wiley
4. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68


Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Personality Traits Social Psychology Corr I 462
Personality traits/social psychology/Robinson/Sedikides: Personality traits could be assessed by aggregating across multiple observers (Funder 1991)(1) or across momentary samples of experience and behaviour in daily life (Epstein1983)(2). Yet, this is not common practice. Instead, researchers typically assess traits by asking people to self-report on their broad (i.e., ‘in general’) tendencies to think, feel and act in particular ways. Likely, then, there is a close link between trait self-judgments and the global self-concept. This observation led Robinson and Clore (2002a)(3) to suggest that trait self-reports assess abstract or generalized self-views rather than those more closely tied to momentary experience and behaviour.
Corr I 463
1) Generalized self-views are more consistent with self-relevant stereotypes than are ratings obtained in experience-sampling protocols (e.g., women are more emotional than men: Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco and Eyssell 1998)(4). 2) Amnesic, autistic or demented patients can make reliable and valid trait judgments about the self, despite a complete inability to recall specific trait-relevant experiences or behaviours (e.g., Klein, Loftus and Kihlstrom 1996)(5).
3) Reaction time paradigms converge on the point that ratings of the self ‘in general’ are made on a fundamentally different basis than are ratings of the self within more momentary time-frames (Robinson and Clore2002b)(6). In short, trait self-judgments tap generalized beliefs about the self somewhat independently of more momentary self-views (Robinson and Clore 2002a(3), 2002b(6)).



1. Funder, D. C. 1991. Global traits: a neo-Allportian approach to personality, Psychological science 2:31–9
2. Epstein, S. 1983. Aggregation and beyond: some basic issues on the prediction of behaviour, Journal of Personality 51: 360–92
3. Robinson, M. D. and Clore, G. L. 2002a. Belief and feeling: an accessibility model of emotional self-report, Psychological Bulletin 128: 934–60
4. Barrett, L. F., Robin, L., Pietromonaco, P. R. and Eyssell, K. M. 1998. Are women the ‘more emotional’ sex?: evidence from emotional experiences in social context, Cognition and Emotion 12: 555–78
5. Klein, S. B., Loftus, J. and Kihlstrom, J. F. 1996. Self-knowledge of an amnesic patient: toward a neuropsychology of personality and social psychology, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 125: 250–60
6. Robinson, M. D. and Clore, G. L. 2002b. Episodic and semantic knowledge in emotional self-report: evidence for two judgment processes, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 198–215


Michael D. Robinson and Constantine Sedikides, “Traits and the self: toward an integration”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Plato Political Philosophy Gaus I 309
Plato/Political philosophy/Keyt/Miller: after 2,400 years there is still no settled interpretive strategy for reading Plato. Since he writes dialogues rather than treatises, the extent to which his characters speak for their author is bound to remain problematic. The major divide is between interpreters who respect Platonic anonymity and those who do not (see D.L. III.50-1). A. Plato as anonymous author:
[These interpreters of Plato] are impressed by the literary 'distancing' that Plato creates between himself and his readers. (The ideas attributed to Protagoras in the Theaetetus, for example, are thrice removed from Plato: they are expressed by Socrates, whose speeches are read in turn by Euclides, the narrator of the dialogue.)
Characterology: Interpreters who take such distancing seriously might be called characterologists' since they hold that the characters in the dialogues are literary characters who speak for themselves, not for Plato. Characterologists take the dialogues to be 'sceptical', or aporetic, rather than 'dogmatic', or doctrinal, and emphasize their dramatic and literary elements.
Leo Strauss: Thus, Leo Strauss, a particularly fervent characterologist, claims that the dialogues must be read as dramas: 'We cannot,' he says, 'ascribe to Plato any utterance of any of his characters without having taken great precautions' (1964(1): 59) (...) .
B. Platonic persons as speaking for themselves:
The opposing group of interpreters suppose that in each dialogue Plato has an identifiable spokesman: Socrates in the Gorgias and the Republic, the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman, and the Athenian Stranger in the Laws (D.L. III.52). Such interpreters fall into three camps
(1) Unitarians suppose that Plato's spokesmen present a consistent doctrine in all four dialogues.
(2) Developmentalists believe that the doctrine expressed by Plato's spokesmen evolves from
one dialogue to the next. They believe, of course, that the order of composition of our four dialogues can be established, the order usually favoured being, from earliest to latest, Gorgias, Republic, Statesman, Laws.
(3) Particularists interpret each dialogue on its own. Though they allow that there may be thematic links among the four dialogues,
Gaus I 310
they do not worry overly much about the relation of one dialogue in the group to the others. Griswold (1988)(2) and Smith (1998(3): vol. I) are two useful collections of essays on interpretive strategies, and Tarrant (2000)(4) is a major new work on Platonic interpretation. Dialogues:
Nomoi: in the Laws the Athenian Stranger enumerates seven claims to rule - the claim of the wellborn to rule the base-born, the strong to rule the weak, and so forth - and concludes that the greatest claim of all is that of the wise to rule the ignorant (Laws III.690a-d). This conclusion is the animating idea of the four political dialogues.
Gorgias: in the Gorgias Socrates maintains that true statesmanship (politiké) differs from public speaking (rhetoriké) in being an art (techné) rather than an empirical knack (empeiria) - where an art, unlike an empirical knack, has a rational principle (logos) and can give the cause (aitia) of each thing (Gorg. 465a). He argues that none of the men reputed to be great Athenian statesmen practised true statesmanship (Gorg. 503b-c, 517a), and claims to be himself the only true statesman in Athens (Gorg. 521d6-9).
Republic: in the Republic the role of reason and knowledge in politics is neatly encapsulated in the simile of the ship of state: just as a steersman must pay attention to sky, stars and wind if he is to be really qualified to rule a ship, so a statesman must have knowledge of the realm of Forms, a realm of incorporeal paradigms that exist beyond space and time, if he is to be really qualified to rule a polis (Rep. VI.488a7-489a6).
Politikos: in the Statesman the Eleatic Stranger asserts that the only correct constitution is the one in which the rulers possess true statesmanship, all other constitutions being better or worse imitations of this one (Plt. 293c-294a, 296e4-297a5); and in the Laws the Athenian Stranger affirms the same principle (IX.875c3-d5). (The relations among these dialogues are discussed by Owen, 1953(5); Klosko, 1986(6); Laks, 1990(7); Gill, 1995(8); Kahn, 1995(9); and Kahn, 1996(10).) >Justice/Plato.
Gaus I 311
Republic:/today’s discussion: the Republic is the most controversial work in Greek philosophy. There is no settled interpretation of the dialogue as a whole, of any of its parts, or even of its characters. Of the current controversies surrounding its political ideas the most notable concern its communism, its view of women, its hostility toward Athenian democracy, and its utopianism. Aristotle/VsPlato: Plato's rejection of private, or separate, families and of private property (at least for the rulers and warriors of his ideal polis) is usually examined through the lens of Aristotle's critique of Platonic communism in Politics II.1-5.
Literature: T. H. Irwin (1991)(11) and Robert Mayhew (1997)(12) reach opposite conclusions about the cogency of Aristotle's critique.
Feminism: Whether Plato was a feminist and whether he masculinized women are hotly debated issues, especially among feminist philosophers. Tuana (1994)(13) is a collection of diverse essays on this topic.
(New books on the Republic appear regularly. Among the most notable are Cross and Woozley, 1964(14); Annas, 1981(15); White, 1979(16); and Reeve, 1988(17). Three recent collections of essays are particularly helpful: Fine, 1999(18): vol. Il; Kraut, 1997b(19); and Höffe, 1997(20).)
Statesman/Politikos: (After long neglect the Statesman has recently come into the spotlight. Lane, 1998(21), is a study of its political philosophy; and Rowe, 1995(22), is an extensive collection of papers on all aspects of the dialogue.)


1. Strauss, Leo (1964) The City and Man. Chicago: Rand McNally.
2. Griswold, Charles L. (1988) Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. New York: Routledge.
3. Smith, Nicholas D., ed. (1998) Plato: Critical Assessments. Vol. l, General Issues of Interpetation. London: Routledge.
4. Tarrant, Harold (2000) Plato 's First Interpreters. London: Duckworth.
5. Owen, G. E. L. (1953) 'The place of the Timaeus in Plato's dialogues'. Classical Quarterly, 3: 79-95.
6. Klosko, George (1986) The Development of Plato 's Political Theory. New York: Methuen.
7. Laks, André (1990) 'Legislation and demiurgy: on the relationship between Plato's Republic and Laws'. Classical Antiquity, 9: 209-29.
8. Gill, Christopher (1995) 'Rethinking constitutionalism in Statesman 291—303'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.
9. Kahn, Charles H. (1995) 'The place of the Statesman in Plato's later work'. In C. J. Rowe, ed., Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.
10. Kahn, Charles H. (1996) Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Irwin, T. H. (1991) 'Aristotle's defense of private property'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.
12. Mayhew, Robert (1997) Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Republic. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
14. Cross, R. C. and A. D. Wooziey (1964) Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary. New York: St Martin's.
15. Annas, Julia (1981) An Intmduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon.
16. White, Nicholas P. (1979) A Companion to Plato's Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett.
17. Reeve, C. D. C. (1988) Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato 's Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
18. Fine, Gail (1999) Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19. Kraut, Richard, ed. (1997b) Plato's Republic: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
20. Höffe, Otfried, ed. (1997) Platon Politeia. Berlin: Akademie.
21. Lane, M. S. (1998) Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Rowe, C. J. (1995) Reading the Statesman: Proceedings of the 111 Symposium Platonicum. Sankt Augustin: Academia.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Political Parties Downs Mause I 65
Political Parties/Downs: Downs mathematically models the actions of rational voters and rational parties and in this way comes to two central insights: Rational parties primarily pursue the interest of coming to power. To this end, they organise their party programme in such a way that it appeals to as many citizens as possible.(1) Empirically, in a unimodal (one-summit) distribution of political preferences in the one-dimensional political space, this leads to the parties moving programmatically to the middle (i.e. to the summit of unimodal distribution) and thus programmatic differences gradually disappear. It is rational for voters not to vote, since the cost of obtaining information or the general opportunity cost of voting with a sufficiently large electorate is higher than the probability of decisively influencing the election with one's own vote. This phenomenon has been called a paradox of voting since Downs, and part of the academic literature of the rational choice paradigm still addresses this problem today (Aldrich 1993 (2) Dowding 2005 (3); Geys 2006 (4)).


1. A. Downs, An economic theory of democracy. New York 1957; [dt. Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie. Tübingen 1968.
2. Aldrich, John H., Rational-choice and turnout. American Journal of Political science 37, 1993, S. 246– 278.
3. Dowding, Keith. Is it rational to vote? Five types of explanations and a suggestion. British Journal of Politics & International Relations 7 2005., S. 442– 459.
4. Geys, Benny, Rational theories of voter turnout: A review. Political Studies Review 4, 2006. , S.16– 35.

EconDowns I
Anthony Downs
An economic theory of democracy New York 1957


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Qualia Putnam V 137
Qualia/Russell: was a realist in terms of both qualia and universals. Moreover, he understood qualia as paradigmatic universals: the way in which things can be similar.
V 138
Universals / vagueness: universals are considered completely well-defined by the traditional realist. Words may be vaguely, universals themselves cannot be vaguely! For Russell, qualia were universals par excellence. Qualia/Putnam: so if they are well defined as universals, it must also be well defined whether any given thing or event has a certain quale or not.
Qualia/term/Putnam: not well-defined, but that does not exclude the existence of these entities - that houses are not well defined does not exclude that they exist anyway - >Meaning is not the same as >reference.
---
I (d) 118
Qualia/tradition: objects of perception - new: states of the subject (already in Reichenbach). Sensations/Qualia/Putnam: Qualia may not be the objects of perception as one thought before (it is becoming more and more fashionable to regard them as states or sensitivities of the subject, as Reichenbach had demanded a long time ago).
They may be poorly defined entities rather than the perfectly sharp individuals they were once thought to be.
We probably have no uncorrectable knowledge about them.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Reaction Time Matthews Corr I 411
Reaction time/performance/speeded response/personality traits/extraversion/Matthews: variation in reaction time depends on a variety of factors. Stage models of RT (reaction time) discriminate a variety of separate processes ranging from encoding to motor response; moreover, RT is strategically regulated, as evidenced by the well-known speed-accuracy trade-off function (see Matthews, Davies, Westerman and Stammers 2000)(1). Extraversion: Although it is often assumed that traits including Extraversion should be associated with a general pattern of fast, inaccurate performance, no such relationship is supported by the literature. Instead, a careful focus on different component processes is needed to demonstrate personality effects. Doucet and Stelmack (2000)(2) used reaction time paradigms that provided separate measures of decision time (analysing the stimulus and selecting the response), and movement time (executing the motor response of pressing the correct response key).
Further research on Extraversion and motor processes (reviewed by De Pascalis 2004)(3) has shown that these individual differences in motor response may relate to motoneuronal sensitivity, so that a purely neurological account of the finding may be advanced. De Pascalis (2004)(3) also discusses evidence relating to shorter-latency lateralized readiness potentials that index speed of response organization (i.e., a central rather than a peripheral process), demonstrating how multiple component processes may contribute to observed personality effects.




1. Matthews, G., Davies, D. R., Westerman, S. J. and Stammers, R. B. 2000. Human performance: cognition, stress and individual differences. London: Psychology Press
2. Doucet, C. and Stelmack, R. M. 2000. An event-related potential analysis of Extraversion and individual differences in cognitive processing speed and response execution, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 956–64
3. De Pascalis, V. 2004. On the psychophysiology of Extraversion, in R. Stelmack (ed.), On the psychobiology of personality: essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman, pp. 295–327. Amsterdam: Elsevier science



Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Reciprocity Psychological Theories Haslam I 174
Reciprocity/group behavior/psychological theories: what is special about ingroup reciprocity? It is perhaps no surprise that people expect reciprocity from the ingroup, but if reciprocity is the critical thing, why does it appear to be less effective when it is explicitly forthcoming from a minimal outgroup? Problem: researchers have tended to fall back on evolutionary arguments, proposing that from an evolutionary perspective there may be good reasons to trust the ingroup and to distrust or even fear the outgroup (Gaertner and Insko, 2000(1); Yamagishi et al., 1999(2)).
Group behavior/VsEvolutionary psychology(Spears/Otten: a problem here is that standard evolutionary arguments might lead one to expect men to be generally more competitive than women (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1994(3); Yuki and Yokota, 2009(4)). And while it is difficult to rule out these evolutionary arguments, it is just as difficult to prove them.
If bounded reciprocity is concerned with self-interest why do group members sacrifice self-interest as they do in the maximum differentiation strategy (MD; see >Method/Tajfel)? In this regard, Marilyn Brewer (1999)(5) has claimed that social identity theory (and the findings of the minimal group studies) are better able to explain ‘ingroup love’ than ‘outgroup hate’.
Vs: this criticism would seem to apply even more to the bounded reciprocity argument: after all, this is more about reciprocating within the ingroup than harming the outgroup. In sum, then, self-interest may help explain why participants strive to maximize ingroup profit, but it struggles to explain why they sacrifice ingroup profit in order to deprive an outgroup of benefits.



1. Gaertner, L. and Insko, C.A. (2000) ‘Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation or fear?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 77–94.
2. Yamagishi, T., Kikuchi, M. and Kosugi, M. (1999) ‘Trust, gullibility, and social intelligence’, Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2: 145–61.
3. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. and Mitchell, M. (1994) ‘In-group identification, social dominance orientation, and differential intergroup social allocation’, Journal of Social Psychology, 134: 151–67.
4. Yuki, M. and Yokota, K. (2009) ‘The primal warrior: Outgroup threat priming enhances intergroup discrimination in men but not women’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45: 271–4.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Reduction Chalmers I 43
Reduction/explanation/Chalmers: a reductive explanation of a phenomenon does not imply the reduction of this phenomenon to something else. Explanation: it does not mean identification with something else, especially not with something on a lower level.
---
Chalmers I 264
Reduceability: The fact that multiple realizability is possible is regarded by some authors as a counter-argument to a reducibility. But: BrooksVs: (Brooks 1994)(1): explains this as irrelevant. Likewise, Wilson (1985)(2) and Churchland (1986)(3); paradigmatic reducible cases such as e.g. temperature are indeed mutiple possible. Reduction: reduction should not be equated with a reduction towards a higher-level theory. Sometimes there is no such theory.
---
I 46
Consciousness/explanation/reduction/Chalmers: we need something like a cognitive model, that is, a model of the abstract causal organization, without having to specify the physicochemical substrates. This is very good for psychological aspects, but not for the phenomenal side.
---
I 47
Explanation gap: an explanation gap exists between the psychological and the phenomenal side of consciousness (Levine 1983). ---
I 48
Reductive explanation: reductive explanation is always possible when the explanatory (for example, the natural phenomenon) supervenes globally logically on the explanatory (e.g., the physical). If supervenience is not global, the question always remains: why is this process accompanied by this phenomenon? ---
I 49
Reduction: reduction does not always eliminate a "mystery" at the resulting level, but perhaps eliminates the assumption that there must be something extra that has precedence. ---
I 50
Consciousness/Chalmers: here logical supervenience fails in the explanation. ---
I 104
Reduction/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the arguments of the inverted spectra, the bat example, the color researcher Mary does not necessarily follow that there is no reductive explanation of the consciousness. (This would be equivalent to the fact that consciousness does not logically supervene on physical facts). Analysis/Analyzability/Consciousness/Chalmers: One last argument for the irreducibility is that no analysis of consciousness is available from physical facts.
---
I 105
Problem: Arguments that rely on better distinctions or better information in the future must fail. In turn, they do not have what is important: the conscious experience! Even if conscious states can play certain causal roles, they are not defined by their causal roles. For example, distinguishing ability can also be explained without consciousness.



1. D. H. M. Brooks, How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994: pp. 803-14.
2. M . Wilson, What is the ting called "pain"? The philosophical science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66, 1985: pp.227-67.
3. P. S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Scinece of the Mind-Brain. Cambridge 1986.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Reinforcement Sensitivity Matthews Corr I 417
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory/VsReinforcement Theory/Matthews: [The] Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Philip J. Corr 2004(1), >Reinforcement sensitivity/Corr) links the impulsivity and anxiety traits to the sensitivity of brain systems for reward and punishment. Hence, these traits should interact with motivational factors to influence outcomes, including learning and performance. There is indeed some evidence for interactions of this kind, within various task paradigms (Corr 2004(1)).
MatthewsVsCorr: However, as with arousal theory, it is questionable whether the theory’s predictions are supported in detail (see Matthews 2008b(2), for a critique).



1. Corr, P. J. 2004. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28: 317–32
2. Matthews, G. 2008b. Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory: a critique from cognitive science, in P. L. Corr (ed.), The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of personality, pp. 482–507 Cambridge University Press


Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Relation-Theory Bigelow I 55
Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big.
Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here.
Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations.
Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves.
---
I 56
Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects.
Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves.
BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways.
---
I 57
Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all?
Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained.
Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur.
Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level.
2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things?
Ad 1. Example Mass
Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). ---
I 58
Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". Entailment/N.B.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity.
Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete.
Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others.
Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2.
Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things.
It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume.
For example, compare the pairs
"a, b"
"c, d"
"e, f"
between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length.
Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs.
---
I 59
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities).
Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components
(1) Individuals
(2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes:
Mass/Volume/Proportions/N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other.
Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another.
Level 1: Objects
Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties.
Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level.
Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg.
N.B.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc.
Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet...
---
I 60
...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField).
Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941, 1966) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic")
Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit.
Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato.
---
I 61
Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example.
Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings.
Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,...
---
I 62
...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations.
BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels).
Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Risk Perception Gibson Slater I 41
Risk perception/visual cliff/E. J. Gibson/developmental psychology: In the 1980s, Gibson reconceptualized her studies with the visual cliff (>visual cliff/Gibson) as investigations into the development of perception of “affordances” – the fit between an animal’s physical capabilities and the features of the environment that allow a particular action to be performed (Gibson, 1988(1); Gibson & Schmuckler, 1989)(2). This reconceptualization led to a series of studies on infants’ perception of affordances for traversability (Gibson et al., 1987)(3). Now Gibson’s focus was on comparing crawling and walking infants because differences in the stability of their postures affect affordances for locomotion. Of special interest were the exploratory behaviors used to generate information for affordances. (…) in this case, the rigidity of the ground surface varied instead of the height of the drop-off. Crawling infants crossed a squishy waterbed more frequently than walking infants, but both groups went straight over rigid plywood. Walkers differentiated the two surfaces with increased visual and tactile exploration on the waterbed, whereas crawlers did not.
Gibson’s new view of the old visual cliff paradigm led to dozens of studies on infants’ perception of affordances for locomotion: over real cliffs (Kretch & Adolph, in press), gaps (Adolph, 2000(4); Adolph, Berger, & Leo, 2011(5); Zwart, Ledebt, Fong, de Vries, & Savelsbergh, 2005)(6), slopes (e.g., Adolph, 1997)(7), stairs (Ulrich, Thelen, & Niles, 1990)(8), bridges (Berger & Adolph, 2003(9); Berger, Adolph, & Kavookjian, 2010(10); Berger, Adolph, & Lobo, 2005(11); Kretch, Kung, Quon, & Adolph, 2011)(12), foam pits (Joh, 2011(13); Joh & Adolph, 2006(14)), slippery ground (Adolph, Joh, & Eppler, 2010)(15), under, over, and around barriers (Kingsnorth & Schmuckler, 2000(16); Lockman, 1984(17); Mulvey, Kubo, Chang, & Ulrich, 2011(18); Schmuckler, 1996(19).



1. Gibson, E. J. (1988). Exploratory behavior in the development of perceiving, acting, and the acquiring of knowledge. Annual Review of Psychology, 39, 1–41.
2. Gibson, E. J., & Schmuckler, M. A. (1989). Going somewhere: An ecological and experimental approach to development of mobility. Ecological Psychology, 1, 3–25.
3. Gibson, E. J., Riccio, G., Schmuckler, M. A., Stoffregen, T. A., Rosenberg, D., & Taormina, J. (1987). Detection of the traversability of surfaces by crawling and walking infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 13, 533–544.
4. Adolph, K. E. (2000). Specificity of learning: Why infants fall over a veritable cliff. Psychological science, 11, 290–295.
5. Adolph, K. E., Berger, S. E., & Leo, A. J. (2011). Developmental continuity? Crawling, cruising, and walking. Developmental science, 14, 306–318.
6. Zwart, R., Ledebt, A., Fong, B. F., de Vries, H., & Savelsbergh, G. J. P. (2005). The affordance of gap crossing in toddlers. Infant Behavior & Development, 28, 145–154.
7. Adolph, K. E. (1997). Learning in the development of infant locomotion. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 62, 3 (Serial No. 251).
8. Ulrich, B. D., Thelen, E., & Niles, D. (1990). Perceptual determinants of action: Stair-climbing choices of infants and toddlers. In J. E. Clark & J. H. Humphrey (Eds), Advances in Motor Development Research (Vol. 3, pp. 1–15). New York: AMS Publishers.
9. Berger, S. E., & Adolph, K. E. (2003). Infants use handrails as tools in a locomotor task. Developmental Psychology, 39, 594–605.
10. Berger, S. E., Adolph, K. E., & Kavookjian, A. E. (2010). Bridging the gap: Solving spatial means-ends relations in a locomotor task. Child Development, 81, 1367–1375.
11. Berger, S. E., Adolph, K. E., & Lobo, S. A. (2005). Out of the toolbox: Toddlers differentiate wobbly and wooden handrails. Child Development, 76, 1294–1307.
12. Kretch, K. S., Kung, J., Quon, J. L., & Adolph, K. E. (2011, October). Bridging the gap: Infants’ sensitivity to bridge width and drop-off height. Poster presented at the meeting of the Cognitive Development Society, Philadelphia, PA.
13. Joh, A. S. (2011). Development of learning from falling in young infants: A longitudinal study on the effects of practice, locomotor skill, and learning context. Manuscript in revision.
14. Joh, A. S., & Adolph, K. E. (2006). Learning from falling. Child Development, 77, 89–102.
15. Adolph, K. E., Joh, A. S., & Eppler, M. A. (2010). Infants’ perception of affordances of slopes under high and low friction conditions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36, 797–811.
16. Kingsnorth, S., & Schmuckler, M. A. (2000). Walking skill versus walking experience as a predictor of barrier crossing in toddlers. Infant Behavior and Development, 23, 331–350.
17. Lockman, J. J. (1984). The development of detour ability during infancy. Child Development, 55, 482–491.
18. Mulvey, G. M., Kubo, M., Chang, C.-L., & Ulrich, B. D. (2011). New walkers with Down Syndrome use cautious but effective strategies for crossing obstacles. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 82, 210–219.
19. Schmuckler, M. A. (1996). Development of visually guided locomotion: Barrier crossing by toddlers. Ecological Psychology, 8, 209–236.


Karen E. Adolph and Kari S. Kretch, “Infants on the Edge. Beyond the Visual Cliff” in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Seeing Kuhn I 131
Paradigm/Vision/Seeing/Science/Kuhn: e.g. pendulum/Aristotle: he regarded it as a fall - Galileo: he regarded it as a repetition of movement. Arguments for the independence of weight and rate of fall - but not through better observation. See also >Incommensurability, >Interpretation/Kuhn, >Theories/Kuhn, >Theory Change.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Selective Attention Matthews Corr I 412
Selective Attention/cognitive psychology/memory/Matthews: Work on attentional bias has also been extended to the investigation of memory bias. Would a trait-anxious individual encode threat-related stimuli more readily than someone low in anxiety? Early studies of personality and cognitive bias suggested that depression related to memory bias (perhaps because depressives tend to ruminate and elaborate on negative events) but anxiety related only to selective attention bias (Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Mathews 1997)(1). More recent work provides a more nuanced picture. As in other research areas, careful attention to underlying processes is the key to obtaining reliable results. One of the paradigms frequently used is incidental learning. If trait-anxious individuals are vulnerable to memory bias, they should show enhanced recognition of threatening words, but, typically, no such bias effect has been found (Williams et al. 1997)(1).
Vs: However, Russo, Whittuck, Roberson et al. (2006)(3) argued that the recognition test lacks sufficient sensitivity to pick up what may be modest biases in memory. >Anxiety/Matthews.



1. Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. and Mathews, A. 1997. Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders, 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley
3. Russo, R., Whittuck, D., Roberson, D., Dutton, K., Georgiou, G. and Fox, E. 2006. Mood-congruent free recall bias in anxious individuals is not a consequence of response bias, Memory 14: 393–9


Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self Personality Psychology Corr I 459
Self/Personality Psychology/Robinson/Sedikides: Why are traits so stable over time? Swann’s (e.g., Swann and Schroeder 1995)(1) contends that people are motivated to confirm rather than disconfirm strongly held views of the self (see also Sedikides 1995)(2). Thus, a given self-view (e.g., that the self is high in Neuroticism) is likely to create its own reality through trait-consistent processes related to self-verification (Swann, Rentfrow and Guinn 2002)(3). See also Tamir (2005)(4)
Self-enhancement reflects a motive to view the self as positively as possible (Sedikides and Gregg 2008(5); Sedikides and Strube 1997)(6). On the basis of this motive, one can explain why individuals
(a) view their own traits as more socially desirable than the average person (Alicke and Govorun 2005)(7);
(b) interpret ambiguous trait terms in a way that reflects best on the self (Dunning, Meyerowitz and Holzberg 1989)(8);
(c) choose questions likely to confirm their positive (versus negative) traits (Sedikides 1993)(9); and
(d) manifest superior memory for feedback related to their positive (versus negative) traits (Sedikides and Green 2000)(10).
Heterogeneity of the self: when describing themselves, individuals mention important relationships, social roles, goals and motives, preferences and values, as well as rules and strategies for self-regulation (Markus 1983(11); McConnell and Strain 2007(12)). When individuals rate their traits in relation to different role-contexts (e.g., in school versus at home), their traits differ in ways that are particular to a given role-context (Donahue and Harary 1998(13)). There has been an attempt to incorporate role-specific tendencies into more general models of traits (Wood and Roberts 2006)(14).

Corr I 460
Hierarchies: The self is hierarchically organized. Its most abstract features are captured when individuals characterize themselves in general, irrespective of context or social role (Schell, Klein and Babey 1996)(15) Lower Level: here, social roles encompass aspects of personality that, although generalized, are specific to the role under consideration (Donahue and Harary 1998)(13).
At the lowest level of abstraction, self-views are particular to a given day (Kernis, Grannemann and Barclay 1989)(16) or moment in time (Heatherton and Polivy 1991)(17).
Such levels of the self function differently. For example, momentary self-esteem varies substantially from day to day, whereas this is not true of global self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy 1991)(17).



1. Swann, W. B. and Schroeder, D. G. 1995. The search for beauty and truth: a framework for understanding reactions to evaluations, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21: 1307–18
2. Sedikides, C. 1995. Central and peripheral self-conceptions are differentially influenced by mood: tests of the differential sensitivity hypothesis, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69: 759–77
3. Swann, W. B., Rentfrow, P. J. and Guinn, J. 2002. Self-verification: the search for coherence, in M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (eds.), Handbook of self and identity, pp. 367–83. New York: Guilford Press
4. Tamir, M. 2005. Don’t worry, be happy?: Neuroticism, trait-consistent affect regulation, and performance, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89: 449–61
5. Sedikides, C. and Gregg, A. P. 2008. Self-enhancement: food for thought, Perspectives on Psychological science 3: 102–16
6. Sedikides, C. and Strube, M. J. 1997. Self-evaluation: to thine own self be good, to thine own self be sure, to thine own self be true, and to thine own self be better, in M. P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, vol. XXIX, pp. 209–69. New York: Academic Press
7. Alicke, M. D. and Govorun, O. 2005. The better-than-average effect, in M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning and J. I. Krueger (eds.), The self in social judgement, pp. 85–106. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press
8. Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A. and Holzberg, A. D. 1989. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57: 1082–90
9. Sedikides, C. 1993. Assessment, enhancement, and verification as determinants of the self-evaluation process, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65: 317–38
10. Sedikides, C. and Green, J. D. 2000. On the self-protective nature of inconsistency/negativity management: using the person memory paradigm to examine self-referent memory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 906–22
11. Markus, H. 1983. Self-knowledge: an expanded view, Journal of Personality 51: 543–65
12. McConnell, A. R. and Strain, L. M. 2007. Structure and content of the self, in C. Sedikides and S. Spencer (eds.), The self in social psychology, pp. 51–73. New York: Psychology Press
13. Donahue, E. M. and Harary, K. 1998. The patterned inconsistency of traits: mapping the differential effects of social roles on self-perceptions of the Big Five, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 610–19
14. Wood, D. and Roberts, B. W. 2006. Cross-sectional and longitudinal tests of the personality and role identity structural model (PRISM), Journal of Personality 74: 779–809
15. Schell, T.L., Klein, S. B. and Babey, S. H. 1996. Testing a hierarchical model of self-knowledge, Psychological science 7: 170-3
16. Kernis, M. H., Grannemann, B. D. and Barclay, L. C. 1989. Stability and level of self-esteem as predectors of anger arousal and hostelity, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 56: 1013-22
17. Heatherton, T. F. and Polivy, J. 1991. Development and validation of a scale for measuring state self-esteem, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60: 895-910



Michael D. Robinson and Constantine Sedikides, „ Traits and the self: toward an integration“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Self-Knowledge Robinson Corr I 461
Self-Knowledge/Robinson/Sedikides: Generalized self-knowledge has properties of association consistent with semantic memory networks (Kihlstrom, Beer and Klein 2003(1); Robinson and Clore 2002a(2)). These associative links should, in turn, have systematic implications for understanding how traits function. For example, a greater interconnectivity of positive affective knowledge should render it more likely that one positive thought would trigger another one in daily life (Robinson and Compton2008)(3). In support of this sort of analysis, a series of studies have shown that higher levels of life satisfaction are associated with stronger positive affective priming effects (Robinson and Kirkeby 2005(4); Robinson and von Hippel 2006(5)), whereas higher levels of Neuroticism are associated with stronger negative affective priming effects (Robinson, Ode, Moeller and Goetz 2007)(6).
In short, traits may be profitably viewed as associative memory structures, as assessed within semantic and affective priming paradigms. >Memory/Robinson/Sedikides.


1. Kihlstrom, J. F., Beer, J. B. and Klein, S. B. 2003. Self and identity as memory, in M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (eds.), Handbook of self and identity, pp. 68–90.New York: Guilford Press
2. Robinson, M. D. and Clore, G. L. 2002a. Belief and feeling: an accessibility model of emotional self-report, Psychological Bulletin 128: 934–60
3. Robinson, M. D. and Compton, R. J. 2008. The happy mind in action: the cognitive basis of subjective well-being, in M. Eid and R. J. Larsen (eds.), The science of subjective well-being, pp. 220–38 New York: Guilford Press
4. Robinson, M. D. and Kirkeby, B. S. 2005. Happiness as a belief system: individual differences and priming in emotion judgments, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31: 1134–44
5. Robinson, M. D. and von Hippel, W. 2006. Rose-colored priming effects: life satisfaction and affective priming, Journal of Positive Psychology 1: 187–97
6. Robinson, M. D., Ode, S., Moeller, S. K. and Goetz, P. W. 2007. Neuroticism and affective priming: evidence for a Neuroticism-linked negative schema, Personality and Individual Differences 42: 1221–31


Michael D. Robinson and Constantine Sedikides, “Traits and the self: toward an integration”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press

EconRobin I
James A. Robinson
James A. Acemoglu
Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty New York 2012


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Skepticism Austin Stroud I 41
AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs)
Stroud I 45
AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words.
I 47
Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it.
Stroud I 48
Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it.
I 57
Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions).
Stroud I 64/65
Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. - Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider.
Stroud I 74
Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. - StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Slavery Aristotle Höffe I 70
Slavery/Aristotle/Höffe: Slaves working in mines and handicraft enterprises, in private households and on agricultural goods are legally even worse off than the Helots ("serfs") who are important for the economy of Sparta. Helots: Although they are excluded from land and political rights and are obliged to pay tribute to their masters, they live in a fixed place. Slaves, however, bought or captured in war, can be resold. In addition to their even lower legal status, they are not settled, i.e. they are homeless.
AristotleVsAlkidamas: Aristotle [claims] that there are people who deserve the slave status(1).
Master/Slave/Dominion/Slavery: For the relationship between master and slave is to be based on mutual advantage, that is, on justice: by nature (physei), that is, with good reason, master is he who is capable of foresighted thinking, by nature slave is he who lacks this ability, which is why he needs someone who thinks for him and, in return, has a body that is suitable for the "procurement of the necessary.(2)
Höffe I 71
Character weakness as an argument for slavery: lack of courage.(3) Höfe: [This] reminds me of a famous thought by Hegel:
Master/Slave/Hegel: According to the chapter "Master and Slave" from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the question of whether one becomes a master or a servant is not decided by the ability to think ahead, but by the willingness to fight to the death.


1. Politika I 4–7
2. I 5, 1254b22 ff
3. VII 7, 1327b27 f.


Gaus I 314
Slavery/Aristotle/Keyt/Miller: Aristotle's treatment of slavery and its antithesis is also rooted in his naturalism. Aristotle's defence of natural slavery in Politics I.3-7 is the most notorious passage in ancient philosophy. Aristotle argues that any person whose deliberative capacity is too enfeebled to provide for his own preservation is by nature a slave and, hence, can be justly enslaved. But who are these people? Are any of them Greeks? How strong is Aristotle's argument and are its premises consistent with Aristotle's own principles (see Newman, 1887-1902(1): vol. Il, 146)? Polis/Aristotle: In Aristotle's ideal polis the farmers are slaves (Pol. VII.9.1329a26, 10.1330a25-8). Are they slaves by nature or slaves by law only? Aristotle's idea that freedom should be held out to them as a reward (Pol. VII.lO.1330a32-3) seems inconsistent with their being natural slaves (and hence in need of a master); but if they are slaves by law only, his ideal polis, supposedly a paradigm of justice, rests on a grave injustice. (For discussion of some of these issues see Charles, 1990(2) 191, 196; Smith, 1991(3).)
The idea of slavery is not exhausted by Aristotle' s much pilloried defence of natural slavery; it enters his analysis of constitutions, and runs as an undercurrent through the entire Politics. >Tyranny/Aristotle.

Pol: Aristotle Politics


1. Newman, W. L. (1887-1902) The Politics of Aristotle, 4 vols. Oxford: Clarendon.
2. Charles, David (1990) 'Comments on M. Nussbaum'. In Günther Patzig, ed., Aristoteles ' 'Politik': Akten des XI Symposium Aristotelicum. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
3. Smith, Nicholas D. (1991) 'Aristotle's theory of natural slavery'. In David Keyt and Fred D. Miller, eds, A Companion to Aristotle 's Politics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Keyt, David and Miller, Fred D. jr. 2004. „Ancient Greek Political Thought“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Social Goods Demsetz Mause I 154f
Social Goods/Demsetz: since common goods are scarce, they cannot simply be consumed free of charge, but their benefits must first be appropriated by using time and other scarce resources. (1) See Social Goods/Hardin.
1. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1973. The property rights paradigm. Journal of Economic History 33 (1), 1973, pp. 16– 27.

EconDems I
Harold Demsetz
Toward a theory of property rights 1967


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Social Identity Theory Tajfel Haslam I 141
Social Identity Theory/SIT/Tajfel/Turner: [the theory] suggests that people do not automatically take on roles associated with group membership, but do so only when they have come to identify with the group in question (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)(1). Cf. >Stanford Prison Experiment/psychological theories. For the Stanford prison experiment the theory suggests that guard only came to identify with their role, and to define that role in brutal terms, because a tyrannical social identity was actively promoted by Zimbardo in his guard briefing.


1. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48.


S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications



Haslam I 170
Social Identity Theory/Tajfel: Tajfels theory (Tajfel 1971(1) started to shift in relation to the interpretation of the results of the minimal group studies (>Minimal group/Tajfel). (See Diehl 1990(2)). A new explanation in terms of social identity started to emerge (Tajfel, 1974(3); Turner, 1975(4)). Turner (1975) talked of ‘social competition’ between the minimal groups and contrasted this with Sherif’s (1967)(5) notion of ‘realistic’ competition. Thesis/Tajfel/Turner: social categorization into groups, and membership in one of these groups, provides a basis for anchoring the self in the ingroup. At this point, Tajfel famously defined social identity as ‘that part of the self-concept corresponding to our group membership’ (Tajfel 1978(6): 63). >Social identity/Tajfel.
A further element was a social comparison process: understanding the meaning of our group involves a comparison with other relevant groups of which we are not members (facilitated by the social categorization process). To see the ingroup as ‘us’ implies a contrast with „them“.
Distinctiveness/Tajfel/Turner: Tajfel and Turner (…) posited a motivational process whereby groups strive for ‘positive group distinctiveness’, which entails them positively differentiating their ingroup from the relevant comparison outgroup, on valued dimensions, and thereby gaining a positive social identity. This central element in the theory was elaborated to explain processes of social change in status hierarchies. (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)(7).
Problem: it is not clear, whether the process of differentiation starts form the investment in a social identity, or whether it is used to create or consolidate a (distinctive) sense of identity.
Haslam I 171
In the new social identity explanation it is probably true to say that [the] (…) idea [of] focusing on creating meaning and coherence (…) became sidelined by the focus on the quest to create a positive social identity. Self-esteem hypothesis: As a result, positive differentiation became more bound up with enhancing the ingroup and raising self-esteem (i.e., through self-enhancement) than with creating (group) distinctiveness per se. >Self-esteem/Tajfel.



1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77.
2. Diehl, M. (1990) ‘The minimal group paradigm: Theoretical explanations and empirical findings’, European Review of Social Psychology, 1: 263–92.
3 Tajfel, H. (1974) ‘Social identity and intergroup behaviour’, Social science Information, 13: 65–93.
4. Turner, J.C. (1975) ‘Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 5: 5–34.
5. Sherif, M. (1967) Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
6. Tajfel, H. (1978) ‘Social categorization, social identity and social comparison’, in H. Tajfel (ed.), Differentiation Between Social Groups. London: Academic Press. pp. 61–76.
7. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48.


Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Social Influence Moscovici Haslam I 94
Social influence/Moscovici: To test his ideas about minority influence, Moscovici and his colleagues developed a paradigm where participants made judgments about the colour of a slide (Moscovici et al., 1969)(1). >Experiment/Moscovici.
Haslam I 93
MoscoviciVsAsch: Moscovici (1976)(2) argued that, in focusing so much on majority influence, the conformity bias had led researchers to view social influence as a one-way street, where the minority always falls into line with the majority. However, as the few examples mentioned above clearly demonstrate. >Conformity/Asch, >Majority/Asch, >Majority/Jetten/Hornsey, >Conformity/Psychological Theories. In Moscovici’s experiment (>Experiment/Moscovici) it turned out, that contrary to the idea that people always conform to a majority (as might be expected based on the earlier Asch studies (Asch 1951(3), 1952(4), 1955(5)), the studies (…) show that a numerical minority is able to change the judgments of a majority. >Conversion theory/Moscovici.


1. Moscovici, S., Lage, E. and Naffrechoux, M. (1969) ‘Influence of a consistent minority on the response of a majority in a color perception task’, Sociometry, 32: 365–80.
2. Moscovici, S. (1976) Social Influence and Social Change. London: Academic Press.
3. Asch, S.E. (1951) ‘Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgment’, in H. Guetzkow (ed.), Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. pp. 177–90.
4. Asch, S.E. (1952) Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
5. Asch, S.E. (1955) ‘Opinions and social pressure’, Scientific American, 193: 31–5.


Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone, “Minority Influence. Revisiting Moscovici’s blue-green afterimage studies”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Social Movements Habermas Gaus I 271
Social movements/Habermas/West(...) the expansion of state and capitalist systems increasingly organizes human life according to the instrumental logic of money and power, overwhelming any possibility of communicatively achieved consensus and reducing the lifeworld to a lifeless shell. New social movements [NSMs] are understood in these terms as an embryonic counterattack from the life- world against the colonizing force of instrumentally rationalized systems (Habermas, 1981(1); 1987(2): 391—6).
Lifeworld: The new conflicts are displaced from economic and state systems to the lifeworld or, more precisely, the 'seam' between system and lifeworld: 'the new conflicts arise in areas of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of distribution, but concern the grammar of forms of life'. NSMs respond to the disruption and 'colonization' of the lifeworld in either 'defensive' or 'offensive' ways according to whether it is a question of 'how to defend or reinstate endangered life styles, or how
to put reformed life styles into practice' (1981(1): 32).
Feminism: However, the women's movement is‘the only movement that follows the tradition of bourgeois-socialist liberation movements. The struggle against patriarchal oppression and for the realization of a promise that is deeply rooted in the acknowledged universalist foundations of morality and legality lends feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas all other movements are more defensive in character. (1981(1): 34)
Enviroment/peace: Environmental and peace movements - usual paradigms of new social movements - represent a more 'defensive' reaction, albeit one 'which already operates on the basis of a rationalized lifeworld and tries out new forms of co-operation and community' (1981(1): 35). Cf. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine.


1. Habermas, Jürgen (1981) 'New social movements'. Telos, 49: 33_7.
2. Habermas, Jürgen (1987) The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. Il, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, trans. T. McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity.


West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Stanford Prison Experiment Psychological Theories Haslam I 136
Stanford Prison Experiment/SPE/psychological theories: the SPE (…) generated heated ethical debate (e.g., Savin, 1973(1); Zimbardo, 1973(2)). Indeed, this ultimately prompted the American Psychological Association to tighten guidelines for participation in psychological research in order to ensure that the abuses witnessed at Stanford would never be repeated.
Haslam I 137
Browning: The historian Christopher Browning (1992)(3) thus draws parallels between the behaviour of guards in the SPE and the activities of Reserve Police Battalion (RPB) 101, a mobile Nazi killing unit that roamed German-occupied Poland and murdered at least 38,000 Jews between July 1942 and November 1943. Browning shows that the members of this unit were not fanatics or even particularly pro-Nazi, and were not forced to do what they did. As the title of his book puts it, for Browning they were just ‘ordinary men’ who, like Zimbardo’s guards, succumbed to a system that ‘alone was a sufficient condition to produce aberrant, anti-social behavior’ (1992(3): p. 168). Abu Ghraib prison: Initial responses by military and political leaders attempted to dismiss these abuses as isolated incidents, and as the perverted actions of a few ‘rogue soldiers’. However, Zimbardo questioned this account and went so far as to present himself as an expert witness for the defence at the trial of Ivan ‘Chip’ Frederick, a staff sergeant accused of torturing detainees at Abu Ghraib.
Zimbardo: like the guards in the SPE, Zimbardo describes him as a ‘chip off the best block’ who was unwittingly perverted by the „bad barrel“ in which he found himself (Zimbardo 2004(4): 344.
Haslam I 138
Different approaches to the SPE can be labelled a) „Dispositionalism“ ( the thesis that behavior is based in characterizer traits),
b) „Situationalism“ (the thesis that individual behavior emerges in individual situations) and
c) „Interactionism“ (the thesis, that interaction of situational factors with those of personality, attitudes and expectations in a situation is decisive). (Zimbardo 2007(5): 9)
Abu Ghraib: Zimbardo’s evidence at Frederick’s trial was met with similar scepticism by the Army prosecutor, Christopher Graveline: Impossible to resist the situational forces?… Clearly the situation a person faces plays a significant role in his actions, but to say that bad action becomes inevitable negates the responsibility, free will, conscience and character of the person. (Graveline and Clemens, 2010(6): 179).
1. VsZimbardo: (Banuazzi and Movahedi 1975(6)) The claim that guard aggression was ‘emitted simply as a “natural” consequence of being in the uniform of a “guard” and asserting the power inherent in that role’ (Haney et al., 1973(7): 12) seems inconsistent with the content of Zimbardo’s briefing of his guards before the start of the SPE.
Haslam I 139
2. VsZimbardo: while Zimbardo claims that it was the guards who dreamed up the various abuses that were meted out to prisoners in the SPE, it would appear that in this they were simply making use of props and procedures that had been provided by the experimenters (e.g., chains, bags over the head, forced nudity). In some cases the guards were also clearly instructed to use these tools. (Banuazzi and Movahedi 1975(6)) 3.VsZimbardo: a third objection focused on Zimbardo’s claim that participants in the study were simply normal college students. This point arises from research by Thomas Carnahan and Sam MacFarland (2007)(7) at Western Kentucky University that sought to assess whether there is anything unusual about the type of person who volunteers to participate in such a study. To answer this question, these researchers placed two adverts in a local newspaper. One contained exactly the same wording as the original advert for the SPE (…) but simply omitted the
Haslam I 140
phrase „of prison life“. When Carnahan and MacFarland subsequently compared the personality profile of the two sets of volunteers, they found that they were very different. Specifically, those who responded to the invitation to take part in ‘a study of prison life’ (rather than just ‘a study’) tended to be more authoritarian, more Machiavellian, more narcissistic and more socially dominant. They were also less empathic and less altruistic. ReicherVsZimbardo/HaslamVsZimbardo: The BBC Prison Study (BPS) (Reicher and Haslam, 2006(8); see also Haslam and Reicher, 2005(9), 2009(10)) (…) revisited issues raised by the SPE using the same basic paradigm as Zimbardo’s study – seeking to examine the behaviour of 15 men who had been randomly assigned to roles as guards or prisoners within a specially constructed prison-like environment over a period of up to two weeks.
BPS: differed form the SPE in two key respects: 1. No rule within the prison was assumed so that
Haslam I 141
[one] could study groups dynamics without directly managing them. 2. The study involved a number of manipulations that had been devised on the basis of social identity theory (SIT). It suggests that people do not automatically take on roles associated with group membership, but do so only when they have come to identify with the group in question (Tajfel and Turner, 1979)(11).
BPS/Reicher/Haslam: its outcome suggests a very different analysis of tyranny from that promoted by Zimbardo.
1) this is because when participants in the BPS became committed to tyranny they were not acting in terms of roles assigned by the experimenters, but instead had rejected those roles and adopted new ones.
Haslam I 142
2) There was variation in participants’ enthusiasm for this tyrannical solution, and that those who were most enthusiastic were the participants who had been most authoritarian at the study’s outset. (…) this meant that authoritarian participants were only in a position to express and advance their authoritarian ambitions once they had been galvanized by a sense of shared identity that had both steeled them and drawn more moderate individuals to their cause.


1. Savin, H.B. (1973) ‘Professors and psychological researchers: Conflicting values in conflicting roles’, Cognition, 2: 147–9.
2. Zimbardo, P.G. (1973) ‘On the ethics of intervention in human psychological research: With special reference to the Stanford Prison Experiment’, Cognition, 2: 243–56.
3. Browning, C. (1992) Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. London: Penguin Books.
4 .Zimbardo, P.G. (2004) ‘A situationist perspective on the psychology of evil: Understanding how good people are transformed into perpetrators’, in A. Miller (ed.), The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. New York: Guilford. pp. 21–50.
5. Zimbardo, P. (2007) The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil. London: Random House.
6. Banuazizi, A. and Movahedi, S. (1975) ‘Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated prison: A methodological analysis’, American Psychologist, 30: 152–60.
7. Carnahan, T. and McFarland, S. (2007) ‘Revisiting the Stanford Prison Experiment: Could participant self-selection have led to the cruelty?’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 603–14.
8. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (2006) ‘Rethinking the psychology of tyranny: The BBC Prison Study’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45: 1–40.
9. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2005) ‘The psychology of tyranny’, Scientific American Mind, 16(3): 44–51.
10. Haslam, S.A. and Reicher, S.D. (2009) The BBC Prison Study website. Available at: www.bbcprisonstudy.org.
11. Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48.



S. Alexander Haslam and Stephen Reicher, „Tyranny. Revisiting Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Structural Lingustics Ricoeur II 4
Discourse/structural model/structural lingustics/Ricoeur: The eclipse of discourse was further encouraged by the tentative extension of the structural model beyond its birth place in linguistics properly speaking, and by the systematic awareness of the theoretical requirements implied by the linguistic model as a structural model. Extension of the structural model concerns us directly insofar as the structural model was applied to the same categories of texts that are the object of our interpretation theory. Originally the model concerned units smaller than the sentence, the signs of the lexical systems and the discrete units
of the phonological systems from which the significant units of lexical systems are compounded. A decisive extension occurred, however, with the application of the structural model to linguistic entities larger than the sentence and also to non-linguistic entities similar to the texts of linguistic communication.
As concerns the first type of application, the treatment of folktales by the Russian formalists such as V. Propp(1) marks a decisive turn in the theory of literature, especially as regards the narrative structure of literary works. The application of the structural model to myths by Claude Lévi-Strauss constitutes a second example of a structural approach to long strings of discourse; an approach similar to, yet independent of the formal treatment of folklore proposed by the Russian formalists.
II 5
Postulates: First, a synchronic approach must precede any diachronic approach because systems are more intelligible than changes. Second, the paradigmatic case for a structural approach is that of a finite set of discrete entities.
The paradigmatic position of systems constituted of finite sets of discrete entities lies in the combinatory capacity and the quasi-algebraic possibilities pertaining to such sets. These capacities and possibilities add to the type of intelligibility instituted by the first postulate, that of synchronicity.
Third, in such a system no entity belonging to the structure of the system has a meaning of its own; the meaning of a word, for example, results from its opposition to the other lexical units of the same system.
Fourth, in such finite systems, all the relations are immanent to the system. In this sense semiotic systems are "closed," i.e ., without relations to external, non-semiotic reality.
II 6
The last postulate alone suffices to charactenze structuralism as a global mode of thought, beyond all the technicalities Of its methodology. Language no longer appears as a mediation between minds and things. It constitutes a world of its own, within which each item only refers to other items of the same system, thanks to the interplay of oppositions and differences constitutive of the system. Discourse/Ricoeur: At this extreme point language as discourse has disappeared.
II 81
Structural Linguistics/interpretation/understanding/Ricoeur: [the approach of the structural schools of literary criticism] proceeds from the acknowledgement of what I have called the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference. (>Reference/Ricoeur). The text intercepts the "worldly" dimension of the discourse - the relation to a world which could be shown - in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the discourse to the subjective intention of the author. place. According to this choice, the text no longer has an exterior, it only has an interior. To repeat, the very constitution of the text as a text and of the system of texts as literature justifies this conversion of the literary object into a closed system of signs, analogous to the kind of closed system that phonology discovered underlying all discourse, and which Saussure called langue. Literature, according to this working hypothesis, becomes an analogon of langue. >Langue/Ricoeur.


1. V. Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1958).

Ricoeur I
Paul Ricoeur
De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud
German Edition:
Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999

Ricoeur II
Paul Ricoeur
Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976

Structuralism Lyons I 52
Structuralism/Linguistics/Structuralistic/Lyons: Thesis: Each language is a system of relationships (more precisely: a group of interrelated systems whose elements - sounds, words, etc. - have no validity regardless of the relationships of equivalence and contrast prevailing between them.
I 76
Syntagmatic/paradigmatic: can be different relations, depending on whether "possible occurrence" is limited to meaningful contexts or limited to certain utterances. >Acceptability, Content/meaning/grammar/semantics/Lyons: the distinction syntagmatic/paradigmatic allows us to distinguish between grammatical and meaningful sentences without speaking of "semantic" units (meaning).
I 76
Syntagmatic/paradigmatic/Lyons: it is pointless to look at linguistic units separately from syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships.
I 77
Structuralism: this is a formulation of the structuralist principle that each linguistic unit occupies a certain place within a system of relationships. You cannot define the elements first and then the possible combinations. The elements are determined by simultaneously taking into account their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Syntagma Lyons I 75
Def Paradigmatic/Linguistics/Lyons: in paradigmatic relation there are two linguistic units to those that can occur in the same context. Def Syntagmatic/Linguistics/Lyons: in syntagmatic relation there are two linguistic units to those that occur simultaneously with them in the same context. ((s) Words of other grammatical function e.g. adjective, noun, verb are in syntagmatic relation to each other).
Syntagma: Unit of several words e.g. predicate = verb + noun, e.g. subject = article + noun.
I 76
Syntagmatic/paradigmatic: can be different relations, depending on whether "possible occurrence" is limited to meaningful contexts or limited to certain utterances. >Acceptability. Content/meaning/grammar/semantics/Lyons: the distinction syntagmatic/paradigmatic allows us to distinguish between grammatical and meaningful sentences without speaking of "semantic" units (meaning).
I 76
Syntagmatic/paradigmatic/Lyons: it is pointless to look at linguistic units separately from syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships.
I 77
Structuralism: this is a formulation of the structuralist principle that each linguistic unit occupies a certain place within a system of relationships. You cannot define the elements first and then the possible combinations. The elements are determined by simultaneously taking into account their syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships.
I 82
Syntagmatic/Length/Linguistics/Lyons: if a set of units is to be characterized according to how it is composed of elements of "lower" levels, the following rule applies: Length: measured at the higher level by the number of elements in syntagmatic relation within the complex in which they are located, is inversely proportional to the number of elements within the complex in a paradigmatic contrast relation.
Example 1. System two elements: 0,1
2. System: Eight elements: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7
all combinations are allowed.
If eight "phonological" words are to be distinguished within the first (binary) system, each will be at least three elements long: 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 110, 111
((s) The system has only two expression elements, i.e. sounds or (here) characters, but there are different composition options. 1st level: characters, 2nd level: resulting shapes).
Second system: here each of the eight possible occurrences is represented with a single character.
Example: 65 words are to be reproduced: then at least six elements are necessary in the binary system, in the figure of eight system complexes of at least two elements.
General: logical form: N = p1 x p2 x ...x pm. m: number of paradigmatic contrast positions for the elements of the lower level, p1: number of elements with paradigmatic contrast ratio in the first position...
This does not require the same elements to occur in all positions,
I 83
nor that the number is the same in all positions. More generally:

2 x 2 x 2 = 8, 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 16 and so forth. And

8 = 8, 8 x 8 = 64, 8 x 8 x 8 = 512 and so forth.

This shows the connection between paradigmatic contrast and syntagmatic length.
The minimum length of our binary words is three times the length of our octal words.
Semantics: we will return later to the general principle that distinctions can be made either syntagmatically or paradigmatically.
Definition: "length" is defined here by the number of paradigmatic contrast positions in a syntagmatic complex.

Ly II
John Lyons
Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977

Lyons I
John Lyons
Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968
German Edition:
Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995

Terminology Kuhn I 26
Definition Paradigm/Kuhn: Performances with the two features: a) ongoing attractiveness for established researchers - b) openness to unresolved issues for young researchers - cannot logically be broken down into components - hallmark of a mature science - without a paradigm sciences have at best family resemblance.
I 96
Crisis/Science/Kuhn: The area does not seem to be quite what it used to be. Even former default solutions are questioned - crises end in three ways - 1) normal scientists cope with the problem - 2) the problem balks even against seemingly radically new approaches - 3) appearance of a new candidate for a paradigm and dispute over its recognition.
I 106
Paradigm/Community/Kuhn: When choosing a paradigm there is no higher standard than the approval by the respective community.
I 133
Paradigm Shift/Kuhn: Thesis: With its shift the world does not change, but the scientists do live in a new world afterwards - the data which is now collected by the scientists is inherently different. ---
Flor IV 507
Paradigms/Kuhn: not comparable before and after a scientific revolution. The scientist almost lives "in a different world" - E.g. Newton: pushed the question of why gravity even exists away - a question which appeared to be central in the theories of Aristotle and Descartes. -> Incommensurability/Kuhn.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973


Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Terminology Agamben Brocker I 823
Exception/Terminology/Agamben: on the one hand, the exception is excluded from the norm as an individual case, but on the other hand, what is special about the exclusion relation is "that what is excluded is therefore not completely without relation to the norm; on the contrary, it remains connected with it in the form of its abolition". (1) Homo sacer/Agamben: the "Holy Human": is not protected from the outset, but on the contrary a possible sacrifice; see Holiness/Agamben.
Brocker I 827
The exceptional conditions infect politics as a whole and this mutates into an administration of states of emergency; this is Agamben's central insight. See Politics/Agamben.
Brocker I 830
The spell: is the original political relationship - and not the treaty, as the liberal democracies make it believe. Sovereign power: is originally aimed at the production of naked life, which represents the threshold of the connection between "zōḗ" and "bíos" - the figure of the citizen and his political freedoms therefore appears as a power-political illusion.
The camp replaces the state as the biopolitical paradigm of the West - and thus also sheds a radically different light on the current understanding of public space.


1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 27.


Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Agamben I
Giorgio Agamben
Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Theories Mayr I 359
Theory/Biology/Mayr: there are phenomena for which there are simply no theories yet. For example the orientation of the carrier pigeons. ---
I 81
Hempel/Oppenheim: (1948) deductive nomological model (D N model). Modification (1981, John Beatty):"Semantic conception of the theoretical structure": a...
---
I 81
...Definition theory is the definition of a system. Theories are neither permanent nor general in nature. They are compatible with a variety of solutions and evolutionary character. ---
I 84
External factors: For example, the fact that Wallace and Darwin came to practically the same results in such different ways makes it clear that external factors are irrelevant for the formation of theory. ---
I 93
Theory/Hypothesis/Mayr: Philosophers attach importance to this distinction. Fact/Theory/Law/Mayr: after the discovery of Pluto, a theory became a fact. The laws of thermodynamics could also be described as facts.
For example, that birds have feathers is a fact and not a law.
---
I 96
Biology/Mayr: concepts play a greater role than laws here. ---
I 107
Theory/Mayr: often a completely new cause is postulated, although much of the old theory remains intact. ---
I 138
Theory: one and the same theory can be far more revolutionary in some sciences than in others. For example plate tectonics. ---
I 140
Changes in concepts can have a much greater impact than discoveries: Mendel's inheritance, Darwin's evolution, (This argument comes from Popper). ---
I 141
Paradigm (Kuhn)/Mayr: Comparison with platonic eidos: only to replace, not to delete. Variations are just coincidences. ---
I 146
Theory: some theories are only accepted long after they have been established. Reasons: 1. Different series of indications lead to different conclusions
2. Different ideologies:
For example, many French were easy for Lamarck...
3. At one point in time, several explanations can interpret a phenomenon equally well. Long distance orientation of birds: sun, magnetic field of the earth, sense of smell, other factors.
Sometimes there are several possible answers.
---
I 149
Science: most of the questions about "what " or "how" are accessible to science. Not so the question of why. Vannevar Bush: "science is an endless borderland".

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Theory of Mind Developmental Psychology Slater I 155
Theory of Mind/ToM/false-belief task/FBT/developmental psychology: recent research in developmental pragmatics show that preverbal infants spontaneously take their audience’s perspective. 12-month olds’ pointing behaviors are best understood by positing that they are in some sense trying to influence the audience’s mental states (see Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004(1); Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007(2); Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007(3)). Conversely, infants are able to interpret adults’ points and gaze direction as cues to their communicative intentions. In particular, infants use these behaviors in word learning situations as crucial cues to the speaker’s referential intent (Bloom, 2000(4); Nurmsoo & Bloom, 2008(5)). More strikingly still, recent research demonstrates that manipulating whether or not a communicator has a false belief leads 17 month-olds to different interpretations of the same communicative act, thereby demonstrating early mental state attribution in pragmatic contexts (Southgate, Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010(6); for similar results in an active helping paradigm, see Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009(7)). These recent results using behavioral measures also answer one of the standard criticisms formulated against violation of expectancy paradigms (as in Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005(8), and Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007(9)), namely that indirect measures — such as looking times — cannot be straightforwardly used to infer complex underlying cognitive process.
VsBaron-Cohen: these results show that caution is needed when interpreting failures at the Sally-Anne task. (>Autism/Baron-Cohen, >False-Belief Task/psychological theories).


1 Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Henning, A., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest. Developmental science 7, 29 7—307.
2. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Reference and attitude in infant pointing. Journal of Child Language, 34, 1—20.
3. Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., & Liszkowski, U. (2007). A new look at infant pointing. Child Development, 78, 705—722.
4. Bloom, P. (2000). How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
5. Nurmsoo, E., & Bloom, P. (2008). Preschoolers’ perspective taking in word learning: Do they blindly follow eye gaze? Psychological science, 19, 211—215.
6. Southgate, V., Chevallier, C., & Csibra, G. (2010). 1 7-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret others’ communication. Developmental science, 13, 907—912.
7. Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 1 12, 337—342.
8. Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? science, 308,5719,255—258.
9. Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological science, 18, 580—586.


Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Slater I
Alan M. Slater
Paul C. Quinn
Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012
Truth Kuhn Flor IV 508
Truth/Kuhn: Only relative to a paradigm because the paradigms are not comparable to each other. >Incommensurability, >Theories/Kuhn, >Paradigm/Science.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973


Flor I
Jan Riis Flor
"Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor II
Jan Riis Flor
"Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Flor III
J.R. Flor
"Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Flor IV
Jan Riis Flor
"Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Vagueness Field II 227
Vagueness/revision of the logic/Field: some authors: to allow double negation, to prohibit explicit contradictions, thus also not to allow negations of the law of the excluded middle (l.e.m.). - Then old version: if Jones is a limiting case, so we cannot claim either "bald" or "not-bald", so we can now. - New: neither claim: E.g. "Jones is bald or not bald" nor "It is not the case that Jones is either bald or not bald." - On the other hand: Field: with definite-operator (definite): "It is not the case that Jones is either definitely bald or definitely not bald". - Without law of the excluded middle: "neither bald nor not bald". ---
II 228
Limiting case/vagueness/definite-Operator/Field: we need the definite-operator to avoid a limiting case of the a limiting case. ---
II 228
Def Weakly true/vagueness/truth/truth-predicate/Field: to be able to say general things about borderline cases. - Not only that somebody represents a certain limiting case. - (> generalization.) Def paradigmatic borderline case: definitely a borderline case. - Not weakly true/deflationism: e.g. "Either bald or not-bald is true". Then the Truth-predicate itself inherits the vagueness. - It's not definitely true whether or not.
Def Strongly true/Field: assuming, Jones is a limiting case: then neither "bald" nor its negation (strongly) - plus classical logic: then the disjunction "bald or not bald" should be true even in strong interpretation - Law of the excluded middle: if we give it up:
a) weakly true: then the disjunction is not true
b) strongly true: then the disjunction is without truth value.
Strongly true: is less vague, does not inherit the vagueness.
Correctness: which interpretation is the correct one is only dependent on utility.
Per weak truth: allows infinite conjunction and disjunction. - This corresponds more to the theory of validity. - Only the weak Truth-concept is supplied by the disquotation scheme.
Deflationism: additionally requires the definite-operator to declare the predicate strongly true.
---
II 230
Inflationism/Vagueness/FieldVsInflationism: Problem: the I. needs a thing that is "neither bald nor not bald". - Inflationism: explains e.g. "weakly true" compositional. Supervaluation/Sorites/Inflationism: "candidate of an extension". - Definition strongly true: is a sentence with a vague predicate then iff it is true relative to each of the candidates of an extension - then limiting case without definite-operator: "Jones is bald in some extensions but not in all". ---
II 233
Vagueness/Ontology/Field: Thesis: is a deficiency of language, not of the world. ---
II 234
Vagueness/radical non-classical logic/Field: here we do not need a definite-operator or distinction between strong/weak truth: e.g. Jones is a limiting case iff it is not the case that he is either bald or not bald. - Deflationism/Field: seems to save a lot of trouble, because there is no definite-operator, one would have to understand. - Vs: that deceives: the trouble is only postponed: here the logical rules for "not", etc. are much more complicated. - + II 228 weakly true.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Welfare State Political Philosophy Gaus I 210
Welfare state/Political philosophy/Moon: Some of the programmes of the welfare state, such as public schools and old age pensions, were first developed in the nineteenth century, but what might be called the 'institutional' welfare state did not fully emerge until after World War Il, when most democratic countries adopted a more or less integrated range of programmes of welfare provision and policies of economic management. The institutional welfare state is characterized by a range of programmes designed to meet different needs and to provide security against various contingencies. Brian Barry: At least as an ideal, as Brian Barry (1990)(1) points out, the institutional welfare state would not even require a general safety net, since specialized programmes would cover all of the different conditions that prevent people from meeting their needs. In reality, of course, there will always be some who fall between the cracks, and so the welfare state must have a programme of 'social assistance' to cover residual cases. The emergence of the institutional welfare state is reflected in the enormous growth of government expenditures to finance its programmes,
both in absolute terms and in relation to national income. In the UK, for example, social expenditure increased from less than 6 percent of GNP in 1920 to 25 percent in 1996—7 (Barr, 1998(2): 171).
Political theories on welfare state: tional frameworks. Students of the welfare state have offered a variety of classifications of welfare regimes, and disagree among themselves even about whether particular countries (notably, the US) even qualify as welfare states. Some students of welfare politics emphasize the difference between selective and universal welfare states (e.g.
Rothstein, 1998)(3); others discern liberal, corporatist, and social democratic regimes (e.g. Esping- Andersen, 1990)(4); while yet others distinguish among social democratic, Christian democratic,
liberal, and wage-earner welfare states (Huber and Stephens, 2001)(5).
More philosophically oriented theorists place the welfare state in the context of different traditions of political thought, and differ- ent ideals and/or patterns of justification. Thus, some discuss the minimal state and the arguments for and against it (e.g. Nozick, 1974(6); Schmidtz and Goodin, 1998(7)); others consider the 'residual' versus the 'institutional' welfare state (e.g. Barry, 1999)(8); yet others find four distinct strands, laissez-faire, feminism, socialism, and Fabianism (Clarke, Cochrane and Smart, 1987(9)). While most recognize that class is a major concern of the welfare state, an increasing number of theorists see that gender is at least as important (Gordon, 1990(10); Fraser, 1997(11)).
Moon: As a political formation the welfare state tends todivide theorists who in other respects share a view
Gaus I 211
of politics. Thus, defenders and critics of the welfare state include people who identify themselves as (inter alia) >conservatives, >liberals, >communitarians, >socialists, and postmodernists, and so both its critics and its defenders find themselves with strange allies and opponents.
Common features: In spite of the great variability mentioned above, welfare states share important features; four of the most important are a democratic political system, a largely private market economy, a wide range of public programmes that provide monetary support or services as a matter of right, and an active role for the state in managing the economy to dampen the business cycle and to regulate economic activities.
Efficiency: (...) many welfare services are provided through market transactions, such as the purchase of life or medical insurance. Why, then, should the state be involved in providing welfare, either directly in the form of specific services (such as health care or education) or in the form of resources or income to enable people to meet their own needs? Government programmes, after all, both involve an element of coercion and impose uniformity.
Gaus I 212
Market: The alternative to state provision is often taken be the market, where profit-seeking firms provide consumers with goods and services. But this is an oversimplification, as families and voluntary associations also lay key roles. Private provision: The rise of the welfare state with its compulsory programmes has led to the
demise of many of these voluntary associations and private firms reducing citizens' autonomy and
imposing uniformity on them. The more extensive the welfare state, the more it has displaced other welfare institutions.*
Efficiency: One reason for substituting state for private provision is that state provision (either of services or of resources) can sometimes be more effective than private provision, either because it can provide services or resources more cheaply, or because private provision is incapable of providing an optimal (or even adequate) level of services. For Problems: see >Market failure, >Public goods. For a Minimal welfare state: >Welfare state/Friedman.
Gaus I 214
Distributional justice: A second line of argument supporting the welfare state appeals to the idea of justice rather than efficiency. The policies of the welfare state do not simply make it possible for individuals to realize their own interests more effectively, but generally redistribute income. Efficiency-based arguments normally take the outcome produced by market exchange, prior to governmental taxation and transfers, as their baseline, and show that a particular policy can at least in principle make everyone better off than they would be given that baseline. But to the extent that welfare policies deliberately redistribute income, those whose income goes down would normally (though not necessarily) be worse off; such policies could be justified, then, only by invoking values other than efficiency. >Distributive justice/welfare economics.
VsEfficency-based approaches: (...) the appeal to e Iciency is itself problematic, in as much as the pretax/pretransfer baseline it takes for granted must be justified. There are some risks which we face, when we think of our lives taken as a whole, that cannot be covered by any form of private provision, because they reflect conditions into which we are born, such as congenital handicaps, genetic predispositions to certain diseases, and the cultural and economic disadvantages one's parents may suffer. >Distributive justice/Welfare economics.


* See Paul (1997)(12), particularly the articles by Beito, Davies, and the references cited therein for an account of non-state forms of welfare.


1. Barry, Brian (1990) 'The welfare state versus the relief of poverty'. Ethics, 100 (June): 503-29.
2. Barr, Nicholas (1998) The Economics of the Welfare State, 3rd edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
3. Rothstein, Bo (1998) Just Institutions Matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990) Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press.
5. Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens (2001 ) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
6. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell.
7. Schmidtz, David and Robert Goodin (1998) Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press.
8. Barry, Norman (1999) Welfare, 2nd edn. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
9. Clarke, John, Allan Cochrane and Carol Smart (1987) Ideologies of Welfare. London: Hutchinson.
10. Gordon, Linda, ed. (1990), Women, State, and Welfare. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
11. Fraser, Nancy (1997) Justice Interruptus. New York: Routledge.
12. Paul, Ellen, ed. (1997) The Welfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press.


Moon, J. Donald 2004. „The Political Theory of the Welfare State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications



Mause I 579ff
Welfare State/Political Theories: given the empirical diversity of the structure of the welfare state in the various countries, one must assume that one is dealing with a mixed system in the specific case of an examined country. The term welfare state is criticized as conservative. (Schmidt 2005) (1). For the division into system types see Esping-Andersen 1990(2) and 1999(3).
Mause I 581
History of the welfare state: the oldest strand of comparative welfare research used key socio-economic variables such as the state of economic development, the spread of employees in the non-agricultural sector ("employment rate") and other concepts of macro-sociological modernisation. (Customs officer 1963 (4); Wilensky 1975 (5). Functionalistic explanations: here we are concerned, among other things, with the diffusion of social policy effects across territorial borders, e.g. social learning (Hall 1993) (6).
Garbage can theory: this is about the contingent interaction of political processes, one example being the multiple streams approach. (Kingdon 1984)(7).
Newer approaches, on the other hand, focused on concepts such as power, conflict and institutions and examined decision-making processes.
Party Difference Thesis/Hibbs: (Hibbs 1977) (8): The party-political composition of governments is significantly reflected in internationally and historically variable levels of social expenditure. (Castles 1982 (9); Schmidt 2005 )

1. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, Wiesbaden 2005
2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990.
3. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999.
4. Zöllner, Detlev. Öffentliche Sozialleistungen und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Ein zeitlicher und internationaler Vergleich. Berlin 1963.
5. Wilensky, Harold L. 1975. The welfare state and equality. Structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Berkeley 1975.
6. Peter A. Hall, 1993. Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative Politics 25( 3): 275– 296.
7. Kingdon, John W., Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston/ Toronto 1984.
8. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political parties and macroeconomic policy. American Political science Review 71: 1467– 1487.
9. Castles, Francis G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states, Hrsg. Francis G. Castles, 21– 96. London 1982.


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Words Plato Gadamer I 410
Word/Plato/Gadamer: Two theories discussed in Plato's "Cratylos" attempt to determine the relationship between word and thing in different ways. A. Conventionalism: Conventionalist theory sees in the unambiguousness of language use, as achieved by agreement and practice, the only source of word meanings.
B. Similarity theory: The theory opposing it represents a natural agreement between word and thing, which is precisely what is called correctness (orthotés).
Conventionalism/Gadamer: The limit of conventionalism is: one cannot arbitrarily change what words mean if language is to be. The problem of "special languages" shows the conditions under which such rebaptisms take place.
Name/Cratylos: Hermogenes in "Cratylos" himself gives an example: the rebaptizing of a servant(1). The inner dependence of the servant's life, the coincidence of his person with his function makes possible what otherwise fails because of the person's claim to his or her "being-for-themselves", to the preservation of his or her honor. Likewise, children and lovers have language through which they communicate in the world that is only their own, but even this not so much through arbitrary fixation as through the development of a habit of language. Always the commonality of a world - even if it is only a played one - is the precondition for "language".
Similarity theory: [its] limit is also clear: one cannot criticize language with regard to the things meant in the sense that the words do not correctly represent the things. Language is not there at all like a mere tool that we use, that we build up to communicate and distinguish with it.(2)
Gadamer: Both interpretations of the words start from their existence and being present and let things be for themselves as if they were known in advance. For this very reason they start too late from the outset.
Plato/Gadamer: So one has to ask oneself whether Plato, who has the inner untenability of the two extreme positions, wants to put in question
Gadamer I 411
a common prerequisite. Plato's thesis: With this discussion of contemporary theories of language, Plato wants to show that in language, in the claim to linguistic correctness (orthotes tön onomaton), no objective truth (aletheia tön onton) is attainable and that, without the words (aneu ton onomaton), one must recognize the existing purely from oneself (auta ex heauton)(3).
Gadamer: This is a radical shift of the problem to a new level. The dialectic at which this is aimed obviously claims to place thinking on itself and to open it to its true objects, the "ideas", in such a way that the power of words (dynamis tön onomaton) and their demonic mechanization in the sophistic art of argumentation is overcome.
Recognition/Truth: The exaggeration of the range of words (onomata) by dialectic is of course not meant to mean that there really is a wordless recognition, but only that it is not the word that opens the access to truth, but the other way round: that the "adequacy" of the word is only to be judged from the recognition of things. >Language/Plato.
Gadamer I 412
The element of true speeches remains the word (onoma and rhema) - the same word in which truth is hidden beyond recognition and completely void.(4)
Gadamer I 415
Truth/correctness/word/Cratylos/Plato/Gadamer: [It makes sense] to speak of an absolute perfection of the word, in so far as there is no sensual relationship at all between its sensual appearance and its meaning, and thus no distance. Cratylos would therefore have no reason to be bent back under the yoke of the image scheme. It is true that the image, without being a mere duplication of the original image, is similar to the original image, that is, as something that is different and refers to the other that it represents by its imperfect similarity. But this obviously does not apply to the relationship of the word to its meaning. In this respect, it is like the flash of a completely obscured truth when Socrates - in contrast to the paintings (zöa) - recognizes that the words are not only correct but also true (aléthe)(5). The "truth" of the word, of course, does not lie in its correctness, in its correct application to the matter. Rather, it lies in his perfect spirituality, i.e., the openness of the sense of the word in the sound. In this sense, all words are "true", i.e. their being is reflected in their meaning, while illustrations are only more or less similar and insofar - measured by the appearance of the thing - more or less correct. >Correctness/Plato, >Sophists/Plato.
Gadamer I 416
Word/number/sign/Plato/Gadamer: one understands that not the word but the number is the actual paradigm of the noetic, the number, the naming of which is obviously pure convention and whose "precision" consists precisely in the fact that every number is defined by its position in the series, i.e. is a pure construct of intelligibility, an ens rationis, not in the attenuating sense of its being, but in the sense of its perfect rationality. This is the actual result to which the "Cratylos" refers, and this result has a highly momentous consequence which in truth influences all further thinking about language. >Logos/Plato.
Gadamer I 418
The legitimate question of whether the word is nothing more than a "pure sign" or whether it does have something of the "image" in itself is fundamentally discredited by that. >Image/Plato.

1. Krat. 384 d.
2. Krat. 388 c. 3. Krat. 438 d-439 b.
4. But Cf. on >Mimesis as well as the significant change from "mimesis" to "methexis" which Aristotle attests in his Metaphysics A 6, 987 b 10-13
5. Krat. 430 d 5.


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Adaptionism Dennett Vs Adaptionism I 382
DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro)   The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro).
Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions.

Münch III 375ff
DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does.
III 376
Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted.
CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted.
III 379
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories.
We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.


Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Adaptionism Verschiedene Vs Adaptionism Dennett I 348
Vsadaptionism: Master in subsequent justification. (Evolution can in principle not look ahead).
Münch III 376
DobzhanskyVsadaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature can not be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964: also the futility can not be taken for granted.

Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355





Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Behaviorism Dennett Vs Behaviorism Münch III 370
Skinner: Vs "mentalism": DennettVsSkinner: he himself constantly used mentalist vocabulary, which he excused as "shortcuts" or that he wants to explain something to the layman.
III 373:
He never admits how much of expressibility he would lose.
III 372
Skinner: mentalism distracts psychologists from having to search for evidence for amplication. "The world of the mind steals the show".

Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Charity Principle Putnam Vs Charity Principle I (b) 56
Charity Principle/N. L. Wilson: E.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles would then be the electrons according to Wilson.
I (b) 57
E.g. historians made a terrible mistake and not Caesar (who was actually a fictional character), but Pompey founded the Roman Empire and did all the other heroic deeds that were previously attributed to Caesar. According to Wilson, Smith then always refers to Pompey when he says "Caesar"!
PutnamVsWilson: according to a "historical" conception of names this is wrong, of course. He does not refer to a real person when he says "Caesar" (because he is now a fictional character). We have a false causal chain.
PutnamVsWilson: descriptively, his theory is wrong: E.g. Someone has heard about another Quine and falsely believes that he is the logician Quine.
We would then not say he refered to the right one, because that would be the most charitable!
Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: affects only real situations!
Applying it to counterfactual situations would mean not to grasp the distinction between what we mean by our expressions (even if we speak about counterfactual situations!) and what we would mean if that were the real situation! It would miss what Kripke calls rigidity.
Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: Second deficiency: too egalitarian: what makes my beliefs about elm trees true is unimportant for determining the denotation of "elm". Even for the denotation in my idiolect.
I (b) 58
Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: too numerical! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. Convictions cannot be counted! Reference/Possible World/Putnam: E.g. electron Bohr. Suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely imputed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons", but toour electrons. Reason: the primacy of the phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and they are also our phenomena.
I (b) 58/59
Contribution of the Environment/Reference/Twin Earth/Putnam: from the fact that a liquid would be associated with the same stereotype and the same criteria on different planets would not follow that XYZ is water. It would only follow that it looks like water, tastes, etc. The reference depends on the true condition of the paradigms (?), not on our minds.
Principle of Credit of Trust/Meaning/Knowledge/Idea/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without ever having a clear notion of it!
The principle of credit of trust forbids us to assume that baptists must be experts! It also prohibits assuming omniscience.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Frege, G. Searle Vs Frege, G. II 285
Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions.
II 286
Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege!
Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for.

II 301
The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation.
2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification.
3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress).
Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress..
II 303
Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words.

II 228
Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement.
III 229
Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not.
2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements.
Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation.

V 116
SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too).
V 117
Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself.
E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound!

V 144
SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition!
V 152
Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously
b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions.
Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic).

V 155
Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b).
Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms.
V 156
Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property!
V 172
Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression.
V 173
2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals.
4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals.
5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions.

V 256
Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions.
To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star.
They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Frege, G. Waismann Vs Frege, G. Waismann I 77
Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal.
b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation.
Under
Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world.
VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation.
For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before.
As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups.
But what does "can" mean?
I 78
That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly.
Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example
1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer.
2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus.
According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment!
In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example
1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned.
I 79
2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry.
4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability
5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation).
WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use.
I 80
This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons.
For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible.
There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning.
For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many.
This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists.
You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor.
Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate.
For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words.
I 80/81
VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett)
Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said.
Frege: second part of the definition of numbers:
Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!).
Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3.
This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term.
WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words?
Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3.
Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it.
WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences.
In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein).
RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class.
Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0.
To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the
Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong.
This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom.
Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know.
It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning.
I 82
Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not:
The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies.
That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world
(VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world).
Waismann I 85
The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture,
I 86
as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them.
Waismann I 163
The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege)
II 164
1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert)
Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away?
But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means.
If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers.
The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation!
I 165
For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore?
Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts.
WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore?
Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something.
I 166
Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink.
WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent.
I 167
Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command.

Waismann I
F. Waismann
Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996

Waismann II
F. Waismann
Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976
Gould, St. J. Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. I 371
Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often.
I 388
Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! "
Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever.
Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation.
Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping).
DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process.
I 405
DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development.
I 409
DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism.
I 423
Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others.
I 424
Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements.
Münch III 379
Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1)

1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Inwagen, P. van Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van V 195
Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins.
LewisVsInwagen:
1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused.
But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis.
(Even Inwagen postulates this.)
Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning.

V 296
Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true.
Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L.
Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong.
Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.)
LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself!
What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity.
Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition.
Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them.
Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way.
V 297
Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition.
The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law.
The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law.
feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)).
strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action.

Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis:
Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong.
But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense.
Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6.
If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5.
Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases.
LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all.
Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light.
LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense.

V 298
Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part.
LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense.
Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense.

Schwarz I 28
Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense.
e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968.
Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly!
Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis.
Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions:
1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism).
2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81).
LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.)
LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define.
Schwarz I 30
Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well.
Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence.
LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree".
Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h

Schwarz I 34
Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist.

Schwarz I 227
Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained.

1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press
2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell
4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kripke, S. A. Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. Putnam I 247
Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality":
Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25).
Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies?
Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region.
KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region!
QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague.
Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates.
LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).).
Putnam: so there are three questions:
1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region?
2) Is the matter identical to the fields?
3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions?
Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is!

Quine II 209 ff
Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic.
Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models.
II 210
They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify?
The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling:
"As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160)
QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be.
Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow.
Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states.
... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality.
QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning.
II 210f
KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kuhn, Th. Feyerabend Vs Kuhn, Th. I 375
Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsKuhn: his ideas are more inclined toward psychology and suggest that every scientific change leads to a) a shift of meaning and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the perception of the world are to be determined through research; they are not a foregone conclusion. Kuhn: an understanding between different paradigms is not possible. Feyerabend: scientists from different paradigms can understand each other very well.
II 174
FeyerabendVsKuhn: the boundaries of traditions and disciplines on which Kuhn and Polanyi base their thesis of the untouched vagueness of science are temporary stages of the historical process. Science today is business which inadvertently strengthens the totalitarian tendencies of society. That takes care of Kuhn’s objection.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Kuhn, Th. Putnam Vs Kuhn, Th. V 155
VsKuhn/Putnam: his smart aleck readers have accused him that he had claimed such a thing that rational justification would not exist in science, only shape change and conversions. Kuhn has rejected this interpretation and introduced a new term: "non-paradigmatic rationality". Putnam: possibly the same as the above-mentioned "criterial rationality".
---
I (c) 84
PutnamVsKuhn: E.g. electron: there are entities, that we call now "electrons", that behave in many ways like Bohr's "electrons". We should only say that we have a different theory of the same entity. So Bohr's term referred.
I (c) 85
Reference/theory/semantic change/PutnamVsKuhn: we can only say that because the current theory asserts the existence of entities that satisfy many of the roles that should satisfy Bohr's "electrons". Question: What if we accept a theory that sees electrons as something like phlogiston? Then we would have to say that electrons do not exist.
Question: What if all the entities do not exist from the standpoint of the later theory?
We need to concede trust to secure reference at all.
But this must not be unreasonable confidence: We cannot concede phlogiston.
If Boyd's two assumptions would be wrong trust would always turn out to be unreasonable and reference would collapse.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kuhn, Th. Verschiedene Vs Kuhn, Th. I 186
VsKuhn: it is argued that he makes a subjective and irrational business from science. He greatly appreciates the unanimity of the scholars in their binding to a paradigm.  Other authors doubt that the revolutions really are preced by crises and the awareness that something was wrong.
II 506
VsKuhn: it is very well conceivable that phenomena that are anomalies relative to the original paradigm, only then can ever be revealed when at the same time research is being conducted from the standpoint of an alternative paradigm.




Kuhn, Th. Scheffler Vs Kuhn, Th. Rorty I 352
Kuhn/Rorty: for Kuhn there can be no algorithm for the course of science, unless from a winning perspective in retrospect. VsKuhn: he has often been accused of idealism. He gave his critics a point of attack by saying that there could be no "neutral language of observation" because scientists "see different things" or "live in different worlds".
I 353
Rorty: that is completely harmless.
I 354
Kuhn/Rorty: the dispute between competing standards can only be decided within the framework of criteria that lie outside normal science.
I 355
SchefflerVsKuhn: Kuhn speaks of a second discursive level. Second order standards. Accepting a paradigm means not only accepting theories and methods, but also guiding standards and criteria.
I 356
Kuhn: Choice between theories not according to rules, but according to values. Theory/criteria: "Conformity with facts, consistency, scope, simplicity and fertility".

Schef I
I. Scheffler
Science and Subjectivity Indianapolis 1982

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
McDowell, J. Rorty Vs McDowell, J. I 111
McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object).
McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature.

VI 201
McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly.
RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory).
VI 203
Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor.
VI 204
"Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all.
RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary.
VI 208
RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts:
1. "Crass naturalism"
2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom"
Vi 210
Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature.
VI 211
RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"!
Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of ​​law each are sui generis.
RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it.
With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes.
VI 212
Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms.
Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech!
McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of ​​"memorizing facts".

RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric.
VI 214
RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us.
VI 215
      Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one.
VI 217
      "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature".
VI 216
VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons."
VI 219
Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content.
     James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior?

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Mentalesese Dennett Vs Mentalesese II 177
Mentalese/Dennett: most of what has been written about the possibility of a "thought language" presupposes that we think in a written thought language (thought language, Mentalese). (DennettVsMentalese).
Münch III 375
DennettVsAdaptionism: is, like mentalism, at risk of building the entire building from the ground up. Theory/Dennett: Adaptionismus and mentalism are no theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and to ask nature questions.


Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Popper, K. Kuhn Vs Popper, K. Hacking I 400
Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out.

Kuhn I 90
Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations.
I 157
KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification".
I 158
KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn).
However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Putnam, H. Dennett Vs Putnam, H. I 571/572
Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality.
Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia".
I 573
Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury).
But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses.
((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.)
Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible.
I 575
Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of ​​what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion.
This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e.

Münch III 379
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural).
DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!.
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate.
The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism.
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds.

Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Putnam III 31
DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism.

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Quine, W.V.O. Dennett Vs Quine, W.V.O. II 132
de re/de dicto/DennettVsQuine: hopeless philosophical doctrine that there are two different types of belief. The only exception: E.g. I have to follow an object with my eyes before I can describe it. "Priority of tracking before the description."
But we can also take the most direct, most primitive cases of tracking with the senses in the de dicto mode: "the what-ever-it-is" that is responsible for the current pixel cluster. (> Disjunction)
De re/De dicto/Dennett: the difference is in the point of view, not the phenomenon.

Münch III 343
DennettVsQuine: too strongly behavioristically bound. What happens to the task of the translator, if you separate yourself from behaviourist terminology?
Münch III 362
Gavagai/Dennett: Quine presupposes that the linguist has already convinced himself of the communicative nature of the natives. (s) Question: can behaviorism presuppose communication at all?.


Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Quine, W.V.O. Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 191
Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist:
I 192
"Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated.
I 222
Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology.
I 223
Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in?
I 225
RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences:
1) There is such a thing as an ontology.
2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status.
3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning.
4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point.
5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference.
RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism.
I 226
Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles.
I 231
RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of ​​the idea" than necessary.
I 250
Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants.

IV 24
RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network.

VI 212
RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ryle, G. Rorty Vs Ryle, G. Frank I 597
Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently. >Cartesianism, >Dualism.
Fra I 598
That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area.
b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings.
If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no >mind body problem.


Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994