Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaptionism | Dennett Vs Adaptionism | I 382 DennettVsAdaptionism / mimicry: there is a temptation to say, when the forest floor looked different, the butterfly had a different color. But that is not justified. It does not have to be true too! (Dennett otherwise pro) The Adaptionist would ask: why do all the doors in this village have the hinges on the left? Answer: there is no reason for it, it s just a historical accident. (Dennett pro). Theory /Dennett: adaptionism and mentalism are not theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and nature to ask questions. Münch III 375ff DennettVsAdaptionism: is in danger to construe the entire building out of nothing, like mentalism does. III 376 Pangloss/Dennett: you can use this position to open up the completeness of a list of conditions. DobzhanskyVsAdaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature cannot be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964. Also, the uselessness cannot be taken for granted. III 379 Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on a micro-physical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears the rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Adaptionism | Verschiedene Vs Adaptionism | Dennett I 348 Vsadaptionism: Master in subsequent justification. (Evolution can in principle not look ahead). Münch III 376 DobzhanskyVsadaptionism: 1956 (in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin): The usefulness of a feature can not be taken for granted. CainVsDobzhansky: 1964: also the futility can not be taken for granted. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Behaviorism | Dennett Vs Behaviorism | Münch III 370 Skinner: Vs "mentalism": DennettVsSkinner: he himself constantly used mentalist vocabulary, which he excused as "shortcuts" or that he wants to explain something to the layman. III 373: He never admits how much of expressibility he would lose. III 372 Skinner: mentalism distracts psychologists from having to search for evidence for amplication. "The world of the mind steals the show". Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Charity Principle | Putnam Vs Charity Principle | I (b) 56 Charity Principle/N. L. Wilson: E.g. in a possible world electrons could be twice as heavy and neutral. These other particles would then be the electrons according to Wilson. I (b) 57 E.g. historians made a terrible mistake and not Caesar (who was actually a fictional character), but Pompey founded the Roman Empire and did all the other heroic deeds that were previously attributed to Caesar. According to Wilson, Smith then always refers to Pompey when he says "Caesar"! PutnamVsWilson: according to a "historical" conception of names this is wrong, of course. He does not refer to a real person when he says "Caesar" (because he is now a fictional character). We have a false causal chain. PutnamVsWilson: descriptively, his theory is wrong: E.g. Someone has heard about another Quine and falsely believes that he is the logician Quine. We would then not say he refered to the right one, because that would be the most charitable! Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: affects only real situations! Applying it to counterfactual situations would mean not to grasp the distinction between what we mean by our expressions (even if we speak about counterfactual situations!) and what we would mean if that were the real situation! It would miss what Kripke calls rigidity. Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: Second deficiency: too egalitarian: what makes my beliefs about elm trees true is unimportant for determining the denotation of "elm". Even for the denotation in my idiolect. I (b) 58 Charity Principle/PutnamVsWilson: too numerical! Truths range from extremely trivial to important. There are also many dimensions. Convictions cannot be counted! Reference/Possible World/Putnam: E.g. electron Bohr. Suppose there were particles that had the properties falsely imputed by Bohr ("selectrons") but they only existed in the other half of the universe. Then Bohr would still not have referred to "selectrons", but toour electrons. Reason: the primacy of the phenomena. His theory was to explain his phenomena, and they are also our phenomena. I (b) 58/59 Contribution of the Environment/Reference/Twin Earth/Putnam: from the fact that a liquid would be associated with the same stereotype and the same criteria on different planets would not follow that XYZ is water. It would only follow that it looks like water, tastes, etc. The reference depends on the true condition of the paradigms (?), not on our minds. Principle of Credit of Trust/Meaning/Knowledge/Idea/Putnam: I can know the meaning of "gold" without ever having a clear notion of it! The principle of credit of trust forbids us to assume that baptists must be experts! It also prohibits assuming omniscience. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Frege, G. | Searle Vs Frege, G. | II 285 Index words/I/SearleVsFrege: what little Frege says about indexicality is wrong and incompatible with his theory. About "I", he says, this calls for a public and a private sense. "Yesterday" and "Today": if we want to express the same proposition today, we must use the word "yesterday". So he accepted apparently an de re theory of indexical propositions. II 286 Frege does not notice the self-reference of these expressions. (Unlike morning star/evening star). The idea that expressions have a meaning that cannot be notified, is profoundly anti Frege! Sense is open to the public. That is what the concept was introduced for. II 301 The descriptive theory was directed against the three traditional views: VsMill, VsFrege, Vstraditionel Logic. 1. Mill: Names no connotation, but only denotation. 2. Frege: meaning of a name is recognized by individual with it associated identification. 3. logic textbooks: the meaning of the name "N" is simply "called N". (Regress). Searle: No. 1 refuses to answer, No. 3 brings infinite regress.. II 303 Names/Frege/Searle: his theory is the most promising, I developed it further. There always must exist an intentional content in proper names. SearleVsFrege: Weak point: the semantic content must always be put into words. II 228 Identity/fact/statement/Searle: the identity of the fact depends on the specific properties of the fact being the same as those that are called by the corresponding statement. III 229 Facts/Searle: are not the same as true statements. (SearleVsFrege). 1. Facts have a causal function, true statements do not. 2. The relation of a fact to the statement is ambiguous, the same fact can be formulated by different statements. Disquotation/Searle: the analysis of a fact as that e.g. this object is red, requires more than disquotation. V 116 SearleVsFrege: wrong: that the word "that" initiates something that has to be considered as "Name of a proposition" (virtually all subordinate clauses). (SearleVsTarski too). V 117 Regress/quotation marks/Searle: if "Socrates" is the name of Socrates, then I can only talk about it, that means the above-mentioned, when I put it again in quotation marks..: „“Socrates““. Then again I could only speak about this in quotation marks: "" "Socrates" "". - "Xxx" is not the name of a word! It is not a reference! The word refers to neither anything nor to itself. E.g. an ornithologist, "the sound, the Californian jays produces is ....". What completed the sentence, would be a sound, not the proper name of the sound! V 144 SearleVsFrege: failed to distinguish between the meaning of an indicative expression and the by it's statement transmitted proposition! V 152 Predicate/SearleVsFrege: he tried to unite two philosophical positions that are fundamentally incompatible. He wants a) to extend the distinction between meaning and significance to predicates (predicates that have a meaning, an object) and simultaneously b) explain the functional difference between pointing and predicative expressions. Why does Frege represent position a). - That means why does he say, predicates have a meaning? Reason: his theory of arithmetic: the need for quantification of properties. (> Second order logic). V 155 Concept/Frege: ascribe a property via the use of a grammatical predicate. SearleVsFrege: contradiction: once term = property (a) once feature of the attribution of a property (b). Properties/SearleVsFrege: properties are not essential predication: you might as well point to them through singular nominal terms. V 156 Solution/Searle: if you no longer insist that predicate expressions would have to be indicative, everything dissolves. Predicate expressions do not mean properties! They ascribe to a property! V 172 Summary: 1. Frege: is right: there is a significant difference between the function of an indicative expression and a predicate expression. V 173 2. VsFrege: his performance is inconsistent when he tries to show that a predicate expression is also indicative. 3. By letting go of this assertion Frege's representation of arithmetic (here he needs quantification of properties) is not questioned. The letting go of the claim is not a denial of universals. 4. There is at least an interpretation which exist according to universals. 5. There is no class of irreducible existence conditions. V 256 Names/Descriptive support/Searle: E.g. Everest = Tschomolungma: the descriptive support of both names refers to the same object. Names/SearleVsFrege: mistake: that proper names are just as strong and clear as certain descriptions. To be blamed is his famous example morning star/evening star. They are not paradigms for proper names, they lie rather on the boundary between certain descriptions and names. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Frege, G. | Waismann Vs Frege, G. | Waismann I 77 Frege: Definition of the number in two steps a) when two sets are equal. b) Definition of the term "number": it is equal if each element of one set corresponds to one element of the other set. Unique relation. Under Def "Number of a Set"/Frege: he understands the set of all sets equal to it. Example: the number 5 is the totality of all classes of five in the world. VsFrege: how shall we determine that two sets are equal? Apparently by showing such a relation. For example, if you have to distribute spoons on cups, then the relation did not exist before. As long as the spoons were not on the cups, the sets were not equal. However, this does not correspond to the sense in which the word equal is used. So it is about whether you can put the spoons on the cups. But what does "can" mean? I 78 That the same number of copies are available. Not the assignment determines the equivalence, but vice versa. The proposed definition gives a necessary, but not sufficient condition for equal numbers and defines the expression "equal number" too narrowly. Class: List ("school class") logical or term (mammals) empirical. With two lists it is neither emopirical nor logical to say that they can be assigned to each other. Example 1. Are there as many people in this room as in the next room? An experiment provides the answer. 2. Are 3x4 cups equal to 12 spoons? You can answer this by drawing lines, which is not an experiment, but a process in a calculus. According to Frege, two sets are not equal if the relation is not established. You have defined something, but not the term "equal numbered". You can extend the definition by saying that they can be assigned. But again this is not correct. For if the two sets are given by their properties, it always makes sense to assert their "being-assignment", (but this has a different meaning, depending on the criterion by which one recognizes the possibility of assignment: that the two are equal, or that it should make sense to speak of an assignment! In fact, we use the word "equal" according to different criteria: of which Frege emphasizes only one and makes it a paradigm. Example 1. If there are 3 cups and 3 spoons on the table, you can see at a glance how they can be assigned. I 79 2. If the number cannot be overlooked, but it is arranged in a clear form, e.g. square or diamond, the equal numbers are obvious again. 3. The case is different, if we notice something of two pentagons, that they have the same number of diagonals. Here we no longer understand the grouping directly, it is rather a theorem of geometry. 4. Equal numbers with unambiguous assignability 5. The normal criterion of equality of numbers is counting (which must not be understood as the representation of two sets by a relation). WaismannVsFrege: Frege's definition does not reflect this different and flexible use. I 80 This leads to strange consequences: According to Frege, two sets must necessarily be equal or not for logical reasons. For example, suppose the starlit sky: Someone says: "I don't know how many I've seen, but it must have been a certain number". How do I distinguish this statement from "I have seen many stars"? (It is about the number of stars seen, not the number of stars present). If I could go back to the situation, I could recount it. But that is not possible. There is no way to determine the number, and thus the number loses its meaning. For example, you could also see things differently: you can still count a small number of stars, about 5. Here we have a new series of numbers: 1,2,3,4,5, many. This is a series that some primitive peoples really use. It is not at all incomplete, and we are not in possession of a more complete one, but only a more complicated one, beside which the primitive one rightly exists. You can also add and multiply in this row and do so with full rigor. Assuming that the things of the world would float like drops to us, then this series of numbers would be quite appropriate. For example, suppose we should count things that disappear again during counting or others emerge. Such experiences would steer our concept formation in completely different ways. Perhaps words such as "much", "little", etc. would take the place of our number words. I 80/81 VsFrege: his definition misses all that. According to it, two sets are logically necessary and equal in number, without knowledge, or they are not. In the same way, Einstein had argued that two events are simultaneous, independent of observation. But this is not the case, but the sense of a statement is exhausted in the way of its verification (also Dummett) Waismann: So you have to pay attention to the procedure for establishing equality in numbers, and that's much more complicated than Frege said. Frege: second part of the definition of numbers: Def Number/Frege: is a class of classes. ((s) Elsewhere: so not by Frege! FregeVs!). Example: the term "apple lying on the table comes to the number 3". Or: the class of apples lying on the table is an element of class 3. This has the great advantage of evidence: namely that the number is not expressed by things, but by the term. WaismannVsFrege: But does this do justice to the actual use of the number words? Example: in the command "3 apples!" the number word certainly has no other meaning, but after Frege this command can no longer be interpreted according to the same scheme. It does not mean that the class of apples to be fetched is an element of class 3. Because this is a statement, and our language does not know it. WaismannVsFrege: its definition ties the concept of numbers unnecessarily to the subject predicate form of our sentences. In fact, it results the meaning of the word "3" from the way it is used (Wittgenstein). RussellVsFrege: E.g. assuming there were exactly 9 individuals in the world. Then we could define the cardinal numbers from 0 to 9, but the 10, defined as 9+1, would be the zero class. Consequently, the 10 and all subsequent natural numbers will be identical, all = 0. To avoid this, an additional axiom would have to be introduced, the Def "infinity axiom"/Russell: means that there is a type to which infinitely many individuals belong. This is a statement about the world, and the structure of all arithmetic depends essentially on the truth of this axiom. Everyone will now be eager to know if the infinity axiom is true. We must reply: we do not know. It is constructed in a way that it eludes any examination. But then we must admit that its acceptance has no meaning. I 82 Nor does it help that one takes the "axiom of infinity" as a condition of mathematics, because in this way one does not win mathematics as it actually exists: The set of fractions is dense everywhere, but not: The set of fractions is dense everywhere if the infinity axiom applies. That would be an artificial reinterpretation, only conceived to uphold the doctrine that numbers are made up of real classes in the world (VsFrege: but only conditionally, because Frege does not speak of classes in the world). Waismann I 85 The error of logic was that it believed it had firmly underpinned arithmetic. Frege: "The foundation stones, fixed in an eternal ground, are floodable by our thinking, but not movable." WaismannVsFrege: only the expression "justify" the arithmetic gives us a wrong picture, I 86 as if its building were built on basic truths, while she is a calculus that proceeds only from certain determinations, free-floating, like the solar system that rests on nothing. We can only describe arithmetic, i.e. give its rules, not justify them. Waismann I 163 The individual numerical terms form a family. There are family similarities. Question: are they invented or discovered? We reject the notion that the rules follow from the meaning of the signs. Let us look at Frege's arguments. (WaismannVsFrege) II 164 1. Arithmetic can be seen as a game with signs, but then the real meaning of the whole is lost. If I set up calculation rules, did I then communicate the "sense" of the "="? Or just a mechanical instruction to use the sign? But probably the latter. But then the most important thing of arithmetic is lost, the meaning that is expressed in the signs. (VsHilbert) Waismann: Assuming this is the case, why do we not describe the mental process right away? But I will answer with an explanation of the signs and not with a description of my mental state, if one asks me what 1+1 = 2 means. If one says, I know what the sign of equality means, e.g. in addition, square equations, etc. then one has given several answers. The justified core of Frege's critique: if one considers only the formulaic side of arithmetic and disregards the application, one gets a mere game. But what is missing here is not the process of understanding, but interpretation! I 165 For example, if I teach a child not only the formulas but also the translations into the word-language, does it only make mechanical use? Certainly not. 2. Argument: So it is the application that distinguishes arithmetic from a mere game. Frege: "Without a content of thought an application will not be possible either. WaismannVsFrege: Suppose you found a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is for pleasure only. Would it not express a thought anymore? Why cannot one make use of a chess position? Because it does not express thoughts. WaismannVsFrege: Let us say you find a game that looks exactly like arithmetic, but is just for fun. Would it notexpress a thought anymore? Chess: it is premature to say that a chess position does not express thoughts. Waismann brings. For example figures stand for troops. But that could just mean that the pieces first have to be turned into signs of something. I 166 Only if one has proved that there is one and only one object of the property, one is entitled to occupy it with the proper name "zero". It is impossible to create zero. A >sign must designate something, otherwise it is only printer's ink. WaismannVsFrege: we do not want to deny or admit the latter. But what is the point of this assertion? It is clear that numbers are not the same as signs we write on paper. They only become what they are through use. But Frege rather means: that the numbers are already there somehow before, that the discovery of the imaginary numbers is similar to that of a distant continent. I 167 Meaning/Frege: in order not to be ink blotches, the characters must have a meaning. And this exists independently of the characters. WaismannVsFrege: the meaning is the use, and what we command. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Quine Vs Kripke, S. A. | Putnam I 247 Def "Small Realism"/Putnam: ( "realism with a lower case r"): here, to say what we say and do what we do means being a "realist". But that brings problems with realism and "reality": Reality/Realism/Wittgenstein: (trees and chairs), "the this and that to which we can point" are paradigms for what we call real. (1971, Lecture 25). Realism/Reality/Objects/Space-Time Points/Putnam: here Kripke, Quine, Lewis disagree: what is the relationship between the chair and the space-time region it occupies? Quine: the chair and the electromagnetic and other fields that constitute it are one and the same. The chair is the spacetime region. KripkeVsQuine: both are numerically different objects, but have the same mass (e.g. statue/clay). The chair could have occupied a different space-time region! QuineVsKripke: this proof is worthless, because modal predicates are hopelessly vague. Lewis: Quine is right as far as the chair is concerned, but wrong in terms of the modal predicates. LewisVsKripke: not the chair but a counterpart to this chair could have been somewhere else. (Not "exactly this chair" within the meaning of the logical concept of identity (=).). Putnam: so there are three questions: 1) is the chair identical with the matter or does the chair somehow coexist with the matter in the space-time region? 2) Is the matter identical to the fields? 3) Are the fields identical with the space-time regions? Putnam: these questions are probably all three nonsense, but at least the first one is! Quine II 209 ff Replica on Saul Kripke The concept of possible worlds contributed to the semantics of modal logic. Kripke: meaningful model theory of modal logic. Def Models/Quine: allow for proof consistency. They also have heuristic value, but they do not offer an explanation. >Models. II 210 They can as clear as they want, nevertheless they can leave us completely in the dark regarding the primary, intended interpretation. QuineVsKripke: following questions regarding possible worlds: 1) When can objects between different worlds be equated 2) When is a designation expression rigid, 3) where is metaphysical necessity to testify? The way in which Kripke refers to Bishop Butler is startling: "As Bishop Butler said," Everything is what it is and not another thing." I.e. " heat is molecular motion" will not be contingent, but necessary." (Kripke p. 160) QuineVsKripke: I can also interpret the bishop according to my own purposes: Everything is what it is, do not ask what it may be or must be. Possible World/QuineVsKripke: allow proofs of consistency, but no unambiguous interpretation when objects are equal? Bishop Butler ("no other thing"): identity does not necessarily follow. Kripke on the identity of mind and body: The identity theorist who thinks pain is a brain state ... has to claim that we are mistaken if we think it is conceivable that pain could have existed without brain states. ... The materialist therefore faces a very tricky objection: he has to prove that something whose possibility we deem to imagine is not possible in reality. QuineVsKripke: the materialist will only feel the intricacy of Kripke's objection as far as he believes in metaphysical necessity. I can gratefully read Kripke in a way that he supports me in my desire to show what an intricate network the representative of the modality concept is spinning. II 210f KripkeVsIdentity Theory: imagine: Pain without a brain state - for materialists difficult to exclude. QuineVsKripke: only difficult if materialist believes in metaphysical necessity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Feyerabend Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 375 Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsKuhn: his ideas are more inclined toward psychology and suggest that every scientific change leads to a) a shift of meaning and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the perception of the world are to be determined through research; they are not a foregone conclusion. Kuhn: an understanding between different paradigms is not possible. Feyerabend: scientists from different paradigms can understand each other very well. II 174 FeyerabendVsKuhn: the boundaries of traditions and disciplines on which Kuhn and Polanyi base their thesis of the untouched vagueness of science are temporary stages of the historical process. Science today is business which inadvertently strengthens the totalitarian tendencies of society. That takes care of Kuhn’s objection. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Putnam Vs Kuhn, Th. | V 155 VsKuhn/Putnam: his smart aleck readers have accused him that he had claimed such a thing that rational justification would not exist in science, only shape change and conversions. Kuhn has rejected this interpretation and introduced a new term: "non-paradigmatic rationality". Putnam: possibly the same as the above-mentioned "criterial rationality". --- I (c) 84 PutnamVsKuhn: E.g. electron: there are entities, that we call now "electrons", that behave in many ways like Bohr's "electrons". We should only say that we have a different theory of the same entity. So Bohr's term referred. I (c) 85 Reference/theory/semantic change/PutnamVsKuhn: we can only say that because the current theory asserts the existence of entities that satisfy many of the roles that should satisfy Bohr's "electrons". Question: What if we accept a theory that sees electrons as something like phlogiston? Then we would have to say that electrons do not exist. Question: What if all the entities do not exist from the standpoint of the later theory? We need to concede trust to secure reference at all. But this must not be unreasonable confidence: We cannot concede phlogiston. If Boyd's two assumptions would be wrong trust would always turn out to be unreasonable and reference would collapse. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Verschiedene Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 186 VsKuhn: it is argued that he makes a subjective and irrational business from science. He greatly appreciates the unanimity of the scholars in their binding to a paradigm. Other authors doubt that the revolutions really are preced by crises and the awareness that something was wrong. II 506 VsKuhn: it is very well conceivable that phenomena that are anomalies relative to the original paradigm, only then can ever be revealed when at the same time research is being conducted from the standpoint of an alternative paradigm. |
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| Kuhn, Th. | Scheffler Vs Kuhn, Th. | Rorty I 352 Kuhn/Rorty: for Kuhn there can be no algorithm for the course of science, unless from a winning perspective in retrospect. VsKuhn: he has often been accused of idealism. He gave his critics a point of attack by saying that there could be no "neutral language of observation" because scientists "see different things" or "live in different worlds". I 353 Rorty: that is completely harmless. I 354 Kuhn/Rorty: the dispute between competing standards can only be decided within the framework of criteria that lie outside normal science. I 355 SchefflerVsKuhn: Kuhn speaks of a second discursive level. Second order standards. Accepting a paradigm means not only accepting theories and methods, but also guiding standards and criteria. I 356 Kuhn: Choice between theories not according to rules, but according to values. Theory/criteria: "Conformity with facts, consistency, scope, simplicity and fertility". |
Schef I I. Scheffler Science and Subjectivity Indianapolis 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| McDowell, J. | Rorty Vs McDowell, J. | I 111 McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature. VI 201 McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly. RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory). VI 203 Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor. VI 204 "Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all. RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary. VI 208 RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts: 1. "Crass naturalism" 2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom" Vi 210 Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature. VI 211 RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"! Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of law each are sui generis. RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. VI 212 Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms. Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech! McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of "memorizing facts". RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric. VI 214 RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us. VI 215 Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one. VI 217 "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature". VI 216 VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons." VI 219 Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content. James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
| Mentalesese | Dennett Vs Mentalesese | II 177 Mentalese/Dennett: most of what has been written about the possibility of a "thought language" presupposes that we think in a written thought language (thought language, Mentalese). (DennettVsMentalese). Münch III 375 DennettVsAdaptionism: is, like mentalism, at risk of building the entire building from the ground up. Theory/Dennett: Adaptionismus and mentalism are no theories in the traditional sense! They are attitudes and strategies to organize data to explain relationships and to ask nature questions. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Popper, K. | Kuhn Vs Popper, K. | Hacking I 400 Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out. Kuhn I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. I 157 KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification". I 158 KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn). However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Putnam, H. | Dennett Vs Putnam, H. | I 571/572 Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality. Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia". I 573 Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury). But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses. ((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.) Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible. I 575 Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion. This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e. Münch III 379 Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural). DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!. Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate. The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism. Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 Putnam III 31 DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism. |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Dennett Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 132 de re/de dicto/DennettVsQuine: hopeless philosophical doctrine that there are two different types of belief. The only exception: E.g. I have to follow an object with my eyes before I can describe it. "Priority of tracking before the description." But we can also take the most direct, most primitive cases of tracking with the senses in the de dicto mode: "the what-ever-it-is" that is responsible for the current pixel cluster. (> Disjunction) De re/De dicto/Dennett: the difference is in the point of view, not the phenomenon. Münch III 343 DennettVsQuine: too strongly behavioristically bound. What happens to the task of the translator, if you separate yourself from behaviourist terminology? Münch III 362 Gavagai/Dennett: Quine presupposes that the linguist has already convinced himself of the communicative nature of the natives. (s) Question: can behaviorism presuppose communication at all?. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Ryle, G. | Rorty Vs Ryle, G. | Frank I 597 Sensation/Thought/RortyVsRyle: his approach encounters the difficulty that our everyday language seems to support the Cartesian notion of two series of events persistently. >Cartesianism, >Dualism. Fra I 598 That is not the problem with opinions, feelings, etc. Here we are not tempted to consider them as episodes instead of dispositions. Mental/Rorty: only the first class a) (thoughts, feelings) generates the contrast to the physical, which is more than a mere linguistic contrast. (see below) They are paradigmatic for a separate area. b) (moods, feelings, etc.) these are such that in no way would bring forth the idea of a separate area if we had not heard of thoughts and feelings. If we had no mental concepts, but only concepts of opinions and desires, then we would have no >mind body problem. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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