Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equilibrium | Gould | II 256ff Equilibrium/evolution/Eldredge/Gould: I am one of the evolutionists who believe in leaps in evolution. Together with Niles Eldredge: Thesis: theory of uninterrupted equilibrium: leaps do not have to express gaps in fossil finds, but can confirm the predictions of the theory of evolution.(1) II 258 These tendencies cannot be attributed to the gradual change within the sexes, but must arise from the different success of certain types of species. They are rather stairs than a sloping plane. Transitional forms are generally absent at the level of species, but are abundant between larger groups. IV 186 Equilibrium/theory of the interrupted equilibrium (selective equilibrium)/Gould: thesis: the theory of the interrupted equilibrium is an unorthodox theory to explain the absence of expected patterns and laws (together with Niles Eldredge). Thesis: in normal times there is no continuous adaptive perfection within the groups of descent. Rather, the species are formed quite quickly on a scale of geological periods (i. e. in a few thousand years) and then remain extremely stable in the following millions of years. IV 187 Evolution/Gould: therefore, it must have an effect on the species level and not in Darwin's sense as a fight of the individuals: > punctuated equilibrium. >Evolution. Mass extinction: what was accumulated in normal times collapses, is dismantled and rearranged or newly started and spread. If the theory of the interrupted equilibrium is correct, then mass extinctions are even more catastrophic than previously assumed! If they can destroy up to 90% of all species, then by an unfortunate coincidence we lose some groups forever, while others in another world are better equipped. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Equilibrium | Newton | Kanitscheider I 119 Equilibrium problem/Newton: revived by Feynman: Problem with a static universe with finite matter density: if matter is evenly distributed, how can a body stay in the middle without moving if the slightest disturbance triggers all possible movements. If one does not want to claim divine help, the only consequence seems to remain to accept an infinite amount of matter, which balances out all disturbances. Newton: that's a fallacy: not all infinite sizes are the same! (Newton himself, however, felt that his teaching was compatible with a theistic attitude). Disturbances/LaplaceVsNewton: the planetary system is stable in the long term, the disturbances of certain planets are not arbitrarily strong, but balance out in the long term. Newton had embraced permanent corrective interventions. >Universe/Kanitscheider, cf. >Relativity theory, >Natural laws, >Laws/Newton, >Laws. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Equilibrium | Rawls | I 456 Equilibrium/Rawls: I use the term intuitively(1). The term stability, which I use for this purpose, is actually one of the quasi-stability: when an equilibrium is stable, all variables return to their equilibrium after a disturbance. In terms of quasi stability, there are only a few(2). Quasi-stable society: is a well-ordered society that is quasi-stable in terms of its institutions and the sense of justice of its citizens. If, for example, certain circumstances mean that institutions can no longer be regarded as fair, they should be able to be reformed as the situation requires, and justice has been restored. >Justice/Rawls. I 457 Three conditions must be fulfilled for a society in an equilibrium: 1. The system is to be identified and internal and external forces must be distinguishable. 2. Different states of the system and their characteristic features are to be identified. 3. The laws linking the different states shall be specified. Depending on their nature, some systems do not have a state of equilibrium, others have many. I 458 Sense of justice: the sense of justice of citizens in a society plays a decisive role. Moral learning/tradition: we can distinguish between two main currents: 1) One originates from Hume to Sidgwick and can be found today in social learning theories. Thesis: missing social motives are gained through learning. >D. Hume, >H. Sidgwick. A variant of this thesis assumes that moral standards are acquired before any understanding. >Morals, >Emotivism. I 459 2) The second traditional thesis comes from Rousseau and Kant, it is rationalistic and is sometimes represented by J. St. Mill and, more recently, by J. Piaget: Moral learning is therefore not so much a question of filling gaps as a free development of our innate and intellectual abilities after natural disposition. >Morals, >Morals/Kant, >Morality/Piaget, >Innateness. I 460 See footnotes 3-7. 1. See W. R. Ashby, Design for a Brain, 2nd. Ed. (London, 1960), chs. 2-4,19-29. 2. See Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, (New York, 1957), p, 18. 3. See J.-J. Rousseau, Emile (London, 1908) esp. pp. 46-66 (in bk. II), 172-196 (in bk. IV); 4. See also Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, Pt. II, The Methodology of Pure Practical Reason. 5. See also J. Piaget, The Moral Judgment oft he Child (London, 1932). 6. See also Lawrence Kohlberg, „The Development of Moral Thought“, Vita Humana, vol. 6 (1963). 7. For VsPiaget see: M. L. Hoffman, „Moral Development“ (1970) pp. 264-275, and for VsKohlberg: pp. 276-281. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Equilibrium | Buchanan | Brocker I 565 Equilibrium/Buchanan: only when a state of "natural distribution"(1) has been reached does contractual negotiations take place in which property rights (i.e. all types of individual rights of disposal) are negotiated. >Contracts, >Contracts/Buchanan. The so-called "natural distribution" arises as follows: 1. There is a shortage of goods 2. Consumption by one person means a negative effect for every other person (rivalry) 3. Each person wants to bring as much as possible into his possession 4. Characteristics that are conducive to competition are not evenly distributed 5. This will result in an uneven distribution of goods. This situation arises when the marginal benefits of the conquest costs and the marginal costs of the defence efforts Brocker I 566 will be balanced. This "natural balance" has a certain stability. The parties can only improve their position through a disarmament agreement. Negotiations/Buchanan: Negotiations are conducted to reduce unproductive defence costs. Both A and B recognize that they are better off if they can save on defence costs. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equilibrium | Eldredge | Gould I 192 Punctualism/punctuated equilibirum/Evolution/Eldredge/Gould: Eldredge and Gould thesis: "Model of intermittent equilibrium states" (punctuated equilibrium): Species should be consistent throughout their lifetime because they are remnants of large, stable populations. In every area inhabited by predecessors, a species of their ancestral origin should suddenly appear, immigrating from the periphery on which it has evolved evolutionary.(1) >Species, >Evolution, >Selection, cf. >Darwinism. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Eldredge I Niles Eldredge The Triumph of Evolution and the Failure of Creationism New York 2001 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Equilibrium | Walras | Mause I 54 Equilibrium/Neoclassical Theory: The demand for and supply of various goods and the corresponding market equilibrium with equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity can be derived from the behaviour of individual households and companies. However, it is not this partial analysis of individual markets that is of central importance for the evaluation of markets and market equilibria, but rather the total analysis, i.e. the simultaneous consideration of all markets in an economy and the interdependencies between them (general equilibrium theory). The pioneer of total analysis was Léon Walras.(1) In its modern form it was coined by Kenneth J. Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Arrow 1951(2); Arrow and Debreu 1954(3)). In a first step, the existence of a general market equilibrium can be proven. The relative prices of all goods are determined exclusively by real economic conditions (e.g. the production technology, resources euipment or demand structure); money only plays a role insofar as the price level (in accordance with quantity theory) depends on the money supply; moreover, it is neutral. Problem: the conditions necessary for the equilibrium are never fulfilled in reality. Solution: in theory, the existence of the equilibrium is proven, but not its stability. >Neoclassical economics, >K. Arrow. 1. L. Walras, Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure. Teile I– III (1874), Teile IV– VI (1877). Lausanne 1874/ 1877. 2. K.J. Arrow, An extension of the basic theorems of classical welfare economics. In Proceedings of the second Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability, Hrsg. J. Neyman, Berkeley 1951 3. K. J. Arrow, G. Debreu Existence of equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22: 82– 109. |
EconWalras I Léon Walras Eléments d’Economie Politique Pure Lausanne 1874 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equilibrium | Microeconomics | Mause I 225 Equilibrium/Portfolio/Microeconomics: In terms of microeconomic theory, the portfolio is in equilibrium when the marginal return of each form of investment is identical. If this situation leads to an expansionary monetary policy, the rate of return on money decreases. Households will transfer their assets into other forms of assets (bonds, shares, up to human assets). >Monetary policy, >Human capital. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Equilibrium | Pareto | Brocker I 99 Equilibrium/Pareto: The state of equilibrium is to be understood as a variable and fluid state variable. At the same time, it is precarious and preserves our existence: disruptions that occur in reality as crises or unintended effects do not lead to system disintegration and chaos; instead, they always bring about a new balance that in turn leads to dysfunctions. Pareto's theory is thus multidimensional and multicausal from the outset. >Society. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equilibrium | Hirschman | Brocker I 522 Equilibrium/Economy/HirschmanVsTradition/Hirschman: A drop in performance is an imbalance phenomenon. Hirschman leaves no doubt about how critical he is of the equilibrium thinking of the economic mainstream and also of the ideal image of so-called perfect competition - he almost frames this part of his introduction with appropriate text passages to emphasize this(1). He is therefore aware that the starting point of his investigation, the idea of the drop in performance itself, is basically a "heretical" thought from the point of view of the economic mainstream. >Competition, >Economy, >Markets. 1. Hirschman, Albert O., The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, Ct. 1958, S. 1f, 12f. Stephan Panther, „Albert O. Hirschman, Abwanderung und Widerspruch“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolHirschm I Albert O. Hirschman The Strategy of Economic Development New Haven 1958 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Equilibrium | Meadows | Brocker I 556 Equilibrium/Growth/World Model/World3/Meadows: as a solution to the problem of collapse through exponential growth (see Model/Meadows), Meadows' team introduced a global equilibrium(1): growth constraints were built into the model: the computer model moved towards a global equilibrium when skillful use of technologies could be improved to an optimal level without previous shrinkage processes of population, industrial and food production sizes. Problem: this could only be achieved with restrictions on freedom and authoritarian measures such as restricting the number of children or the consumption of raw materials. See Utopia/Meadows. Solution: "It seems possible to change growth trends and to achieve an ecological and economic equilibrium that can be maintained in the future. It could be achieved in such a way that the material foundations of life for every human being on earth are Brocker I 557 secured and that there is still room to use individual human abilities and achieve personal goals" (2). 1. Donella H. Meadows/Dennis L. Meadows/Jørgen Randers/William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth. A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New York 1972. Dt.: Dennis Meadows/Donella Meadows/Erich Zahn/Peter Milling, Die Grenzen des Wachstums. Bericht des Club of Rome zur Lage der Menschheit, Stuttgart 1972, chap 5, p. 141-164) 2. Ibid. p. 17 Patrick Kupper, „Dennis Meadows u. a., Die Grenzen des Wachstums“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolMeado I Dennis L. Meadows Dynamics of Growth in a Finite World Cambridge 1973 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | Vollmer Vs Anthropic Principle | II 95 Consciousness/Evolution/VollmerVsAnthropic Principle: the question "why did consciousness need to be formed?" is based on a misconception. It did not have to happen at all. II 252 VollmerVsAnthropic Principle: an unsatisfactory explanation establishes a link between the nature of the world and the existence of intelligent observers, but this link is not a causal one and therefore does not provide a causal explanation! It actually waives an explanation. That may be appropriate. The connection could probably be described like this ((s) but one would have to refrain from stating an inevitable development): The universe is as old as it is, because if it were younger, and if it were older, it could no longer exist. And it is as big as it is, because, if it were smaller, no nuclear fusion could take place and it could not have remained stable for long. II 253 Only beings in an entropy vale can ask such questions at all. II 252 Entropy/Universe/Boltzmann/Vollmer: according to him, the universe as a whole is in thermodynamic equilibrium, i.e. in entropy maximum. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Boltzmann, L. | Vollmer Vs Boltzmann, L. | II 252 Entropy/Universe/Boltzmann/Vollmer: according to him, the universe as a whole is in thermodynamic equilibrium, i.e. in the entropy maximum. II 253 VollmerVsBoltzmann: the observations speak against it! If we penetrate more distant parts of the universe, we always find low entropy. According to Boltzmann, higher entropy could be assumed in our neighborhood! According to Boltzmann, we would also have to assume higher entropy values (greater disorder) in the past than we do today. VollmerVsBoltzmann: then all our fossils would have been created by chance. |
G. Vollmer I Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd I Die Natur der Erkenntnis - Beiträge zur evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie, Stuttgart 1988 II Vollmer Was können wir wiessen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur - Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie, Stuttgart 1988 |
| Darwin, Ch. | Gould Vs Darwin, Ch. | IV 110 GouldVsDarwin: was so convinced of the need for unlimited time as a condition of evolution, that he mistook the selection with the gradualism. This led to criticism HuxleyVsDarwin: exaggerated assumption: "nature does not make leaps." Dennett I 363-367 GouldVsOrthodox Darwinism: supposedly disproved by his "punctuated equilibrium". |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Kripke Vs Davidson, D. | III 335 Language/Davidson: "Davidson’s criterion": A language cannot have an infinite number of basic concepts. Kripke: Otherwise it cannot be "first language". III 338 KripkeVsDavidson: We only need to demand that only a finite number of axioms possess "new" vocabulary (weaker). Horwich I 450 Reference/Radical Interpretation/RI/Field Linguist//Davidson/Rorty. Reconciles these two approaches saying that Strawson is right when his approach is seen holistically, i.e. if one places Aristotle’s formulation of the "whole and for the most part" first. Rorty Strawson: Yet his criterion cannot be applied to individual cases while being sure that one is right. Quine/Rorty: Stands between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of both, of the causation and of the reference, is equally a question of the conviction’s coherence of the native and the field linguist. Reference/Kripke/Rorty: His approach is a "building block" approach: Here we see causal paths of objects leading to individual speech acts. Conviction/true/Truth/KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: this approach leaves the possibility open that all our convictions could be wrong. Or that one basically does not know what he refers to (because one misunderstands all causal paths). KripkeVsDavidson/Rorty: which makes it possible to completely separate the reference and intentional objects. DavidsonVsKripke / Rorty: Davidson warns exactly against this: The gap between scheme and content. Solution/Davidson: Reverse order: We must first maximize coherence and truth, and then the reference, as a byproduct, can be like as it wants to be! Important Argument: This ensures that the intentional objects of many convictions (the "most direct cases") are their causes. ((s) Vs: it would then still be possible according to Löwenheim that what appears to be direct to us is not the most direct. DavidsonVsKripke: Kripke’s gaffe, e.g. the Gödel-Schmidt case must remain the exception. I 451 Because if the gap between references and intentional objects (which one refers to, and the one of which one believes one refers to) would be the rule, then the term "reference" would have no content! He would be as useless for the field linguist as the term "analytic". Gavagai/RI/Communication/DavidsonVsKripke/Rorty: the field linguist can communicate with the natives when he knows most of his intentional objects. Therefore: DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The radical interpretation (RI) starts at home. Then we can assume for ourselves as well as for the natives that most of our beliefs are true. Rorty: Is this an answer for the skeptic or does it only express what JamesVsSkepticism says:that the question is a bad question? Language/Representation/Intermediary/Medium/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson rejects "intermediaries" (intermediate members) between the organism and its environment (to be able to perform RI). Intermediate links between the organism and object: e.g. "special meaning", e.g. "intended interpretation", e.g. "what stands before the mind of the speaker" Without them we can say "RI begins at home". I 453 Solution/Davidson:fulfillment/DavidsonVsSkepticism/DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: For his refutation we need Tarski’s fulfillment ratio (word-world) instead of "correspondence" (which would correspond to the truth of sentences) of the relation proposition world). ((S) Because only whole sentences can be true). RI/Gavagai/Field Linguist/Davidson/Rorty: The field linguist is going to connect individual words of the native with objects (pieces of the world). Translation/fulfillment/Davidson/Rorty: Problem: The fulfillment relation is not a basis for translations, the fulfillment is rather a byproduct of translations. Hermeneutical circle/HC/Gavagai/RI//Davidson/RortyVsKripke: To go back and forth in the HC is not a building block-theory. It corresponds more to the "Reflective Equilibrium" of Rawls. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Equilibrium Theory | Luhmann Vs Equilibrium Theory | AU Kass 6 LuhmannVsEquilibrium Theories: they have the concept of disturbance (even as a basic concept) in two directions, probability, artificiality of the equilibrium (17th century example a few French soldiers more and the Prussians already have to arm.) Further development: dynamic equilibrium, alternative realizations in different areas, establishment on a new level. Progress, functional equivalents. Actually, equilibrium is a metaphor. Equilibrium as a condition of stability. Structure preservation is tied to the equilibrium term. Today questionable: 1. From the natural sciences: it is the imbalances which are stable! 2. Also in the economy! A precise vote is too unstable! Socialist systems keep goods scarce, capitalist systems keep buyers scarce. And that is stable! Luhmann: but that becomes questionable if one uses equilibrium and imbalance as it were as a system term! Furthermore, disturbance has a different meaning today. Disturbance/ST/Luhmann: can best be understood as follows: the system has certain (very limited) structures and possibilities. A disturbance brings one or the other as current into the system. This can initiate a search or identification process. For example, fire or just burnt potatoes? However, the range is adjusted, so it is not assumed that the petrol has run out. The search can be handled operationally in the system itself or communicatively. Information processing process instead of equilibrium process. Disturbance: is only a disturbance within the system, not in the environment! |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Field, H. | Putnam Vs Field, H. | Field IV 405 Internal realism/metaphysical/Putnam/Field: (ad Putnam: Reason, Truth, and History): FieldVsPutnam: the contrast between internal realism and metaphysical realism is not defined clearly enough. >Internal realism, >metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism/Field: comprises three theses, which are not separated by Putnam. 1. metaphysical realism 1: thesis, the world is made up of a unity of mentally independent objects. 2. metaphysical realism 2: thesis, there is exactly one true and complete description (theory) of the world. Metaphysical realism 2/Field: is not a consequence of the metaphysical realism 1 ((s) is independent) and is not a theory that any metaphysical realist would represent at all. Description/world/FieldVsPutnam: how can there only be a single description of the world ((s) or of anything)? The terms that we use are never inevitable; Beings that are very different from us, could need predicates with other extensions, and these could be totally indefinable in our language. Field IV 406 Why should such a strange description be "the same description"? Perhaps there is a very abstract characterization that allows this, but we do not have this yet. wrong solution: one cannot say, there is a single description that uses our own terms. Our current terms might not be sufficient for a description of the "complete" physics (or "complete" psychology, etc.). One could at most represent that there is, at best, a true and complete description that uses our terms. However, this must be treated with caution because of the vagueness of our present terms. Theory/world/FieldVsPutnam: the metaphysical realism should not only be distinguished from his opponent, the internal realism, by the adoption of one true theory. 3. Metaphysical realism 3/Field: Thesis, truth involves a kind of correspondence theory between words and external things. VsMetaphysical Realism 3/VsCorrespondence Theory/Field: the correspondence theory is rejected by many people, even from representatives of the metaphysical realism 1 (mentally independent objects). Field IV 429 Metaphysical realism/mR/FieldVsPutnam: a metaphysical realist is someone who accepts all of the three theses: Metaphysical realism 1: the world consists of a fixed totality of mentally independent objects. Metaphysical realism 2: there is only one true and complete description of the world. Metaphysical realism 3: truth involves a form of correspondence theory. PutnamVsField: these three have no clear content, when they are separated. What does "object" or "fixed totality", "all objects", "mentally independent" mean outside certain philosophical discourses? However, I can understand metaphysical realism 2 when I accept metaphysical realism 3. I: is a definite set of individuals. Williams II 430 P: set of all properties and relations Ideal Language: Suppose we have an ideal language with a name for each element of I and a predicate for each element of P. This language will not be countable (unless we take properties as extensions) and then only countable if the number of individuals is finite. But it is unique up to isomorphism; (but not further, unique up to isomorphism). Theory of World/Putnam: the amount of true propositions in relation to each particular type (up to any definite type) will also be unique. Whole/totality/Putnam: conversely, if we assume that there is an ideal theory of the world, then the concept of a "fixed totality" is (of individuals and their properties and relations) of course explained by the totality of the individuals which are identified with the range of individual variables, and the totality of the properties and relations with the region of the predicate variables within the theory. PutnamVsField: if he was right and there is no objective justification, how can there be objectivity of interpretation then? Field/Putnam: could cover two positions: 1. He could say that there is a fact in regard to what good "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention is. And that treatment of "electron" as a rigid designator (of "what entity whatsoever", which is responsible for certain effects and obeys certain laws, but no objective fact of justification. Or. 2. He could say that interpretation is subjective, but that this does not mean that the reference is subjective. Ad 1.: here he must claim that a real "rational reconstruction" of the speaker's intention of "general recognition" is separated, and also of "inductive competence", etc. Problem: why should then the decision that something ("approximately") obeys certain laws or disobeys, (what then applies to Bohr's electrons of 1900 and 1934, but not for phlogiston) be completely different by nature (and be isolable) from decisions on rationality in general? Ad 2.: this would mean that we have a term of reference, which is independent of procedures and practices with which we decide whether different people in different situations with different background beliefs actually refer on the same things. That seems incomprehensible. Reference/theory change/Putnam: We assume, of course, that people who have spoken 200 years ago about plants, referred, on the whole, to the same as we do. If everything would be subjective, there would be no inter-theoretical, interlinguistic term of reference and truth. If the reference is, however, objective, then I would ask why the terms of translation and interpretation are in a better shape than the term of justification. --- Putnam III 208 Reference/PutnamVsField: there is nothing that would be in the nature of reference and that would make sure that the connection for two expressions would ever result in outcomes by "and". In short, we need a theory of "reference by description". --- Putnam V 70 Reference/FieldVsPutnam: recently different view: reference is a "physicalist relationship": complex causal relationships between words or mental representations and objects. It is a task of empirical science to find out which physicalistic relationship this is about. PutnamVsField: this is not without problems. Suppose that there is a possible physicalist definition of reference and we also assume: (1) x refers to y if and only if x stands in R to y. Where R is a relationship that is scientifically defined, without semantic terms (such as "refers to"). Then (1) is a sentence that is true even when accepting the theory that the reference is only determined by operational or theoretical preconditions. Sentence (1) would thus be a part of our "reflective equilibrium" theory (see above) in the world, or of our "ideal boundaries" theory of the world. V 71 Reference/Reference/PutnamVsOperationalism: is the reference, however, only determined by operational and theoretical preconditions, the reference of "x is available in R y" is, in turn, undetermined. Knowing that (1) is true, is not of any use. Each permissible model of our object language will correspond to one model in our meta-language, in which (1) applies, and the interpretation of "x is in R to y" will determine the interpretation of "x refers to y". However, this will only be in a relation in each admissible model and it will not contribute anything to reduce the number of allowable models. FieldVs: this is not, of course, what Field intends. He claims (a) that there is a certain unique relationship between words and things, and (b) that this is the relationship that must also be used when assigning a truth value to (1) as the reference relation. PutnamVsField: that cannot necessarily be expressed by simply pronouncing (1), and it is a mystery how we could learn to express what Field wans to say. Field: a certain definite relationship between words and objects is true. PutnamVsField: if it is so that (1) is true in this view by what is it then made true? What makes a particular correspondence R to be discarded? It appears, that the fact, that R is actually the reference, is a metaphysical inexplicable fact. (So magical theory of reference, as if referring to things is intrinsically adhered). (Not to be confused with Kripke's "metaphysically necessary" truth). ---- Putnam I (c) 93 PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms. Anyway, in a certain sense: even if Boyd's causal explanations of the success of science are wrong, we still need them to do formal logic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 WilliamsB I Bernard Williams Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy London 2011 WilliamsM I Michael Williams Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology Oxford 2001 WilliamsM II Michael Williams "Do We (Epistemologists) Need A Theory of Truth?", Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986) pp. 223-42 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Gould, St. J. | Dennett Vs Gould, St. J. | I 371 Arch Spandrels/DennettVsGould: Gould: Thesis: the spandrels are so refined that the whole cathedral stands for their sake. GouldVs "pervasive adaptation" DennettVsGould: not so clever and not so often. I 388 Dennett: false juxtaposition of adaptionism with architectural necessity. Minimum surface limits expensive mosaic stones. Exaptation/Gould: thumb of the panda not really a thumb, but it does a good job! " Exaptation/Dennett: according to orthodox Darwinism any adjustment is some form of exaptation. This is trivial, because no function is preserved forever. Strand: GouldVsGradualism: "punctuated equilibrium". Jumps possible Long periods of stability, periods of abrupt changes. But no theory of macromutation. Broken Balance/DennettVsGould: Figure I 392: it depends on how the diagram is drawn: with sloping or horizontal branches (standing and jumping). DennettVsGould: it is known that changes can only be evaluated retrospectively in evolution. Nothing that happens during the sideways movement distinguishes an anagenetical from a kladogenetical process. I 405 DennettVsGould: but the fact that a currently existing group will be the founder of a new species, cannot be important for the intensity of a development. I 409 DennettVsGould: Gould would certainly not regard such a local imperceptible (but fast) transition from mouse to elephant (a few throusand years) as a violation of gradualism, but then he has no evidence in the form of fossil finds for his counter-position to gradualism. I 423 Has Neo-Darwinism ever claimed that evolution is proceeding at a constant speed? DennettVsGould: actually presumes (wrongly) that the majority of the contest of evolution was a lottery! His only clue: he cannot imagine why some of the amazingly bizarre creatures (Burgess) should be better designed than others. I 424 Chance/Evidence/Dennett: E.g. a geyser suddenly erupts on average every 65 minutes. The form of the suddenness is no evidence of the randomness. I 426 Cambrian explosion/DennettVsGould: Equally, the suddenness here is no evidence for the randomness. Evolution/DennettVsGould: he is quite right: the paths are continuous, unbroken lineages (to us), but they are not lines of global progress. So what? There are local improvements. Münch III 379 Adaptionism/Dennett: the more complex the condition, the less likely appears a rational reason. But the truth of a non-adaptionist story does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories. We should accept Pangloss’ assumption.(1) 1. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kauffman, St. | Verschiedene Vs Kauffman, St. | Kauffman I 94 Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: we want to determine the conditions under which the same molecules act as catalysts and products at the same time. We know that proteins and RNA molecules play this role. In addition, all types of organic molecules can be substrates and products of reactions, while at the same time being catalysts for other reactions. Now we need to know which molecules catalyse which reactions. We only have assumptions here. Vs: but you have to know about it to be sure that a molecule system contains an autocatalytic formation. If the general conditions were slightly different, there would be no life. I 97 KauffmanVsVs: Thesis: perhaps these details of chemistry do not play a role at all! The legality of life lies on an even deeper level. This emergence is directly rooted in mathematics itself. Kauffman I 104 VsKauffman: it could be argued that what is true for As and Bs is not considered necessary for atoms and molecules. Problem: to produce large polymers energy is required because the thermodynamics favors their splitting into smaller groups. E.g. peptide bond. (100 amino acids) during the bond, a water molecule is released, vice versa consumed during the splitting. Thus, water itself is product of the reaction. (Water > Life). In a normal aqueous environment the ratio of split to bound amino acid pairs is about 10 : 1. I 105 For tri or tetrapeptides, the ratio increases to 100 : 1 or 1000 : 1. Rule: If the length of a polymer increases by one amino acid, its equilibrium concentration decreases by a factor of 10 in relation to the free amino acids. How can high concentrations of such molecules be achieved against this trend? Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: there are at least three basic mechanisms: 1. Reactions can be limited to surfaces instead of taking place in a volume. This favors the formation of larger molecules, because the speed of the reaction depends on how fast the partners meet each other. 2. Dehydration. if the water molecules are removed, the reaction is slower. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Simple systems do not achieve catalytic isolation. Life came into being in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Genz Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a beam scale can also be stable in an inclined position! - The equilibrium is indifferent. LeibnizVs: e.g. Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, none will occur -Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantialism: there can be no independent space - otherwise the universe in it could be shifted (senseless) - today: VsLeibniz - Solution: spontaneous symmetry calculation. Sentence of the sufficient reason/Leibniz: for example Buridan's donkey: if there is no sufficient reason for a deviation to the right or left, none will occur. VIII 59 Leibniz: there is never an indifferent balance. (today: wrong! (see above)) E.g. (Leibniz) If two incompatible things are equally good, God will not create either of them. VIII 60 Space/Leibniz: so there can be no independent space, independent of things, because otherwise the world could be settled in it here and there. The same applies to the time and time of the creation of the world. Spontaneous symmetry calculation: e.g. the pencil does not stand on its tip, but falls to one side. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Newton, I. | Laplace Vs Newton, I. | Kanitscheider I 119 Equilibrium Problem/Newton: revived by Feynman: problem when static universe with finite density of matter is present: if matter is equally distributed, how can a body hold itself in the middle without movement, if the smallest disturbance triggers all possible movements. If one does not want to take any divine help, only the consequence seems to remain, to accept infinitely much matter, which compensates all disturbances. Newton: this is a false conclusion: not all infinite quantities are the same! (However, Newton himself thought that his teaching was compatible with a theistic attitude). Disturbances/LaplaceVsNewton: the planetary system is stable in the long run, the disturbances of certain planets do not become arbitrarily strong, but balance themselves out in the long run. Newton had assumed permanent corrective interventions. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Steady State Theory | Verschiedene Vs Steady State Theory | Kanitscheider I 359 Steady State Theory/SST/Bondi/Kanitscheider: Thesis: Priority of cosmology over local physics. Bondi's Thesis: the unclear complexity of the phenomenon world is only one property of the mesocosm. I 360 VsSST: incompatible with our empiricism: a static universe has long been in thermodynamic equilibrium. All development would already have reached its final state. It would no longer be possible to determine the direction of the time flow. Of the two types of motion allowed by Perfect Cosmological Principle, expansion and contraction, contraction is already eliminated because the necessary excess of radiation in relation to matter is lacking. For expansion, however, the steady state theory now needs the assumption of constant additional generation of matter. But this overrides the important principle of hydrodynamic continuity! I 361 However, at the current values for density and recession constant (distance movement of galaxies from each other), the origin of matter would only be one H atom per litre every 5x10 exp 11 years. Conservation of Matter/BondiVsVs: he even believes he can save the conservation of matter. He says that in a certain, observable area, seen globally, the observable amount of matter does not change, i.e. that in a constant eigenvolume matter is preserved, in contrast to the relativistic models, where the conservation applies rather to the coordinate volume. The Def Eigenvolume is the part of space that is fixed by a fixed distance from the observer, while the Def coordinate volume is given by the constancy of the com mobile coordinates. I 362 Steady State Theory/SST: here there is always the same amount of matter within the range of a certain telescope, while here the relativity theory assumes a dilution, i.e. the matter remains the same in the expanding volume. At the SST, the new formation ensures that the total amount of all observable matter remains the same. Observer/SST: when investigating motion, each observer can perceive a preferred direction of motion apart from local deviations, whereby he determines the constant relationship between velocity and distance completely symmetrically within a small range. In relativistic cosmology this was the starting point for the Weyl principle. Def Weyl-Principle: Postulate: the particles of a substrate (galaxies) lie in spacetime on a bundle of geodesists that start from a point in the past (Big Bang) and never intersect except at this point. From this follows the existence of a family of hyperplanes (t = const) orthogonal to these geodesists and the only parameters possessing cosmic time. I 362/363 Bondi/SST/Steady State Theory: doubts now that in view of the scattering of the fog movement these hyperplanes exist secured. Because of its stationary character, SST does not need Weyl's postulate and can define homogeneity without cosmic time. Thermodynamic imbalance/universe/SST: Explanation: a photon emanating from a star has a very long free path and reaches areas with strongly changed local motion. This shifts its frequency to red. However, the thermal energy it gives off on its way to the surrounding matter is only a very small part of that lost by its original star. Thus the universe represents a kind of cosmic sink for radiant energy. According to the Perfect Cosmological Principle, sources must exist that make up for the loss. Perfect Cosmological Principle: is logically compatible with three types of universes: 1. Static, without new creation of matter, 2. Expanding, with new development I 364 3. Collapsing, with destruction of matter SST/Bondi: believes in the strict relationship between distance and speed R'(t)/R(t) = 1/T. This results in R as an exponential function and the metric of the SST takes the form of the line element of de Sitter. (see above). Already the self-similarity of the scale function shows the basic metric properties of this model. It is not possible for us to recognize at which point of the curve R = et/T we are. The universe has no beginning and no end. I 365 Age/Universe/SST: Advantage over relativistic theories where the inverse Hubble constant led to a too low age. Metric/SST: while the de Sitter metric is unusable in Einstein's representation because it can only be reconciled with vanishing matter, this problem does not occur in the SST: here there is no necessary connection between physical geometry and matter content of space! According to the de Sitter structure, the world has an event horizon, i.e. every clock on a distant galaxy follows in such a way that there is a point in its history after which the emitted light can no longer reach a distant observer. If, however, a particle has formed within the range that can in principle be reached with ideal instruments, then it can never disappear from its field of view. I 367 Perfect Cosmological Principle: Problem: lies in the statistical character, which applies strictly on a cosmic scale, but not locally, whereby the local environment only ends beyond the galaxy clusters. Steady State Theory/SST/Hoyle: starts from the classical field equations, but changes them so strongly that all Bondi and Gold results that they have drawn from the Perfect Cosmological Principle remain valid. Hoyle/SST: Thesis: In nature a class of preferred directions can obviously be observed in the large-scale movements, which makes a covariant treatment impossible! Only a preferred class of observers sees the universe in the same way. I 368 Weyl Principle/Postulate: defines a unique relationship of each event P to the origin O. It cannot be a strict law of nature, since it is constantly violated in the local area by its own movements! Hoyle: (formula, tensors, + I 368). Through multiple differentiation symmetric tensor field, energy conservation does not apply, matter must constantly arise anew. Matter emergence/SST/Hoyle: there is an interpretation of matter origin caused by negative pressure in the universe. It should then be interpreted as work that this pressure does during expansion! VsSST: the synchronisation of expansion and origin is just as incomprehensible from theory as the fact that it is always matter and not antimatter that arises. (...+ formula, other choice of the coupling constant I 371/72). I 373 Negative Energy: it has been shown to cause the formation rate of particle pairs to "run away": infinite number in finite region. VsSST/Empiricism: many data spoke against the SST: excess of distant and thus early radio sources, redshift of the quasars indicating a slowdown of expansion, background radiation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Luhmann Vs Various Authors | Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statistical Mechanics | Feynman, R. | I 557 Statistical Mechanics/Feynman: this is about systems that are in (thermal) equilibrium. Thesis: all properties of matter can be explained by the motion of their parts. New: here we are talking about the position of the atoms, how many are at different positions in thermal equilibrium? 1 How are they distributed when forces act on them? 2. How are they distributed with respect to their velocities? N.B.: 1. The two questions are completely independent of each other. 2. The distribution of the speeds is always the same. (See above): the mean K.E per degree of freedom 1/2 kT is independent of the forces acting on the molecules and thus the velocity distribution is also independent of the forces, because the frequency of collisions does not depend on the forces. I 573 Statistical mechanics: thesis: If a given system is in thermal equilibrium at any temperature, it will also be in thermal equilibrium with any other things of the same temperature! |
|
| Self-Organization | Kauffman, St. | Dennett I 303 Self-Organization/Kauffman/Dennett: Thesis: Evolution itself undergoes evolution. It develops because it is a forced move in the design game. Finding the right path is surprisingly easy - laws of design, not of form - inevitabilities of metatechnics - epistasis: interaction between genes: - aptitude landscape strongly determines development: successful results are sacrificed. Kauffman I 30 Kauffman's thesis: If the band of life were played again, the individual branches of the family tree of life might look different, but the patterns of branches, which initially diverge strongly and then become more and more a refining of details, probably follow a deeper regularity. Self-Organization/Kauffman: Thesis: these structures occur at all levels: from ecosystems to economic systems undergoing technological evolution. Thesis: All complex adaptive systems in the biosphere - from protozoa to economies - strive for a natural state between order and chaos. Great compromise between structure and chance. I 49 Thesis: The best compromises are apparently achieved in the phase transition between order and chaos. I 51 Chaos Edge/Kauffman: great similarity with the theory of "self-organized criticality": thesis: Per Bak, Chao Tang, Kurt Wiesenfeld. I 349 Self-Organization/Kauffman: Bak, Chao, Wiesenfeld, 1988: new theory: thesis: self-organized criticality. For example, a heap of sand on a table that is constantly getting bigger. I 350 Potency Law/Kauffman: many small and little large avalanches. For avalanches there is no typical size at all! It is also independent of the size of the triggering grain of sand. Catastrophe/Chaos/Kauffman: Equilibrium systems do not need massive triggers to start moving massively. I 366 Economy/Organization/Self-Organization/Kauffman: new researches (Emily Dickinson): Thesis: flatter organizations are more successful, split into fields, each striving to improve their own benefit. The trick is how to select the fields. (NK model). Fields can detect peaks. "Simulated annealing": Finding a good approximation method. ("Temperature" see below) I 415 Thesis: we can consider goods and services as strings that interact with other strings. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vs Gradualism. | Gould, St. J. | Dennett I 330 GouldVsgradualism: thesis: "punctuated equilibrium". Development in reality often erratic. Long periods of stability, periods of intense changes. But no theory of macro-mutation. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reflective Equilibrium | Rawls, J. | Rorty VI 293 Def reflexives Gleichgewicht/Rawls/Rorty: Gleichgewicht zwischen spezifischen Einsichten und allgemeinen Prinzipien. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||