Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Simultaneity | Gadamer | I 132 Simultaneity/Artwork/Work of Art/Representation/Gadamer: (...) the being of the work of art is subject to simultaneity. It constitutes the essence of it. It is not the simultaneity of the aesthetic consciousness. For this simultaneity means the simultaneity and the indifference of different aesthetic objects of experience in one consciousness. On the other hand, what we mean here is that a single object that presents itself to us, however distant its origin, gains full presence in its representation. Simultaneity is thus not a given fact in consciousness, but a task for consciousness and a performance that is demanded of it. It consists in adhering to the thing in such a way that it becomes, but that means that all mediation is suspended in total presence. Cf. >Simultaneity/Kierkegaard. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Simultaneity | Kierkegaard | Gadamer I 132 Simultaneity/Kierkegaard/Gadamer: [The] concept of simultaneity originates, as is well known, from Kierkegaard, who gave it a special theological imprint(1). "Simultaneity" with Kierkegaard does not mean being at the same time, but formulates a task. This task is set for the believer, to communicate what is not at the same time, one's own presence and the saving act of Christ, and to communicate this totally with each other that they nevertheless experience it as a present (instead of at a distance back then) and that it is taken seriously. Gadamer: Conversely, the simultaneity of aesthetic consciousness is based on the concealment of the task set with simultaneity. >Simultaneity/Gadamer, >Aesthetic consciousness. 1. Kierkegaard, Philosophische Brocken, 4. Kap. |
Kier I S. Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments 2009 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Absolutism | Stalnaker Vs Absolutism | I 124 absolute/Possible Worlds/poss.w./Stalnaker: but that is not the sense in which we usually speak of properties and relations as absolute! Nobody would argue Vsabsolute simultaneity for the reason that simultaneity is contingent that simultaneous events could have taken place one after another. Suppose we are Vsabsolute identity in Salmons sense. Question: can we still understand the intraworldly or the poss.w.-relative identity relation as "to be the same thing" independent from the description of things? Stalnaker: there is no reason why we could not do so. Def identity/relative to poss.w./Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in every possible world w is the set of pairs so that d is in the domain of w. Nonexistence/predication/predication utterances/Stalnaker: problem: if the object does not exist. Thesis: I prefer a modal semantics that requires that the extension of a predicate is a subset of (things-) domains of their poss.w.. Then x=x is wrong if the value that is attributed to x does not exist (or has no counterparts). Versus: If you drop this condition (which is unusual) you allow that non-existent objects have properties and stand in relations. I 214 "Pessimistic view"/Jackson: e.g. a pessimist Vsabsolute quiescent point: Someone says, there is no absolute quiescent point, everything what we can represent by language are facts about relative position. Suppose we want to refute this: one could specify a coordinate system and a unit. E.g. take the mass centers of the earth, sun and mars, form a plane and in addition the moment of Newton's birth. Then we have an x-y plane then we introduce the units meter and second and define for each axis positive and negative directions. Then we have the means to specify absolute position as quadruples of real numbers, at least if we assume that there are absolute positions that you can specify. With that we ignore that our reference points (sun, mars could be vague). Vs: Jackson's skeptics could argue that this is not really allowed to say how things are absolute but only how they relate to the sun, earth and moon at the time of Newton's birth. VsVs/Stalnaker: but it would not be clear on what basis he replies that. I 215 We did therefore not escape the problem that all our words, even all of our representational resources come from the actual world - there is no point outside where we could look for it. Important argument: but that does not imply that the contents of whose expression we use our words, are inevitably dependent from many of the facts that our words have these contents. I 226 Relationalism/relationism/space/Leibniz/Stalnaker: Thesis: pro conceptual independence of space and time. Stalnaker: I think he is coherent. Thesis: there is no absolute localisation (Position, no absolute quiescent point). That means that the assignment of number triples to space points is arbitrary. RelationismVsAbsolutism/Stalnaker: the point of issue is whether the identification of spatial points is conventionally in time. Relationism: there is no absolute movement. Only change in time of the relative positions of things. Movement/Relationism/Stalnaker: Assertions about movements are totally useful here! But they are always understood in terms of a frame (frame of reference). Analogy/Stalnaker: suppose someone tried to refute relationism with an argument analogous to that of Shoemaker, meaning the one of the gradual change. Interpersonal spectrum: analogous to his denial is the denial of the meaningfulness of the thesis that the universe could also be shifted one meter to the left. Such a poss.w. would only be a conventional new description. I 227 Relationism: but even he has to admit - it is then said - that the chair could be first placed alone one meter to the left, and then gradually all other objects. This is certainly not impossible. And it would turn nonsense, one would say that at the last change the initial state would at a stroke again exist. ((s) In order to meet the thesis that nothing has changed on the whole). Stalnaker: I hope no one takes this argument seriously VsRelationism. Relationism/Stalnaker: has no reason to abandon his view that the overall effect of the series of changes leaves the things as they were. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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