Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Lewis | IV 245 Absolute/relative/vagueness/Unger/Lewis: e.g. (Peter Unger): you could say there is really nothing that is really smooth. Sure, the pavement is flat, but the desk is still smoother. Lewis pro: suppose that for no description of the relative vagueness of "smooth" and "smoother" it is true that something is smoother than something that is smooth. Score keeping/vagueness/Lewis: the correct answer is that he changed their score. The approximation rule allows Unger to create a context in which everything he says is true but that does not prove that something is wrong in our everyday contexts. Cf. >Absoluteness/Unger. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Assertions | Assertion: a statement that goes beyond mere writing down of a sentence or a string of characters. By the assertion the subject is commited to certain other claims. See also score keeping, inferences, speech acts, statements. |
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| Compatibility | Brandom | I 244 Incompatibility/Brandom: normative-functionally analyzed: the determination of a claim precludes the authorization of another - advantage of this analysis: inconsistent beliefs are made understandable - definition: commitments exist only because people treat each other as fixed. >Understanding. --- I 252 Assigning foreign commitments is fundamental for entering own commitments. >Score keeping. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descriptions | Lewis | I (a) 10 Description/Lewis: it always is also about the meaning of the terms used. - Therefore, it is pointless to point out several differences. Description: a true sentence about things of any kind as such is not about those things by themselves, but about them together with the meaning of the expressions you use. It is therefore useless to point out various differences. In the case of >identity theory, we can explain these differences without denying the body/mind identity. Detailed descriptions lead to deviations due to the expressions used. IV 240 Definite Description/Lewis: necessary: something outstanding, relative prominence - not: uniqueness. - The prominence changes constantly during the conversation. Denotation by a definite description then depends on the score keeping. >Scorekeeping model. Alignment rule: Prominence of an object is affected by the course of the conversation. Boundaries/Lewis: it is easier to expand the boundaries than to narrow them. --- I (b) 26/27 Failed descriptions are not meaningless. (Putnam: the theoretical terms of a refuted theory are meaningless.) LewisVsPutnam: they are not, if they are similar failed descriptions. "The Mars moon" and "The Venus moon" name nothing here in our real world (in any normal way); but they are not meaningless, because we know very well what they denote in certain other possible worlds. >Senseless/ Sensible, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Metaphysics | Brandom | I 716 MetaphysicsBrandomVsMetaphysics: confuses assigning and the assumption or recognition of commitments. >Score keeping, >Attribution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Necessity | Wessel | I 126 Necessary/Wessel: often: "~ p > p" interpreted as necessary - Problem: no way to differentiate between "p" and "p is necessary". >Logical necessity, >Logical possibility. "Logically impossible": "p> ~ p": then "~ p" and "p is impossible" equivalent. >Equivalence. I 344 Necessity/Wessel: when I designate a sentence as needed, I give a hint about my judgment reasons. >Judgments, >Reasoning, >Justification. Possibility: Speaker abstains from judgment. >Possibility, cf. >Score keeping. I 350 Logical/physically necessary/Wessel: 1. what is logically necessary is also factually necessary 2. What is factually possible is also logically possible 3. What is factually not necessary, is also not logically necessary 4. what is logically impossible , is also factually impossible. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. Logical modality sets limits on the factual modality - because logical modality alone from linguistic requirements, not ontologically. Logical truth is equivalent to logical demonstrability and logical necessity. >Provability, >Modalities, >Logical truth. Logical falsifiability is equivalent to logical falsehood and logical impossibility. >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Planning | Lewis | IV 248 Plan/Lewis: For example, we set up the plan to raid the nuclear power plant to steal plutonium: the plan grows and we become more and more complicated, but sometimes parts are also revised. IV 249 Score keeping: suddenly I start talking about the getaway car, so it automatically becomes part of the plan and the account changes, before it was perhaps a presupposition. >Presupposition, >Score keeping model. Maybe the whole plan is part of our presuppositions? The two could also come into conflict if, for example, we just set up the plan to show that the nuclear power plant should be better protected. Plan/Presupposition/Lewis: the difference between the two is not between what we assume and what we really do. While we are planning to invade the nuclear power plant and presuppose that we are not doing it, perhaps we could not assume for certain that we are doing it, nor that we are not doing it. Everyone could hope to convert the other to do it after all. For example "Then you drive the getaway car to the side entrance": The car is planned, the side entrance is rather presupposed. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Brandom | I 693 Propositional attitudes/Brandom: their attribution plays an explicating and expressive role - they make the deontic attitudes explicit and not the inferential structure of a semantic content. >Score keeping, >Propositions, >Attribution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Rationality | Habermas | III 25 Rationality/Habermas: has less to do with acquisition than with the use of knowledge. Knowledge can be criticized as unreliable. III 26 This is where the ability to justify comes into play. For example, actions which the actor himself/herself considers to be hopeless cannot be justified. >Justification, >Reasons, >Contradictions, >Knowledge. III 30 Rationality/Realism/Phenomenology/Habermas: two approaches differ in the way propositional knowledge is used: a) The "realistic" position is based on the ontological premise of the world as the epitome of what is the case, in order to clarify on this basis the conditions of rational behaviour. The realist can limit himself/herself to the conditions for objectives and their realization. b) The "phenomenological" position reflects on the fact that the rational actors themselves must presuppose an objective world. >Propositional knowledge. III 31 It makes the ontological preconditions a problem and asks about the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a communication community. It must be regarded by the subjects as one and the same world in order to gain objectivity. >Lifeworld, >Rationality/Pollner. III 33 The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality, derived from the realistic approach, can be added to the broader phenomenological concept of rationality. There are relationships between the ability of decentral perception and manipulation of things and events on the one hand and the ability of intersubjective communication on the other. (See also Cooperation/Piaget), >Cooperation. III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their lifeworld would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. >Descriptions, >Predication, >Attribution, cf. >Score keeping. III 44 Those who use their own symbolic means of expression dogmatically behave irrationally. Cf. >Language use. IV 132 Rationality/Habermas: we can trace the conditions of rationality back to conditions for a communicatively achieved, justified consensus. Linguistic communication, which is designed for communication and does not merely serve to influence one another, fulfils the prerequisites for rational expressions or for the rationality of subjects capable of speaking and acting. The potential for rationalization (...) can be released (...) to the extent that the language fulfils functions of communication (and) coordination of action (...) and thus becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration and socialization take place. >Language/Habermas. Rorty I I 92 RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how". >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >RortyVsHabermas. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reason | Brandom | I 395 Reason/Brandom: we are rational beings exactly as far as our recognition of discursive determinations makes a difference for what we will do next. >Discourse, >Actions. I 399 Mind/Brandom: Thesis: we gain mutual recognition out of our ability to say "we". >Recognition. --- II 213 Definition mind/Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules - KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. >Mind, >Understanding, >Rules, >Score keeping model. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reason (Justification) | Brandom | I 813 Justification/Brandom: monologic justification is parasitic to dialogic justification. >Justification, >Score keeping. --- Newen I 163 Reason/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: inference can be a relationship in the opposite direction - e.g. to expect a thunder when it has flashed before. Cf. >Natural meaning/signs/Armstrong. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Reason/Cause | Brandom | II 121 Reason/Hume/Brandom: must be accompanied by a desire to perform an action - KantVsHume: Desire (sensual inclination) can provide no basis for an action - in addition: recognition of an obligation. >Desire, >Actions, >Intentions, >Motives. II 122 Brandom: to have a reason is to be eligible to own practical commitment. II 123 Recognition of a commitment can cause and can be caused. >Score keeping. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Reliability Theory | Brandom | I 308f Regularity theories/Regth/Brandom: Assessment of truth based on the correct or incorrect use of concepts. >Regularities, >Regularity theory. Reliability theories: already presume the concept of correct asserting and application. >Assertions. Authorisation: derived from accuracy of assertion. >Score keeping model. VsReliability theory: gerrymandering: there is an infinite number of patterns for explaining a regularity - there must be privileged regularities (uniformities, UF). >Gerrymandering. I 312/313 Reliability/Goldman/Brandom: objective property - it is based on the probabilities, not on the perception. >Objectivity, >Perception. I 324 Reliability theory: E.g. Monique has learned to recognize white beech by its leaves, but is unsure herself - in that case, she has knowledge even though she denies it - the knowledge status is external - SellarsVs, Brandom pro - Reliability theory: Monique has knowledge - Sellars: it is always located in the space of reasons (instead of non-inferential, direct perception) - so it is always about justification. >Justification. --- II 59 Reliability theories/Definition "basic insight"/Brandom: reliably formed true beliefs may qualify as knowledge, even though the one who knows cannot justify them. Goldman/Brandom: Attributions of reliability must be qualified to reference classes. Definition "conceptual blind spot": over-generalization of the basic insight of reliability theory to semantics. - It is wrongly assumed that one could understand the content of knowledge claims, just because there may be knowledge in cases, in which the one who knows himself does not have an inferential justification. - In order to avoid that, he must be shown that inferential significance plays a role for the distinction of representations. Definition "Naturalistic Blind Spot": wants to see the basis of a fully naturalized epistemology that requires no standards or reasons in the reliabtility approach. In order to avoid this it is necessary to recur to interpersonal inference. >Inference. II 127ff Reliability theoryVsGettier/Brandom: not whether justified true beliefs are necessary together, but whether they are necessary individually - "basic insight": there are at least some cases of knowledge without justification. II 128f E.g. chicken sexers (odour) - E.g. country sayings. II 130 Reliability theory/Brandom: externalist, because facts decide whether we know something. >Externalism, >Facts. II 140 Cases of knowledge without knowledge about are only possible as a local, not as a global phenomenon - otherwise notion of reliability would not be possible - and, a fortiori, not of knowledge. II 144 Reliability itself cannot assume the explanation role ((s) >Circular reasoning.). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Self | Brandom | I 776 Definition Self/Brandom: selves are classes of the same responsibility or bundles of deontic status and attitudes. >Score keeping model. I 777 Assigning of beliefs is based on the fact that our bodies have continuous paths in space - specification and performances are divided into classes that correspond to individuals. >Individuals, >Individuation, >Person, >Attribution. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Speech Act Theory | Austin | Husted III 240ff Speech Act Theory: expressive function. >Accuracy, >Adequacy. VsRedundancy Theory (p = "it is true that p"). >Redundancy theory. Speech Act/Austin: Def lokutionary act: enunciation - E.g. you give an example of the meaningful sentence "the bull is going". perlocutionary: effect by using the statement - E.g. warning with this sentence. >Perlocutionary acts. illocutionary: you frighten the listener. >Illocutionary acts. III 245 In addition: fulfilling conditions as a "plus" to the statement: the warranty given by the speaker -> Brandom, >Score keeping. II 247 Speech act theory -VsLogical Positivism: more than just the two functions a) description of reality, b) expression of emotions Speech acts belong to neither of these two categories. >Positivism. III 248 AustinVsWittgenstein: per continuous similarity - Speech act theory: shows its strength here. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle. |
Austin I John L. Austin "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Austin II John L. Austin "A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3 German Edition: Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Supervenience | Brandom | I 428 Definition Supervenience/Brandom: a vocabulary supervenes on another if and only if there could be no two situations in which true statements (i.e. facts), formulated, would differ in supervenient vocabulary, while the true statements, formulated in the vocabulary, that supervenes on it, do not differ. Neutral: if it is clear what one is commited to in one language, it is also clear what one is committed to in the other. >Score keeping model. Supervenience/Brandom: here: vocabularies in terms of appearance/reality: weaker than reduction (when phenomenalism): the actual conditions of perception are crucial. >Perception, >Appearance, >Reality, >Phenomenalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Weak Will | Brandom | II 125 Weakness of will/Brandom: Solution: if the self-assignment of practical commitments (I should) does not possess the causal significance of recognition of these practical commitments - not mysterious. >Score keeping model. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Various Authors | Brandom Vs Various Authors | I 205 The approach advocated here is critical of three views: Vs 1) that the content is construed exclusively in accordance with the model of the representation of facts. 2) that the quality of the inference solely according to the model of formal validity, 3) that rationality is construed only according to the model of reasoning based on means or purposes. I 338 Brandom: VsReductionism, Brandom pro Relativism I 340 Beliefs: make a difference for what we say and do. They can only be understood in a context of social linguistic practice. First-person reflection is the internalization of third-person reflections. (Vs "privileged access"). I 542 BrandomVsFormalism: of course it is not the case, that something would be propositional in content only by virtue of its relation to accuracies in the inferential practice. Formalistic error: equals all accuracies of inference with logical correctness. I 822 VsTradition: so far, a clear distinction could be made between semantics and pragmatics only by largely overlookeding anaphoric phenomena. I 826 BrandomVsTradition: instead of non-perspective facts one must pay attention only to the structural characteristics of score keeping practices. II 13 VsBrandom: characterized as super-rationalist by others. The meaning of it all stems from the role in language use. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Wittgenstein | Brandom Vs Wittgenstein | Brandom I 92 Wittgenstein: the fact that there is a conception of a rule is not the interpretation, it manifests itself from time to time what we call "following the rules" and what we call "acting against it". That means there must be something like practice-implicit standards. I 94 BrandomVsWittgenstein: worrying that the normative attribution here requires a range of regularities of behavior and dispositions. Moreover, that the existence of these regularities is not part of what is asserted by such attributions. An analogy to length measurement assumes the rigidity of the world. But we learn practically immediately to apply new concepts. I 820 BrandomVsWittgenstein: W. had insisted that explicit standards are intelligible only before a background of practice-implicit standards. (see above regress - prevention). II 26/27 Brandom: He was wrong to say that this principle is incompatible with understanding the discursive practice in a way that it involves interpretation at every level (in his sense), including the most basic one. Double score keeping: an assertion is seen in the face of further determinations assigned by the score keeper as well as the stipulations entered into by himself. BrandomVsWittgenstein: the inferential identification asserts that the language has a center. Assertions are not just things that can be done with language. Rather, they are that by which thinking and intellectual ability are made possible at all. |
R. Brandom I Brandom Expressive Vernunft Franktfurt/M 2000 II Brandom Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt/M 2001 |
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