Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mysticism | Dennett | I 246 Evidence/paranormal/mysticism/Dennett: E.g. there is someone who promises to give magical powers in the competition of the coin toss. - There will certainly be a winner. - This will then be taken as a proof that there are supernatural forces. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Mysticism | McGinn | I 35 Mysticism/M/McGinn: The mysticism akes the concept related facts at face value, but is unable to accept them as something simply inexplicable like the follower of non-traceability. (But raises further claim). I 63 McGinnVsMysticism: the problem is not that a lot on mysticism is undoubtedly wrong but that it is incoherent. It is no position in logical space. What content actually has the concept of the supernatural? - "The supernatural is the reified ignorance of the people." I 138 Free will (According to McGinn): Mysticism: the will is perhaps the natural home of the non-naturalist. He will say that there is surely nothing in the world of experience, which differs so starkly from the routine processes of causality and predictability, like an act of free choice. By free choice we made the otherworldly aspect of our existence proof. Natural expression of the soul, far from human processes. McGinnVsMysticism: this is not a response to the initial argument (determinism = indeterminism). Is our supernatural soul determined, or is it not? The question is therefore only postponed. God himself would face the dilemma. I 160 Mystification: we have knowledge a priori by divine revelation. Plato, Goedel: Thesis: there is a special faculty of mathematical intuition that brings us inexplicably with the abstract reality in conjunction. --- II 104 Human ignorance is no proof that the answer must be supernatural. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Mysticism | Nozick | II 660 Astral body/mysticism/Nozick: Suppose we have a theory that in a dream a body leaves the sleeping body. Problem: if one dreams of others, must there astral bodies also arrive there? Problem: if many dream of Marilyn Monroe, but she does not dream of so many. II 157 Mysticism/Nozick: mystical experiences might as well be more superficial. - They do not show that they are "deeper". >"Ivresse des grands profondeurs", >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 154 People have always difficulty to describe it - but sounds and colors are not hard to describe - Incorrect use of "indescribable". >Description, >Colors, >Knowledge, >Phenomena, >Qualia. II 158 If the reality is as the mystic says, but the knowledge of it brings no evolutionary advantage, we should not expect that brain states were selected to display the reality as it is (namely, as the mystics experienced). >Selection, >Evolution, >Brain states. Meditation/"as few thoughts as possible": should we believe that there is something that corresponds to this experience? - That depends on what we believe, what meditation creates, if there were no such underlying reality. - E.g. what would the amplifier amplify if we take out the CD? - To adopt an unusual reality, would be a mistake. >Reality, >Regularity, >World. If a particular experience adjusts each time in the procedure (meditation), it is an artifact. >Artifacts. Rigid coupling shows nothing. >Covariance, >Rigidity. II 160 The mystical experience does not show why it is there. Mysticism/Nozick: I take it seriously - if not, you should justify this. >Experiences, >Justification. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Mysticism | Poundstone | I 58 Extrasensory perception/PoundstoneVsMysticism: You can ask the esotericist: to what extent would the world be different if there were no extrasensory perception? ((s) He can then answer only in a way in which he refutes himself: a) He answers that it looks different, then this would be determined by sensual perception; b) He answers that it does not look different, then he cannot know the difference himself). >Paradoxes, >Evidence, >Provability, >World/Thinking, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Reality, >Perception. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Mysticism | Wittgenstein | McGinn I 115 Magical theories rather play a subliminal role than an official role: approaches to Wittgenstein: A philosophical contemplation (The brown book, 263 ff): one could almost imagine that the naming was performed by a strange sacramental act, and that this is a magical relationship between the name and the thing. Cf. >Magical thinking. It is a common theme in Wittgenstein, that meaning triggers strange and occult ideas, The Tractatus is rather a place for magic ideas, of which Wittgenstein moves away later. Wittgenstein III 133 Philosophy/Wittgenstein: thesis: the most important of philosophy is to distinguish the meaningful and logically sayable from the unspeakable. What can be said is unimportant to human existence. The mystical is not what the world is, but that it is! VII 21 Pointing/Saying/Tractatus/Tetens: Wittgenstein refuses to say that there is nothing that cannot be meaningfully described. >Description, >Senseless. Solution/Tractatus: there is "inexpressible" that "shows itself". This is the "mystical" (> Tractatus 6.522). Cf. >Circular reasoning. VII 25 Whole/World/Tractatus/Tetens: the expression "the whole reality" means the world "within the limits of my language". This can be logically displayed in a meaningful way. The rest is not nothing, but can only be shown. Whole/Tractatus: "the feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical" (6.45). >Wholes. VI 106 Golden Bough/Frazer/Wittgenstein/SchulteVsFrazer: the book suffers from the weakness of presenting ritual and magical customs as if they were based on pseudo-scientific theories. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Mysticism | Darwin | Gould II 120 Mysticism/Darwin/Gould: Darwin's theory is materialistic in so far as it denies the causality of any spiritual forces, energies or powers. Example: Method/Darwin/Gould: How can we be scientific about the past? Darwin's book on worms makes that clear. Cf. >Individual causation, >Causal explanation. Gould II 123 Darwin made above all two statements about the worms (1): 1. the impact on the design of the soil is dependent on direction. 2. they form the humus, the uppermost layer of the soil and thus form a constancy in the midst of other permanent changes. Gould II 129 Gould: What if the evidence is limited to the static object itself? If we cannot observe the process of formation, can we still find several stages of the process? Darwin's answer: we deduce the history of imperfections that capture the constraints of descent. If God had applied orchids to the purpose from the very beginning, which their complex organs now hold, he would certainly have made them much easier. 1. Charles Darwin: The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms, with observations on their habits. London: John Murray, 1881. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Mysticism | Feyerabend | I 385 Mysticism/Feyerabend: there is no clearly formulated difference between myths and scientific theories. The science is loud, cheeky, expensive and strinking. We need a separation of state and science. >Science/Feyerabend. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Mysticism | Feynman | I 250 Mysticism/Feynman: in fact, there is no fortuneteller who can tell us about the presence in a distant place! It is unobservable. >Unobservables, >Observation, >Empiricism, >Prediction, >Knowledge, >Reality, >World/Thinking. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Mysticism | Kanitscheider | II 135 Supernaturalism/Supernatural/Kanitscheider: nowhere does supernaturalism aim at something indeterminate, but always around certain numinous persons, who are endowed with quite certain qualities, which allow man to interact with them. A purely metaphysical existence does not move a human being. >Metaphysics, >Ontology, >Supernatural. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mysticism | Leibniz | Holz I 96 Mysticism/LeibnizVsMysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: one should not take refuge in miracles (God), or accept unexplainable forces. >Ultimate justification/Leibniz, >Metaphysics/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Mysticism | Surowiecki | I 62 Mysticism/J. Scott Armstrong/Surowiecki: Armstrong's thesis: "As strong as the proof that visionaries do not exist might be, there are always fools who finance the existence of visionaries. (1) 1. J. Scott Armstrong, »The Seer-Sucker Theory – The Value of Experts in Forecasting«, Technology Review 83/1980), S. 16-24. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Locke, J. | Leibniz Vs Locke, J. | I 34/35 LeibnizVsLocke: Innate ideas are an ontological problem. I 44 Innate Ideas [Eingeborene Ideen]/LeibnizVsLocke: Their origin does not lie in the sensory perception, but in the reflection. Reflection: Nothing else than the attentiveness for what is in us. The reflection finds that there is much innate in our mind because we are self innate. e.g. being, unity, substance,duration, change, activity, perception, lust, and many other objects. I 45 They are the condition for the objective being to be determined as such (ens qua ens). They are given to us together with the being, and are a formal determination of the being. It is not established how those innate ideas behave when meeting the "initial truths" [erste Wahrheiten], the latter which are derived from sensory perceptions. I 46 Ideas/Perception/LeibnizVsLocke: these "ideas" (expansion, duration, appearance, etc.) come from the mind, not from the perception! They are the "ideas of the pure reason". However, they are connected to the exterior world; as such, they can be defined and proved. I 86 World/Totality/Leibniz: The construction of totality corresponds to calculus. Maximum: the infinite quantity of different substantialities.(World) Minimum: Representation of the whole in the individual.(Representation). I 87 LeibnizVsLocke: The connection of the indefinite quantity of predicates and the idea of the infinite as unity: this is the complete opposite of a pure addition of various things. As such, the idea of infinity is excluded from the realm of quantity! There is no "infinite number". There also is no infinite line. I 96 Miracle/Mysticism/LeibnizVsLocke: You should not seek refuge in miracles (God) or accept unexplainable forces. Vollmer I 17 Leibniz/Vollmer: 1704. New treatise on human reason. LeibnizVsLocke: Vs wax tablet, Vstabula rasa. Even though there might be nothing written on the wax tablet, it has nevertheless a certain structure right from the beginning, particularly a certain surface. It depends on the type and the number of the sensory organs which signals are processed as sensory perceptions. A propos: "There is nothing in the mind which was not first in some manner in the senses." ["Es gibt nichts im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen war"]: Leibniz: Except the mind itself! Like Aristotle: Thesis: The mind has particular characteristics right from the beginning. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| McGee, V. | Field Vs McGee, V. | II 351 Second Order Number Theory/2nd Order Logic/HOL/2nd Order Theory/Field: Thesis (i) full 2nd stage N.TH. is - unlike 1st stage N.TH. - categorical. I.e. it has only one interpretation up to isomorphism. II 352 in which the N.TH. comes out as true. Def Categorical Theory/Field: has only one interpretation up to isomorphism in which it comes out as true. E.g. second order number theory. (ii) Thesis: This shows that there can be no indeterminacy for it. Set Theory/S.th.: This is a bit more complicated: full 2nd order set theory is not quite categorical (if there are unreachable cardinal numbers) but only quasi-categorical. That means, for all interpretations in which it is true, they are either isomorphic or isomorphic to a fragment of the other, which was obtained by restriction to a less unreachable cardinal number. Important argument: even the quasi-categorical 2nd order theory is still sufficient to give most questions on the cardinality of the continuum counterfactual conditional the same truth value in all interpretations, so that the assumptions of indeterminacy in ML are almost eliminated. McGee: (1997) shows that we can get a full second order set theory by adding an axiom. This axiom limits it to interpretations in which 1st order quantifiers go above absolutely everything. Then we get full categoricity. Problem: This does not work if the 2nd order quantifiers go above all subsets of the range of the 1st order quantifiers. (Paradoxes) But in McGee (as Boolos 1984) the 2nd order quantifiers do not literally go above classes as special entities, but as "plural quantifiers". (>plural quantification). Indeterminacy/2nd Order Logic/FieldVsMcGee: (see above chapter I): Vs the attempt to escape indeterminacy with 2nd order logic: it is questionable whether the indeterminacy argument is at all applicable to the determination of the 2nd order logic as it is applicable to the concept of quantity. If you say that sentences about the counterfactual conditional have no specific truth value, this leads to an argument that the concept "all subsets" is indeterminate, and therefore that it is indeterminate which counts as "full" interpretation. Plural Quantification: it can also be indeterminate: Question: over which multiplicities should plural quantifiers go?. "Full" Interpretation: is still (despite it being relative to a concept of "fullness") quasi-unambiguous. But that does not diminish the indeterminacy. McGeeVsField: (1997): he asserts that this criticism is based on the fact that 2nd order logic is not considered part of the real logic, but rather a set theory in disguise. FieldVsMcGee: this is wrong: whether 2nd order logic is part of the logic, is a question of terminology. Even if it is a part of logic, the 2nd order quantifiers could be indeterminate, and that undermines that 2nd order categoricity implies determinacy. "Absolutely Everything"/Quantification/FieldVsMcGee: that one is only interested in those models where the 1st. order quantifiers go over absolutely everything, only manages then to eliminate the indeterminacy of the 1st order quantification if the use of "absolutely everything" is determined!. Important argument: this demand will only work when it is superfluous: that is, only when quantification over absolutely everything is possible without this requirement!. All-Quantification/(s): "on everything": undetermined, because no predicate specified, (as usual E.g. (x)Fx). "Everything" is not a predicate. Inflationism/Field: representatives of inflationist semantics must explain how it happened that properties of our practice (usage) determine that our quantifiers go above absolutely everything. II 353 McGee: (2000) tries to do just that: (*) We have to exclude the hypothesis that the apparently unrestricted quantifiers of a person go only above entities of type F, if the person has an idea of F. ((s) i.e. you should be able to quantify over something indeterminate or unknown). Field: McGee says that this precludes the normal attempts to demonstrate the vagueness of all-quantification. FieldVsMcGee: does not succeed. E.g. Suppose we assume that our own quantifiers determinedly run above everything. Then it seems natural to assume that the quantifiers of another person are governed by the same rules and therefore also determinedly run above everything. Then they could only have a more limited area if the person has a more restricted concept. FieldVs: the real question is whether the quantifiers have a determinate range at all, even our own! And if so, how is it that our use (practices) define this area ? In this context it is not even clear what it means to have the concept of a restricted area! Because if all-quantification is indeterminate, then surely also the concepts that are needed for a restriction of the range. Range/Quantification/Field: for every candidate X for the range of unrestricted quantifiers, we automatically have a concept of at least one candidate for the picking out of objects in X: namely, the concept of self-identity! ((s) I.e. all-quantification. Everything is identical with itself). FieldVsMcGee: Even thoguh (*) is acceptable in the case where our own quantifiers can be indeterminate, it has no teeth here. FieldVsSemantic Change or VsInduction!!!. II 355 Schematic 1st Stage Arithmetic/McGee: (1997, p.57): seems to argue that it is much stronger than normal 1st stage arithmetic. G. is a Godel sentence PA: "Primitive Arithmetic". Based on the normal basic concepts. McGee: seems to assert that G is provable in schematic PA ((s) so it is not true). We just have to add the T predicate and apply inductions about it. FieldVsMcGee: that’s wrong. We get stronger results if we also add a certain compositional T Theory (McGee also says that at the end). Problem: This goes beyond schematic arithmetics. McGee: his approach is, however, more model theoretical: i.e. schematic 1st stage N.TH. fixes the extensions of number theory concepts clearly. Def Indeterminacy: "having non-standard models". McGee: Suppose our arithmetic language is indeterminate, i.e. It allows for unintended models. But there is a possible extension of the language with a new predicate "standard natural number". Solution: induction on this new predicate will exclude non-standard models. FieldVsMcGee: I believe that this is cheating (although some recognized logicians represent it). Suppose we only have Peano arithmetic here, with Scheme/Field: here understood as having instances only in the current language. Suppose that we have not managed to pick out a uniform structure up to isomorphism. (Field: this assumption is wrong). FieldVsMcGee: if that’s the case, then the mere addition of new vocabulary will not help, and additional new axioms for the new vocabulary would help no better than if we introduce new axioms simply without the new vocabulary! Especially for E.g. "standard natural number". Scheme/FieldVsMcGee: how can his rich perspective of schemes help to secure determinacy? It only allows to add a new instance of induction if I introduce new vocabulary. For McGee, the required relevant concept does not seem to be "standard natural number", and we have already seen that this does not help. Predicate/Determinacy/Indeterminacy/Field: sure if I had a new predicate with a certain "magical" ability to determine its extension. II 356 Then we would have singled out genuine natural numbers. But this is a tautology and has nothing to do with whether I extend the induction scheme on this magical predicate. FieldVsMysticism/VsMysticism/Magic: Problem: If you think that you might have magical aids available in the future, then you might also think that you already have it now and this in turn would not depend on the schematic induction. Then the only possible relevance of the induction according to the scheme is to allow the transfer of the postulated future magical abilities to the present. And future magic is no less mysterious than contemporary magic. FieldVsMcGee: it is cheating to describe the expansion of the language in terms of its extensions. The cheating consists in assuming that the new predicates in the expansion have certain extensions. And they do not have them if the indeterminist is right regarding the N.Th. (Field: I do not believe that indeterminism is right in terms of N.Th.; but we assume it here). Expansion/Extenstion/Language/Theory/FieldVsMcGee: 2)Vs: he thinks that the necessary new predicates could be such for which it is psychological impossible to add them at all, because of their complexity. Nevertheless, our language rules would not forbid her addition. FieldVsMcGee: In this case, can it really be determined that the language rules allow us something that is psychologically impossible? That seems to be rather a good example of indeterminacy. FieldVsMcGee: the most important thing is, however, that we do not simply add new predicates with certain extensions. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mysticism | Black Vs Mysticism | III 69 VsScience/Mysticism/Black: some contemporary critics might say "the so-called science (the "academic" one that arouses their hostility) has proved that real science (mysticism, etc.) is impossible." BlackVsMysticism: the price for giving up objectivity is much higher: it is also the task of the commonsense view of the everyday world. III 70 Naïve realism/Black: the commonsense view is often called naïve realism but it is definitely correct in all essential respects of dealing with the outside world. ((s) The scientist pushes the red button instead of the green one, because he believes that both exist. Def Objective orientation/Terminology/Black: By that I do not mean "everyday ontology", but something that underlies it: we have an objective orientation of perception. Violating it leads to madness and self-destruction. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Mysticism | Kauffman Vs Mysticism | I 9 Wissenschaft/Zufall/Kauffman: Manche Autoren: die Wissenschaft hat uns zu Wesen reduziert, die ihre Existenz dem Zufall verdanken. KauffmanVs: das ist unvollständig. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Mysticism | Lewis Vs Mysticism | V 169 Causal Dependency/cauD/Lewis: is simply not the same as causation. But causation without causal dependency is rare. >Causal dependenc/Lewis, >causation/Lewis. LewisVsMysticism: if there were inexplicable causal dependencies, we wouldn't (understandably) know anything about it. (If we weren't aware of it). LewisVsRegularity: a fixed regularity theory would rule out inexplicable causal dependencies, and I want to avoid that. V 182 The hidden quality must therefore be something else: it does not supervise on those qualities of the possible worlds on which as far as we see everything else supervenes. Accepting something so mystical is a serious matter. We need better reasons than isolated intuitions. (LewisVsMysticism). Some people have important reasons... |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Mysticism | Wittgenstein Vs Mysticism | III 226 WittgensteinVsEsotericism/Private Language/Flor: it makes no sense to speak of a knowledge of certain phenomena, regardless of the participation in a regulated public practice. WittgensteinVsMysticism. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Mysticism | Verschiedene Vs Mysticism | John Gribbin Auf der Suche nach Schrödingers Kätzchen, München, Zürich 1991 VII 207 Mysticism: some try to equate the net of electromagnetic radiation, through which everything is "simultaneously" connected, with Eastern wisdom. GribbinVsMysticism: they missed the fact that photons can be produced and destroyed naturally! Therefore the net is not complete. VII 208 Perspective/Gribbin: but the reality is a photon orbit in spacetime, which connects my eye e.g. with the polar star. However, there is no real movement of time in which this orbit develops, this is only my perception from my point of view. From another point of view, this track is an eternal phenomenon. Reality/Feynman/Diagram: Question: how real are the other tracks now? When we move a slot above the diagram, we change our perception, not reality. VII 209 We are connected to a constantly moving observation slit. Therefore we see a positron moving forward in time and not an electron moving backward in time. But both interpretations are equally real. This gave Wheeler the idea that there could only be one electron in the universe. Anyway, they are all connected on a complex zigzag path through space-time. |
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| Mysticism | Feynman Vs Mysticism | I 250 Mysticism/FeynmanVsMysticism: there is no fortune teller who can tell us about the present times in a remote location - it is unobservable. |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Mysticism | Kanitscheider Vs Mysticism | II 70 Vs Unity of Science/Hans Primas: (ETH Zurich) new ideological monism, seeks the domination of a single idea and a single way of life. II 71 But Primas is also a critic of the rational approach in science. He believes that a "holistic" view must also include the irrational aspects of reality. (Emotionality). KanitscheiderVsMysticism/KanitscheiderVsPrimas: the existence of the irrational always appears only as a global assertion. The moment an example is given, there is also a science that can approach the phenomenon with rational means. Primas' assertion that the emotional dimension does not allow rational access is not substantiated by anything, but has no influence whatsoever on the unity of physics. Irrrationality/Kanitscheider: the irrational does not consist in a further ontological level, but precisely in the belief that this layer of reality exists. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Teilhard de Chardin | Kanitscheider Vs Teilhard de Chardin | II 176 Teilhard de Chardin/Kanitscheider: precursor of Process Theology. Thesis: Immanence of God in an incomplete and ever evolving world. Omega point. He distinguishes two types of energy, "tangential" (physical), "radial" (mental). The mental energy becomes denser and more concentrated with evolution, which is expressed in the emergence of intelligent living beings. In the end, the radial energy dominates the tangential energy. II 177 Supernatural/Religion/Theory/KanitscheiderVsMysticism/Kanitscheider: For example, if a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. Teilhard de Chardin/Kanitscheider: precursor of Process Theology. Thesis: Immanence of God in an incomplete and ever evolving world. Omega point - two types of energy, "tangential" (physical), "radial" (mental) - the latter increases and prevails in the end. KanitscheiderVsTeilhard: Doubling effect - Solution: Self-Organisation. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mysticism | Pro | Black III 61 Science: skepticism against science: Theodore Roszak (1972) - Defense: Chwistek, 1949 |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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