Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 49 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adaption | Evolutionary Psychology | Corr I 267 Adaption/evolutionary psychology/Figueredo: There are essentially three solutions to the problem of adaptation to environments that are variable or heterogeneous in either time or space (including ‘ecological space’): (1) developmental plasticity, (2) genetic diversity, and (3) spatial migration. According to Brunswikian Evolutionary Developmental (BED) theory, ecologies that are variable over evolutionary time select for organisms that are phenotypically plastic enough to adapt by means of learning over developmental time (Figueredo, Hammond and McKiernan 2006)(1). However, such behavioural development depends critically on the existence of reliable and valid cues that signal which alternative phenotype is optimal under each set of localized conditions in time, space and ecology. >Niches/Figueredo, >Ecology/evolutionary psychology. 1. Figueredo, A. J., Hammond, K. R. and McKiernan, E. C. 2006. A Brunswikian evolutionary developmental theory of preparedness and plasticity, Intelligence 34: 211–27 Aurelio José Figueredo, Paul Gladden, Geneva Vásquez, Pedro Sofio, Abril Wolf and Daniel Nelson Jones, “Evolutionary theories of personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Atomism | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 25 Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Thesis: all logical forms can be constructed from the shapes of objects. Hintikka I 175 Logical Independence/Elementary Proposition/Atomism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: (1931) Wittgenstein eventually abandons the quest for logical independence of elementary propositions. - It was a real failure. - Reason: color attributes (color predicates) are not independent - E.g. red exists in the degree q1r and red exists in the degree q2r, then it follows: if q2>q1, q1r follows from q2r. - Later Vs: does not work with impure and opaque colors either. I 176 Atomism/Middle Period/Wittgenstein/Waismann/Hintikka: new: atomic sentences are no longer individually compared with the world, but as a sentence systems. - ("Holistic"). - WittgensteinVsAtomism: middle period: - New: I apply the whole color scale at once. - That is the reason why a point cannot have more than one color. -> Measuring/Wittgenstein, More autors on measurements. - If I apply a set system to reality, then it is thereby said that only one fact can exist at a time. --- II 138 WittgensteinVsAtomism/WittgensteinVsTractatus: 2 errors: 1) assuming the infinite to be a number and assuming that there would be an infinite number of sentences. - 2) that there are statements that express degrees of qualities - atomism; requires, however, that if p and q are contradictory, they may be further analysed until t and ~t result. II 157 Atomism/Atom Sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: in the analysis of atomic sentences you do not encounter "particulars", not unlike in chemical analysis. --- IV 14 Atomism/Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: if the world had no substance, ((s) = unchangeable objects), the atomic sentences would not be independent of each other. ad IV 36ff Tractatus/Atomism/Wittgenstein/(s): Atoms: undefined objects, quasi material things, (sounds), primitive signs - unclear whether thing (object) or immaterial, only components of the sentence are translated. - Thus, they are open to meaning theory which simultaneously derives from complex of objects, facts as well as connection of words, but (4.0312) the logic of the facts cannot be represented - the logical constants (and, or, not) do not represent. - Representative: sign for the object - internal properties: in the sentence different than the relations to the world (external). WittgensteinVsRussell, VsFrege: confusion mention/use: internal/external. >Mention, >Use, >Representation, >Logical constants, >Facts, >Signs. --- VII 122 Atomism/Atom Sentence/Truth Value/Truth Functions/Tr. fnc./Laws of Nature/LoN//Tractatus/Te Tens: the truth values of the atom sentences determine the truth of all remaining sentences with logical necessity, also those of the Laws of Nature - but then you should not say that something is only possible impossible or necessary by virtue of natural law or causality. - (6.37) - Laws of Nature are the truth functions of elementary propositions. - Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. >Truth values, >Truth functions. VII 124 Laws of Nature: are not the ultimum; that is logical space. >Laws of Nature. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Being a Bat | Putnam | V 128 Bat-Example/Nagel: "What is it like to be a bat? Thesis: we cannot imagine what it would be like to be a bat. V 128/129 Qualia/Bat: for example we want to imagine an argument: A: no bat quale is at least the same as a human quale. B: maybe there are at least some that are the same. There are also some feelings of other people that I probably cannot imagine, but that does not mean (that I see the psychological space of these other people as unimaginably different from my own). (By the way, bats can see very well, contrary to the prevailing opinion!) >Qualia, >Experience. I could at least say now: their pain is as much pain as mine. Could we come to a decision on this? The hearing center of the bat is 7/8 of the brain. ((s) Does the brain therefore have to provide completely different experience?) Example: 1. The brain of the bat has the disjunctive property P1 or P2; my brain has the disjunctive property P'1 or P'2. The respective sensations are correlated with the respective disjunctions. V 129/130 We assume: the qualitative character of the bat's sensation is identical to the qualitative character of my sensation, and both are identical (or correlated) with the more complex disjunctive property (P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2). According to the 1st theory, the bat and I have different experiences, according to the second theory, we have the same experience. However, both theories lead to the same predictions regarding the experiences of normal and abnormal human observers! Again, they are indistinguishable from an observational point of view! It is also not clear whether methodological maxims can be useful here. We also lack the principles to decide which theory is the simpler one. From our perspective we can decide which is the more "chauvinistic" one. V 129/130 Bat Example/disjunctive properties/identity theory/Putnam: Theory 1: Fl: disjunctive property P1 or P2, disjunctive property P'1 or P'2 U (assuming each correlation). Theory 2: we assume identity instead of correlation - correlation to complex property P1 or P2 or P'1 or P'2. N.B.: both theories lead to the same predictions of normal as of abnormal observers. Stones always have the disjunctive property "sensation or no sensation". |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Circumstances | Sellars | I XVIII Standard Conditions: the person who utters the sentence "this is green" must know that such a sentence is a reliable indicator of green objects. In addition, he must be aware that these conditions are standard conditions. He must be able to relate the opposite of other sentences in the logical space of reasons in relation. >Logical space, >Observation, >Observation sentence, >Perception, >Appearance, >Seeing, >Predication, >Attribution, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer. I 33 Standard Conditions: their assumption leads out of the logical atomism. >Atomism. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. Circumstances: to determine them we need to know something about the objects, about how they are in other circumstances. >Knowledge, >Reality, >World/thinking, >World, >Realism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Compositionality | Gärdenfors | I 241 Compositionality/conceptual space/linguistics/Gärdenfors: how can conceptual spaces describe the mechanisms that act during the formation of composite meanings? (For compositionality Szabo 2004). (1) Compositionality/GärdenforsVsFrege: thesis: since the communicative context changes the meaning of the expressions involved, the linguistic expression is under defined in its meaning. Communication/Transformation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the compilation of meanings often transforms these meanings. --- I 242 Direct composition/Gärdenfors: (non-Fregean): direct compositions are mappings between semantic areas (Holoyak & Thagard, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2000). (2)(3)(4) Combination adjective-noun: e.g. blue rectangle: its meaning is defined as the Cartesian product of the blue region of the color space and the rectangle region of the shape space. A product of compact and convex amounts will in turn be compact and convex. The mapping functions are continuous. The function product is also continuous. N.B.: thus the fixed point properties remain in the composition. (See fixed point/Gärdenfors (I 97): certainty about the common focus on an object. Meaning/GärdenforsVsFrege: the meaning of the compound structure is no longer formed by the meaning of the components but by the areas and functions. These can be located as regions in the product space (e.g., of color and size). It is assumed that the areas involved are separable. But in practice, they are not completely separate: some pre-processing must take place before the areas can be combined. --- I 244 Head/Modification/Gärdenfors: the analysis with head and modifier will usually not work because our knowledge about the respective areas will change the representation of the modifier: e.g. white wine is not white, e.g. a large squirrel is not a big animal. ((s)> syncategorematic expressions in Analytical Philosophy). Solution/Gärdenfors: we need contrast classes. E.g. adjectives such as "large" need contrast classes, which introduce yet another property. Then we can assume compact convex regions of metric spaces for the head and modifier, as well as a radial (continuous) projection between the spaces. (C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Mineola, NY, 1997). (5) Problem: e.g. Lion > Stone Lion: here, not all areas can be equally attributed, e.g. habitat, behavior, etc. --- I 246 Metaphorical composition: even if the head and modifier have no common dimensions, one can create an image between the two by using convexity and compactness. For example, a bumpy road and a bumpy relationship share the geometrical quality of a dimension: a) the length b) the time. --- I 247 Dimension: its diversity is sometimes seen as an obstacle: cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980).(6) > Metaphors/Gärdenfors. --- I 249 Noun verb combination/Gärdenfors: in my analysis a force pattern can be applied to different situations. E.g. the engine is running - the clock is running. --- I 250 Thesis about noun-verb combinations: the meaning of the verb is modified by the patient, but not by the agent. E.g. (From Keenan, 1984, p.20)(7): a) Oscar cut the lawn. The machine cut the lawn. b) Oscar cut the dress. The sharp stone cut the dress. Gärdenfors: the meaning of "cut" varies greatly between the pairs, but not so strong within the pairs. This shows that the meaning is not modified by the agent. 1. Szabo, Z. (2004). Compositionality. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compositionality 2. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1996). Mental leaps. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, R. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22, 133–187. 4. Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Berge, C. (1997). Topological spaces. Mineola, NY: Dover. 6. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. Keenan, E. J. (1984). Semantic correlates of the ergative/absolutive distinction. Linguistics, 22, 197–223. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Consciousness | Sellars | Rorty I 203 "Psychological nominalism": Sellars: thesis: any consciousness of varieties, similarities, facts and abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The acquisition of language does not even presuppose the awareness of the varieties, similarities and facts, related to the so-called immediate experience. >Language acquisition, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Dissimilarities, >Objects, >Seeing, >Seeing-as, >Knowledge, >World/thinking. Consciousness/Sellars (as Rorty) distinguishes between two types of consciousness: a) distinguishing behavior, b) consciousness as a movement in the logical space of reasons. Distinguishing behavior a) can also be found in rats, amoebas and computers. >Computer model/Sellars, >Logical Space of reasons. --- Frank I 264 Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosure of consciousness is the "myth of the given". >Myth of the Given/Sellars. Roderick M. Chisholm (1981): The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality, Brighton 1981 |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| de dicto | Lewis | IV 144 Knowledge de dicto/Lewis: E.g. encyclopedia - aimed at the world and provides knowledge about the world, not on the reader (de se) E.g. Lingens with memory loss finds himself in the library - (> tour guide example, Lost wanderers) - provides localization in logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap - E.g. map: will only be useful when the red dot "you are here" is removed. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Determinism | Rorty | VI 216 ff Determinism/Hume/Davidson/Rorty: the problem is not solvable. But the instruments that we use to apply our standards are often different from the ones we use for prediction. >Prediction. RortyVsMcDowell: There is no need for a "search for an understanding of nature that includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons". >Logical space, >space of reasons, >space of nature. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Equivalence | Stalnaker | I 84 Def Equivalence/localization/logical space/Stalnaker: to say that i is equivalent to j, is to say that the localization functions represent i and j in the same world. >Localization, >Equivalence, >Possible worlds, >Logical space. Def Intrinsic Property: an intrinsic property is the region in logical space that is invariant with respect to this equivalence relation. Contrast: in contrast to this stands the conventional property. >Intrinsicness, >Conventions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Experience | Leibniz | Holz I 54 Def Experience/Leibniz/Holz: Regression of different things to their connection in such a relation. Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. I 55 Experience/Leibniz: The first truths according to our knowledge are the experiences, because in them the objects are given as identical pre-predicative. Predication/Leibniz/Holz: in predication, the "first pre-predicative truths of experience" then become truths in the "logical space". I 57 Experience/Leibniz: 1. Principle of experience: that various things are received by me. >Unity/Leibniz, >Dissimilarity/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Grue | Stalnaker | I 81 Grue/grueness/Stalnaker: grue is not a region in logical space. Logical space: principle: all relations must be grounded in intrinsic properties. >Foundation, >Logical space, >Intrinsicness. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Justification | McDowell | I 18 Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations. A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions. This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative". I 31 Justification/Judgment/McDowell: the relations through which judgments are justified can only be understood as relations in the space of concepts (reasons). It is one thing to be free from guilt, and another to have a justification. Free from guilt: the raw influence of causality (the effect of the world on our senses) withdraws itself from the control of spontaneity. It is an excuse for someone if he was driven by a tornado to a place where he did not have anything to look for. But what we want is: that the exercise of spontaneity is subject to a control exercised by the world itself, but so that the applicability of spontaneity is not undermined (by no longer being the cause of excuse). >Spontaneity. Justification/McDowell: every concept which is now constituted by the fact that it consists in a justification relation to a merely present must be a purely private concept. I 161 Justification/Quine: cannot be done through experience. Only by events which are subject to natural laws. McDowellVsQuine: Contradiction: If experience is not within the order of justification, it cannot be exceeded by world views. This, however, requires "conceptual sovereignty." >Conceptual sovereignty. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Language Games | Rorty | III 221 Rules/language game/ Derrida/Rorty: Derrida does not want to make a move in the language game. - He does not want to play. - He does not wants to refute anyone. >Derrida. VI 210f RortyVsMcDowell: one should not speak of forms of comprehensibility. McDowell: logical space of reasons and logical space of the laws are sui generis respectively. >Logical Space, >Space of Reason, >Space of Nature. RortyVsMcDowell: They are not so strictly separate areas (the reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They can not be reduced to one another. e.g. Football and biology. But that is philosophically sterile question. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. >Language/Rorty, >Meaning, >Use theory, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Language community, >Idiolect, >Private language. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Logical Space | Flusser | Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
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| Logical Space | Logical space: is the designation by L. Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus for a set of independent (atomic) sentences that are connected with the truth value true or false. Some of these sentences will represent facts or elements of facts. These facts can be conceived as possible worlds and localized as points in the logical space. |
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| Logical Space | Lewis | V 87 Logical space/Lewis: points therein: possible worlds - Regions: propositions (= sets of worlds). >Proposition/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Logical Space | Stalnaker | I 81 Glue/Glueness/Stalnaker: glue does not form a region in logical space. >Grue. Logical space: principle: all relations must be found on intrinsic properties. >Intrinsicness, >Relations, >Foundation. I 83/84 Def Equivalence/localization/logical space/Stalnaker: saying that i is equivalent to j is to say that the localization functions i and j represent the same possible world. >Equivalence. Def intrinsic property: an intrinsic property is a region in logical space that is invariant with respect to this equivalence relation. Contrast: the contrasting property is the conventional property. >Conventions, >Properties. I 85 Logical space/Stalnaker: logical space does not exist independently of the individuals who inhabit it, but is abstracted from the world as we find it. >Abstraction. I 127 Spatial/logical/Stalnaker: solution/Stalnaker: the solution is our intuition: most of us have an actualistic conception of a possible world and possible individuals, but they represent a possibilism regarding spatial localization. Places north and south of us are just as real. We do not need surrogates for absent objects - even if there is no world-independent identity, there is still a localization-independent one. >Localization, >Identity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Logical Space | Bigelow | I 241 Definition Logical Space/Bigelow/Pargetter: the set of possible worlds together with the accessibility relation. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Map Example | Lewis | IV 144 Knowledge de dicto/Map-Example/Lewis: e.g. encyclopedia - applies to the world and provides knowledge about the world, not about the reader (de se). - E.g. Lingens with memory loss found himself in a library and reads his own story. (-> E.g. Lost wanderers). - Knowledge de dicto provides localization in the logical space but not in space-time - but you can close the gap. - E.g. Map: will only be used if the red dot "you are here" is removed. Explanation/(s):E.g., Two lost hikers meet. By chance they have the same hiking book. Then they will not find out their localization with the help of this book alone. Reason: In the printed book, the walkers are not identified, for example, as the one who came from the west and the one who came from the east. Solution: A modern navigation system registers the route and uses it to identify the user holding the device. >Propositional knowledge, >Non-propositional knowledge, >Self-identification, >Self-ascription. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Metaphysics | Stalnaker | I 1 Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics asks how the world is, not how we think about it. I 2 CarnapVsMetaphysics: in metaphysics there is a confusion of discovery and stipulation. I 15 Def understanding/Stalnaker: thesis: we understand the informational or propositional content in terms of distinguishing between options. Def metaphysics: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that need to be made between options. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Def semantics: semantics affects our ability to represent options and to distinguish between them. >Semantics, >Intentionality, >Meaning (Intending). Representation: we can only judge representation if we know how our logical space is structured. >Representation. Descriptive semantics: descriptive semantics asks what the semantic value of expressions is. Basic semantics: basic semantics asks, due to which facts they have this value. Metaphysical: metaphysical is inconceivable. I 181 Metaphysics/Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: thesis: the only role of theory in Kripke is that it serves to reject false arguments based on the confusion of two different questions (metaphysical and semantic questions). >Essence/Kripke, >Metaphysics/Kripke, >Essentialism/Kripke, >Essentialism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Minkowski Space | Kanitscheider | I 472 Minkowski space/Kanitscheider: the flat space-time of special relativity (SR). Four-dimensional Euclidean space spanned with the imaginary time coordinate ict = x4.(Notation: t time, c speed of light). Here the laws of the SR can be represented particularly simply. A point (event) is a world point, a place vector a world vector, the path of a particle a world line. Lorentz transformation means here a simple rotation of the coordinate system. If one chooses as time coordinate the real quantity x0 = ct = ix4 , then the space has a pseudo-Euclidean metric. The square of the length of any world vector is then given by R2 (squares of the coordinates). For R2 > 0 the world vector is space-like, for R2< 0 time-like. Light cone: the null cone or causality cone defined by R² = 0: The area within the light cone (R² < 0) includes all events which are or can be causally related to events in the vertex. Def Haussdorff space/Kanitscheider: a topological space is Haussdorffian if the Def separation axiom is satisfied: if x and y are two distinct points from T, then there are environments U(x) and U(y) such that there is no intersection of the two environments. >Relativity theory, >Space curvature, >Weyl principle. I 183 Spacetime/Kanitscheider: The Minkowski space (asymptotically flat in great distance is isotropic only from our location! I.e. from other points of view, the universe looks different. This is unsatisfactory. Our requirement is that the whole universe is isotropic (looking the same from all sides) and homogeneous (same approximate density everywhere). I.e. that if one puts a cut S(t) = const through the space-time, then one receives three-dimensional spaces (not Minkowski), which possess everywhere constant curvature and material condition. Friedman succeeded in 1922 to present a solution model. >Field equations/Kanitscheider. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Mysticism | McGinn | I 35 Mysticism/M/McGinn: The mysticism akes the concept related facts at face value, but is unable to accept them as something simply inexplicable like the follower of non-traceability. (But raises further claim). I 63 McGinnVsMysticism: the problem is not that a lot on mysticism is undoubtedly wrong but that it is incoherent. It is no position in logical space. What content actually has the concept of the supernatural? - "The supernatural is the reified ignorance of the people." I 138 Free will (According to McGinn): Mysticism: the will is perhaps the natural home of the non-naturalist. He will say that there is surely nothing in the world of experience, which differs so starkly from the routine processes of causality and predictability, like an act of free choice. By free choice we made the otherworldly aspect of our existence proof. Natural expression of the soul, far from human processes. McGinnVsMysticism: this is not a response to the initial argument (determinism = indeterminism). Is our supernatural soul determined, or is it not? The question is therefore only postponed. God himself would face the dilemma. I 160 Mystification: we have knowledge a priori by divine revelation. Plato, Goedel: Thesis: there is a special faculty of mathematical intuition that brings us inexplicably with the abstract reality in conjunction. --- II 104 Human ignorance is no proof that the answer must be supernatural. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Natural Laws | Wittgenstein | Hempel I 98ff Law of Nature/Wittgenstein: because they cannot be verified completely, they are not statements but only instructions for the formation of statements. >Statements, >Law statements. --- II 99 Laws of Nature/causal necessity/Wittgenstein: the laws of nature are not outside the phenomena - they belong to the language and to our description of things - when ones discusses them, one cannot ignore how they manifest themselves physically. II 131 Justification/laws of nature/Wittgenstein: laws of nature can be justified, rules of grammar not. >Rules, >Grammar, >Justification. II 163 Law of Nature/law/Wittgenstein: 2. Law of Thermodynamics/Wittgenstein: it is not clear a priori that the world continues to lose its order over time. It is a matter of experience. II 164 However, it is not a matter of experience, that it must come to an equal distribution of nuts and raisins, if one whirls them. That something happens with necessity, there is no experience. That one presupposes another force to explain the separation. (For example, specific weight). Laws of nature/Hertz/Wittgenstein: Hertz has said where something does not comply with his laws, there must be invisible masses, to explain it. WittgensteinVsHertz: this statement is neither right nor wrong, but it can be practical or not. Hypotheses like talking of "invisible masses" and "unconscious mental events" are standards of the expression. >Hypotheses. Laws of Nature/Wittgenstein: we believe it has to do with a law of nature a priori while it is a standard of expression: E.g. So like saying "Actually, everyone is going to Paris, II 165 Although some do not arrive, but all their displacements are preparations for the trip to Paris." --- IV 109 Law of Nature/explanation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 6,371 laws of nature are not explanations of natural phenomena - Tractatus 6,372 So they stay with the laws of nature, like the older with God. IV 105 Law of Causality/Law of Nature/Tractatus: 632 the law of causality is not a law but the form of a law. >Causal laws. IV 108 Causality/form/show/say/Tractatus: 636 if there were a law of causality, it might be: "There are laws of nature". But one cannot say that, it turns out. >Causality, >Causal explanation. --- Tetens VII 122 Civilization/WittgensteinVsCivilization/WittgensteinVsModernity/Tetens: believes he can explain everything and thinks all important is explained once the facts are scientifically explained in principle. It is an illusion that the world is explained when we know the laws of nature. >Explanation. VII 123 Definition laws of nature/Tractatus/Tetens: are the truth functions of elementary propositions. Therefore, the world as a whole cannot be explained. Neither through logic nor through the laws of nature. The laws of nature also not explain natural phenomena. (> Tractatus 6.317). VII 124 The laws of nature are also not the last. That is the logical space, the space of all possible distributions of truth values to the elementary propositions. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). --- I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. --- I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. Natural Law/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx). (see above) Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Naturalism | McDowell | I 18 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: refuses to acknowledge that the relationships that constitute the logical space of the reasons are not natural. >Space of reasons. I 92 Definition "blunt naturalism"/McDowell: denies that the spontaneity of the mind is sui generis. The blunt naturalism aims to place the conceptual abilities in nature, presented as the realm of natural laws. Abolition of the distinction between the space of reasons and nature. This means that what is natural is disenchanted. (Disenchantment of nature). --- I 102 Naturalism/McDowell: a different kind of naturalism than the blunt naturalism equates nature with the field of natural laws. But it is a different concept of updating our nature: We must bring the susceptibility for the meaning back into the operations of our natural sensibilities as such. This does not mean, however, that susceptibility for the meaning can be captured naturalistically (in the sense of natural laws). >Meaning/McDowell, >Understanding/McDowell, >Nature/McDowell. This looks as if we had to stand with one foot inside and with the other outside nature. This is not naturalism at all. But we must not see ourselves as divisive, the exercise of our spontaneity belongs to our way of realizing ourselves as animals. >Spontaneity/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Nature | McDowell | I, 123 et seq Nature/Kant/McDowell: nature is equal to the realm of natural laws in Kant. He does not know the concept of the second nature, although he is well aware of the concept of >education. But not as a background. >Second nature, >Nature/Kant, >Natural laws/Kant. --- I 118 Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: there are rules of nature, whether you are receptive to them or not. This is the result of proper education. "Naturalism of the Second Nature", "Naturalized Platonism". >Platonism. Nature/Natural Law/McDowellVsNaturalism: Vs "blunt naturalism": The space of nature is not equal to the space of natural laws. The forces are partially part of the second nature. >Theory of force/McDowell. Nature/McDowell: encompasses everything that belongs to the most fundamental understanding of things, that is, neither meaning nor values. (VsAristotle). Disenchantment of nature is progress. But: what has been disenchanted does not have to be identified with nature. --- Rorty VI 212 McDowell/Rorty: Nature may not only exercise causal but also rational control over human research. Definition Second Nature/McDowell: "People acquire a second nature, among other things, by developing conceptual abilities whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons." (E.g., initiation, entry into a moral community, "education"). That one's eyes are opened gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. And thus to be able to make judgments that are responsible to the world. In addition, this gives a rational freedom. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: all this becomes incomprehensible when we use Sellar's, Davidson's, or Brandom's terms. >Sellars, >Davidson, >Brandom. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nature | Rorty | VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. >Second nature. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these authors would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. >Robert Brandom, >Wilfrid Sellars, >Donald Davidson. VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge. >Judgments. VI 214 World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner, VI 215 it does not merely call on us to judge. VI 434 Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes. >Technocracy. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Nominalism | Sellars | I 53f Def Psychological Nominalism: every consciousness of species, resemblances, facts, i.e. abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The perception of similarities and also of facts presupposes the process of acquisition of language use. >Language acquisition, >Language use, >Language, >Meaning, >Language community, >Concepts/Sellars. I 56 Psychological nominalism/Sellars: Thesis: there is no consciousness of a logical space that precedes the acquisition of language and would be independent of it. >Logical space, >Consciousness/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Objects of Belief | Lewis | IV 134 Objects of belief/Lewis: we should attribute properties instead propositions as objects of belief - they work in more cases - Proposition: set of possible worlds - i.e. a region in the logical space - in contrast properties: set of individuals. --- IV 138 Attitudes/Belief/Objects of belief/Relation theory/Lewis: instead of propositions as objects of belief: - self-attribution of properties - e.g. spatial (not logical) localization: is not a proposition: E.g. I am on the 6th floor of the Stanford library - is not a property that corresponds to a proposition - E.g. >Lingens lost his memory and has to identify himself as a member of a sub-population, whose boundaries do not coincide with the boundaries of possible worlds - with the sub-population whose sole member he is himself - propositional knowledge/Lewis: knowledge of perception: I perceive does not correspond to any proposition - reason: there are possible worlds in which someone has this perception situation and someone else ((s)the same time) does not. --- IV 139 Self-attribution of a property: is >de se, not >de dicto. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Observation | Sellars | I XVII Observatory Reports: reports seem to be able to take the foundation of justification instead of the sensory data. >Sense data, >Justification. Vs: They are not independent, in the sense that they require no further knowledge Someone who always responds with "This is green" expresses no knowledge. >Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons." >Logical space of reasons, >Fuel gauge example. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Ontology | Lewis | IV 40 Ontology/Lewis: for me it consists in iterative set theory with individuals - the only unorthodox strait is my view of what individuals there are - part-whole relation: for me, it relates to individuals, not sets. >Individual/Lewis. Sets/possible worlds: therefore there is no set in a world in the sense of being part - sets: E.g. numbers, properties, propositions, events - even a sequence of possible individuals (all from the same world) is strictly speaking not itself (as a quantity) in this world. Nnumbers: are sets - they are not more localized in the logical space than in spacetime. They even exist from the perspective of all worlds. Properties: are sets (of individuals). Propositions: are sets Events: are sets. >Event/Lewis, >Properties/Lewis, >Proposition/Lewis, >Numbers, >Sets/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis, >Terminology/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 232 Ontology/Lewis/(s): all attributed to the distribution of properties instead of objects: "a priori reductionism of everything". Schwarz I 233 Ontology/explanation/theory/Lewis/Schwarz/(s): Analysis/ |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Predication | Leibniz | Holz I 55 Experience/Leibniz: The first truths according to our knowledge are the experiences, because in them the objects are given as identical pre-predicative. Predication/Leibniz/Holz: in predication, the "first pre-predicative truths of experience" then become truths in "logical space". >Predicate/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz, >Perception/Leibniz, >Sensory impression/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Properties | Stalnaker | I 9 Def property/Stalnaker: a) Def thin/economic definition: a property is a way in which individuals can be grouped b) Def richer/Stalnaker: (more robust): a property is something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space. >Intrinsicness. Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation. ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated). >Instantiation, >Individuals, >Individuation. I 75 Modal Logic/ML/semantics/extensional/Stalnaker: e.g. property: a property is represented as a singular propositional function which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value. >Propositional functions. Equivalent to this: property: a property is a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals. Cf. >Selection axiom, >Sets, >Set theory. Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones. >Essential properties, >Accidental properties. Def Referential properties: referential properties are defined in terms of the individuals that they have. Wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental propositions may be selected for atomic predicates. This does not prevent that essential attributions could be true. It prevents only that they can be expressed. Anti-essentialism/solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals. >Essentialism. I 78 Intrinsic Property/bare particular/theory: to identify an intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them. These do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space. >Intrinsicness, >Bare particulars. E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth. - This is how we can represent anti-essentialism. I 79 Kripke, early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball. Kripke, later: there is a fallacy in that. Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as we already did. That is not what it is about (see below). This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been. >Conceivability. Essential property/Kripke/Stalnaker: e.g. Kripke: thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties. >Natural kinds, >Essence. Names for species are referential terms. Referential: referential means that they are determined by a causal connection. >Causal theory of reference. Natural kinds: natural kinds are not purely linguistic, but restrict the movement in the logical space. Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then this solution is uninteresting. I 81 Property/narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between 1) narrow P and 2) propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individuals in general. >Narrow/wide, >Propositional functions. I 94f Physical non-property: a physical non-property is a complex combination of physical properties and relations (see below, e.g. golden mountain). Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties. >Supervenience. Attribute: an attribute is an easy way of picking out. >Attributes. I 103 Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals. Basic property/Stalnaker: basic properties must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained. Problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Propositional Knowledge | Lewis | Frank I 16f Propositional knowledge/Lewis: There are attitudes that cannot be analyzed as A about propositions: E.g. 2 Gods could know all the propositions without being able to localize themselves - Proposition/Lewis: Never with index I, he, here, now - de se: includes de dicto, but not vice versa. >de se/Lewis, >de re/Lewis, >de dicto/Lewis. --- IV 143 Propositional knowledge/Lewis: E.g. wonder what time it is: - no propositional knowledge - he knows which world he lives in - he also knows which time-space position he occupies - solution: it is the time states of him, which wonder - a time section locates the whole insomniac enough in space and time and also in logical space - however, the time layer cannot localise itself enough in the population of time sections - it cannot attribute itself the property to lie awake at 3:49 - it is the time segment, not the person as a continuant that fails in self-ascription. >Continuants/Lewis, >Person/Lewis, >Knowing how. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Lewis | Frank I 17 Proposition/Lewis: the number of possible worlds in which this proposition is true. >Possible world/Lewis. Def property/Lewis: the number of (actual or non-actual) beings that have this property. >Properties/Lewis. Proposition/Lewis/Frank: now a one-to-one correspondence can be established between each proposition and the property to inhabit a world in which the proposition applies. It makes it possible to dispense with propositions as the objects of the attitudes. But there are now attitudes that cannot be analyzed as an attitude toward a proposition: where we locate ourselves in space and time. E.g. memory loss: someone bumps into their own biography and can still not fit themselves in. - ((s) Because proposition = number of possible worlds, then - e.g. I’m true here in every possible worlds. - Therefore no knowledge). Frank I 329 Proposition: number of possible worlds in which they are true (extensional). Advantage: non-perspectivic access. - ((s) Not everyone has their own possible worlds.) Frank I 355 Propositions: have nothing intersubjective per se. - Problematic therefore is the subjectivity of reference of the first person. >First Person, >Subjectivity, >Centered world. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 --- Lewis IV 137 Proposition/Lewis: divides the population into inhabitants of such worlds in which it applies and those in which it does not apply - one assigns oneself to one of the worlds through belief and localizes oneself in a region of logical space - if quantification over several possible worlds is possible (cross-world), there is a large population across worlds and times. IV 142 E.g. Heimson thinks I’m Hume/Perry/Lewis: self-attribution of a property, not an empty proposition Heimson is Hume - all propositions that are true for Hume, are also true for Heimson, because both live in the same world. - Lewis: So Heimson believes the same things as Hume by believing a true proposition - the predicate -believes to be Hume - applies to both. E.g. of HeimsonVsPropositions as objects of belief - otherwise "I am Hume" would either be true both times or false both times - ((s) difference > proposition / > statement). IV 145 Proposition: in a divided world any proposition is either true or false - hence individual objects of desire are more likely properties (that can be self-attributed) than propositions. IV 146 Proposition: No Proposition: E.g. - there is something that I wish now and I will also want it even when I have it, only I will be happier then - no proposition, because it applies to the time before and after - one time of me will not be happy to live in a world where it will happen at some time. - Solution: the wish for the property to be located later in time - localization in logical space instead of proposition: E.g. The Crusader wants a region in logical space without avoidable misfortune - these are properties. V 160 Proposition: no linguistic entity - no language has enough sentences to express all the propositions - truth functional operations with propositions are Boolean operations about sets of possible worlds. - > inclusion, overlapping. --- ad Stechow 42 Language/Infinite/Lewis/(s): number of propositions is greater than the number of sentences, because power set of the possible worlds). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Propositions | Sellars | I XXXII Proposition/thoughts/tradition: classical empirical model of thoughts: they have the function to give worrds and sentences a meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. Task: to produce actions in form of beliefs. RyleVsTradition: category confusion: thoughts are not locatable. >Thoughts, >Categories/Ryle, >Localization, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Logical space. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Propositions | Stalnaker | I 35 Proposition/structure/possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not. >Possible worlds/Stalnaker. The structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds. Propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot. >Stronger/weaker, >Content, >Situations, >World. A minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds. >Structures. I 37 Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is made up of individuals and properties. Sentence/Stalnaker: a sentence is made up of names and predicates. >Sentences, >Predication, >Truth. I 51 Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content. >Understanding. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset. >Assertions, >Logical space. Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition. Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition). >Bare truth. Proposition: a proposition is identified with its truth conditions. >Truth conditions, >Individuation. I 191 Secondary proposition/two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): secondary propositions are based on the real world. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Primary proposition: ("fp"): primary propositions are based on the particular world in which the statement is made. Logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Relationism | Stalnaker | I 82f Relationism/relationalism/Stalnaker: to represent relationism in terms of the logical space, it must be assumed that the logical space itself is partially conventional. >Logical space. I 84 This means, we must assume that the localization function sometimes only conventionally differs and therefore actually represents the same possible world. >Localization. It is not conventional that the origin of the coordinate system can be chosen freely. - This is true for each coordinate system. It would be true even if an absolute theory of space were true. >Coordinate system, >Absoluteness, >Absolute space, >Space, cf. >Substantivalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Second Nature | McDowell | I 19 Definition second nature/McDowell: Nature includes the second nature acquired by conceptual skills whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons. Second nature(s): internalised background of norms borrowed from nature. >Nature/McDowell. I 109/110 Second nature/McDowell: it cannot float freely above the possibilities that belong to the normal human organism. >Education. I 114 Second Nature/McDowell: Our education updates some of the potentials with which we were born. But: Animal/Human/McDowell: this is not an adding to our animal nature. No admixture. I 118 Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: There are rules of nature, whether one is receptive to it or not. This is the result of proper upbringing. "Naturalism of second nature","Naturalized Platonism". Naturalized Platonism/McDowell: the structure of the space of reasons has autonomy. But it cannot be derived from truths about humans. It is not unbridled: not isolated from the "merely human". (Instead: sensitivity through education). I 121 McDowellVsPlatonism: any platonism means that the norms are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein's Quietism recognizes this as a pseudo-problem. >Platonism, >Quietism. Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhuman. This does not raise any real questions about norms. >Norm/McDowell. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Second Nature | Rorty | VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell/Rorty: people acquireit, inter alia, by conceptual skills being unravelled to them whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons - this gives one the ability to be controlled rationally by the world - this enables one to judge in a ways that is responsible to the world. McDowellVsBrandom/McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson: with their concepts it becomes incomprehensible - these would not refer to the world as a conversation partner. - VI 215 McDowell: thesis: the world calls on us to judge. VI 214 World/SellarsVsMcDowell/BrandomVsMcDowell/Rorty: the world is not a conversation partner. I 215 It does not merely call on us to judge. >John McDowell. VI 434 Nature/technocracy/technocratic//Rorty: the beauty of purely mechanical explanations from the atheistic point of view is that they demand nothing except our own purposes. >Explanation. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Space | Space, philosophy: various discussions deal, among others, with the question whether the space is absolute or whether empty space is possible. In different sciences, multi-dimensional spaces with certain properties are used to better calculate like Hilbert spaces in the theory of relativity or multidimensional spaces in mathematical nodal theory. No ontological assumptions are made. See also substantivalism, relativism, movement, absoluteness, compactness, conceptual space, dimensions, logical space, four-dimensionalism. |
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| Substance | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 69 ff Object/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: phenomenological objects (objects of immediate experience) are also included. >Objects, >Phenomenology, >Experience, >Ontology. 2.021 Objects are the substance of the world 2.024 The substance is what exists independently of what is the case. 2.0271 The object is the fixed, the existing, the configuration is the changing, the volatile. I 74 Substance/Tractatus/Hintikka: ("Objects: substance of the world...") Important: this kind of substantiality has nothing to do with the permanence or transience of the objects in the actual course of events. 2.025 Wittgenstein claims that the objects are form and content and not only substance of the possible world, but also its form. (logical form). When a philosopher thinks about logical form today, he probably thinks first and foremost of the possibilities of making complex sentences out of simple sentences. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. I 102 ff Substance/Object/World/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: how is it possible that objects of acquaintance to which we can only point, function as an existing, solid form of the world? What can be less existing, firm and consistent than the sense data, which in Russell's writings are regarded as prime examples for the objects of acquaintance? >Acquaintance. Substance/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: so the problem of substantiality remains. Solution: a completely different kind. All talking about permanence is relative to any postulated transformation or change. What change is Wittgenstein planning? The change from one possible world to another! This has nothing to do with the durability of the objects in time. Cf. >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Hintikka I 104 Substance/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not because Wittgenstein's objects would be indestructible, they are substance-like but because they are the meanings of our simplest expressions. The expressions whose meanings cannot be described but only exhibited. It is logically incorrect to point to an object "this does not exists". Not because it would be indestructible. - Also not unchangeable - different: if they were composed. Therefore, the objects that make up the substance, are simple objects. VI 73 Substance/Tractatus/Schulte: the simple objects form the solid form of the world, its substance. They contain the possibility of all circumstances. Schulte: there are three interpretations here: 1. realistic objects, "real" atoms, in turn invariable 2. objects are sensory data, 3. the nature of the objects is to be understood only in dependence on the function of the expressions denoting them. >Sense data. Tetens VII 48 Definition Substance/Tractatus/Tetens: the substance of the world is the set of all logically possible worlds: ((s) So it is identical with the logical space). - Tetens: what remains the same in these worlds: the set of objects. The facts change. ((s) = configurations) - actual world: the possible world whose facts are facts. N.B.: therefore the world is the totality of facts. - Fact: possible fact. >Possible worlds. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Terminology | McDowell | I 18 Logical space of the reasons/Logical space of nature/McDowell: Thesis: beside the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: of the natural laws, non-normative relations. A) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. B) logical space of nature: objects, sense impressions. This is not a splitting of "natural" and "normative". |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Lewis | IV 139 Two Omniscient Gods/2 Gods/Lewis: the example is to show that objects of attitudes should not be identified with propositions as sets of possible worlds. E.g. both know exactly the world they inhabit - i.e. they know every true proposition - but do not know who they are themselves. Solution: self-attribution of a property, not a proposition - (spatial (not logical) localization is not propositional knowledge). >Localization, >Propositional knowledge. LewisVsCastaneda: Solution: de se: we just need to find a case where the editor of soul knows which world is his without knowing if he is among the millionaires - de se: self-identification, self-localization. de dicto: self-localization in logical space (which proposition one believes). >de re, >de dicto, >de se. IV 141 Two omniscient gods/Lewis: E.g. assuming a variant with two pairs of two gods in two possible worlds W and V, who swapped places - Assuming God 1 knows that the proposition "I’m on the highest" is true in W - and he knows that he lives in W! - It does not follow that he knows that he is on the highest! - Because if he had been on the coldest, the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W - one of which he knew that it is false. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Understanding | Rorty | I 38 Microstructure/macrostructure: Putnam: we cannot understand from the knowledge of elementary particles why square pegs do not fit into round holes. But that’s not a disturbing ontological gap! Cf. >Microstructure/Armstrong, >Causal explanation, >Disposition. II (f) 126 Def understanding/Rorty: ability to link old descriptions with new descriptions. IV 109 ff Comprehensibility: it is hard to explain what it is supposed to mean that tables and chairs are incomprehensible and God is not (or vice versa!). Logical positivism is already something of a solution with its formal type of speech. >Positivism, >Formal speech. IV 117 Comprehensibility: problem from Parmenides to Ayer: we are constantly tempted to say "the intelligibility conditions of a statement are..." Although the statement itself does not fulfil the specified conditions. >Parmenides, >Ayer. VI 208 ff McDowell: Problem: "whether our experience is excluded from in the area of the kind of intelligibility appropriate to the concept of meaning". RortyVsMcDowell: one should not even speak of "forms of intelligibility"! - McDowell: logical space of reasons - and logical space of the laws are each sui generis. >Space of reason, >space of nature. VI 211 RortyVsMcDowell: there are no strictly separated areas (of reason and law). All language games are sui generis. >Language game. VI 212 Understanding/explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about comprehensibility. >Explanations. Comprehensibility/Rorty: is quite cheap to have: if we train two people to speak the same way. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Understanding | Stalnaker | I 15 Def understanding/Stalnaker: thesis: we understand the informational or propositional content in terms of distinguishing between options. >Propositional content. Def metaphysics: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that need to be made between options. Def semantics: semantics affects our ability to represent options and to distinguish between them. Representation: we can only judge representation if we know how our logical space is structured. >Logical space, >Representation. Descriptive semantics: descriptive semantics asks what the semantic value of expressions is. Basic semantics: basic semantics asks, due to which facts they have this value. Metaphysical: metaphysical is inconceivable. I 51 Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition can not be misunderstood like a sentence, it is already the content. >Content, >Propositions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Vagueness | Wright | I 129f Color/vagueness/Wright: shades could be characterized as "accepted" the description as "vague". One could denote something as "red", without being obliged to it. But should one say then that this has both mandatory and permissive moves? Or should we rather conclude that it is wrong to speak of "borderline cases" that permit decisions, but do not prescribe anything? Def Vagueness: does not mean the existence of an "inbetween realm". Vagueness/Wright: is rather the fact that the contrast between what "red" prescribes and that what "not red" prescribes, is not clear everywhere. Also ambiguous shades contrast with unambiguous. ((s) WittgensteinVs, sorites). Vagueness/convergence/conditions/criteria/Wright: Could there not be a completely permissive discourse? It is clear that the contrast between conditions, that allow an assertion and such for which nothing applies, cannot be completely permissive itself. >Assertibility conditions, >Assertibility, >Truth conditions, >Facts. Otherwise, there could be no information without additional information. Nothing would be excluded by the "correctness" of such an information ("per se"). There would be nothing then in which this correctness could exist. --- II 226f Vagueness/sorites/Wright: the existence of borderline cases does not include blurred boundaries - blurred boundaries instead blurry in logical space. Frege/Russell: vagueness is a lack of our language. WrightVs: vague predicates merely partial functions. This is consistent with a sharp distinction between cases where applicable and where not. - There is no lack of instruction, but a demand that the borders are not drawn. Continuity of the world,... II 230 ...not a reflex of our mental weakness. >Continuity. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Vocabulary | Strawson | VI 398 Vocabulary/Strawson: 1st ontological vocabulary for ontological space, time, things, general characteristics 2nd semantical vocabulary for semantic types and individual abstract elements, proper names for things 3rd functional vocabulary for combinations and relation types, deictic elements 4th vocabulary of the formal apparatus. >Terminilogy/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Davidson, D. | McDowell Vs Davidson, D. | I 42 McDowellVsDavidson: the myth has deeper roots: we can not understand how the pursuit of spontaneity could ever represent a world if spontaneity were not subject to any external control. (And Davidson denies this control.) I 41 McDowellVsDavidson: refutes that thoughts and observations are connected in a rational way. McDowell: but then we do not come to an empirical content. (without concepts, observations are blind (Kant)). I 168 Conviction/McDowellVsDavidson: he could also have said: nothing comes into consideration as a reason for conviction if it is not also located in the realm of reasons, e.g. the fact that it appears as such to a subject (!). Of course it is not the same, whether something seems to me to be this or that, or if I am convinced that it is so. I 172 Davidson: spontaneity not subjected to external rational condition. McDowellVsDavidson: therefore his theory of coherence is without control. I 86 Myth/Davidson: to escape it, one must deny that experience is epistemologically significant. (EvansVs, McDowellVs). I 124 The idea that all things belong to nature does not help. (I 102ff) Spontaneity/Davidson: characterizes what are in fact the operations of the sentient nature, but it does not characteriz them as such. McDowellVsDavidson: dilemma: either: these operations are still rationally related, or we must assume that they have no epistemological significance. Kant considers this choice to be unacceptable. I 216 McDowellVsDavidson: if we turn off the background of tradition (and still only presume radical interpretations), we succumb to the myth of the given. Hegel: "lack of mediation." Objectivity/McDowellVsDavidson: Davidson speaks of "triangulation" (reciprocal corrigibility). McDowell: It's too late to take care of the configuration of the concept of objectivity when the subjects have already entered the stage. Objectivity and subjectivity emenate together from the inauguration in the space of reasons. Rorty VI 205 McDowell/Rorty: Difference betweej "logical space of nature" ("realm of the law") "logical space of reasons". McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsSellars/Rorty: too impressed by the realm of law, such that they explain experience in a way that the tribunal of senses is no longer possible. Conviction/justification/cause/Davidson/SellarsRorty: avoiding the confusion of justification and cause leads to the thesis: convictions can only be justified by convictions. (McDowellVsDavidson). VI 206 McDowellVsDavidson/Rorty: if proceding in this manner (to eliminate experience), the old philosophical questions look still as if they were any good. VI 207 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in again through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility towards the world. Rorty VI 213 There will remain a discomfort. Empiricism will sneak in through the back door. We still need something that lets us make sense of the world-directedness of empirical thinking. SellarsVsMcDowell/Rorty: human kind has no responsibility for the world. Rorty VI 213 Def Second Nature/McDowell: people acquire a second nature, e.g. by exploring conceptual skills whose interactions belong to the logical space of reasons. (E.g. initiation, access to the moral community, "Education"). To have one's eyes opened, gives one the ability to be rationally controlled by the world. McDowellVsSellars/McDowellVsDavidson/McDowellVsBrandom: all that becomes incomprehensible if we use the terms of Sellars, Davidson or Brandom. Rorty VI 217 McDowellVsDavidson: a merely causal explanation carries the risk of emptiness. (With Kant: "spontaneity of thought") ("spontaneity: corresponds to rational truths, receptivity: truths of fact). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Haecceitism | Lewis Vs Haecceitism | IV 140 LewisVsHaecceitism: Haecceitism/Possible World/poss.w./VsLewis: Followers of haecceity are not persuaded by the example of the two gods. Variant: e.g. 2 gods: both live in world W, two other gods live in world V, which differs from W because both gods have swapped their seats. The god on the highest mountain in W and the god on the coldest mountain in V are linked by a simple bond which somehow makes them one. (The same is valid for the other two.) If the god on the highest mountain in W does not know whether he sits on the hightest or the coldest mountain, then he cannot know for sure which one of the worlds is his. He may know everything about the qualitative state that can be known about his world, but he does not know whether his world is W or V. If he knew, he would know every proposition that is valid in his world. But it seems that he does not know one proposition: The one which would correspond to the sentence "I sit on the highest mountain." I/Haecceitism: If his pronoun "I" is accurate for both, his brother and him, in haecceitas on the coldest mountain, then the proposition is indeed valid in W, but not in V! IV 141 If he were to know this proposition, would he then not know that he sits on the hightest mountain? 2 gods/LewisVsHaeccetism: I would love to discover what I should know about the objects of belief, and leave the followers of haeccetism to themselves. But I cannot resist to barge in. If you were a follower of haecceitism, I would recommend you to not believe the analysis written above. Haecceitism or not, there is a kind of not knowing which cannot be healed by some sort of self-localization in the logical space. E.g. supposing that both gods have swapped their places, and it shall be conceded that the god on the highest mountain knows that his world is W and not V! He shall be all-knowing with regards to all propositions, not only the qualitative ones. Is this helpful? Do not occupy yourself with V of which he knows that he does not live there. Does he know the proposition: "I am on the highest mountain"? Naturally, he does! He knows all the propositions, and this is one of them. Does he therefore know that he sits on the highest mountain? No! Because this does not follow from it. Since he is the one on the highest mountain, his sentence expresses a particular proposition which is true in W but not in V. It is one he knows to be true. Had he been the god on the coldest mountain (which he could be for all he knows), the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W. It would be one of which he knows that it is wrong. He would know the proposition which would indeed by expressed by "I am on the highest mountain". But that does not mean that he knows whether he is on the highest mountain. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, D. | Meixner Vs Lewis, D. | I 58 Description/Properties/Necessary/Contingent/Individual/INDIVIDUAL/Meixner: E.g. "the President of the USA in 2002" denotes the individual George W. Bush. I 59 The same description can also be conceived for a initial-property maximally consistent individual, namely for "george w. bush". Bush and bush have exactly the same initial properties (but "have" in a different sense). Point: while Bush might very easily not have had the property of being president, bush needs to have this property! Meixner: This can be easily confused and has been confused at least twice in the history of philosophy: 1) in Leibniz. 2) MeixnerVsLewis: Confusion of individual and INDIVIDUAL in his counterpart theory: the individual has its properties contingently ((s) a singled out counterpart needs its properties as such, because it is individuated by the set of these properties.) INDIVIDUAL/Leibniz/Meixner: For the Leibnizian, the individual Bush is identical with the INDIVIDUAL bush ((s) because the two (in that particular moment) are indistinguishable). PoWo: but Leibniz says the reason why Bush might as well not have been president is that his counterpart bush is not president! --- I 139 Part/Constituent/Meixner: E.g. we are not parts, but indeed constituents of facts. MeixnerVsLewis: therefore, he cannot consider possible worlds (PoWo) as facts. I 144 Actuality Relativism/AR/Meixner: is forced to consider PoWo as individual-like entities (see above), one of which is highlighted by the fact that it is the only PoWo of which we are parts. This one therefore advances to become the absolutely actual world and all other entities that are absolutely actual are so by being actual within it. MeixnerVs. Vs: Problem: no counterfactual conditionals like "UM (= Uwe Meixner) could also have studied geography in his life" possible due to our fixation to the real world (actual world). The fact that UM is a also constituent of another PoWo than w* contradicts the AR, which says that he can only be a constituent of the only actual world w*. I 145 Because in the individual-like entity of the PoWo (as assumed by the AR), constituents of individual-like entities are only when they are parts of them. To be able to be a constituent also of another PoWo UM would also have to be part of another PoWo than w* and this is impossible according to the AR. Solution/Lewis: (AR): a counterpart of UM studied geography in a different PoWo. MeixnerVsLewis: that misses the point of the sentence that UM could have studied geography. It's not about anyone else but me in a PoWo. KripkeVsLewis/Meixner: Kripke also suggested to Lewis depart from his interpretation, but he never did. Leibniz pro Lewis: (Letter to Antoine Arnauld): For example, could Adam also have had a different progeny? This can only be affirmed in the following sense: God was free to create another Adam (counterpart). That would then have been another PoWo (certainly not the best of all worlds). Nevertheless, Leibniz is not an AR. II 146 Absolute Actuality/Leibniz: is something lent by God and around it there is one single matching PoWo. Meixner: Absolute actuality is then not a matter of a mere place in "logical space," not a matter of mere positioning within the possible, but The possible does not bring forth from itself everything real, it does not shine out of itself in the light of reality everywhere, where it shines in this light, rather it is largely on its own "reality darkness". |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Linguisticism | Stalnaker Vs Linguisticism | VsLinguicism I 79 Natural-kind viewVsLinguicism/Natural-kind viewVslinguistic view/KripkeVsLinguisticism/Stalnaker: Natural-kind-predicates are double bound: 1. to the actual denotation and 2. to the structural and qualitative characteristics that are the basis for the classification. This is not purely linguistic but a restriction of the movement in logical space. Stalnaker: why should one e.g. forbid Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball? I see no benefit in it to allow it to him. I cannot say anything about him in such a situation that I could not say about billiard balls that are not him. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| McDowell, J. | Rorty Vs McDowell, J. | I 111 McDowell: We need to reconcile Kant with Aristotle, for whom an adult is a rational being. RortyVsMcDowell: this reconciliation is an outdated ideal. (Reconciliation of subject / object). McDowellVsRorty: instead: reconciliation of reason and nature. >Space of reason, >space of nature. VI 201 McDowell/Rorty: Thesis: "Responsibility to the world": to understand the world-directedness of mental state or process (conviction, judgment) you have to put it into a normative context. It has to be an attitude that you take to rightly or wrongly. A way of thinking aimed at judgments is responsible to the world for whether the thought is thought correctly or incorrectly. RortyVsMcDowell: he does something that critics of the correspondence theory always lament: he takes perceptual judgments as a model for judgments in general. (VsCorresondence Theory). VI 203 Standards/BrandomVsMcDowell: is content with understanding them in the sense of responsibility among people. RortyVsMcDowell: his decision for Kantian concepts is also a visual metaphor. VI 204 "Minimal Empiricism"/Terminology/McDowell: the notion that experience must constitute a tribunal. Experience/Sellars/Brandom/Davidson/Rorty: for all three we are in constant interaction with things as well as with people, but none of the three needs a "tribunal of experience" or experience at all. RortyVsMcDowell/DavidsonVsMcDowell: causality is enough, "rational control" (McDowell) is not necessary. VI 208 RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: "world-directedness" typical European longing for authority, is related to Heidegger's "forgetfulness of being". McDowell/Rorty: three central concepts: 1. "Crass naturalism" 2. "Second Nature" 3. "Rational freedom" Vi 210 Experience/Understanding/McDowell/Rorty: Problem: "whether our experience might not be excluded from the field of the kind of intelligibility that is appropriate to the concept of meaning." >Second nature. VI 211 RortyVsMcDowell: we should not speak of "forms of intelligibility"! Rationale/Law/McDowell/Rorty: logical space of reasons and logical space of law each are sui generis. RortyVsMcDowell: there are no such strictly separated areas (of reason and the law). All language games are sui generis. They cannot be reduced to one another. E.g. soccer and biology. But that has something philosophically sterile to it. With Wittgenstein: we should not over-dramatize the contrasts. It is simply banal: different tools serve different purposes. VI 212 Quine/Rorty: Particle physics provides the only viable paradigm. McDowell/Rorty: we have two paradigms. Understanding/Explanation/RortyVsMcDowell/Rorty: we should not talk about intelligibility! Intelligibility is very cheap to have: if we train two people at the same speech! McDowell/Rorty: the notion of openness to facts has an advantage in terms of "intelligibility" over the notion of "memorizing facts". RortyVsMcDowell: Such metaphors depend merely on the rhetoric. VI 214 RortyVsMcDowell: he writes as if the world did us a favor if it does not trick us. VI 215 Although he does not believe that trees and stones speak, he does believe that they do not merely cause us to make judgments. He understands an appearance as a challenge judge that comes from the world. Although in itself it is not yet a verdict, but it already has the conceptual form of one. VI 217 "Impressions"/McDowell: are neither physiological states, nor the non-inferential beliefs themselves, but something in between: a part of the "Second Nature". VI 216 VsMcDowell: no need to "search for a conception of nature, which also includes the ability to resonate with the structure of the space of reasons." VI 219 Research/Standards/Science/McDowell: it is precisely the point of the standards of research that their compliance increases the likelihood of coming on to the essence of the world! RortyVsMcDowell: this re-introduces a false distinction of scheme and world. McDowell, who accepts Davidson's criticism of the differentiation scheme/content, denies this. >Scheme/Content. James: would ask: What difference would it make in behavior? |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Possible Worlds | Stalnaker Vs Possible Worlds | I 49 Possible world/poss.w./knowledge/mathematics/StalnakerVsLewis/Stalnaker: I am inclined to say that the poss.w.-theory makes assumptions about the nature of their properties that are - unlike the corresponding assumptions of mathematical platonism - incompatible with the representation of the connection between the knowledge subjects and their objects in the case of poss.w.. poss.w./MR/VsModal realism/knowledge/verificationism/StalnakerVsLewis: the modal realist cannot cite any verificationist principles for what he calls his knowledge. Conclusion: problem: the MR cannot on the one hand say that poss.w. things are of the same kind as the actual world (contingent physical objects) and say on the other hand that poss.w. are things of which we know by the same kind like of numbers, sets, functions. ((s) Namely no real existing things.). I 53 StalnakerVsLewis: he contradicts himself because his other thesis about poss.w. about which we can have substantial beliefs contradicts his definition of content (see above). I 58 Contradiction/Lewis: there is no object howsoever fantastic about which one could tell the truth by contradicting oneself. Footnote: Takashi YagisawaVsLewis: why not? What should you expect otherwise? Impossible things are impossible. II 20 Belief ascription/solution/Stalnaker: I always wonder how the poss.w. would be according to what the believer believes. E.g. Pierre: for him there are two cities (Londres and London) E.g. Lingens in the library: for him there are two men, one named "Lingens" about which the other reads something. Relations theory/RelTh/Stalnaker: this can reconcile with the assumption that propositions are the belief objects. (Team: Stalnaker pro Relations theory? (1999)) Index/belief/Stalnaker: nevertheless I believe that convictions have an irreducible indexical element. Solution/Lewis: sets of centered poss.w. as belief objects. StalnakerVsLewis: although I have accepted that such poss.w. then include a representation of the mental state of the believer. But that is not what it is about! It is not sufficient that poss.w. that are compatible with one's convictions then include a person who has these convictions (> e.g. Lingens), the believer must identify himself with the person who has this thought! Proposition/identification/self-identification/Stalnaker: I am not suggesting that this identification is fulfilled by the belief in a proposition. I now think that this is not at all about some kind of cognitive performance. Indexical conviction/Stalnaker: (E.g. Perry: memory loss, library, e.g. Lewis: 2 gods (2 omniscient gods, e.g. Castaneda: memory loss): indexical unknowing. Stalnaker: thesis: people do not differ in what they believe. II 21 E.g. O'Leary knows that he is in the basement and that Daniels is in the kitchen. And Daniels knows the same thing: that he is in the kitchen and O'Leary in the basement. Everyone knows who and where he is and who and where the other is. The poss.w. that are compatible with the convictions of the two are the same. They argue about nothing. Yet there is an obvious difference in their doxastic situation: O'Leary identifies himself with the one in the basement and Daniels identifies himself as one who is in the kitchen. poss.w. semantics/StalnakerVsPossible worlds semantics/Stalnaker: this difference in the belief states of the two is not reflected by a set of poss.w. as belief state. Solution/Lewis: self-ascription of properties, or - equivalently - sets of centered poss.w.. StalnakerVsLewis: I do not want that. StalnakerVsLewis: problem: it is wrong to treat the difference in perspective as a dispute (disagreement). The two argue about nothing. Problem: it is not sure if one can express their agreement with the fact that the set of their uncentered poss.w. is the same. Because E.g. Heimson/Perry/Stalnaker: (Heimson believes "I am David Hume") all his impersonal beliefs about Hume are correct. Suppose they are the same convictions as the convictions of Hume about Hume. Stalnaker: nevertheless it would be wrong to say that they argue about nothing. ((s) unlike O'Leary and Daniels). II 134 Localization/space/time/self-localization/logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: set of poss.w. from which one selects one. Self-localization/physical: in space and time. We usually know where we are. ((s) but we never know all poss.w. in which we could be localized, we cannot distinguish all poss.w. because we do not know everything). Gods example/Stalnaker: the two know exactly where they are in the logical space. II 135 But they do not know where within this poss.w. they are. LewisVsTradition: the doctrine of the proposition is focused only on one of the two types of localized belief. Generalization: is what we need and for that the transition from propositions to properties (as belief objects) serves. II 144 Gods example/Stalnaker: this is also a case of unknowing, which of two indistinguishable poss.w. is actual. One is actually the actual world while the other exactly the sam, with the exception that the god who sits in the actual world on the highest mountain is this time sitting on the coldest mountain and in fact with all the properties that the god on the highest mountain actually has. ((s) two individuals change places but keep all the properties. This is only possible if localization is not a property) Omniscience/Stalnaker: then you have to say, the two gods are not really omniscient regarding propositions, but rather omniscient in relation to purely qualitative criteria. LewisVsStalnaker: Lewis rejects this explanation for two reasons: 1. because he represents the counterpart theory (c.th.) that makes the cross world identity superfluous or meaningless. 2. even without counterpart it would not work because Assuming that the two gods of world W have traded places in world V assuming the god on the highest knows that his world is W, not V. Assuming he is omniscient with respect to all propositions not only the qualitative propositions. II 145 V: the world V cannot be relevant because he knows that he does not live there. Problem: there are still two mountains in a poss.w. W where he after all what he knows can live. StalnakerVsLewis: that does not answer the question: you cannot simply stipulate that the God in W knows something and not V. Because after the explanation we proposed that leads to the fact that he knows on which mountain he lives. Lewis/Stalnaker: his explanation is plausible if one conceives it as a metaphor for a location in the logical space: logical space/Lewis/Stalnaker: assume that a map of the logical space divided into large regions match the poss.w. and in smaller subdivisions represent the locations within poss.w.. Important argument: then we can tell someone in which large region he is without telling him exactly where he is located in it. Modal Realism/MR/logical space/Stalnaker: for him this image might be appropriate. Actualism/logical space/localization/Stalnaker: for the actualism this image is misleading: to know in which country you are is different to know where in the country you are but it is not so clear that there is a difference between the fact that one knows anything about in which poss.w. one is and knowing which poss.w. is the actual. Lewis also admits this. Stalnaker: my approach seems to be really close to the one of Lewis, but no. Centered poss.w.: one should perhaps instead of indistinguishable poss.w. speak of centered worlds (after Quine). These are then distinguishable. Indistinguishability/poss.w./Stalnaker: distinct but indistinguishable poss.w. would then be the same worlds but with different centers. Attitude/properties/propositions/centered world/Lewis: to treat objects of attitudes as sets of centered poss.w. makes them to properties instead of propositions. Centered poss.w./Stalnaker: I agree that possible situations normally, perhaps even essential, are centered in the sense of a representation of a particular mental state. II 146 StalnakerVsLewis: but this makes the approach (gods example) more complicated when it comes to the relations between different mental states. E.g. to compare past with current states is then more difficult, or relations between the convictions of different people. Information/communication/Stalnaker: we need then additional explanation about how information is exchanged. Two examples: E.g. O'Leary is freed from his trunk and wonders at around nine: a) "What time was it when I wondered what time it was?" Stalnaker: that is the same question like the one he asked then. When he learns that it was three o'clock, his doubt has been eliminated. Solution: the doubt is eliminated since all possible situations (poss.w.) in which a thought occurs at two different times are involved. The centers of these situations have moved in the sense that it is now nine o'clock and O'Leary no longer in the trunk but it may be that the first occurrence of the then thought is what O'Leary is now thinking about. Important argument: this moving of the center does not require that the poss.w. that the propositions characterize are changed. b) "What time was it when I wondered if it was three or four?". (If he wondered twice) Indistinguishability: even if the two incidents were indistinguishable for O'Leary, it may still be that it was the first time which O'Leary remembers at around nine o'clock. StalnakerVsLewis: his approach is more complicated. According to his approach we have to say at three o'clock, O'Leary wonders about his current temporal localization in the actual world (act.wrld.) instead of wondering in what poss.w. he is. Versus: at nine, things are quite different: now he wonders if he lives in a poss.w. in which a particular thought occurred at three or four. This is unnecessarily complicated. E.g. Lingens, still in the library, meets Ortcutt and asks him "Do you know who I am?" – "You are my cousin, Rudolf Lingens!". Stalnaker: that seems to be a simple and successful communication. Information was requested and given. The question was answered. II 147 Proposition/Stalnaker: (Propositions as belief objects) Ortcutt's answer expresses a proposition that distinguishes between possible situations and eliminates Lingen's doubt. StalnakerVsLewis: according to his approach (self-ascription of properties), it is again more complicated: Lingens: asks if he correctly ascribes himself a certain set of properties i. Ortcutt: answers by ascribing himself a completely different set of properties. Lingens: has to conclude then subsequently himself the answer. So all the answers are always indirect in communication. ((s) also StalnakerVsChisholm, implicit). Communication/Lewis/Chisholm/StalnakerVsLewis/StalnakerVsChsholm: everyone then always speaks only about himself. Solution/Stalnaker: Lewis would otherwise have to distinguish between attitudes and speech acts and say that speech acts have propositions as object and attitudes properties as an object. Problem/StalnakerVsLewis: Lewis cannot say by intuition that the content of Ortcutt's answer is the information that eliminates Lingen's doubt. That is also a problem for Perry's approach. (> StalnakerVsPerry) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Sellars, W. | Verschiedene Vs Sellars, W. | Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their claims to each other. I 207 Language/VsSellars: some opponents argue that this is a confusion of terms and words. That having a term and using of a word is one and the same fact in psychological nominalism. I 208 SellarsVsVs: could answer here: either you admit to everything and everyone (e.g. record players) that you are able to react distinctively to certain kinds of objects, or you give an explanation why you want to draw the line between conceptual thinking and its primitive precursor in a place other than between the acquired language and the learning process still in progress. This makes it clear that the: Tradition: (Myth of the Given): has thrown two things together: sensations and differentiation abilities. Sellars I 34 Logical Atomism: VsSellars: he could reply that Sellars 1. overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sensory content. 2. the concepts of sense contents show that logical independence from each other which is characteristic for traditional empiricism. I 34/25 3. Terms for theoretical entities such as molecules have the interdependence that Sellars may rightly have attributed to terms for physical facts, but: the theoretical terms have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space! Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of physical objects in space and time. Sense Data TheoryVsSellars:( > I 103) the individual objects are found in the cosmos of everyday language. Physical redness can be analyzed on the basis of red glow, but red glow must be analyzed on the basis of red sensory content. (SellarsVs). But why should the properties of physical objects not be broken down directly into the properties and phenomenal relationships of sensory content? Sellars: admitted. I 35 SellarsVsSense Data Theory: how does the sensory data theorist get to the system of sensory content? Even if red glow does not play a role in the analysis of physical redness, he hopes to convince us of this system by asking us to think about the experience of red glow of something. But so far my analysis has not even brought to light such things as sensory content! I 36 Glowing/Appear/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of red glow. We have to distinguish between qualitative and existential glowing. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Schiffer Vs Stalnaker, R. | I 46 The second position in the logical space for the "propositionalist": (Stalnaker) represents a major divergence from functionalism: he concedes that no psychological theory will provide a definition of belief itself as E.g. x believes that some dogs have fleas. ((s) with content). but probably of x is a belief. ((s) without content). 1. you have to find a psychological theory, with which you can define the monadic predicate "x is a conviction". 2. define a functional property, for each composite belief property via non-functional, explicit definition of the form (R) x believes p iff (Es)(s is a belief; x is in s; & R(s,p)) for a given specified relation R. Stalnaker: takes up an idea of Dennis Stampe. Stampe: (1977, unpublished) as the completion of (R ) (FG) x believes p iff x is in a belief system, that x would not have under optimal conditions, if it were not the case that p. FG/Fuel gauge/Fuel gauge/Representation/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "Fuel gauge"-model of representation: it represents the fuel level, because it is a reliable indicator. ((s) By regularity to representation. Additional assumption: Counterfactual conditional). I 47 Representation/Schiffer: is not only a feature of mental states! >fuel gauge example. SchifferVsStalnaker/Belief/theory: the fuel gauge model is only a first step. It implies that one has no wrong beliefs under optimal conditions. That may be. Problem: 1. What shall these optimum conditions be then that will never be fulfilled? 2. how should they be fulfilled without the fuel gauge model becoming circular?. "Optimal"/Condition/(s): as a condition in itself is suspicious circular: they are fulfilled when everything is ok. (R)/belief/Schiffer: FG is only a proposal for the completion of (R). This should best determine the truth conditions in a system of mental representations. Conclusion: if belief is a relation to propositions, and there is a non-mentalist specification of this relation, then it cannot be functionalist. I 282 Belief content/Stalnaker: (1984): his approach refers to public language, but would be, based on Mentalese, the approach by Fodors, b) there is a ("optimum" -) Condition D - unfulfilled but fulfilled - and be specified in naturalistic vocabulary so An M function f the truth-conditions for function x * lingua mentis M is if for every sentence s of M: D would consist, then x would believe if and only if f(s) consists). Comparable, with "only if" rather than "if and only if". Then one is merely infallible under optimal conditions. SchifferVsStalnaker: that is not much better. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Non-Factualism | Field, Hartry | I 21 Field: thesis: the most natural conclusion is that topological spaces, numbers, ordered pairs and functions neither are definitely sets nor definitely no sets. There is no fact that decides! II 243 Nonfactualism: Thesis: the actual world contains no "normative facts". II 256 Nonfactualism: thesis in case of an epistemic impossibility of the antecedent of a conditional there is no question of acceptability ((s) > assertibility?). |
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| Reasons | McDowell, J. | I 17 Logical space of the reasons/logical space of nature/McDowell: thesis: besides the space of reasons (concepts) there is a logical space of nature: the laws of nature, not normative relations. a) logical space of reasons: justification, knowledge, belief, functional concepts. b) logical space of nature: objects, sensory impressions. This is not a division of "natural and normative". Esfeld I 146~ McDowell/Esfeld: thesis: space of reasons (justifications) further than that of the conceptual. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| psycholog. Nominalsm. | Sellars, W. | Rorty VI 183 psychological nominalism / Sellars: his thesis paves the way: if anyone can make use of semantic concepts, he already has everything necessary to intentional speech. > Intentionality. I 56 psychological nominalism / Sellars: Thesis: there is no consciousness of a logical space that precedes the acquisition of language and would be independent of it. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feminism | MacKinnon, C. | Rorty VI 293 MacKinnon / Rorty: thesis: change the "logical space" to bring women to see themselves "as women". VI 296 Women / MacKinnon thesis: the term "woman" means no way of being human. Still no name for a moral identity, at most for a failure. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 |
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