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Conditional Probability  Conditional probability: probability of an event if another event is given. 

Conditional Probability  Cartwright  I 33 Conditional Probability/Cartwright: is the measure of efficiency. >Cause, >Effect, cf. >Bayesianism. I 34 Conditional Probability/Harper/Gibbard/Cartwright: can be deceiving.  E.g. it is indeed the case that the owners of the insurance policy live longer, but it would be a poor strategy, to buy one in order to get a longer life. Solution/Cartwright: counterfactual conditionals. >Causality, >Causal explanation. It's not about how many live longer, but the probability that a person lives longer if they buy one.  Problem: testing probability for counterfactual conditionals > Kripke/((s) because we invent the possible worlds). >Counterfactual conditionals. Apparent conditional probability: is not a measure with linked causes. I 36 Conditional probability: elimination of causal laws.  Instead: association, common occurrence. >Association. I 42 Partial Conditional Probability/Cartwright: Important argument: it holds all and only the causal factors fixed. >Probability. 
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 7193 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 
Conditional Probability  Lewis  V 178 Conditional Probability/Lewis: Problem: an event can have two causes, what conclusions should we draw from the unequal probabilities?  No solution: Background: how to evaluate?  LewisVsConditional Probability: is not neutral to determinism/indeterminism  Solution: causal dependency rather than causation. >Causation/Lewis, >causal dependence/Lewis. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author Vs Author 
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Copenhague Interpr.  Fraassen Vs Copenhague Interpr.  I 175 Copenhagen Interpretation/CI/Double Slit/Quantum Mechanics/QM/Fraassen: revolutionary: the number that results from the formula Pmw(E) is the conditional probability of a result that is within E, given that the observable m was measured in a system in state w  VsBorn: no trajectory through the upper slit: instead. I a I ² is the probability (prob.) that if a measurement is made, we obtain a light spot  to say that a system is in a certain state only indicates a relation of conditional probabilities of measurements  FraassenVsCopenhagen Interpretation: it is not certain whether the concepts of probability and conditional probability are applicable  I 177 but the Copenhagen interpretation allows viewing probability as a measure of objective variables: the frequency of results  problem: when no measurements are made. 
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 
Field, H.  Schiffer Vs Field, H.  I 105 SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition.  FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "trueof" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.). I 109 Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probabilityfunction of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prbltyfunction is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance. 
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 
Grice, P.H.  Jackson Vs Grice, P.H.  Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot"  "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely nonA?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. 
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
Hempel, C.  Schurz Vs Hempel, C.  I 224 Erklärung/Gesetz/Hempel: die Gesetzesprämissen können oft weggelassen werden! Geisteswissenschaften/Hempel/Schurz: beanspruchte, auch für sie Erklärungen liefern zu können, indem er annahm, dass auch hier Gesetze herrschen. VsHempel: diese Gesetze sind aber nicht strikt. Hempel: spät: dafür probabilistische Erklärung. I 234 Wahrscheinlichkeit/Erklärung/Schurz: es gibt zwei Lager: Hempel (1965) fordert, dass zu einer Erklärung die conditional probability nahe 1 liegen sollte. VsHempel: (Stegmüller, Tuomela: statt dessen Minimalforderung: Def "LeibnizBedingung"/Schurz: Minimalanforderung an den Wert der conditional probability p(Ex I Ax): er muss größer als ½ sein. Schurz: für probabilistische Begründungen und Voraussagen ist sie sicherlich zutreffend, aber gilt sie auch für Erklärungen? Dann nicht, wenn ihr Wesen darin liegen soll, positiv relevante Kausalfaktoren zu zitieren. 
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 
Lewis, D.  Jackson Vs Lewis, D.  V 152 Indicative Conditional/IC/JacksonVsLewis: better theory (Lewis pro): both theories have the following in common: 1) The IC has the truth conditions of the truthfunctional conditional A>C. 2) nevertheless, assertibility goes with the conditional subjective probability 3) there is a discrepancy between truth and assertibilitypreserving inferences involving indicative conditionals. V 152/153 4) our intuition about valid inference with conditionals may be applied to the conditionals, but are also meager evidence of validity. 5) The discrepancy between the assertibility of P(C I A) and the probability of the truth of P(A > C) is due to one or the other Gricean implicature. 6) The right approach to do this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truthfunctional) A ⊃ C . V 154 Lewis Thesis: "Assert the stronger" theory for conditional probability. Jackson Thesis: "Implicature of robustness": theory for conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: E.g. "Fred will not study and even if he does, he will fail." If (according to Lewis) the conditional is only assertible if the antecedent cannot be denied, how can it be that yet both are asserted together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of the robustness. Even if you believe that I am mistaken in thinking that Fred does not study, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. 
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 
Popper, K.  Schurz Vs Popper, K.  I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities must agree with them when the objective probabilities are known. Lewis: (1980): singular principal principle: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear which property a singular propensity should correspond to at all. Solution/de Finetti: you can also accept the objective probability concept at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on any experience date E(b1...bn) about other individuals b1,...bn it is important to derive two further versions of the principal principle: 1. Principal Principle for random samples used for the subjective justification of statistical likelihood intuition 2. The conditional principal principle, for the principle of narrowest reference class and the inductive statistical specialization conclusion is subject. Principal Principle: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r Principal Principle for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk mal (1 r)nk. Conditional Principal Principle: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,…bn)) = r. Principal Principle: is only useful for subjective a priori probabilities. I.e. belief degrees of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual Belief Degree/Belief Degree: the principle does not apply generally for it: for example if the coin is already showing head (=Fa) the belief degree of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. Apriori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedens of a conditional probability statement w(  I W). actual: = personalistic. apriori probability: connection with updated probability function: Strict Conditionalization/Schurz: w0 is the a priori probability or probability to t0 and w1 the current probability. I 116 Wt is the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A applies: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Narrowest reference class/n.r.c./Principle/Schurz: can be justified as follows: for a given event Fa, the individual can belong to a great many reference classes that assign very different probabilities to Fx. Then we got contradictory predictions. Question: but why should the appropriate reference class be the narrowest? Because one can prove that it maximizes the frequency value of true predictions. 
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 
Stalnaker, R.  Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R.  Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)^{(1)} Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)^{(2)}: then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things  for example in a completely symmetrical world  are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991^{(3)},1996^{(4)}, Lewis 1986e^{(5)}:36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, nonsemantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, contextdependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e^{(5)},42 48: for primary, 1969^{(6)}, Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978^{(7)}): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a^{(8)},38, 1994b^{(9)},296f). Newer terminology: Def AIntension/Primary Intension/1Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def CIntension/Secondary Intension/2Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def AProposition/1Proposition/CProposition/2Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a^{(10)},2004^{(11)}, Lewis 2002b^{(12)},Chalmers 1996b^{(13)}, 56,65) Def meaning_{1}/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975^{(14)},173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning_{2}/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "twodimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by metalinguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need AIntensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 
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Cond. Prblty  Jackson, F.  Lewis V 154 Jackson Thesis: "ImplicatureofRobustness" theory for the conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: Example "Fred will not learn and even if he does, he will fail". If (according to Lewis) here the conditional is only claimable, if the antecedence cannot be denied, then how can it be that nevertheless both are claimed together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of its robustness. Even if you think I am wrong, if I think Fred doesn't learn, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
Cond. Prblty  Lewis, D.  V 132 Lewis: the conditional probability is the probability of conditionals. (Especially presented by Stalnaker). V 154 Lewis: proposes an "assertthestrongertheory" for conditional probabilities. 
