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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Computer Programming | Weizenbaum | I 305 Programmes/programming/Weizenbaum: most of the programmes currently (mid-1970s) available, especially the most extensive and important of them, are not (...) theoretically sound. They are heuristic, not necessarily in the sense that they use heuristic methods within themselves, but that their construction follows rules of thumb, strategies that seem to "function" in most foreseeable circumstances, and are based on other ad hoc mechanisms that are added from time to time. ((s) See also >Ad Hoc Hypotheses, >Quine-Duhem-Thesis. I 308 Laymen assume that first of all a human being has organized what a computer program is supposed to become before it is entered into the computer. The layman believes that this is a guarantee that a programmer has formulated and understood every detail of the process embodied by the program. But the facts speak against this assumption. Even the programmer cannot know the way of decision making in his own program, let alone know what intermediate or final results it will produce. The formulation of a programme is therefore more like the creation of a bureaucracy than the construction of a machine. Cf. >Artificial intelligence, >Artificial neural networks, >World/thinking, >Artificial consciousness, >Black box. I 311 When programs are no longer understood by an individual, they can only grow. And their growth and the associated increase in dependency is accompanied by increasing legitimacy of their "knowledge base". >Legitimation, >Legitimacy. I 313 During the Vietnam War, for example, computers were operated by officers who had no idea what was actually going on in these machines. The computers decided which villages to bomb. ... Of course, only those data could be entered into the machine that were "machine-readable", i. e. largely target information originating from other computers. I 314 The corresponding secret reports came from computers. Admiral Moorer later said himself: "... until the lies that computers were supposed to tell others, brought them down, the masters of computers". (Cf. Seymour Hersh in: New York Times August 10,1973). I 315 Weizenbaum: the huge computer systems in the Pentagon and their counterparts elsewhere in our civilization have no authors in a highly real sense. >Authorship, >Computers, >Software. Correctness/Weizenbaum: therefore they do not allow questions about "right" and "wrong", about justice or any theory on which consent or contradiction could be based. I 317 Responsibility/Weizenbaum: the myth of technical, political and social inevitability is an effective sedative for consciousness. Its function is to remove responsibility from the shoulders of anyone who believes in it. Note that it is not people, but systemes that are responsible. >Responsibility. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Falsification | Popper | I 122 Falsification/Popper: can always be overridden ad hoc. >Ad hoc hypotheses, >Quine-Duhem Thesis. --- I 123 Empirical scientific method: consists precisely in the exclusion of such procedures. - "Humean contradiction": only experience is allowed, but not conclusive - solution/Popper: not all sentences are fully decidable. - There must be particular empirical sentences as a major premise of falsifying conclusions. >Undecidability. --- I 127 These cannot be protocol sentences, because these are only psychological. >Protocol sentences. --- Stegmüller I 400ff Falsification/Popper: falsification itself must be repeatable - we can reformulate universal statements into "There are-not"-sentences to falsify them, e.g. "there are no non-white swans". Induction/Popper. Schurz I 15 Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: The asymmetry is valid for strict (unexceptional all propositions): they cannot be verified by any finite set of observations but can be falsified by a single counterexample. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never rejected on the basis of a single counterexample, but adapted. >Asymmetry. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Review | Lakatos | Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974(1), 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in case of conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. protective belt": every (physical ) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to make empirical predictions. These are stored like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observable that contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad-hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown confounding factors are postulated. Vs: problem: this does not explain the divergent date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the ad hoc hypothesis is introduced! ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are legitimate at all only if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. Schurz I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: A theory version is falsified only if there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "instant rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. That only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def research program/Lakatos: hard core of theory together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def negative heuristic/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only at the periphery, However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can turn on against the core. Def positive heuristic/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can cope with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Def Falsification/Schurz: A theory version is falsified, gdw. some phenomena deductively following from it were falsified by actual observation sets. (s) Schurz always speaks of propositions instead of observations. 1. Lakatos, I. (1974). "Falsifikation und die Methodologie wissenschaftlicher Forschungsprogramme". In: Lakatos, I. und Musgrave, A., Kritik und Erkenntnisfortschritt. Braunschweig: Vieweg. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Theories | Lakatos | Feyerabend I 238 Lakatos/Feyerabend: also Lakatos' insightful attempt to establish a methodology that takes the historical reality of the sciences seriously, but which nevertheless subjects them to a control on the basis of regularities discovered in itself, is not excluded from this conclusion: 1. There are not the regularities to which Lakatos refers to, he idealizes the sciences just as his predecessors. 2. If the regularities were regularities of the sciences, and therefore useless to the "objective" judgment. 3. Lakatos' regularities are only a finery behind which an anarchic process is basically concealed. >Regularity, >Objectivity/Lakatos. I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper/Feyerabend: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but that. And, moreover, completely irrational. >Falsification. I 240 Lakatos/Feyerabend: Thesis: one should grant theories a "breathing space": in the evaluation counts the development of theories over a long period of time and not the current form. Moreover, methodological standards are not beyond criticism. --- Hacking I 206 Theories/Knowledge/HackingVsLakatos: Instead of increase of knowledge, it should mean: increase of theories! Feyerabend/VsLakatos: his "methodology" is of no use when one needs advice on current research. Schurz I 196 Theory revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with the experience by making adjustments to the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective Belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (excluding ceteris paribus hypotheses) to provide empirical predictions. These lie like a protective belt in the outer periphery around the center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be eliminated by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Definition Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date which contradicts the entire theory (core + periphery). Solution: Definition ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complex system conditions in which unknown disturbing factors are postulated. >Hypotheses, >Additional hypotheses. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. That is, it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is only falsified when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). That is, there is no "immediate rationality" (instant decision) which theory is better. This can only be seen in historical development. Definition Research Program/Lakatos: hard theoretical core along with a negative and a positive heuristics. Definition negative heuristics/Lakatos: Adaptations are not made in the core, but only at the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can also be directed against the core. Definition positive heuristics/Lakatos: a program that allows more and more complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core to deal with unruly data. I 199 Theory version/Schurz: core plus periphery. I 200 Definition Falsification/Schurz: a theory version is falsified, iff. some of the phenomena derived deductively from it were falsified by actual observational sentences. ((s) Schurz always speaks of sentences instead of observations.) I 202 Verisimilitude/SchurzVs/Failure/Success/Theory: the concept of failure has the advantage that it is not the epistemological-conflicted consequences of the theory that are understood, but the phenomena. The concept of truth is based only on the consequences. I 206 Definition tacking paradox/Lakatos/Schurz: the possibility to increase the empirical content of a theory version by the mere conjunctive addition of some empirically unchecked assertion. Solution/Lakatos: the connection of an auxiliary hypothesis creating a new empirical content with the previous theory must be more intimate than that of a mere conjunction. I 207 Solution: the theory T must be homogeneous with respect to the empirical content: Definition Homogeneity/Theory/Schurz: a factorization ((s) division) of T with respect to E (T) is not possible. Logical form: subdivision of T and E(T) into two disjoint subsets T1UT2 = T and E1UE2 = E (T) so that T1 implies all phenomena in E1 and T2 implies all phenomena in E2. If this is possible, the theory is heterogeneous. Any theory obtained by irrelevant amplification can be factored in this sense. A connection of the theory T with this gain H is empirically not creative. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Galilei, G. | Feyerabend Vs Galilei, G. | I 128 Perception/Natural Interpretation/Galilei/Feyerabend: apart from natural interpretations Galilei also changes perceptions that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits the existence of such perceptions, praises Copernicus for ignoring them, and claims to have removed them with the help of the telescope. But he gives no theoretical reasons for the unreliability of the telescope in celestial observations. Conclusion//Feyerabend: an argument is construed that Copernicus disproved due to the observation. The argument is reversed in order to discover the natural interpretations which are responsible for the contradiction. The offensive interpretations are replaced by others (through propaganda). The new natural interpretations are formulated as auxiliary hypotheses. They are partly established because of the help they give Copernicus, partly due to plausibility considerations and ad hoc hypotheses. This gives rise to a completely new ’experience’. Independent data are still missing completely, but this is not a disadvantage. They will only come about after a long time. What we need now is a theory of aerodynamics and of solid objects. They have been left out completely. But their task is now determined. This points the way for further research. I 129 Movement/Aristotle/Feyerabend: Question: how is it possible that something is moving, and yet occupies a certain place. Answer: it is not possible. This response by Aristotle agrees with quantum mechanics. A well-defined movement with a well-defined momentum has no place in it. Movement/Galilei/FeyerabendVsGalilei: all that is lost in the revolution of Galilei. He is looks at idealized movements that exist nowhere in the world. Difference Newton/Galilei/Feyerabend: Newton could never push all the rich reality aside like this. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Popper, K. | Lakatos Vs Popper, K. | Feyerabend I 239 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: some of the most famous falsifications were anything but such. And beyond that totally irrational. Hacking I 199 "Protective belts"/Lakatos: you only make a selection of problems you are dealing with. Further objections are then ignored. LakatosVsPopper: so verification still has a place! The researchers choose a few problems, refutations can then be completely uninteresting! Hacking I 286 Observation/LakatosVsPopper: Falsificationism cannot be right because it presupposes the distinction between theory and observation. The simple rule according to which the human thinks and directs nature is not tenable. Two false assumptions: 1. there is a psychological boundary between speculative and observational sentences 2. assuming that observational evidence could be proven by facts. Schurz I 196 Theory Revision/Lakatos/Schurz: (Lakatos 1974, 129ff) Methodology of scientific research programs: two assumptions: 1. "Immunization": it is always possible to save the core of a theory in the event of a conflict with experience by making adjustments at the periphery. I 197 2. "Protective belt": every (physical) theory needs auxiliary hypotheses (exclusive ceteris paribus hypotheses) to establish empirical prognoses. These are located like a protective belt in the outer periphery around center and core. Conflicts with experience can then be resolved by replacing or dropping an auxiliary hypothesis. Def Anomaly/Lakatos: an observation date that contradicts the whole theory (core + periphery). Solution: Def ad hoc hypothesis: assumes more complicated system conditions in which unknown interfering factors are postulated. Vs: Problem: this does not explain the different date. I.e. it remains an anomaly even after the introduction of the ad hoc hypothesis! Ad hoc/Lakatos: such adjustments are only legitimate if they are scientifically progressive. They must have new empirical content. I 198 Falsification/LakatosVsPopper: a theory version is falsified only when there is a progressive new version (with new empirical content). I.e. there is no "immediate rationality" (immediate decision) which theory is better. This only becomes apparent in the historical development. Def Research Program/Lakatos: hard theory core together with a negative and a positive heuristic. Def Negative Heuristics/Lakatos: adjustments are not made in the core but only on the periphery. However, in the course of a degenerative development the modus tollens hits can be directed against the core. Def Positive Heuristics/Lakatos: Program according to which increasingly complex theoretical models or system conditions for the core can be handled with recalcitrant data. I 199 Theoretical version/Schurz: Core plus periphery. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Various Authors | Stalnaker Vs Various Authors | II 48 Presupposition/Stalnaker: 1. as semantic relation (StalnakerVs) between sentences or propositions. Here we have to distinguish between presupposition and assertion in concepts of content or truth conditions ((s) truth-conditional semantics). Def presupposition/semantic/logical form/Stalnaker: a proposition that P presupposes that Q iff Q must be true so that P has a truth value (tr.v.) at all. That means presuppositions are made necessary by the truth and falsity of the proposition. If any presupposition is wrong the assertion has no tr.v.. StalnakerVsSemantic presupposition: although suitable for theoretical explanations, but requires complicated ad hoc hypotheses about the semantics of individual words and constructions. II 49 Def pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: (provisional version): a proposition A is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context precisely in the case that the speaker assumes or believes that P, accepts or believes that the listeners assumes or believes that P and accepts or believes that the listener realizes that he makes these assumptions or has these convictions. II 50 So it are the speakers, not the sentences that make the presuppositions ((s) unlike the semantic approach). logical form: there are three possible definitions of pragmatic presupposition: a) proposition x presupposes that Q exactly in the event that the use of x appropriate (normal, acceptable) is only in contexts where Q is presupposed by the speaker. b) a statement that P (in a particular context) presupposes that Q just in case that one can reasonably conclude that the speaker presupposes Q from the fact that he made the statement. c) ... when it is necessary to assume that the speaker presupposes that Q to properly understand or interpret the statement. Important argument: we do not need an intermediate step of an assumed relation that should exist between propositions (StalnakerVsSemantic approach). II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can change without the truth conditions changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such a third person and ask questions without postulating different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 69 Similarity metrics/similarity/next poss.w./most similar world/Stalnaker: it will always be true that something is more similar to itself than to anything else. Therefore, the selection function must be one which picks out the real world, whenever possible. (poss.w. = possible world). StalnakerVsSemantic approach: nothing can further be said here about what are the relevant aspects of similarity. Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatic approach: here we can explain how the context determines the truth conditions at least for indicative conditionals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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