Martin
Schulz
March 2013
Knowledge Structuring in Scientific Discourse
We are
proposing a five-part structure of scientific argumentation:
„Five-Finger-Model“ (FFM)
1.
Thesis
2.. Vs Counterpositions (“versus”)
3. Def (Idiosyncratic)
Definitions – deviating terminology – debatable groupings of objects
4. Example: different level of
speech, e.g. speech of non-existent objects – presents the subject
5. Camp: a standpoint that is
shared by some researchers and disputed by others
However,
all five components are not always present.
This
structure brings with it a peculiar network of networks in which not all of the
components necessarily have to be linked. This is the case because some
definitions are idiosyncratic or contrarian or are only implicit and realisable
through further examination. It is precisely this further examination which is
conducted in the Lexicon of Arguments. For the Semantic Search in Sciences the
main problem will be non-mentioned concepts as we will see below.
Knowledge
– implicit, explicit, concealed
One might
think that knowledge is concentrated in the nodes of a network, not in the
edges, but this is not quite true. When getting familiar with a scientific
field a student gets the feeling that he or she gains a better understanding of
the arguments contained within this field making them more convincing. Later
on, as the learning processes moves forward, the student will learn that there
are also counterpositions to these arguments. However, this realisation is not
always evident at the beginning because authors sometimes conceal competing
theories when elaborating their own work.
Therefore, we can state that the
edges of the network (i.e. what happens in dispute: the counterpositions
) deserve examination.
The main
problem
Competing
theories and authors often do not mention each other. Therefore, in order to
get into the ropes of the controversies one will need
A. Explicit indications (rare)
B. Treatment of sources
- by the
authors themselves by arranging their abstracts according to a template e.g.
the FFM (see above).
- by the
recipients (arranging according to the FFM)
Knowledge Structure – Structuring of Knowledge
Supplementary
to the distinction between theses, examples, definitions, commentaries and
assignment to scientific camps there are also different forms of arguments in a
particular discourse.
Forms of
Arguments - Forms
of Dispute
Even authors
who belong to one and the same scientific camp may contradict each other.
Therefore, there are different forms these arguments take e.g.:
a) Same camp, equal demarcation of
the scientific field (ontology) – different terminology for objects - this may lead to a
different formation of groups – otherwise it would be only a so called
“notational variant”.
b) Same camp, divergent demarcation
of scientific fields – recess or integration of debated objects and the names
of them – these theories are not so much competing for truth but for
explanatory strength.
c) Same camp, equal demarcation of
scientific field (ontology) – same terminology for objects - but logical divergences. In most cases
you will find a flaw here.
d)
Camps differ mostly in their use (or definitions) of concepts and the
acceptance of premises. Key words from more traditional theories sometimes are
willingly concealed. All contributions are bound by the same logic anyway.
e) Differing kinds of logic (e.g. Dialetheism, the view that statements can be both true and
false at the same time). It is often criticised then that the meaning of the
sentential connectives “and”. “or”, “if…then…” is not
preserved. Theories like this are not in the continuity of a discussion that
presupposes a common logical basis.
f) Differing ontologies: in this case
it is not always possible to put the finger to the dissent.
Problems
for the Semantic Web
“Semantic
Web” is the expression for efforts to search the web automatically for
questions that are more explicitly put than simply in one word.
Example: “Is there a product available similar to
product X, but not X itself and with the diverging properties A and B in the
environment of city Z for a price below $ 500,-?”
Today, agents (programs) are able to resolve
this automatic Semantic Search.
In contrast to this, scientific controversies
lead to questions in the form of
Example: “Do the concepts used by author 1 refer to
the same objects as those used by author 2?” - “Is author X segmenting the objects in his
field of research in the same manner as author Y?” - “Do both authors accept the same conceptual
discrimination?”
Example: The System Theory replaces the distinction
content/form by the distinction inside/outside.
Here we can already see the problem that the
concepts of one camp are not used by the other.
These
questions stretch beyond the Example of the product mentioned above. That
example was limited to covering a prefixed ontology even when not all of the
elements were present at all times.
Now, in the
sciences it may be sufficient to call on scientists to prepare their abstracts
according to something like the FFM (see above), i.e. set marks like “Vs” (AuthorAVsAuthorB) to enable an automatic Semantic Search.
The encouragement to do this is one of the root reasons of this article.
Possibilities and Solutions for the Semantic Search in Scientific
Discourse
We have
noticed above the differences between scientific Semantic Search and the search
for a product e.g. a camera. Nevertheless, indeed there are some similarities
between the two. Even in scientific discourse there are “standardized parts”
which can be present or not. Therefore, these “standardized parts” may fit the
description of a “type of product” (type of argumentation) or they may not.
Example: The Theory of
Possible Worlds (PoWo) in philosophy. Here the question is whether certain
elements are adopted by an author or not, e.g.:
Similarity metrics for PoWo yes/no
Individuals in more than one world
yes/no
Real existence of PoWo yes/no
Emerging and passing off of
individuals between PoWo
yes/no
Accessibility between PoWo
transitive yes/no
Etc.
Using these
elements we can characterise the profile of an author and identify his
affiliation to a scientific camp.
The
Five-Finger-Model (FFM)
– For which Scientific
Field is this appropriate?
The FFM
seems to be appropriate for an array of competing theories such as
Philosophy
Psychology
Economic Sciences
Sociology
Historical Sciences
Law
Art Theory
However, it seems less at home in
the Natural Sciences like
Physics
Chemistry
Biology
These are sciences that are not
necessarily fields of competing theories in which dispute emerges more so
around methods and systematics. Having said this, in this meta-dimension the
FFM, of course, may still be a useful tool to navigate
through the discourse.
Example: (from physics): Lee
SmolinVsStringtheory (analogously): you should
not deploy a theory that is untestable in principle.
Non-mentioning
of a Concept – A Problem for the automatic and non-automatic Semantic Search
Sometimes a
source may not mention a concept even when it is relevant to the discussion
around a particular question. Therefore, this source should still be taken into
account for the inquiry of the problem at hand.
Example: (from philosophy): Vsrepresentation: a purveyor of the speech act
theory might purport that we don’t need to assume representations because when
assuming that speaking is an act we don’t ask primarily about the relationship
between the way of displaying an object and the object displayed. This author
might assume that the depicted object is in flux instead of being fixed.
The author`s text, perhaps, will
not even mention or use the concept of representation. The problem therefore
introduced is that someone at the beginning of their studies in this field will
be left obscured from a possible counterposition in the discussion.
Just because a concept is not used
we cannot draw the conclusion that it is unimportant.
By the way of the definition of an
“advanced student” - she or he will realise that a concept is not mentioned, be
it important or not. An advanced student will detect counterpositions.
Back to
Semantic Search: if we want to get a grip on the situation where a concept is
missing we have to be astute and pay attention to words like “whereas”. This
might reveal the counterposition in phrases
such as “whereas we have to pay attention not to…”, “whereas we may not…” etc.
Other deceptive expressions include
“while”, “on the other hand”, “not at all”, “one might think”
And more directly: “traditional”,
“widespread”, “handed down”, “well established”, “minority”, “majority”, “some
authors”, “steer clear of” etc.
Knowledge
Structuring between Fidelity to the Text and Creativity – Introducing Material
concealed by the Author
For our
above mentioned example we now can set a mark:
Speech Act theoryVsCorrespondence theory
Problem:
correspondence theory again might not be mentioned at all in the source!
Therefore, we will have to make clear that the source is edited. Knowledge
structuring revises a text, as does secondary
literature. Solution: we set a mark for the editor e.g. (s):
Speech Act theoryVsCorrespondence theory/(s):…
This makes
it clear that our resulting text is not directly quoted. In our example we also
add the concept in question which was not found in the original text:
representation/Speechact theoryVsCorrespondence
theory/(s):…
Our problem
initially was that the Semantic Search will likely not find the important
points in a text because the searched concepts are concealed or only present in
paraphrased forms. We were bringing in concepts out of a thesaurus of related
concepts to ease the Semantic Search.
An author
may protest here and say that he did not use the concept because according to
him the object the concept refers to does not exist at all!
Our defence is that we only wanted get better search
results, alternatively perhaps this author would not have been found at all.
By the way, our intervention in a text does not
obscure the source but rather makes such demarcations itself.
Traditional
secondary literature normally embeds texts in even longer texts. What we do is
reduce the text by setting marks:
Thesis:
Def/Concept:
Example:
Vs:
Camp:
Through
this we show the different dimensions of a dispute.
This will
not make the original literature unnecessary. For scientific quotations the original
source with the literal wording is needed, i.e. added or paraphrased concepts will
have to be eliminated or marked. The additional concepts that were inserted are
there to ease the search and to make it possible to find certain sources which would
not be found by standard search engines.
The
problem of paraphrased keywords
Another
problem for the Semantic Search is the deviating use of relevant words
according to the individual taste of an author. An example can be taken from
philosophy. While talking about non-existent objects - a problem for logic - some authors prefer the
Pegasus as an example. Others like unicorns. Apart from Pegasus being a
singular term and unicorn being a general term there is not much difference.
While processing the text for the Semantic Search we should nevertheless put
both words at the beginning of our excerpt in order to make it possible for the
user pull up more results when searching for information about non-existent
objects – our original aim. So this is our job while editing texts and
preparing a lexicon that goes beyond simply copying texts that come up in a
discussion.
Vs, versus., Counterpositions
Indeed,
even today you will find a lot of results by typing “vs”
on Twitter or Google – and be whacked by results from sports teams!
“Brutus vs Caesar”
might be illuminating for a historian or be related to a fancy-dress ball which
will be over in case of doubt.
The main problem here is that the result
of your search will consist one more time in a long text that will have to be
examined once more, though. And at last you will not find in it the answer to
your original question about Caesar!
The Lexicon of Arguments by
contrast puts a single statement after the “Vs” plus the indication of the
source. These statements can then be compared:
BrutusVsCaesar/source1:…
BrutusVsCaesar/source2:…
BrutusVsCaesar/source3:…
Generally:
Author1VsAuthor2. Possible searches are then:
“VsAuthor1”: all arguments against this author
“Author2Vs” everything this author is against.
Thereby, we
automatically establish a whole network of networks:
AuthorAVsAuthorB
___VsAuthorC
___VsAuthorC
___VsAuthorD……..AuthorDVsAuthorB
___VsAuthorC
___VsAuthorE…….AuthorEVsAuthorA
___VsAuthorB
___VsAuthorF
Etc.
Or
AuthorAVs…
Vs….
Vs…
…VsAuthorB
…VsAuthorB
…VsAuthorB
…VsAuthorC
…VsAuthorC
Etc.
According
to the same device we will get
(Scientific)
Camp1VsCamp2 A-IsmVsB-Ism TheoryXVsTheoryY.
You can see
it in our table “Versus!” . Help us make it contain
more results! This is only the beginning.
Scientific Camps
There are
different ways of camp-forming in the sciences and humanities:
A.
Theoretically
Agreements
a) on a
common subsidiary branch
b) against
diverging definitions of commonly used concepts
c) against
integration of new concepts or objects under examination
d) against
eliminations of commonly used concepts or objects under examination
B.
Practically
Forming of groups by mutual
strengthening (mutual quoting)
Scientific
camps emerge only within subsidiary branches of a greater scientific field
because useful distinctions are only made in a sphere of common research.
Unrelated fields do not form scientific camps.
Strategies
of demarcation of scientific camps are:
Claiming
a) that
two objects fall under one concept instead of two
b) that a
conceptual discrimination has to be made between two objects
c) that a
traditional concept is not apt to or makes a wrong discrimination between
objects under examination
d) that a
new concept is not apt to or makes a wrong discrimination between objects under
examination
e) that an
object belongs to an outside array
f) that an
object of an alleged outside array belongs to the own field and should be
integrated
g) like e)
but for concepts instead of objects
h) like f)
but for concepts instead of objects
There is a
tendency that an author will count himself to an established scientific field
while some of his
readers may want to push him “out of the family”.
It would be
helpful while working on structuring knowledge and scientific fields that
authors write their abstracts in form of the FFM (Five-Finger-Model) in the
future. The authors even may hope for more quotations by that!
Cross-author Index
Up to now
there is no cross-author index available. This is astonishing in a way but also
quite understandable if one takes into account the considerable amount of
efforts associated with creating such an index. We have started to prepare this
in German for the field of Analytic Philosophy and it is the core of the
Lexicon of Arguments.
Titles and authors are indicated by
roman numerals – pages by Arabic. Additional to this there are very short
commentaries e.g.
Lambda‑Operator LW III210,211,212(i.Grammat:Verknüpf.("binder"),x^:
"ist ein x, so daß "(something x such that) ‑‑ Q IX 52f(Funktabstr.,"lx"/erzeugt Terme aus
Termen (bei Frege/Church auch von Auss./"lx(x²)"Quadr.v.","lx(...x...):
"{<x,y>: y = ...x...}"),54("lxx" (= D)/Ident/"lxz(={z} X
J)),98,126(bei Rekurs),127(alltagssprchl:ly(x*y) = x‑mal‑Funkt." lv(x + x):"x + Funkt,ly(xy):"x‑hoch‑Funkt),129(ly(x + y):Folge a deren y‑ter Wert a'y für jed.y = x + y ist) ‑‑ EMD 292(Rel.d.Ident/
Wigg:(lx)(ly)(x = y)),296,297,298(Äqui.zw.Formeln
m+ o.LO),300(äuß.Negat:"nicht(lxi)Sokrat. i.kahl)(L)" wobei L irgendein fix.Term, weil xi n.frei/inn.Neg:"(lxi)(xi ist kahl)(Sokrat)"/einheitl. Interpretat.+Funktor v.Präd.>Präd), 305(dient d.Aufnahme belieb.kompl.wffs zw.d.Klamm),
311(falsch:(notw(lx)(ly)(x ist Teil v.Tisch)(Bein)/falsch:(notw(lx)(ly)(x ist Teil v.y)(Bein,Tisch) ‑richtig:"(notw(ly)(Bein Teil v.y)(Tisch)"/Chi pro,KriVs) ‑‑
Mei I 90(Name d.d.off.Stllen bindet,Name
f.präd.Univ), 91(Selbstident:zweideut:a=a,a=b),92(Prädikation, allgem.:"A(b) ist wahr gdw.b. exemplifiz":l01[A(01)]")
There
are lists of abbreviations and logical symbols as well.
Having
this Index on your smartphone in the library, or while ordering books on the
internet, you can easily assess by the commentaries if a book will be helpful
for you.
The Lexicon of
Arguments – Controversies in Sciences
In
the Lexicon of Arguments (philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com) the structure of the FFM
was applied for the first time for scientific excerpts. The Lexicon of
Arguments has done this for the field of Analytic Philosophy which leads the
user to the Tables “Versus”, “Concepts”, “Scientific Camps” as well as the
Glossary and the Index which are available on our website. This organisational
structure shows the dimensions of fields of competing theories that
are always present but normally not explicit.
The Lexicon of Arguments enables
you to stay in the field of your inquiry and to “walk along” the horizontal and
vertical lines in order to confront the positions of the different authors.
While
using Google you will have to start a new inquiry which makes you having to
read a longer text all over again.
We hope
that Psychologists, Historians, Economic Scientist, Sociologists, Art
Theoreticians and many others will join us. Our model can also be used for
navigating the discussion of methodology in the natural sciences
This little
text and the Lexicon of Arguments as a whole is an appeal to scientist to use
the FFM for the sake of better results of Semantic Search. The FFM is neutral
in its relationship to technical realisation.
Please
visit the “Semantic Search” on our website to learn more about the Lexicon of
Arguments and how to take part in this project in the future.