Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Quine, Willard Van Orman
Books on Amazon
Properties Rorty VI 151
Major property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself."
Quine I 43
Features: independent existence is pointless.
I 218
Mass Terminus/Quine: is archaic(> Cassirer) -> Properties a) commonality b) Scattered clumps?
I 217
Features: usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains.
I 219
Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back abstract objects - faithfully distinguished of concrete objects by use of "-ness".
I 322
Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun.
I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties.
I 344
Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions).
I 361
Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46).
I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension.
I 412
Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables.
I 464
QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties.
II 129f
Properties: hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things.
properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator.
Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence).
Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences.
Properties not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function.
Properties as last classes every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn).
Properties/identity: (here) interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion.
Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list.
Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed.
II 144 f
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief de re (essential property).
Modal logic/Quine: entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context.
Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re.
X 95
Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie.

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29