Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription.
 
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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Existence I 54
Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement - can only be avoided by greater complexity - Arbitration: method - question of existence is question of evidence.
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I 300
Existence: Category is dependent on the point of view, but not the existence of the objects E.g. time period.
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I 316
Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms.
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I 402f
Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli weak is a argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions.
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I 412
QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes.
The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension.
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II 173
Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? Medieval logic: Yes - Modern Times: No (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity).
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VII 110
Existence/Ontology/Quine: only values of ​​bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities.
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VII 167
Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation.
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VIII 31
Existence/Quine/(s): ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote?
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IX 29
Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element - ((s) an existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something.
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IX 33
Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes - existence of a means being an element of J (universal class) - the property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something - Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if J is a something - if we postulate the existence of J, i.e. J e J, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then J is not real, J e J. (s) Absurd.
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IX 176
Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - no: even classes are not created by description.
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IX 218
Existence/Quine: for NF plus extreme classes: the property of being a qunatity:
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IX 221
Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF, becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF said "{x: Fx} e J", we now have to say "^uFu e UJ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "UJ").
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XI 128
Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification - its logic is that of the existence quantifier. quantifiers: only receive meaning when the values ​​of the variables are identifiable - Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values ​​of the variables are precisely the objects.
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XI 130
Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable - because a predicate is an open sentence - predicate variables only exist freely - everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Existence



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-27