Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Singular Terms, philosophy: singular terms are linguistic expressions for individual objects or situations or totals, which can be determined as something individual. See also general terms, relative terms, abstract terms, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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W.V.O. Quine on Singular Terms - Dictionary of Arguments
I 102 Distinction singular/general term: independent from stimulus meaning. - Name or general term for space-time segments: the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). >General terms. I 212 Difference verb/noun/adjective: less important - difference singular term/general term very important. I 231 Ambiguity: the name Paul is not ambiguous, no general term but singular term with dissemination - ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object). I 236 Ambiguities:. "one" (can be "any") - "nothing", "nobody" indefinite singular term (E.g. Polyphemus). I 244 Range ambiguous: cannot be decided by parentheses - indefinite singular term: one, any, any member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that..."/"is one so that I think ...". I 258 Indefinite terms do not denote objects - Indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: "Tax auditor is looking for someone" (position denoted - "someone" not denoted). >Someone/Geach. I 273 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not denote a lion - relative term police chasing a man. I 285 Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x..". I 300 "Now", "then" Quine: singular term like "I", "you" - StrawsonVs: "now" no limits. "I 311 Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (unless variable) - i.e. actually general term (Predicate)! E.g. "=Mom", "=Socrates", "=Pegasus". I 323 Elimination of singular term: fusion of "=" with a piece of text - "=" remains! - Together with variables in predicative position - "=" predicative general term. I 327 Definitions: Instructions for transformation, restore singular term! - Flexible, without truth value gaps. --- VII (h) 144 Singular term/Quine: can be eliminated by paraphrase. >Elimination._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Singular Terms
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-26