Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Object I 102
Goodman: "Rabbitness": is a discontinuous space-time segment, which consists of rabbits.
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I 372f
Objects of propositional attitude eliminated: "Thomas believes (Cicero has): no longer the form" Fab" a = Thomas, b = () - but: "Fa" where "F" is a complex expression - no longer "believes" term, but operator.
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I 402
Existence: does not arise from dichotomy "single thing" - "universal" - it does not matter whether they do exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - linking with stimuli is weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions.
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I 412
Object: name which is denoted by singular terms, accepts it as values ​​- (but singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness".
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I 438
Ideal objects not permitted - geometric objects are permitted (no identity without localization).
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I 435
Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint.
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II 30
Object/Quine: Space-Time-piece can also be distributed or scattered. (Nominalism, Goodman).
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II 23
Physical object is deceptive - better space-time pieces - "space" and "places as such" untenable, otherwise there would be absolute standstill and absolute movement - 4-digit coordinates suffice - ontology of pure set theory - no more physical object.
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II 156 ff
Object (physical)/Quine: arbitrarily scattered and arbitrarily singled out - pocket contents, single coin at various points in time, combination with the Eiffel Tower, Space-Time-points, anything - are not so strongly body-oriented - identification like from one possible world to another: without content as long as no instructions are given - value of a variable.
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VI 32
Object/Ontology/Quine: bodies constitute themselves as ideal nodes in the centers of overlapping observation sentences - problem: observation sentences are not permanent - therefore the objectification (reification) is always already a theory.
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VI 34
Question: what should be considered real objectification and not just a theoretically useful one (like classes).
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VI 35
Abstract objects: pointless to speak of permanent stimulus phases - solution: pronouns and bound variables - Vs singular term : often not referring - there must be unspecifiable irrational numbers - Solution: bound variable instead of singular term.
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VI 38f
Objectification/Reification/Quine: for the first time in predicative connection of observation sentences - instead of their mere conjunction - "This is a blue pebble": calls for embedding pebble into the blue.
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VI 41
Abstract objects/Modal/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects - QuineVsModal logic: instead quantification (postulation of objects) - so we can take the slack out of the truth function.
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VII 69
Object/Quine: may be unconnected: E.g. USA Alaska.
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XII 36
Properties/Identity/Quine: Problem: (unlike objects) ultimately based on synonymy within a language - more language-specific identity.
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V 39
Ultimately we do without rigorous individuation of properties and propositions. (different term scheme) - Frege dito: (Basic Laws): do not extend identity to terms.
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XII 68
Object/Theory/Quine: what is an object, ultimately, you cannot say - only in terms of a theory - (ultimately overall theory, i.e. language use) - but wrong: to say that talk about things would only make sense within a wider range - that would correspond to the false thesis that no predicate applied to all things - there are universal predicates.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Object



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29