Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Mention philosophy: the mention of linguistic objects must be distinguished from their use. This distinction is sometimes difficult when symbols are partly used and partly mentioned within logical formulas. One simple case of a mention of a word or phrase is the quote. See also object language, metalanguage, quote, reference, occurrence, type, token.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

W.V.O. Quine on Mention - Dictionary of Arguments

V 100
Mention/Use/Language Learning/Quine: the confusion mention/use is necessary for learning: the sound of the word has approximately the same effect as the sight of the object - also transition from observation statements to timeless statements: E.g. from "Fido is a dog" to "A dog is an animal" (the confusion is ignored here).
>Language Acquisition/Quine
, >Learning/Quine.
VII (e) 82ff
Mention/use/expression/Quine: e.g. the term "(F I Y)" itself is not a formula, but a name that describes the formula. ((s) conditional probability).
IX 22
Use/mention/Quine: on the right hand side of "ε" we use quantifiable variables - on the left hand side of "ε" we mention classes.
>Variables/Quine, >Classes/Quine.
I 339
Mentioning/Use/Russell/Whitehead/QuineVsRussell/QuineVsWhitehead: Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as if it were interchangeable with "If p, then q" (in the material sense).
C. I. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p implies strictly q" and declared it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence, he developed a modal logic in which "necessary" is a sentence operator.
Solution/Quine: It is best to consider "implies" and "analytical" as general terms that are predicted by sentences by adding them predictively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators.
I 68
Implication/mention/use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their names.
For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their names. So we mention the sentences by using their names. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) Implication is via the sentences.
>Implication/Quine.
Different:
Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema.
Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry
This mentions Cassius but not a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation.
VII (e) 82
Mention/Use/Expression/Quine: For example: the expression "(φ I ψ)" is not a formula itself, but a name describing the formula.
VII (f) 112f
Sentence/Schema/Quine: the distinction between sentence and schema is not the same as that between mention/use.
IX 22
Usage/Mention/Quine: to the right of "ε" we use quantifiable variables, to the left of "ε" we mention classes.
X 62
Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the meta language is used to talk about the object language.
>Metalanguage/Quine, >Object language/Quine.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-02-27
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