Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Tax competition: Tax competition occurs when governments lower tax rates or offer incentives to attract businesses or individuals, aiming to stimulate economic growth and investment. This practice can create a race among jurisdictions to lure taxpayers, potentially leading to reduced public revenue or a need for alternate taxation methods to compensate for lowered rates. See also Taxation, Tax evasion, Tax avoidance, Tax havens, Tax incidence, Tax loopholes, Tax system._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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James M. Buchanan on Tax Competition - Dictionary of Arguments
Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 |
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> Counter arguments against Buchanan
> Counter arguments in relation to Tax Competition
