|Discourse, philosophy: a discourse in the philosophical context is a set of topics that are discussed together with a certain set of used terms at a time by a group of people. New topics can be propagated and further terms developed. The setting up of access rules and discourse rules is the subject of various discourse theories. See also intersubjectivity, rationality, communication, communication theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Jürgen Habermas on Discourse - Dictionary of Arguments
Discourse/theoretical/practical/Habermas: I myself have a tendency to adopt a cognitivist position, according to which practical questions can basically be decided on an argumentative basis. However, this position can only be defended in a promising way if we do not hastily assimilate practical discourses, which have an internal reference and interpreted needs of the persons concerned, into theoretical discourses with their relation to the interpreted experiences of an observer.
Arguments used to justify value standards do not meet the requirements of discourses. In the prototypical case they have the form of aesthetic criticism. (See also Culture/Habermas)
Theoretical discourse: cognitive-instrumental - it is about the truth of propositions and the effectiveness of teleological actions
Practical discourse: moral-practical - it is about the correctness of actions
Aesthetic critique: evaluative - it is about the appropriateness of value standards
Therapeutic critique: expressive - it is about the truthfulness of expressions
Explicative discourse: - this is about the comprehensibility or well-formedness of symbolic constructs.
Definition Discourse/Habermas: I only speak of discourses when the meaning of the problematic claim to validity forces the participants conceptually to assume that a rational, motivated agreement could basically be achieved, whereby "basically" expresses the idealizing reservation: if the argumentation could only be led openly enough and continued for long enough. (1)
1. Das geht auf Ch. S. Peirce zurück. Vgl. dazu H. Scheit, Studien zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit, Habilitationsschrift Universität München, 1981._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981