Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Naturalistic fallacy: is described as the error to infer from being to what should be. From the fact that something is the way it is, cannot be concluded that it should be like this. The expression comes from the Principia Ethica by G. E. Moore (1903), but the problem goes much further back and has already been pre-formulated by G. Hume in his “A Treatise of Human Nature” (1738-40). Another name for the problem is the is-ought problem.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Brocker I 617
Naturalistic Fallacy/Being/Should/Jonas: Jonas expressly declares that the "separation of 'being' and 'should' (according to which nature is value-free factuality, from which no principles, norms or values can be derived) represents a philosophical dogma to which he does not want to submit. (1)
VsJonas: it is controversial in research whether Jonas could be accused of "naturalistic fallacy". (2)(3)(4)
Gethmann-Siefert: defends Jonas against this criticism, but accuses him of a "circular justification". (5)
Brocker I 618
Karl-Otto Apel: defends Jonas against the accusation of a naturalistic fallacy, but accuses him of violating Kant's verdict against "dogmatic metaphysics". (6)


1. Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation, Frankfurt/M. 1979, p. 92f.
2. Anna Claas, Lässt sich das ‚Prinzip Verantwortung‘ doch noch verteidigen? Versuch der Begründung des ‚Prinzips Verantwortung‘ von Hans Jonas auf der Basis der diskursiven und neo-pragmatistischen Ethik von Albrecht Wellmer, Marburg 2011, p. 14, 80-82.
3. Wolfgang-Erich Müller, Hans Jons, Philosoph der Verantwortung, Darmstadt 2008, p. 210ff.
4. Wolfgang Kuhlmann, „‘Prinzip der Verantwortung‘ versus Diskursethik“ in: Dietrich Böhler (hg.) Ethik für die Zukunft, IM Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 282
5. Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, ‚Ethos und metaphysisches Erbe Zu den Grundlagen von Hans Jonas‘ Ethik der Verantwortung“, in: Herbert Schnädelbach/Geert Keil (Hg.) Philosophie der Gegenwart – Gegenwart der Philosophie, Hamburg 1993, p. 190-195, 200.
6. Karl-Otto Apel, „Die ökologische Krise als Herausforderung für die Diskursethik“, in: Dietrich Böhler (Hg.) Ethik für die Zukunft, Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas, München 1994, p. 389.


Manfred Brocker, „Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Jonas I
Hans Jonas
Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation Frankfurt 1979

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-26
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