|Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Brandom on Absicht - Dictionary of Arguments
Intention: does not necessarily determine how you will act, but its content determines what is appropriate.
Just as belief is ambiguous (sometimes deontic setting, sometimes deontic status), so is intention ambiguous in the context of accounting.
Intention/Brandom: a) Intentional acting: acknowledging a practical determination -
b) with reasons: to be entitled to a determination - c) from reasons: with consideration. >Reasons, >Actions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001