Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will.<_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Brandom on Absicht - Dictionary of Arguments
I 50 Intention: does not necessarily determine how you will act, but its content determines what is appropriate. I 381f Just as belief is ambiguous (sometimes deontic setting, sometimes deontic status), so is intention ambiguous in the context of accounting. --- II 126 Intention/Brandom: a) Intentional acting: acknowledging a practical determination - b) with reasons: to be entitled to a determination - c) from reasons: with consideration. >Reasons, >Actions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Brandom
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2023-12-09