Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Intention: the will to commit an act, as opposed to a random occurrence of such an event. See also motives, causation, will._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Donald Davidson on Intentions - Dictionary of Arguments
Brandom I 375 Intention/Davidson/early: An intention refers to one thing or state - later Vs - Searle: for intentional action only "action intentions" - for pure intentionality: there is also "preceding intention". - - - Avramides I 5 Language/Davidson/Avramides: The speaker must have the intention to use the words, so that the sentence is true if the state is as the sentence says. - - - Glüer II 116 Intention/Davidson/Glüer: is an unconditioned judgment - contrary: pro-attitude: is a conditioned judgment: E.g. "If sweets are not harmful, then ...". Glüer II 183 Intention/language/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: Davidson himself talks about the fact that the speaker can only mean what the interpreter is able to get out with his utterances. Since he speaks of mistakes, he can only start from a background of "correct" linguistic behaviour that is to be followed on the whole. Glüer II 110 In the terminology of propositional attitudes, there can be no definition of the concept of intentional action. Possible deviating causal chains (e.g. unintentional trembling has an effect) cannot be missed. Glüer II 112 Explanation/Criterion/Intention/Davidson/Glüer: Only the following criterion is possible: (K2) Action x is intentional under description d only if the actor has a primary reason g for x under the description d, and g causes x in the right way. Mere intentions are unrealized decisions to act. They require the assumption of an intermittent event between having the primary reason and the action. >Actions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language, >Acts of will._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Intentions
