Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Theory of Mind: "Theory of Mind" (ToM), refers to the ability to be aware that other people or animals have their own thoughts, beliefs, intentions and emotions, which may differ from your own. It is about understanding that the mental states of others can influence their actions and decisions. The term comes from Daniel Dennett (Dennett, D. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 568-570). It has been further developed by many authors in psychology, including Premack, Woodruff, Perner and Baron-Cohen._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Daniel Dennett on Theory of Mind - Dictionary of Arguments
Slater I 149 Theory of Mind/ToM/Dennett: How does one demonstrate that an individual has the capacity to conceive mental states? As Dennett (1978)(1) pointed out, it is not enough to demonstrate that an individual can predict the actions of another individual, for in many cases, actions can be predicted by simply observing the actual state of the world. Imagine for instance that John knows that there is chocolate in a drawer and observes Mary searching for food. John might expect Mary to look for the chocolate in the drawer, not because he is attributing to Mary specific beliefs, but merely because this is where the chocolate really is. The only robust test then, would be one where the individual is asked to predict the behavior of another individual based on a belief which differs from the actual state of the world, i.e., a false belief. >False-Belief Task/Psychological Theories, >Autism/Baron-Cohen. 1. Dennett, D. (1978). Beliefs about beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1, 568-570. Coralie Chevallier, “Theory of Mind and Autism. Beyond Baron-Cohen et al’s. Sally-Anne Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27