Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Picture: an object which is in a specified relationship to another object. The objects may originate from different areas such as experience and imagination or from similar areas (lighting and photography) or from the same domain as in the forgery. Mathematics here the required relation is defined a function. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Nelson Goodman on Picture (Image) - Dictionary of Arguments
III 216f Picture/Goodman: pictures are more likely to compare with the temperature events, than with the heights of the mercury column. Because in the systems in question, the images are like the temperatures rather denoted, they do not denote themselves. Def seeing/Goodman: what properties a picture exemplifies or expresses is comparable to the use of a scale-free thermometer. >Seeing, III 217f Def saying/Goodman: to say what the picture exemplifies, is then a matter of fitting the correct words from a syntactically unlimited and semantically dense language. There will always be another expression, such that we cannot determine what is actually exemplified by the picture in question. To say what a picuture exemplifies is like measuring without giving tolerance ranges. III 218 Pictorial exemplification/Goodman: so in reality it is an inverted display or measuring system. Systems may not be equated with language. Languages have alphabets, pictorial systems do not. >Exemplification, >Terminology/Goodman. --- IV 121 Pictorial elements/Goodman: pictorial elements can never, how similar they may be, represent syntactic equivalents. Because without an alphabet we have no way to differentiate significant and insignificant differences for marks. A blurry horse-representation is certainly not a representation of a blurred horse. The blurriness belongs to the presentation or imagination. We do not have a lexicon of pictorial forms. Therefore, the theory of language cannot explain visual skills. IV 156 Photography/Goodman: a photograph of the surface of Mars reminds us that the mediumn does not provide its own scale for size and distance. >Photography. IV 169 Digital/analog/Goodman: is the picture composed of dots a digital picture? No! Because no symbol is digital or analog. IV 174 A complete scheme is only pictural if it is analog. Verbally, if it is digital. In other words, not each analog, full scheme is pictural and not each digital full scheme is verbal. Picture/Goodman: so we are unable to reach a definition of images. Cf. >Picture (mapping), >Map example._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28