Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Literally true: a theory can only be literally true when its terms may not be re-interpreted in a given situation. On the other hand, a reinterpretation can make some theories and laws applicable to special cases, without being true or false._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Nancy Cartwright on Literal Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 65 Literal truth/literally/Fraassen/Cartwright: e.g. laws, which may not be followed literally: e.g. Onsager law for the combination of causes, cross effect. >Cause, >Effect. Problem: they must always be interpreted in an arbitrary manner. Solution/Cartwright: nature should be described with many phenomenological laws that are tailored to individual situations, not by first principles. I 77 Cartwright: not literally: explanatory laws - literally: causal laws (only those are t/f). >Theories, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Explanation, >Observation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
||
> Counter arguments against Cartwright
> Counter arguments in relation to Literal Truth
