Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Literally true: a theory can only be literally true when its terms may not be re-interpreted in a given situation. On the other hand, a reinterpretation can make some theories and laws applicable to special cases, without being true or false.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

Nancy Cartwright on Literal Truth - Dictionary of Arguments

I 65
Literal truth/literally/Fraassen/Cartwright: e.g. laws, which may not be followed literally: e.g. Onsager law for the combination of causes, cross effect. >Cause, >Effect.
Problem: they must always be interpreted in an arbitrary manner.
Solution/Cartwright: nature should be described with many phenomenological laws that are tailored to individual situations, not by first principles.
I 77
Cartwright: not literally: explanatory laws - literally: causal laws (only those are t/f).
>Theories
, >Natural laws, >Laws, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Explanation, >Observation.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27
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