Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Bare Truth: atomic statement sentences, which are not a composition of sentence parts, can be simply true. In particular, conditional sentences and counterfactual conditionals cannot be simply true, i.e. even if they are true, they cannot be verified by stating a fact. See also laws, natural laws, causal laws, causality, regularity, counterfactual conditional._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Michael E. Dummett on Bare Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
II 94 "Simply true"/bare truth/Dummett: irreducible - If a sentence is not simply true, its truth sentence is non-trivial: i.e. the truth sentence for the sentence S does not have S itself on the right side. (Cf. >Truth definition). II 100 Important Argument: counterfactual conditionals (>counterfactual conditional) cannot be simply true means: we cannot imagine what the ability of identifying the truth would have to look like. II 95 "Barely true": model: observation, we know what it means for the tree to be taller than the other one. II 106 Simply true/Dummett: a sentence is simply true if there is no set of sentences out of which none is a trivial variant of the original sentence, and the truth of all of which defines the original sentence as true. - Then the trivial Tarski scheme fits: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white. "True because"/True/Dummett: Some sentences that cannot be simply true: E.g. conjunction: is the true because of both conjuncts - disjunction: true because of one of the disjuncts - universal quantification: true because of all instances. - This has led some philosophers to to say that there is no "disjunctive fact". - N.B.: this allows to characterize the concept of reduction of a class of sentences to another class._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
||
> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Bare Truth
