Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Fatalism: the assumption that the result of actions is fixed from the outset. This raises questions regarding the futility of considerations and the futility of decisions that would ultimately be illusory. See also determinism, indeterminism, actions, justification, ultimate justification.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
III (d) 165f
Fatalism/Dummett: Fatalism is the thesis that any influence on the future is useless. - An action is allegedly pointless, since it will happen either way. - E.g. a bullet with your name on it: you will die despite precautions. - A bullet without a name: you won't die, even if there are measures in one or another direction.
III (d) 169
Solution: it depends on the meaning of "if": correct: from "you will not be killed" to "if no action, then you will not be killed".
Not correct: from "if no action ..." to "your actions will not work to ensure …".
Difference "if"/"even if".
Error/(s): inferring from analytical truth to synthetic consequences.
III (d) 169/70
Fatalism/Dummett: the conclusion from
1) "you will not be killed" to
2) "If you take no action, you will not be killed" is allowed - but in every sense of "if" in which this conclusion is valid, it is not permitted to go from
1) "If you don't take any action, you will not be killed" to
2) "Your actions will not work to prevent your death".
That would only be admissible if the truth of
1) "If you don t any action you will not be killed" with the truth of
2) "If you don t take any action, you will be killed" would be incompatible.
Solution: in the meaning of "if" in which the first step was justified they would not be incompatible. - That is the failure of the fatalism.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-09-28
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