Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David B. Kaplan on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 412 Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> vivid name/Locke). - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I". I 430 I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation, >Denotation. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 --- I 459ff I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs. I 469 Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion". >Pronoun, >de re, >de dicto. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Kaplan
> Counter arguments in relation to I, Ego, Self
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28