|Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Possible World/difference/differentiation/Field: E.g. we cannot postulate a possibel world which is isomorphic to ours and in which only Nixon is like Humphrey (here) and Humphrey like Nixon (here) - (throughout the whole story).
Possible Wordls/Lewis: (Counterfactuals, Section 4.1): 4-dimensional slices of a broader reality, like other possible world. All together the actual universe - FieldVsLewis - NominalismVsPossible World: these are abstract entities).
Problem of the quantities/Possible World/Field: with possible world and cross-world-congruence we could avoid the possibility operator - FieldVs: we exactly wanted to avoid the ontology of the space-time regions. Possible World/Field: are only heuristic harmless.
Possible World/StalnakerVsLewis: (1976): Alternative to Lewis: Speech of possibel world should be understood as a speech about a property Q, so it is necessary that if the universe has Q, then there is x*, y*, z*, w* and u*, so that F (x*, y*, z*, w*, u*).
Problem: How should we understand the cross-world congruence? the last incidents of x* are not bound by quantifiers during the comparison.
FieldVsStalnaker: Problem: interpretation of the expression "spatial relation".
Possible world/Quantities of/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of states of the mind is that they form a Boolean algebra - N.B.: then the elements themselves need not be a possible world -any other kind of elements are then just as good for a psychological explanation. - They could simply be everything - e.g. numbers.
Numbers: do not pretend to represent the world as it is. - ((s) They are not intrinsically representative).
Intentionality/Possible world/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: The joke of the possible world assumption is the Boolean Algebra, the boolean relation that prevails between possibel worlds. - Problem: then the empty set of possible worlds which contains the three-part of the angle, which is a subset of the set of the possible world, in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon - Problem: what fact does that make? - Without it the approach is meaningless._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994