Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Quasi-Universals, philosophy: quasi-Universal is an expression by D.M. Armstrong (Armstrong, “What is a Law of Nature?”, Cambridge, 1983, p. 79ff) for an artificial extension of a universal by adding an additional determination. E.g. animal or when thinking, then robot. See also universalism, nominalism, realism, extension._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Quasi-Universals - Dictionary of Arguments
III 79/80 Quasi-universals/particulars/Armstrong: you could say, "true" particulars do not have temporal parts - then it is necessary to introduce properties that have a time index: Quasi-U -> partic. without temporal parts: continuant. >Continuants. III 100 Def Quasi-Universals/Armstrong: e.g. fruit in >Smith's garden: apple or banana, then elephant or cherry then nothing ... or ... - must be introduced so that laws of nature can remain relations between universals. Def Quasi-universal/Armstrong: a quasi-universal is no universal because of reference to individual cases. - It is no particular because it is repeatable. - We need a law for quasi-universals. - Quasi-universals would satify Aristotle s "predicable of many things." _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Quasi-Universals
