Dictionary of Arguments

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Representation, philosophy: representations are adopted internal conditions, such as visual imaginations or linguistic completions, which set in as associations or are possibly developed by reconstruction. In a wider sense, sentences, words, and symbols are representations within a character system. See also truth maker, idea, sentences, propositions, intensions, correspondence, speech act theory.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 155f
Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity.
Representation> de re attribution. Other authors on attribution.
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I 900
Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic.
The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting.
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Rorty VI 179 ff
Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson.
Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (metaphysics).
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Bandom I 127
Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map - VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them.
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I 126
Representation is not an expression.
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I 130
VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding.
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I 145
BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content.
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I 923
Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind.
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I 404f
Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented - four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" - 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts - 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel - 4) Correctness of judgment and inference.
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I 412 ~
BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role.
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I 482
Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content.
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I 719
Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality.
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I 719f
Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain - b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities.
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I 722
Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


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