Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Semantic value: the semantic value of an expression is the result of a division of this expression into word types and subsequent attribution of possible objects which can stand in relation to this word. E.g. semantic values of nouns can be objects, semantic values of predicates can be (but do not need to be) properties. See also truth values, truth conditions, compositionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Michael E. Dummett on Semantic Value - Dictionary of Arguments
III (b) 53 Def Semantic Value/Frege/Dummett: (for the elementary sentence) that of the characteristics whose possession is necessary and sufficient in order to determine each complex sentence according to its composition of elementary sentences as true or not true. The semantic value of an elementary sentence is nothing but its truth value. Semantic interpretation: direct allocation of the semantic values of the different expressions to the scheme letters (not to the expressions themselves!). Semantic value: = reference! - Semantic value of a predicate: extension - not the same as sense. >Reference, >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. III (b) 54 Semantic value of a singular term: the particular. >Singular terms, >Particulars. - - - III 225 Schulte: we should avoid "nature" of the reference object._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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> Counter arguments against Dummett
> Counter arguments in relation to Semantic Value
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27